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Foreword
Th is book was prepared under the “Local Government Policy Partnership” Program, 
the joint project of two donor organizations. Th e British Government’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Open Society Institute, Budapest’s Local 
Government and Public Service Initiative (LGI), launched this regional program in 
the year 2000. Th e “Local Government Policy Partnership” (LGPP) projects intend to 
contribute to policy development and innovation within the countries of Central and 
Southern Europe (http://lgi.osi.hu/lgpp/). 
Th e LGPP hopes to develop expertise and support professional cooperation amongst 
local government specialists throughout the region. Th e experiences of the countries 
participating in this program should be made available in other regions, such as the 
countries of Central Asia. Th e core partner countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. However, other countries have been invited to participate in the 
LGPP regional projects, in order to help facilitate direct information exchange and 
comparison of policy eﬀ orts. 
LGPP publications include policy studies and proposals that have been presented 
to government oﬃ  cials and experts in the countries involved. Targeted beneﬁ ciaries 
of LGPP projects are national government ministries, local government associations, 
research and training institutions, and individual local authorities. LGPP intends to 
publish three studies a year. 
In the ﬁ rst two years of the LGPP project, various policy areas were selected for 
analysis: education ﬁ nancing and management; regulation and competition of local 
utility services; public perception of local governments; the relationship between local 
government size, local democracy and local services delivery; local government and 
housing; capital investment ﬁ nancing. Th ese policy studies were widely disseminated 
in the region. Th ey supported policy dialogue (e.g., on education reform in Macedonia) 
and served as training materials (e.g., for regulatory experts). 
Topics for the third and last year of LGPP in 2002–2003 were as follows: 
a)   the role of local governments in local economic development 
b)   local government borrowing and
c)   regulation on conﬂ ict of interest in local governments.
In this volume LGPP project teams have analyzed recent trends in local govern-
ment borrowing in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia 
and Slovakia. Th ey give an overview of the present status of  lending to municipalities 
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after various technical assistance programs have attempted to develop a local credit 
market in this region. Th e seven country papers and the summary reports focus on the 
ﬁ scal and legal conditions, control and supervision of municipal borrowing. Lending to 
local governments will be particularly important in the new European Union member 
countries, for gaining access to EU funding. Th e policy recommendations formulated in 
this volume will assist them and other countries with emerging local credit markets. 
Ken Davey           Gábor Péteri
November 2003
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5Th e Th eory of Local Borrowing
and the West-European Experience 
Paweł Swianiewicz
1.  WHY BORROW?
Should local governments borrow, and should local politicians support the practice? 
Deﬁ nite answers to these questions are not to be found in the theory and practice of 
European countries. What is clear, however, is the need to distinguish between borrow-
ing for capital investment or for the ﬁ nancing of operations. Th e “golden rule” of the 
balanced budget prescribes that local authorities should never take on debt to cover 
current costs, but it allows—in some formulations even promotes—prudent borrowing 
for capital purposes. Before turning to the practical experiences of various countries with 
borrowing, we will brieﬂ y consider some possible consequences of contracting loans. 
1.1 Why Borrowing to Finance Investments Makes Sense 
Classic ﬁ scal federalism theory suggests that in certain cases it is preferable to ﬁ nance 
investment projects from borrowing rather than from current local revenues (see, for 
example, King, 1984). But why would this be? After all, borrowing results in additional 
costs related to bank charges, interest, etc. Surely it would be better to wait until the 
project could be ﬁ nanced from current revenues, thus avoiding the additional and un-
necessary costs of borrowing. In response to this concern, the most important arguments 
for borrowing by local governments are as follows:
      •     Equitable burden of cost and access to beneﬁ ts (“inter-temporal equity”).  Borrowing 
over time is an eﬀ ective way to overcome the problem of inequitable burden of 
costs among tax payers. Normally, the costs of an investment are incurred when 
the project is implemented (e.g., when a sewage treatment plant is constructed 
or a city bus is purchased), but the beneﬁ ts from it are spread out over a longer 
period. When the capital project is ﬁ nanced from current revenues, those who 
ﬁ nanced it through their local taxes may not always beneﬁ t from it in the future 
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if, for example, they move to another city. At the same time, those who beneﬁ t 
from the project may not have participated in ﬁ nancing it if they moved in 
to the city after it was completed, or if the project was completed either when 
they were small children or before they were born. But with ﬁ nancing through 
bank credit or the issuing of bonds, there is an assurance that most users will 
pay for the beneﬁ ts either through local taxes or directly through user charges. 
Payments from current users are partially used to repay the loan. Some may 
argue that there is no problem in any case, since ﬁ nancing of local investments 
is a constant process and each year local tax payers are paying for some new 
investment project or another, while beneﬁ ting from those that were ﬁ nished 
earlier. Th is might be convincing if the stream of capital spending were rela-
tively constant throughout several subsequent years. But this assumption does 
not hold true, especially in relatively small units such as municipal-level local 
governments in which the volume of investments ﬂ uctuates considerably from 
year to year.
      •       Optimal allocation of resources. A close relationship between those who beneﬁ t 
from and those who pay for a project encourages optimal allocation of resources. 
Financing capital projects through borrowing usually makes this relationship 
much closer, for reasons made clear in the previous point. Th ough this argument 
may appear abstract, virtually any text on management or economics supports 
it.
      •     Beneﬁ ts from accelerated local development overshadow the cost of borrowing. Th is 
can be illustrated by a simple example. Imagine that a certain city  possesses a 
piece of land that may be very attractive to a potential investor, but there is no 
good access road to the plot. Th e city government could do one of the following: 
(i) ﬁ nance the road construction from current revenues, allowing a few years to 
complete the project and then try to attract an investor a few years from now; 
(ii) try to ﬁ nd a potential investor now, agreeing that the price received for 
the plot has to be lower and understanding that some potential investors may 
withdraw from the tender; (iii) take a credit, complete the construction of the 
road as quickly as possible and negotiate the sale of the plot. Th e beneﬁ ts of 
the third alternative (higher price or rent, wider scope of interested investors, 
quicker economic development resulting in multiple-eﬀ ects by attracting new 
projects, providing additional jobs and tax revenues) may well be much greater 
than the costs resulting from interest payments to the bank.
        •       Reduction of operational costs. Consider another simple example: a local public 
transport company has ten old buses that require frequent repairs and consume 
a lot of fuel. Th e city can replace them using current revenues, but will only 
be able to purchase one new bus every two years. Alternatively, the city could 
contract a loan or issue bonds and replace more buses at once. Th e beneﬁ ts 
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of borrowing are considerable, including the comfort of local citizens, lower 
consumption of fuel, higher reliability of local transport, savings in the cost of 
repairs and employment of service staﬀ , etc. Such reductions in current expen-
ditures may in fact be much larger than the costs related to borrowing.
      •     Longer projects cost more. Financing from current revenues usually delays the 
completion of the project for a longer period of time. Th is leads to higher con-
stant costs and higher total volume of spent resources.
      •     Stabilization of required budget resources. As noted above, the volume of capital 
spending in local government units ﬂ uctuates from one year to another. If capital 
projects are ﬁ nanced from current revenues, the demand for resources changes 
over time as well. In countries where a large proportion of local revenues is raised 
through local taxes, an irrational ﬂ uctuation of local tax rates may result.
      •     Access to grants from European and other development funds. Th is rationale for 
borrowing is more speciﬁ c to Central and Eastern European countries, where 
there are several investment grants available for local authorities. A necessary 
condition, however, is to provide own matching funds. Usually this is at least 
25% of the total project costs (such as SAPARD or ISPA projects). Moreover, 
in many cases the local government is required to cover all costs related to the 
investment, and reimbursement occurs only after completion of the project. 
Borrowing may be a means of increasing local capacity to apply for these de-
velopment grants.
   But along with these clear beneﬁ ts there are also potential hazards in borrowing, 
both of a microeconomic and a macroeconomic nature. Th e microeconomic danger 
lies in the potential for excessive indebtedness of some local governments, which may 
lead to serious diﬃ  culties in repayment of loans and may jeopardize the provision of 
vital public services. At the  macroeconomic level, local governments contribute to the 
overall level of public debt. Local government indebtedness may thus have a negative 
eﬀ ect on inﬂ ation and other important parameters of the national economy.
1.2 Why Local Governments Should Not Borrow 
      to Cover Operating Expenses
Th ere is common agreement that borrowing to cover current expenditures is accept-
able only in very rare, speciﬁ c cases—usually for very short periods, to cover deﬁ cits 
arising from uneven cash ﬂ ows within a budgetary year. Th e most typical arguments 
for maintaining a balanced operating budget may be summarized as follows (for details 
see Daﬄ  on, 2002a):
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      •     Borrowing for operating spending would lead to an unmanageable debt burden. 
It would quickly lead to the rolling over of loans (ﬁ nancing payment of previ-
ous debt with new loans) and to very serious indebtedness problems reﬂ ecting 
a structurally imbalanced ﬁ nancial situation.
      •     Covering current costs from current revenues prevents the local public sector 
from growing beyond its optimal size, which may be deﬁ ned here as the ﬁ scal 
burden that voters/taxpayers agree to bear in order to ﬁ nance the desired provi-
sion of public goods. Borrowing can create a short term ﬁ scal illusion and cause 
the demand for public services to be artiﬁ cially high, since it reﬂ ects the supply 
ﬁ nanced partially by credit or bonds rather than by local tax eﬀ ort.
      •     An unbalanced current budget may result in negative macro- and micro-
economic consequences, since private investments could be crowded out. Th is 
could happen for the following reasons:
            –    Public sector borrowing draws on the pool of limited ﬁ nancial resources 
available from local banks, etc. Local government borrowers are more at-
tractive to banks than private borrowers, because giving credit to public 
entities implies lower risk;
            –    Th e competition for borrowing from the public sector exerts an upward 
pressure on the interest rate, making private investments more costly;
            –    An increase in budget deﬁ cits negatively aﬀ ects concerns about inﬂ ation, 
adding  more to the upward trend in interest rates.
It is worthwhile to note that the contracting of loans by local governments to ﬁ -
nance investments does not have such negative “crowding-out” consequences (assuming 
that the current account includes debt service), unless someone postulates that public 
investments are less productive then private ones.
Some theoretical discussions have suggested that the principle of the balanced cur-
rent budget could be applied over a longer time frame (perhaps a few years) than the 
regular annual budget. Th is is not a common solution in practice, as we shall see later. 
But if we were to accept this more ﬂ exible, medium-term deﬁ nition of what a balanced 
budget is, then it should probably coincide with a political term. Th e operating budget 
must then balance over a period of years that begin in one and end in the next term of 
the elected local authorities. In the public choice model of “electoral cycle,”  it is very 
likely that there would be a large deﬁ cit in the year or two prior to an election, when 
governments would try to increase the consumption of public goods in order to please 
the electorate. At the same time, of course, the government would try to avoid an increase 
in local taxes or user charges, so a considerable proportion of the consumption might 
be ﬁ nanced through borrowing (Tufte, 1978; Mouritzen, 1989). Th e resulting deﬁ cit 
would then need to be balanced by the newly elected authorities. 
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1.3 The “Golden Rule” of the Balanced Budget 
      and Separation of Current and Capital Budgets
As Musgrave (1959) argued, to follow the “golden rule” that borrowing is allowed for 
capital projects but prohibited for current purposes requires a clear distinction between 
the current and capital budgets of local governments. In this situation a capital budget 
includes capital receipts (such as revenues from municipal property, various grants re-
ceived for capital purposes and borrowed funds) which are spent on local investments, 
while the current budget includes current revenues used basically to cover operating 
expenditures. Th e surplus in the current budget can also be used to support capital 
needs—typically to repay loans contracted for investment projects.
Th is system increases the transparency of local ﬁ nancial management. It makes it 
easier to assess whether current revenues are suﬃ  cient to cover operating costs, or what 
the level of operating surplus is. Th is information supports the building of viable capital 
development programs and helps in assessing creditworthiness.
Th e separation of current and capital budgets is generally followed in Western 
Europe (with some exceptions) but is rarely the case in Central and Eastern Europe, as 
we will see in the following chapters.
2.   ARE EXTERNAL REGULATIONS 
      ON LOCAL BORROWING NECESSARY?
Is regulation of local government debt necessary? Some may argue that it is enough to 
rely on ﬁ nancial market discipline. In this situation, adopting legal rules is redundant 
since tighter credit market conditions—in particular, higher interest rates—already 
impose eﬀ ective sanctions. Th is would indeed happen, if the total debt of local govern-
ments in the country were to grow too high. Also, banks would be unwilling or would 
demand higher interest from those municipalities that borrow more than they can ef-
fectively bear. Th e same would happen if local governments tried to issue bonds—the 
rating would be low and the market would refuse to buy bonds or would demand a 
very high interest premium.
Daﬄ  on (2002a) suggests, however, that there are several assumptions behind these 
arguments that do not hold true in reality. Th ey are:
      •     that lenders possess adequate information on the local governments whom they 
are ﬁ nancing;
      •     that local governments react appropriately to market signals, and act to avoid 
exclusion from the credit market;
      •     that lenders could assume they would receive a bailout by central government in 
case of local government default (note that although a local government bank-
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ruptcy is technically possible in several countries, it is politically unacceptable 
and thus rarely observed in practice).
Given that these conditions are not always present, external regulations and control 
of local borrowing may play a positive role in supporting the development of the local 
credit market. 
3.   LOCAL BORROWING AND REGULATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE 
Before turning to recent experiences of local government borrowing in Central and 
Eastern Europe, we will examine the more long-standing practices in Western Europe. In 
the concluding chapter of the book we will compare relevant local policies and the shape 
of regulations and control over local borrowing in Western and Eastern Europe.
3.1 Borrowing for Current Expenditure
In most West European countries, long-term borrowing for operating expenditure is 
prohibited. Th is is the case, for example, in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Usually it is permissible to bor-
row funds for short-term (not longer than one budget year) cash liquidity purposes. 
However, these general rules are not always very strictly followed.
In Norway, if the local government presents an unbalanced current budget it will 
not receive approval from the state regional commissioner. But during the last few years, 
18% of local governments on average have been running a deﬁ cit budget in practice. 
To some extent such deﬁ cits have been caused by creative accounting (e.g., when a 
municipality consciously overestimates its revenues in preparing the budget plan) and 
to some extent by unexpected changes in local revenues or expenditures. If a deﬁ cit 
occurs, Norwegian local governments are required to repay it within two years (Borge, 
Rattso 2002).
In Denmark there is no approval process for the budget plan, but there is a com-
pulsory external audit (Jorgen, Pedersen, 2002). If a current deﬁ cit appears, it has to be 
paid down within the budget year. Th is is a very common regulation in several European 
countries including the UK, France, Spain, and in Switzerland where the canton may 
also impose a compulsory increase in the municipal tax rate if a deﬁ cit occurs and the 
municipality has done nothing to avoid it. In the Fribourg canton, for example, such 
an increase is automatic when the current deﬁ cit exceeds 3% of the budget (Daﬄ  on, 
2002b).
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Th ere are, or there used to be, some exceptions to the general rules formulated above. 
Borrowing for current purposes used to be allowed in Italy. In 1976 current revenues 
ﬁ nanced only 70% of current spending, and at the beginning of 1977 the local debt 
exceeded 11% of GDP, of which more than half was contracted to ﬁ nance current 
deﬁ cits. Two-thirds of new loans were made to ﬁ nance old ones! But since 1978 Italian 
local governments have been allowed to borrow for public works (infrastructure) only 
(Fraschini, 2002).
Spain is one of a few exceptions to the rule on the separation of current and capital 
local budgets (Monasterio-Escudero, Suarez-Pandiello, 2002). Consequently, it is dif-
ﬁ cult to control and monitor this situation, even though on principle borrowing is only 
allowed for investment purposes.
3.2 Regulations on Borrowing for Capital Projects
In general there are two modes of regulation found in European countries (Daﬄ  on, 
2002a):
      1)   based on borrowing controls, including individual borrowing limits and permis-
sions;
      2)   based on control of the level of indebtedness and control of the current budget, 
which needs to include resources for servicing debt on capital projects.
Denmark provides a very peculiar example of the former mode of control. As a 
general rule borrowing is prohibited, regardless of the purpose for contracting a loan. 
But this rule is waived in some cases. Jorgen and Pedersen (2002) suggest that through 
this control, central government has the opportunity to inﬂ uence the behavior of local 
governments, which otherwise are very autonomous. Danish municipalities can receive 
two kinds of permissions to borrow:
      1)   automatic permissions, which are granted for investments in public utilities and 
in “priority areas” deﬁ ned in advance by the central government (e.g., energy 
conservation or shelters for the elderly);
      2)   discretionary permissions, for which the government announces an upper ceiling 
every year. Th e ceiling is negotiated annually with local government associations, 
together with negotiations on state grants or local tax rates. Local governments 
apply individually for borrowing permissions, which are granted if the overall 
ceiling has not been exceeded and if the municipality’s debt does not exceed 
30% of total gross outlays.
Th eoretically, one might expect that the central government would want to lower 
the ceiling while local governments would want to raise it. But the reality is much 
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more complicated. If the central government wants to avoid a local tax increase (Dan-
ish municipalities are free to set their own local income tax rates) it has to either allow 
for higher debt or increase central grants. On the other hand, the motivation of local 
governments is to obtain grants rather than to borrow. Th e interplay of these three 
factors (loan limit, amount of grants, local tax rates) makes the negotiations a very 
complicated exercise.
As a consequence, in spite of the general rule that both current and capital budgets 
should be balanced, during the 1990s between 40% and 80% of Danish local invest-
ments were ﬁ nanced through borrowing. In 1998 the local debt amounted to 4.5% of 
GDP, and most of this was the debt of public utility companies owned by municipali-
ties or counties.
Th e United Kingdom also provides a model of an administrative ceiling for borrow-
ing, but in this case each local government receives an individual borrowing limit (Watt 
2002, Councillors Guide…, 1996). Borrowing limits also include leasing arrangements. 
As in Denmark, “sale and lease back” is forbidden. Th e borrowing limit consists of two 
parts: basic approvals and supplementary approval for speciﬁ c projects. Basic approval 
is calculated in the following way:
Basic Credit Approval (BCA) = Annual Capital Guidance (ACG) – Receipts Taken Into Account (RTIA)
ACG is calculated separately for each main sector, but local government is free to 
reallocate it between sectors. For example, the BCA for housing is divided among ten 
regions of England on the basis of a complicated housing needs index. Th e government 
oﬃ  ce in each region then allocates the limit among individual local governments on 
the basis of housing needs, and the allocation is increased or decreased according to 
the eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness of the local government as judged by the regional oﬃ  ce. 
In education, the allocation of limits is on a per capita basis, with an adjustment for 
special needs.
RTIA indicates which capital receipts of local governments can be used for capital 
spending (Councillors Guide…, 1996). Capital receipts mainly come from the sale of 
communal property, of which part is reserved by law for servicing existing debt, while 
part may be spent on new investments.
Total debt cannot exceed the Aggregate Credit Limit (ACL). Every year, each local 
government has to spend an amount equal to at least 2% of ACL to pay debt on housing 
and at least 4% of ACL to pay debt related to other sectors.
In Germany the basis for borrowing regulations is a four-year ﬁ nancial plan of the 
local government. Precise regulations vary from one Länder to another, but in general 
the municipality is required to demonstrate that borrowing will not lead to a current 
deﬁ cit resulting from planned repayments within the next four-year period. Th ere is also 
a general regulation that borrowing is allowed only “after other sources of ﬁ nancing are 
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exhausted.” Th ere was quite high local debt in Germany in the 1970s (7.2% of GDP 
in 1975), but it has decreased signiﬁ cantly in subsequent years and in 2000 it was 
only about 5% (Local Finance in the Fifteen..., 2002). But these statistics are to some 
extent misleading. Th e 1980s and 1990s saw the privatization of several municipal 
in-house service delivery units. Th e newly created companies are still owned by local 
governments, but their debt does not count against limits for local governments. (As 
we will see later in this book, similar rules can be observed in some countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, such as Poland.) In Saarbrucken, for example, the formal debt of 
the city decreased from 658 million marks in 1990 to 632 million in 1994, but at the 
same time the debt of municipal companies increased from 0 to 237 million. Farber 
(2002) quotes similar data for Frankfurt.
In Switzerland, speciﬁ c regulations are diﬀ erent in each of the 26 cantons. Daﬄ  on 
(2002b) discusses the example of Fribourg canton, where every capital project that cannot 
be covered from the annual budget goes to a local referendum. Contracting a loan for 
an investment requires approval by the canton. As mentioned earlier, the canton may 
increase the local tax rate if there are problems with debt service. However, if the local tax 
rate reaches the maximum limit set in the law, then the canton may take responsibility 
for a local loan. In Fribourg canton, there were a few cases in which the canton actually 
repaid the municipal debt and then forced an amalgamation of the indebted commune 
with a larger, neighboring local government.
Th e regulation on borrowing in France is closer to the second mode of regulation, 
as there are no administrative approvals for borrowing but ex ante review of the debt 
service level. Th e central government almost entirely lifted all forms of a priori control 
by the state administration during the decentralization reform of the 1980s (Cacheux, 
Tourjansky, 1993). Th e law protects local governments from bankruptcy, so the risk for 
banks is low. Th e Prefect checks the legality of local borrowing every year, and if it is 
not in accordance with law, the case is passed to the Regional Audit Chamber (Chambre 
Régionale des Comptes). Th e current operating budget surplus has to be higher than the 
annual debt repayment. But not surprisingly, the budget forecast of current revenues 
and expenditures is not precise (either incidentally or purposefully) and in practice, it 
may happen that the current surplus is lower than the initial forecast. However, if the 
current deﬁ cit exceeds 5% or 10% (depending on the size of local government), the 
relevant Chambre Régionale des Comptes may propose appropriate ﬁ scal measures.
 In Italy, ﬁ nancing through borrowing is a relatively new phenomenon (Fraschini, 
2002). Until 1985, local investments were almost entirely ﬁ nanced by the central 
government, and from 1986 to 1992, the role of central government was still dominant. 
Th is experience illustrates very well that ﬁ nancing at zero cost to the local community 
does not provide an incentive to make the best choices, and also leads to underestimating 
the operating expenses resulting from investment projects. During the 1980s, there were 
several cases of public works that were constructed and then never used. Currently, the 
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burden of local investments is ﬁ nanced to a large extent by local borrowing (3.3% of 
GDP in 1999), and there is a limit that interest and capital payments in municipalities 
cannot exceed 25% of current revenues. Recently, an eﬀ ort to reduce local debt is in 
evidence, and is seen as an attempt to fulﬁ ll Maastricht criteria and to enter the Euro-
zone. As part of this attempt, a special prize is awarded to those local authorities who 
have respected the Stability Pact and reduced their debt. Th ey obtain a reduction of 
the interest rate on loans granted by the Deposit and Loans Fund, a main local lender 
in Italy.
In Spain also, borrowing is legally allowed for capital projects, although this rule is 
hampered by the lack of separation of the operating and capital budgets (Monasterio-
Escudero, Suarez-Pandiello, 2002). Central government and the regions together decide 
the annual limits of deﬁ cit and debt for local governments. Th ere are no individual limits 
for local governments (as is the case in the UK), although the concentration of debt 
in the biggest cities has opened a debate on whether individual targets may indeed be 
appropriate in those cities. Long-term borrowing requires the approval of the Ministry of 
Finance if total debt exceeds 110% of annual current revenues or if there was a negative 
balance in the current budget during the previous year. Approval of the Ministry of 
Finance is also required for bonds or debt in foreign currencies.
3.3 Indebtedness of Local Governments in Western Europe: 
      Practical Experiences
Where do West European local governments go to borrow money? First of all, and 
unlike the North American (US or Canadian) model, contracting bank loans is much 
more important than issuing bonds, although the latter method has been increasingly 
popular during the last few years in Europe as well. Th is can be illustrated by the 
number of ratings of local governments presented in the recent publication of one of 
the leading rating agencies—Standards and Poors (Local and Regional…, 2002).1 Th e 
publication includes a list of rated local governments below the regional tier. Th ere are 
28 in Canada alone, 51 in the whole of Western Europe, with the highest numbers in 
Italy—15, France—12 and Sweden—12, and 17 in the whole of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including 6 in Poland, 4 in the Czech Republic and 4 in Russia.
In 1997 in France, for example, banks lent over 70 billion French francs to local 
governments in the form of loans, while the amount of bonds issued was just about 5 
billion French francs. Bonds are usually considered by French local governments to be 
more expensive and less ﬂ exible than bank credits. A similar situation exists in other 
countries, although it should be noted that issuing bonds has gradually become more 
“fashionable” during the last 15–20 years. In Italy, issuing bonds has been possible since 
1990, and some big cities such as Rome, Naples and Turin as well as regions (Sicily) 
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decided to use this path to ﬁ nance their projects. However, bank loans also remain the 
main method in Italy.
If bank loans are the main source of credit, the next question is whether there are 
special institutions or special lines of ﬁ nancing for local governments (perhaps with 
subsidized interest rates). Or, do cities and regions simply go through normal borrowing 
procedures in commercial banks? Th e practice in this respect varies from one country 
to another. In Italy there is a special Deposit and Loans Fund aimed at ﬁ nancing local 
infrastructure projects. Until 1989 it was the only source of local borrowing; since 1989 
there has been no obligation to use this Fund, but the interest rate is usually lower 
than in commercial banks. In England there is a Public Works Loan Board, which 
in 1991 ﬁ nanced 78% of total local debt. In some other countries local governments 
are basically free to go to any commercial bank. In France a special line of loans with 
sometimes negative real interest rates existed until 1984, but this was later closed and 
local governments must now go to commercial banks. Th is change resulted in a decline 
of local borrowing in France—in 1982 loans ﬁ nanced 55% of investment projects, but 
the share dropped to 28% in 1990 and about 30%–40% during the 1990s. Th e free 
choice of banks does not mean there are no institutions specializing in lending to local 
governments, and having a considerable share of the market. Crédit Local de France held 
almost 50% of local debt in 1991 (Cacehux, Tourjansky, 1993) and still held about 
40% in 1998. It was followed by Crédit Agricole (Gilbert, Guengant, 2002).  Th ere has 
been a similar change in Norway, where local borrowing used to be regulated by central 
government banks, but the liberalization of the credit markets in the 1980s changed 
the situation (Oulasvirta 1993).
Th ere is considerable evidence that in practice the biggest cities account for the large 
bulk of local indebtedness. Th eir capital needs are enormous, and at a time of ﬁ scal 
austerity they are often the most severely hit (Sharpe, 1981). One of the most famous 
crises related to indebtedness occurred in New York in the mid-1970s and was soon 
followed by similar, although less spectacular, problems in other big cities in North 
America and Western Europe (Clark, Fergusson, 1983). As mentioned previously, in 
Spain most local debt has been contracted by large cities. Six cities having over half 
a million citizens are responsible for one-third of the total local debt. Together with 
cities having populations over two hundred thousand, their debt is well over half of 
all indebtedness of local governments. Similar concentrations of indebtedness occur 
in France (Le Cacheux, Tourjansky, 1993) and in Germany, where the most indebted 
local government is the city of Frankfurt with an outstanding debt of almost 10,000 
deutch marks per capita in 1994 (Farber, 2002). It is also clearly seen in the British 
data presented in Table 1.1.
Th is aspect will be more closely analyzed in the following chapters, but a similar 
concentration of debt in large cities can be observed in Central and Eastern Europe as 
well.
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Table 1.1
Th e Size of Local Government Debt in West European Countries
Local Debt 
as % of Annual 
Revenues 
(2000)
Debt Service 
as % of Annual 
Revenues
Debt 
Per Capita 
[USD]
% of Local 
Investments 
Financed by 
Borrowing
Austria 6 11 (1995) 1305 (1995)
Belgium 9 1500 (1999) 56 (1999)
Denmark 2 73 (1998)
Finland 3 4 (1992) 410 (1992)
France
• Communes below 10,000 pop.
• Communes over 10,000 pop.
• Departments
• Regions
8
205 (1991)
320 (1991)
100 (1991)
20 (1991)
31 (1997)
Germany
• West Landers 
• East Landers
6
1100 (2000)
1255 (2000)
Italy 6
Netherlands 8
Norway 39 (1998)
Spain 7 11 (1988) 485 (1988)
Sweden 3
United Kingdom
• Counties
• Metropolitan districts
• Non-metropolitan districts
120 (1993)
830 (1993)
245 (1993)
33 (1999/00)
Source:     Own calculations based on: “Local Authorities…” 1996, Daﬄ  on, 2002a, “Local Finance...” 
2002.
Th e recent regulations of the Maastricht stabilization pact related to the introduction 
of the “Euro zone” have brought a new element into discussions on local indebtedness. 
Th e Masstricht agreement limits both the overall level of public debt (which should 
not exceed 60% of GDP) as well as the annual total public budgets’ deﬁ cit (limited to 
3% of GDP). It raises the question of how much local governments contribute and to 
what extent they should contribute to “eating up” the overall limit of debt. In some 
countries there have been discussions about whether the debt limit should be distributed 
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Figure 1.1
Public Debt, Spending and Investments—the Role of Local Governments (2000)
Source:     Local Finance in the Fifteen..., 2002.
among tiers of government. Th is discussion was the most advanced in Germany, where 
it was proposed to give 1.93% (out of 3%) to federal and the rest to Länder and local 
governments  (Farber, 2002), although this was not adopted in the end.   In most other 
countries it is assumed that the overall level of public debt is a responsibility of central 
government which—directly or indirectly—controls the level of subnational debts. It 
should also be noted that the level of public debt is usually much higher at the central 
than the  local level.  For example, in Germany local debt constitutes just above 8% 
and in Switzerland 19% of the total public debt (Daﬄ  on, 2002b). More precise data 
are presented in Figure 1.1. As can be seen, in all EU countries except Luxembourg the 
local share in public debt is much lower than the local share in public spending. Also, in 
18
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
all 15 countries, local governments ﬁ nance the bulk of public investments.  In France, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain, the local share exceeds two-thirds.
As illustrated in Figure 1.2, in most EU countries the ratio of local debt to GDP is 
rather low—on average about 5%. Th e Netherlands and Spain with a local debt ratio 
over 8% are the only exceptions to this rule. It is noteworthy that in 11 out of 15 EU 
countries the local debt to GDP ratio decreased between 1995 and 2000 (Local Finance 
in the Fifteen..., 2002).
1995
2000
Figure 1.2
Local Government Debt as % of GDP
Source:     Local Finance in the Fifteen..., 2002.
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4.   THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
Th e decentralization reform introduced in most of the countries in the region provided 
a new role for local governments as public authorities that enjoy considerable discre-
tion in policy-making, but are also responsible for several tasks of vital importance. 
Local governments provide several infrastructure services, which usually require very 
substantial capital improvements. At the same time, decentralization reforms created 
municipal property (as separate from state property), gave limited power of taxation 
to local governments, and allowed them to make independent decisions on ﬁ nancial 
policy. Th ese changes in regulations related to local ﬁ nance included the formal right 
to use credit instruments.
Considering these formal changes allowing for contracting loans or issuing bonds, 
together with the outstanding demand for huge infrastructure investments, one should 
not wonder that the development of local capital markets in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope has become one of the hottest issues of the last decade. Th e discussion has often 
been supported by foreign advisors working for USAID, other bilateral donors and—
especially—World Bank projects. Th is has contributed signiﬁ cantly to the development 
of relevant legal regulations and of technical skills in the local administrations. But this 
does not mean that the process has been completed. Indeed, the data suggest that the 
situation is very dynamic in most countries in the region.
Th e following chapters analyze the borrowing regulations adopted by central govern-
ments and the practical experience of local governments in seven countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe:
      •     Czech Republic;
      •     Estonia;
      •     Hungary;
      •     Poland;
      •     Romania;
      •     Russia;
      •     Slovakia.
Th ese seem to provide a good mix of cases and approaches. Th e analysis includes both 
big and small countries, from Russia with almost 150 million inhabitants and Poland 
with over 38 million, to Slovakia with over ﬁ ve million and Estonia with a population 
of just below 1.5 million. 
With a slight risk of oversimpliﬁ cation we may say that these countries fall into 
two categories. In some, local governments have been using credit instruments very 
carefully, frequently not taking the opportunity to use all of the new tools available to 
them. In other countries, local governments have been very eager to borrow and many 
of them have fallen into the trap of excessive indebtedness. For various reasons, the 
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issues related to regulations and to proper credit policies are very signiﬁ cant in both 
groups of countries.
Our sample includes countries with relatively precise restrictions on borrowing, as 
in the case of Poland, where credit cannot be contracted if it results in local indebted-
ness exceeding 60% of total annual revenues, or when the future debt service would 
be higher than 15% of total annual revenues. On the other hand, we have Slovakia or 
the Czech Republic in which local governments until recently have not been restricted 
in their borrowing.
Some of the countries analyzed have relatively well-developed local credit markets, by 
Central and East European standards. Hungary and Poland are probably good examples. 
In other cases, such as Romania, borrowing is relatively rare and what we can talk about 
is rather  prospects for the future and recommendations for regulations to help in the 
development of a healthy market. Sometimes, especially in countries created from the 
former Soviet republics and in the Balkans, considerable arrears in local government 
payments may be found, rather than modern credit markets. For example in Bulgaria, 
Soﬁ a remains the only local government without payment arrears (Ivanov et al., 2002). 
In Ukraine, local government arrears peaked at 6.4% of GDP at the end of 1998, and 
were reduced to “only” 0.8% of GDP at the end of 2001.
Th e structure of each of the country reports presented in the book is organized in 
a similar way and presents answers to these key questions:
      •     What are the most important regulations on local borrowing? What are the 
legal limits on local indebtedness? Is it legal to borrow for current operations 
or it is limited to capital projects only?
      •     What has been the development of borrowing by local governments over the 
last decade?
      •     What is the current debt ratio and what is the structure of the debt (bonds, 
short-term credit, long-term bank loans, etc.)?
      •     Are there any banking or non-banking institutions specializing in lending to 
local governments? Do they oﬀ er loans with subsidized interest? Are they avail-
able for all or just some sectors of local investments?
      •     How have changes in the macroeconomic situation (e.g., the inﬂ ation rate) 
inﬂ uenced the development of local borrowing?
      •     What has been the evolution of local government attitudes to borrowing?
      •     What is the local government attitude towards bank loans versus bonds? How 
many local governments have gone through a local and/or international agency 
rating process?
      •     What proportion of capital spending is ﬁ nanced through borrowing? How often 
is borrowing applied to operational spending?
      •     In which sectors is spending most often covered by borrowing?
      •     What is the internal variation in borrowing policies? For example, are there 
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diﬀ erences between big cities and small local governments or between local 
governments of diﬀ erent tiers?
      •     What are the major barriers for more eﬃ  cient functioning of the credit mar-
ket?
When we examine the particular experiences of CEE countries, the scope of our 
analysis cannot be limited to borrowing regulations and practices as discussed in the 
theoretical sections of this chapter. We need to refer also to the wider concept of local 
indebtedness. Of course, debt is usually the result of borrowing money from banks or 
taking out bond issues. But in some of the CEE countries, a more frequent form of 
debt is related to arrears in payments such as unpaid invoices or staﬀ  wages. Arrears have 
an immediate and obvious impact on creditworthiness and the capacity to use credit 
instruments to develop capital programs. Most often it is a form of “hidden operating 
deﬁ cit;” i.e., the budget is formally balanced, but a part of the obligations is forwarded 
to the next generation or to the central government on the assumption that sooner or 
later it will provide additional support. It is important, then, for our empirical analysis 
to capture and not abstract from this peculiar but quite common form of local govern-
ment debt.
In addition to fact-ﬁ nding, the book attempts to reﬂ ect on how the theoretical argu-
ments presented in the opening sections ﬁ t with Central and Eastern European reality. 
Are they valid? And if so, are they present in the consciousness of legislators and those 
who are responsible for the formulation and implementation of local policies?
Last but not least, each chapter provides conclusions and practical recommendations. 
Th e recommendations include both suggestions related to general regulations and the 
institutional framework for borrowing, as well as proposals for policies implemented 
at the local government level.
Th e country reports are followed by a concluding chapter which summarizes the 
various experiences and draws more general conclusions and recommendations.
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NOTE
1     A rating received from one of the major agencies is usually a precondition to major 
bond issuance.
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Th e Regulation and Development 
of the Subsovereign Debt Market in Poland: 
1993–2002
Agnieszka Kopańska and Tony Levitas
1.   INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
      LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN POLAND
Since the mid-1990s, Polish local governments have increasingly used loans and bonds to 
ﬁ nance their capital investments. By 2001, the total outstanding debt of the sector had 
risen to over USD 4.3 billion from virtually nothing in the early 1990s.  Th is growth, 
while dominated by large cities, has included smaller towns and rural areas and, at least 
thus far, has been unaccompanied by signiﬁ cant cases of ﬁ nancial distress. Indeed, not 
only is the Polish municipal capital market among the most dynamic in the region, 
but it has clearly become a permanent and increasingly important component of the 
country’s local government ﬁ nance system.
Nonetheless, the market is still in its infancy. Th e total outstanding debt of local 
governments remains less than 16% of their annual revenues. More importantly, 
most local governments continue to ﬁ nance the vast majority of their investments on 
a pay-as-you-go basis with debt being used to ﬁ nance less than 20% of their capital 
expenditures. Moreover, approximately half this debt comes from subsidized credit lines 
for the improvement of environmental infrastructure and thus is not strictly market-
based. 
At the same time, the market is ﬁ lled with all sorts of anomalies, some of which are 
potentially dangerous. For example, the Polish bond market has grown rapidly over the 
last six years. Most of the issues, however, have been for less than a million dollars and 
have been purchased in their entirety by the underwriting bank. Similarly, the maturities 
of most municipal credits rarely exceed ﬁ ve to seven years, and their interest rates are 
almost always variable.  Th is is odd not only because inﬂ ation has fallen dramatically 
over the last few years—and stayed relatively low—but because the national government 
has begun to issue ﬁ xed-rate instruments with ten-year maturities that could and should 
serve as benchmarks for subsovereign lending.
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Finally and most importantly, there are indications that over the last two years 
increasing numbers of local governments are using long-term debt to ﬁ nance operating 
deﬁ cits.1 Obviously, if this is the case it could lead to serious problems for the country 
in general and for the still immature municipal capital market in particular. In short, 
the development of local government borrowing in Poland has been both dynamic and 
promising, while at the same time fraught with all sorts of curious behaviors, regulatory 
weaknesses and potential dangers.
In the following, we attempt to explain both this dynamic growth and to analyze the 
outstanding structural weaknesses of the market. We will argue that the foundations of 
this growth lie above all in the essential soundness of the ﬁ nances of Poland’s primary 
and most important tier of local government, the gminas (municipalities). At the same 
time, we will argue that most if not all of the most important threats to the market lie 
in the relative weakness of the two new levels of government that Poland created in 
1999, the recent weakening of municipal ﬁ nancial standing and the challenges posed 
by the absorption of EU funds.
2.   STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF 
      POLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
2.1 The Basic Structure of Subnational Governments 
Poland now has a three-tier system of local government. Th e ﬁ rst tier was created in 
1990 and consists of 2,489 gminas or communal governments with an average of about 
16,000 inhabitants. Th e boundaries of municipalities were basically inherited from 
the old regime and Polish reformers permitted the creation of new jurisdictions only 
under exceptional circumstances. As a result, Poland has managed to avoid the kind of 
jurisdictional fragmentation that has complicated the decentralization process in other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the vast majority of local governments 
are of reasonable size. 
Municipalities are the most important level of local government in terms of 
functions and expenditures.  Over the course of the decade, their responsibilities have 
been progressively expanded and there have been considerable shifts in the services that 
they provide as “own” and “delegated” functions.2  
Municipalities are now responsible for pre-school and primary education, water 
and waste-water services, solid waste services, local roads, public housing, land-use and 
urban planning, some social welfare functions, some cultural functions and preventa-
tive public health. Municipalities enjoy the presumptive right to involve themselves 
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in the provision of any local public service not speciﬁ cally assigned to other levels of 
government, and there are no hierarchical relations between Polish local governments. 
Th ey can also establish special purpose associations to provide any of their service re-
sponsibilities in common.3 
County or powiat governments constitute the second tier of local government. Th ey 
took shape on an experimental basis during the mid-1990s and were made universal in 
1999. Th ere are 381 counties, of which 66 are cities that have been granted county rights 
and responsibilities in addition to those they have as municipalities. Th ese include the 
46 largest cities and 19 smaller towns that were granted county powers as compensation 
for their loss of status as provincial or regional capitals in 1999.
Counties are responsible for secondary education, local roads, a wide variety of 
inspection and permitting services, some land use planning, some cultural functions, 
local labor market policy, some social welfare functions, and the ownership and man-
agement, but not the ﬁ nancing, of primary health care institutions. 
Th e creation of cities with county rights has separated substantial numbers of rural 
inhabitants from the infrastructure associated with county functions and created a 
number of problems with commuting—particularly for students in secondary education. 
Similarly, it has left a substantial number of rural counties with very low revenues from 
shared taxes, and with important infrastructure deﬁ cits, raising questions about their 
long term sustainability. Indeed, as we shall see, the ﬁ scal weakness of counties may be 
creating problems for the operation of the subsovereign capital market. 
With the establishment of counties in 1999, Poland also consolidated the number of 
regional (województwo) authorities from 49 to 16 while also extending self-government to 
this level of public administration. Self-governing regions, or Sejmiks, have been assigned 
select service responsibilities in secondary education, culture, roads and inspectorates. 
More importantly, they are responsible for regional development planning.4 Th e Sejmiks 
share power at the regional level with nationally appointed governors (wojewoda) who, 
among other things, retain control over public safety functions and the disbursement 
of special purpose grants to subnational governments. 
As can be seen from Table 2.1, municipalities are the most important level of local 
government and their expenditures account for almost 80% of all local government 
spending. Indeed, this share would be substantially higher if these ﬁ gures included the 
expenditures of oﬀ -budget local government service providers.
As can be seen from Table 2.2 below, local governments are now responsible for 
more than 30% of all public expenditures and a remarkable 58% of all public investment 
spending. Moreover, while only 4% of national government expenditures are spent on 
investments, 13% of local government expenditures are devoted to capital improvements. 
Indeed, as we shall see later, municipalities have been devoting a remarkable 20% of 
their total revenues to capital improvements.
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Table 2.1
Shares of Local Government Expenditure (2001)
[PLN/m] Share [%]
Municipalities 38,568 46.6
Cities with county rights (big cities)   25,137 30.4
Counties 14,293 17.3
Regions 4,737 5.7
Total 82,734 100.0
Source:     Ministry of Finance Reports.
 In short, decentralization in Poland over the last decade has been both fast and 
profound.5  It has also been remarkably rational in the sense that basic public services 
have been assigned to levels of local government that are—in general—of suﬃ  cient size 
and ﬁ scal capacity to comfortably carry out their assigned responsibilities. 
Table 2.2
Consolidated Public Expenditures by Level of Government (2000)
Public Expenditure All Levels
[PLN/m]
National Government Local Governments
[PLN/m] Share [%] [PLN/m] Share [%]
Total 343,570 236,711 68.9 106,859 31.1
Current 320,091 226,921 70.9 93,170 29.1
Capital 23,479 9,790 41.7 13,689 58.3
Capital expenditures as % of total 6,8% 4,1% 12,8%
Source:     GUS Statistical Yearbook, 2001. 
Th ese ﬁ gures include the expenditures of the oﬀ -budget units of both national 
and local governments, according to IMF methodology (general government sector). 
Hence the substantially higher total expenditure ﬁ gures for local governments than 
those shown in Table 2.1. 
Th is does not mean the system is perfect. Poland has a large number of relatively small 
gminas that do have trouble providing many services at acceptable standards. Similarly, 
there are probably too many counties, and the establishment of cities with county rights 
has placed many rural citizens in jurisdictions that lack the infrastructure necessary to 
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perform county functions. Th is has created a variety of transportation problems and 
has led to some disputes between local governments about how the costs of certain 
services should be paid for. Nonetheless, and in comparison with many countries of 
the region, it seems fair to say that Poland has done reasonably well in assigning service 
responsibilities to the appropriate levels of government. 
Equally importantly, and as the investment levels of local governments suggest, 
Poland has also done a reasonably good job in creating an intergovernmental ﬁ nance 
system that actually provides local governments with the revenues they need to meet 
the tasks they have been assigned. 
2.2 Local Government Revenues 
      and the Intergovernmental Finance System
Local government revenues are regulated by the “Law on Local Government Revenues, 
1999–2000.” Th is law was adopted with the creation of regions and counties in 1999 
and was initially conceived as a temporary measure. Since 1999 the government has 
attempted to replace it with new legislation on at least two occasions, so far without 
success.  Th e law preserved the previous legislation’s basic revenue categories for mu-
nicipalities but extended most of them to counties and regions. Indeed, while there has 
been considerable adjustment of the shares and composition of the categories since the 
early 1990s, the basic structure of the law has remained relatively stable. 
Local governments have four basic types of revenues: shared-taxes, conditional 
grants (dotacja), non-conditional ﬁ scal transfers (subwencja) and own revenues. Own 
revenues include income from user fees and charges, from the sale or rental of municipal 
property, and from “own” taxes. 
Th e category of user fees and charges consists of fees for classic urban services like 
water supply and treatment, public transport and solid waste collection and disposal, as 
well as stamp duties on oﬃ  cial documents, fees for the sale of real estate, and fees for the 
exploitation of mineral rights. In many areas, however, the ability of local governments 
to set user fees and charges is constrained by the national government.  For example, the 
rates for stamp duties, transaction fees and exploitation rights are set by the Ministry 
of Finance. As a result, local governments’ ability to generate additional revenues by 
raising local fees and user charges is fairly limited.  
Municipalities, unlike counties and regions, have the right to impose “own taxes”6 
on real estate, agricultural and forestry activities, small businesses (an octroi)7 and dogs. 
With the exception of the tax on dogs, however, the Ministry of Finance determines 
both the base and maximum rates of these taxes. Th e most important own tax is the real 
estate tax. Th is is a  ﬂ at, per square meter charge on land and buildings.8  Meanwhile, 
agricultural and forestry taxes are based on the average price of expected per hectare 
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yields of particular types of land. As a result, municipalities have no true own taxes of 
any signiﬁ cance and their capacity to generate additional revenues is based primarily 
on the sale or rental of municipal property.9
Table 2.3
Structure of Municipal Revenues [%] (1991–2001)
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenue 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Own-revenues: 
of which10
45.5 47.3 46.5 40.3 40.1 35.0 35.3 33.5 37.1 36.6 37.5
Real estate tax 15.3 16.4 14.8 13.4 14.1 11.4 11.2 11.3 11.7 12.3 14.8
Transport tax 1.1 3.5 3.3 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Agricultural tax 3.9 2.7 3.8 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.1
Stamp fees 4.6 5.3 5.0 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.8 1.1
Asset sales NA NA NA 3.0 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.1 7.8 7.9 4.8
Shared taxes 28.9 22.2 25.4 23.1 23.1 24.5 24.3 24.7 17.7 15.9 14.6
of which
CIT 0.0 2.6 3.6 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.1
PIT 0.0 19.6 21.8 20.6 20.7 22.7 22.4 23.0 16.3 14.3 13.5
Grants 12.0 18.8 16.7 21.6 20.6 13.9 14.1 14.3 11.6 13.7 11.7
of which
Delegated 10.8 16.3 13.1 18.4 13.7 7.3 7.5 7.4 7.1 7.2 7.0
Own 1.2 2.5 3.6 3.2 4.2 4.8 4.8 5.0 2.9 4.4 2.8
General subsidy 13.5 11.7 11.4 14.9 15.2 25.3 24.1 25.4 33.6 33.8 36.2
Source:     GUS Statistical Yearbooks.
Between 1991 and 1993 other income included income from asset sales and rentals. 
In 1991 and 1992 it also included surpluses from the previous year. Of other income, 
the most important categories are the small business tax, the forest tax and the mineral 
exploitation tax. 
As can be seen from Table 2.3, the most important own revenues have consistently 
been the real-estate tax, followed by stamp taxes and asset sales.11 Here, it is worth 
noting that the share of revenues coming from asset sales has increased over time, indicat-
ing just how much property was assigned to gminas. Municipalities now derive about a 
third of their income from “own” revenues, down from 45% at the beginning of the 
decade. 
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All local governments receive revenues from shared personal income taxes (PIT), 
and municipalities and regions are also entitled to shares of corporate income taxes 
(CIT). Between 1992 and 1998 shared taxes consistently represented 23% to 25% of 
all municipal revenues. Currently, municipalities receive 27.6% of the PIT taxes paid 
by residents of their jurisdictions, and 5% of the CIT taxes paid by ﬁ rms doing business 
in their jurisdictions.12 
Th e Law on Local Government Revenues also guarantees all local governments a 
block grant, known as the general subsidy (subwencja ogolna).  Th e composition of the 
general subsidy has evolved over the course of the decade and now includes three basic 
components for all levels of local government: an equalization component, a component 
for roads and, most importantly, an education component. For municipalities, the 
equalization component of the subsidy is provided to local governments whose per 
capita revenues are at least 15% below the national average. Th ese local governments 
receive 90% of the diﬀ erence between their per capita revenues and 85% of the 
national average.13 Th e operation of the Polish equalization system has helped ensure 
that even ﬁ scally weak jurisdictions have the ﬁ nancial means to meet their basic service 
responsibilities. It has also helped rural jurisdictions make use of debt ﬁ nance and to 
extend investment borrowing well beyond the larger cities. 
In this context, it is also important to understand how the education component of 
the general subsidy works. Th is component is the largest element of the general subsidy 
and for both rural gminas and counties often represents their single most important 
source of revenue. Th e funds available for the component are set by the Law on Local 
Government Revenues and must equal 12.8% of state budget revenues.14 Th ese funds 
are allocated to local governments on the basis of a formula determined by the Ministry 
of Education, and approved by the Ministry of Finance.
In 1999, the government substantially increased teachers’ pay without accordingly 
increasing the sum of funds to be allocated to local governments through the education 
subvention. Th is produced an immediate crisis in local government ﬁ nances that resulted 
in a partial correction of the subvention by the national government. Nonetheless, 
the costs of the wage hikes lowered the disposable resources of local governments and 
probably constituted the single most important reason for the decline in municipal 
investment spending after 1999. 
Finally, the Law on Local Government Revenues states that local governments can 
receive earmarked grants for the execution of their own functions and for functions 
delegated or commissioned to them by the national government. Earmarked grants now 
account for a relatively modest 14% of municipal revenues, a fair share of which go for 
investments. As a result, municipalities can be said to have very signiﬁ cant expenditure 
authority since more than 85% of their total revenues are freely disposable. 
Until 1999, allocation of these earmarked grants was not subject to objective 
criteria. Instead, decisions were made by state-appointed governors on a discretionary 
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basis. Th eir decisions, however, were subject to review by the Regional Parliaments 
(Sejmik Samorządowy).15 Despite the absence of objective criteria for the allocation 
of these funds, a signiﬁ cant share ﬂ owed to rural gminas with weak ﬁ scal capacities.16 
Th is helped at least some rural jurisdictions to use debt to ﬁ nance investments without 
getting into ﬁ nancial trouble.
Despite the limited tax powers of municipalities, and the constant shifts in the 
way all forms of state transfers have been calculated (shared taxes, earmarked grants 
and the general subsidy), municipal revenues have been remarkably stable and robust. 
Indeed, municipalities have been able to devote more than 20% of their income to 
investments, as can be seen from Table 2.4. In fact, the equalization system (and the 
nature of the education subvention) has made this true for all types of municipalities. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that investment spending has fallen in both real 
and nominal terms since 1999, mostly because of the problems with the education 
subvention described above.
Table 2.4
Municipal Investments as a Share of Revenues and GDP [PLN/m] (1994–2001)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total Municipal Revenues 14,808 1999 30,956 39,518 46,119 51,742 56,350 60,954
Investment Expenditures 3,364 4,657 7,056 9,681 10,937 10,637 11,176 11,210
Investment Expenditures 
as % of revenues 
22.7 23.3 22.8 24.5 23.7 20.2 19.8 18.4
Municipal investment 
as % of GDP
1.6 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.5
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
Th is high rate of investment suggests that the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system has 
generally provided municipalities with revenues adequate to meet their responsibilities. 
After all, no other economic actor on the Polish scene—meaning households, ﬁ rms and 
the central government—has had similar levels of freely disposable income. Th is is not 
to say that the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system has been perfectly aligned or stable. It 
is to say, however, that the system has been suﬃ  ciently predictable and robust to make 
the prudent use of debt ﬁ nance possible for both urban and rural jurisdictions. Indeed, 
there is little question that the general stability and robustness of municipal revenues 
in Poland is exceptional for the region. 
Unfortunately, however, the picture with respect to the revenue adequacy and ex-
penditure authority of Poland’s counties and regions is less clear, particularly for counties. 
As can be seen from Table 2.5, neither level of government has signiﬁ cant own revenues, 
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and for both, close to 50% of income is derived from earmarked grants. Moreover, and 
particularly for counties, the percentage of revenue derived from shared taxes—income 
that (all things being equal) can be expected to grow with the economy—is small.
Table 2.5
Revenues of Counties and Regions in 2001
County Region
[PLN/m] Share [%] [PLN/m] Share [%]
1. Own revenues 1,029.9 7.3 84.2 1.8
 1.1 Income from assets 162.8 1.2 28.3 0.6
2.  Shared taxes 181.2 1.3 558.6 11.6 
 2.1 PIT 181.2 1.3 69.0 1.5
 2.2 CIT — — 462.6 10.1
3. Earmarked grants 6,459.5 45.1 2,401.5 52.2
 3.1 For own tasks 2,249.1 16.0 1,074.7 23.4
 3.2 For delegated tasks 3,932.7 28.0 1,082.6 23.5
4. General subsidy 6,503.9 46.3 1,582.2 34.4
Total 14,041.1 100.0 4,599.5 100.0
Source:     Ministry of Finance Report.
Th us, the revenue base of both these new levels of government is considerably weaker 
than that of municipalities. Only 6.5% of counties’ expenditures went to investments, 
raising serious questions about the adequacy of their revenues. Th e situation for regions 
on this score is better, and a robust 30% of their expenditures went to investments in 
1999. 
2.3 The Regulation of Local Government Budgeting, 
      Borrowing, Financial Reporting and Accounting 
Alongside the Law on Local Government of 1990 and the Law on Local Government 
Revenues of 1998, the ﬁ nancial management of municipalities, counties and regions 
are regulated by a number of other pieces of legislation. Th e most important of these 
are the Public Finance Law, the Law on Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Ordinance on the Classiﬁ cation of Budgetary Revenue and Expenditures. 
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In the following, we discuss the most important aspects of these laws and the regulatory 
system they create.
2.3.1   Th e Regulation of Local Government Budgeting and Borrowing
In Poland, a single legislative act—the Law on Public Finance of 199817—governs the 
constitution, execution and control of both the national budget and the budgets of 
local governments.  Th e law deﬁ nes both the state budget and local budgets as annual, 
unitary (jednolity) constructs (Misiąg, 1996).  Th e principle of unitary budgets means 
that all revenues must ﬂ ow into the general budget, and that no revenues may be 
segregated for speciﬁ c purposes.18  Among other things, this makes it impossible for local 
governments to formally separate their operating revenues and expenditures from their 
capital revenues and expenditures, or to dedicate speciﬁ c revenue streams to particular 
expenditure items.19  
Similarly, the principle of annual budgets means that budgets are conceived of as 
one-year ﬁ nancial plans, and that all appropriations lapse at the end of the year. As 
a result, multi-year ﬁ nancial obligations are subject to political risk and it is unclear 
whether it is legally possible to create so-called sinking funds dedicated to the repayment 
of future debt liabilities (Spoﬀ ord, 1997). To reduce these risks, and to encourage long-
term ﬁ nancial planning at the local level, the law contains provisions that allow but 
do not require local governments to include in their budgets appendices that deﬁ ne 
multi-year investment plans. 
It remains unclear, however, whether these appendices really make possible legally 
binding, multi-year appropriations because the appendices can be changed by a normal 
budget resolution (Article 110, Law on Public Finance, Spoﬀ ord, 1997). Moreover, while 
many municipalities have indeed begun to attach such appendices to their budgets, the 
treatment of them remains rather formalistic.
Th e Law states that the total expenditures contained in a budget deﬁ ne the 
maximum expenditures a government can incur in given year. Th e Law also requires 
that expenditures be broken down into operating expenditures, capital expenditures and 
debt service payments (Article 28, Law on Public Finance). As a result, it is relatively easy 
for local governments to say how much they spend on investments from their general 
budgets every year.  Nonetheless, being able to determine annual investment expenditure 
is not the same thing as having clearly separated operating and capital budgets. In fact, 
the way the law deﬁ nes budget deﬁ cits, having both a surplus and revenues from asset 
sales impedes a clear determination of how investments and operating expenditures are 
in fact being funded.
First, the law states that planned expenditures can exceed planned revenues, but 
that the budget resolution must indicate how the resulting “deﬁ cit” is to be funded 
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(Article 112, Spoﬀ ord, 1997; Oles, 1997). It also states that deﬁ cits can be funded by 
surpluses carried over from the previous year, by revenues from asset sales or by debt. Th is 
means that debt is authorized—by council resolution—to fund a “deﬁ cit,” and is not 
speciﬁ cally linked to investment purposes. Second, surpluses carried over from previous 
years are considered below-the-line income (przychody) and not general revenues 
(dochody). Indeed, they can only be used to ﬁ nance a “deﬁ cit” or to make debt service 
payments. 
Taken together, the deﬁ nition of debt as an instrument to ﬁ nance a deﬁ cit, and the 
deﬁ nition of a surplus as income that can be used only to fund deﬁ cits or make debt 
service payments, make it diﬃ  cult in practice to determine whether long term borrowing 
and/or surpluses from previous years are being used to ﬁ nance capital investments or 
short-falls in operating revenue. In practice this means that it is diﬃ  cult to determine 
whether local governments are using long term debt to ﬁ nance operating deﬁ cits or 
investments.
Th e Law on Public Finance (1998) imposes three diﬀ erent types of restrictions on 
local government borrowing. Th e ﬁ rst limits the ﬂ ow and stock of local government 
debt by prohibiting annual debt service and ﬁ nancial guarantees from exceeding 15% of 
annual revenues, and total outstanding debt from exceeding 60% of annual revenues.20 So 
far only a few local governments have exceeded these limits, as we will discuss in the next 
section. More generally, there have been no cases of outright default by municipalities 
and little evidence that borrowing has led to any ﬁ nancial distress. 
Th e second restriction limits the right of local governments to borrow in foreign 
currencies by stating that the full value of a debt must be stated in zlotys at the moment 
that the debt is incurred.21 Originally, this provision put a freeze on all hard currency 
borrowing from local governments. Eventually, however, the Ministry of Finance issued 
an ordinance that speciﬁ ed how loans in other currencies could be incurred if they 
originated from multilateral ﬁ nancial institutions or received an investment grade rating 
by an international rating agency.22 
Finally, the Law on Public Finance ties the borrowing rights of local governments 
to the borrowing practices of the national government once the consolidated public 
debt exceeds 50% of the GDP.23 If this threshold is crossed, no local government can 
incur new debt greater than the percentage of the national government’s planned annual 
deﬁ cit to its planned annual revenues. 
If, for instance, the consolidated public debt (plus guarantees) stood at 50% of 
the GDP and the national government decided to limit its borrowing to 5% of its 
revenues, then no local government could borrow more than 5% of its revenues during 
the same year. By the same logic, if the national government simply decided to suspend 
all borrowing that year, then no local government could borrow at all. Moreover, if the 
consolidated public debt were to exceed 60% of the GDP then both local governments 
and the national government would be prohibited from incurring new debt.
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Because national government borrowing accounts for more than 98% of the 
consolidated public debt today, and because this debt is not far from the 50% threshold,24 
these procedures essentially hold local governments hostage to the borrowing practices 
of the national government. Moreover, they place local government borrowing for 
investment purposes in de facto competition with national government borrowing for 
current operating expenses and social entitlements.
 Not only does this seem unwise, but it also introduces all sorts of uncertainties and 
moral hazards into the subsovereign debt market for creditors and local governments.25 
Indeed, these uncertainties could be aﬀ ecting the market now because for the ﬁ rst time 
the Ministry of Finance expects the consolidated public debt to exceed 50% in of the 
GDP. According to the Budget Law of 2003, the consolidated public debt (including 
guarantees) will exceed 50% of the GDP and is expected to be 52.5% in 2003, from 
52.7% to 54.2% in 2004, and from 52.2% to 54% in 2005.
 Th ese uncertainties could dampen the growth of the market as a whole and 
discourage local governments from developing sound, long-term planning practices. 
Obviously, this should be monitored closely. Following Maastricht, however, the law 
explicitly exempts debt incurred by commercialized municipal utilities from the statutory 
debt limits described above, and from all calculations of the consolidated public debt. 
Th e Law contains no regulations governing workout or bankruptcy procedures 
in the case of the non-payment of debt by local government. Th ere are also no rules 
for what kind of assets local governments can or cannot use as collateral for loans and 
bonds, and indeed no deﬁ nition of what constitutes an essential public service. As a 
result, the fact that a loan may be fully or partially collateralized has no bearing on the 
calculation of any of the debt limits. 
Th ere are also no prudential regulations concerning the types of investment local 
governments can make. Th is is important because recent American experience shows 
that local governments are as likely to get into ﬁ nancial trouble through imprudent 
investments as they are through imprudent borrowing.26 Finally, local governments are 
required to submit to the Ministry of Finance and the Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces 
quarterly statements concerning their borrowing, cash holdings and any guarantees they 
may have issued to third parties.27
2.3.2   Financial Transparency, Financial Reporting and Accounting
Th e Law on Public Finance states that ﬁ nances of all public entities must be open and 
transparent. It does not require local governments to hold public budget hearings or to 
have their accounts independently audited.28  It does, however, require them to present 
their budgets in accordance with a general classiﬁ cation system for the public sector 
and to use this system in making ﬁ nancial reports. Th e classiﬁ cation system is set by an 
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Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance in agreement with the Main Statistical Oﬃ  ce.29 
All local government entities must also ﬁ le periodic ﬁ nancial reports to the Ministry of 
Finance, the Main Statistical Oﬃ  ce and the 16 Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces that were 
established to insure that local government budgeting and ﬁ nancial management is in 
compliance with the law.
Th e Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces (RIOs) were established in 1993 and are governed 
by the Law on Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces. Each RIO is an independent government 
agency responsible to the Council of Ministers, and while a presidium composed of 
RIO presidents and other members was created in 1997, it does not have the power 
to ensure that all RIOs follow the same standards. Indeed, there has been considerable 
variation in the practices and quality of diﬀ erent RIOs since their inception.
Th e RIOs are responsible for reviewing the legality of local government budget 
resolutions and for monitoring the propriety and timeliness of their accounting practices 
and ﬁ nancial reporting. Th ey are also required to issue an opinion on all long-term debt 
resolutions adopted by local governments, except for those credits coming from the bank 
that holds their main account. In theory, judgment on this issue should be limited to 
whether the budget resolution to incur the debt was carried out in accordance with the 
law, and whether the debt will push a local government over one or another statutory 
limit. In practice, however, some RIOs have used this authority to question the purpose 
of a borrowing or its terms, though in recent years this kind of intervention seems to 
be on the decline.30
Alongside the RIOs, a private, indigenous rating agency, CERA,31 was established 
with the help of USAID support in the mid-1990s and then subsequently bought by 
Fitch Ratings. Fitch Ratings monitors the creditworthiness of banks and other major 
institutional lenders and borrowers, including local governments, and it has rated a few 
municipal bond issues. Th e demand for Fitch Ratings’ services, however, has been limited 
for at least three reasons. First, there has been only one public issue of municipal bonds. 
Second, investors still tend to regard the creditworthiness of most local governments, 
or at least those with name recognition, as equal. And third, the regulations forbidding 
bond issues in hard currencies have limited the demand for ratings designed to assure 
foreign investors.32 
Th e accounting practices of local governments are regulated by the Law on Account-
ing of 1994 and an ordinance of the Ministry of Finance specifying in what ways public 
sector accounting diﬀ ers from the regulations contained in the Accounting Law.33 Under 
these rules local governments should keep both cash and accrual accounts, though it is 
the former that are legally binding for the reporting of their budgets. As a result, many 
local governments do not keep accrual accounts. 
Local governments and their subsidiary units are also required to inventory and value 
the public property they own or administer and to submit to the Ministry of Finance and 
the RIOs’ consolidated balance sheets that summarize their assets and liabilities. Th us, in 
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theory, local governments should have reasonable information about the value of their 
assets. In practice, however, this is rarely the case and the asset value data contained in 
these balance sheets is considered too unreliable to be of much use.34
2.4 Financial Sector Framework
2.4.1   Banking Law 
Unlike in many transitional societies, Polish local governments are not required to keep 
their cash holdings in sub-accounts of the national treasury system. Instead they are free 
to place their deposits with, or to borrow from, any of the country’s commercial banks. 
Th is has facilitated an organic linkage between local governments and the banking sector 
and has undoubtedly helped the development of the subsovereign capital market.
Moreover, the way the country’s banking laws regulate credit risk has encouraged 
banks to see local governments as good borrowers. Th e risk weighting of bank loans is 
governed by Article 128 of the Banking Law and rulings issued by the National Bank 
of Poland’s Commission for Banking Supervision. Article 128 states that a bank’s own 
funds must be equal to at least 8% of it risk-weighted assets and its extra balance-sheet 
obligations. Th e Commission for Banking Supervision’s ordinance of December 2, 1998 
(Zarzadzenie 5/98) sets out the risk coeﬃ  cients for particular types of assets and extra 
balance-sheet obligations.35
Th e ordinance distinguishes between three classes of borrowers. Class I is composed 
of the Polish Treasury, the central bank, the Bank Guarantee Fund, the Export Credit 
Corporation, the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the central banks and stock exchanges 
of EU member states. Class II is composed of Polish local governments, the local 
governments of EU member states and multilateral ﬁ nancial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the EBRD. Class III covers all other economic agents.
Th e risk coeﬃ  cient for the debt obligations of institutions belonging to Class I is 
0% and Class II 20%, unless the obligations are guaranteed by or collateralized with 
the securities of institutions belonging to Class I, in which case the risk coeﬃ  cient is 
zero. Th e basic risk coeﬃ  cient for the obligations of institutions belonging to Class 
III is 50% if they are collateralized by liens on real property, and 100% if they are not 
collateralized by such liens. If the obligations of Class III institutions are guaranteed by 
or collateralized with the securities of Class I or II institutions, then the risk coeﬃ  cient 
on these obligations can be 0% or 20%. 
Th e fact that the risk coeﬃ  cients for the debts of companies (50% and 100%) are 
substantially higher than those for local governments (20%) and are not dependent 
on liens on real estate, creates strong incentives for the banking sector to lend to local 
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governments. By the same token, however, it creates fairly strong disincentives to lend 
to municipal utilities, especially if the real property of these utilities is considered an 
integral part of an essential service that should not be mortgaged. It should be added 
that the ordinance does not enumerate diﬀ erent risk coeﬃ  cients for diﬀ erent types of 
debt instruments and is thus neutral with respect to loans and bonds, or for that matter, 
public and private issues.36
Other aspects of the banking law, however, may create incentives for banks to prefer 
municipal bonds to loans. In short, the law requires that banks monitor the behavior 
of borrowers with respect to the use of loan proceeds, particularly where permitting 
and construction schedules are concerned. With bonds no such obligation exists for the 
purchaser, or indeed the underwriter, because Polish bond law does not require that the 
organizer of an issue fulﬁ ll any trustee-type functions. 
Th is seems to have encouraged the banks to prefer underwriting private placements 
and then purchasing the entire, or almost the entire issue, rather than entering into 
loan agreements for same purpose.37 It may also contribute to the apparent economic 
viability of very small bond issues, one of the stranger anomalies of the Polish bond 
market, as we shall see later.
2.4.2   Capital Market Legislation 
Th ere is no single piece of securities law in Poland devoted to the issuance of municipal 
bonds. Municipal bonds are, however given speciﬁ c treatment in the Law on Bonds 
and the ordinances of the Council of Ministers governing the disclosure requirements 
for bonds traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the over-the-counter market, 
CeTO.38 
Article 2 of the Law on Bonds states that local governments, special purpose 
associations and the capital city of Warsaw can issue bonds. Until 2000, Article 8 of 
the Law made all issuers liable for the repayment of bonds with their entire assets. As a 
result, local governments (and other entities) could not issue revenue bonds.39  In June 
2000 a new paragraph was added to Article 8, making it possible for issuers to state that 
a particular bond issue is secured only with the asset that is to be created by the loan 
and/or the revenues from it.40 But to date, no revenue bonds have been issued despite 
some interest in the instrument by local governments.41 
Article 9 deﬁ nes privately placed issues as issues directed at a maximum of 300 
subscribers. Article 10 deﬁ nes the content of information memorandums for private 
placements and requires that all issuers state the purpose for which bond proceeds will 
be used. Th ese information requirements distinguish between local governments and 
corporate bond issuers. Local governments are required to submit their budgets for the 
year prior to the issue along with the opinion of the Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ce on the 
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credit, while issuers of corporate bonds must submit independently audited ﬁ nancial 
statements and balance sheets. 
With regard to the bond law itself, this is the major distinction between the 
treatment of municipal and corporate issues. Further distinctions, however, are made 
in the ordinance of the Council of Ministers (December 30, 1998) concerning the 
continuous and periodic information requirements for publicly traded securities, as well 
as in the ordinance of the Council of Ministers (December 22, 1998) concerning the 
information requirements for securities traded on the secondary market (CeTO).
Th e placement of substantially diﬀ erent types of information requirements in the 
same pieces of legislation is awkward. But it is fair to say that the disclosure requirements 
for publicly traded municipal bonds on both the primary and secondary market, 
including the requirement for independent audits, are reasonably comprehensive and 
do not diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly from those found in developed market economies. 
Commercial banks are free to invest in municipal bonds as long as no more than 25% 
of their total portfolio is tied to a single borrower. Th ere are no restrictions imposed on 
investment funds with respect to municipal bonds,42 but pension funds and insurance 
companies can invest no more than 5% of their portfolios in privately issued municipal 
bonds and no more than 15% in publicly traded municipal bonds. Th us far, neither of 
these types of institutional investor has begun to approach its statutory limit. 
It is also worth noting that the Ministry of Finance requires the payment of a stamp 
tax of 1.5% on the sale of all securities outside of the banking sector. Th is tax has reduced 
the liquidity of municipal bonds and increased the tendency for banks to hold large 
shares of the issues they underwrite on their portfolios.43 
2.4.3   Special Purpose Financial Institutions
As in many other countries of the region, the (re)creation of local governments in Poland 
was accompanied by a debate about whether to establish special purpose ﬁ nancial insti-
tutions to help them access loan capital. In the early 1990s, this debate was motivated 
by two lines of thought.
On the one hand, there was a group of municipal oﬃ  cials who thought Poland 
should create a special purpose municipal bank that would hold municipal deposits and 
issue subsidized credit loans to local governments. Little came of this idea for at least two 
reasons. First, municipal oﬃ  cials could not agree among themselves on whether local 
governments should capitalize this institution, or whether they should be legally required 
to keep their deposits with it. And second, representatives of the national government 
in general and the Ministry of Finance in particular were not only ideologically opposed 
to such an institution but argued that the national government could not aﬀ ord to help 
with its capitalization. As a result, the idea never really got oﬀ  the ground.
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On the other hand, there were reformers looking for ways to help local governments 
to gain access to loan capital in a situation where newly privatized and weak commercial 
banks were not yet up to the task. Th is group was strongly backed by the World Bank and 
USAID in the early 1990s, and for a while it looked as though the Polish government 
was going to try to develop a temporary Municipal Development Fund to on-lend donor 
resources to local governments. But the Ministry of Finance ultimately rejected these 
plans, arguing that reform of the commercial banking sector was moving forward and 
that donors who wanted to lend to the sector should do so through specialized credit 
lines to the commercial banks.
Nonetheless, the national government did decide, with USAID encouragement 
and support, to create a para-statal Municipal Development Agency. Th e purpose of 
this Agency was not to lend to local governments, but to facilitate the growth of the 
subsovereign capital market by helping local governments prepare bankable projects, 
improve their budgeting practices and lobby for necessary changes in the laws regulating 
their ﬁ nances and the capital market. Indeed, this institution played an important role in 
helping to jump-start the market in the mid-1990s by helping to prepare the country’s 
ﬁ rst municipal bond issues and by developing standards of budget preparation and 
forecasting that were useful to both banks and local governments.
At the same time, Poland has a set of special purpose Environmental Funds that 
in the 1990s were given the right to issue not only grants but subsidized loans for the 
improvement of environmental infrastructure.44 And while reformers were not thinking 
speciﬁ cally about local governments when redesigning these funds, the funds have proved 
important for the development of the Polish subsovereign capital market. 
Th e Funds get their resources from the fees and ﬁ nes imposed on ﬁ rms and 
individuals for the use and abuse of the environment. Th ey then use these monies to 
provide ﬁ nancial support to projects designed to improve environmental conditions. 
Because Polish local governments have important responsibilities in the areas of water 
supply and sewage treatment, solid waste and, to a lesser extent, district heating, a 
signiﬁ cant share of the Funds’ total ﬁ nancial support has gone to them. 
Until the end of 1998, the revenue stream from environmental user fees and ﬁ nes 
was divided between three diﬀ erent types of funds: the National Environmental Fund 
(NFOS), 49 Regional Environmental Funds and 2,489 municipal funds. With the second 
round of administrative reforms in 1999, new county-level funds were established while 
the number of Regional Funds was reduced from 49 to 16. As a result, revenues from 
environmental fees and ﬁ nes are now divided four ways.
Municipal and County environmental funds do not have separate legal identities, 
cannot lend money and are basically controlled by their respective local government 
councils. As such, these funds are essentially special purpose, though oﬀ -budget, local 
government revenues. Both the National and Regional Funds (FOS), however, have 
legal identities and each is empowered—within the boundaries of  the law regulating 
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their operation—to make independent decisions about the types of ﬁ nancial instruments 
they employ to promote their statutory goal of environmental protection. Th e most 
important of these instruments are:
        •     Grants;
        •     Preferential loans that can be partially or entirely forgiven;
        •     Interest rate subsidies paid to commercial banks for environmental credits.
Th e cost of the loans provided by the National and Regional Funds are typically 
a few percentage points lower than those available from commercial banks and are 
most often set between 20% and 90% of the NBP rediscount rate.45 Sometimes these 
preferential loans are accompanied by pure grants. Often, fund loans allow for the 
partial forgiveness of capital and interest payments if investment projects are completed 
on schedule and meet their environmental goals. Many funds also provide interest rate 
subsidies to commercial banks issuing loans for environmental infrastructure projects.46 
We discuss their role in the development of this market in the next section.
Th ere are also some less important but still signiﬁ cant institutions that lend to local 
governments on a preferential basis. Th ese include:
        •     Th e national government’s National Housing Fund which oﬀ ers local governments 
loans for improving infrastructure directly related to apartment construction; 
        •     Th e national government’s Program for the Support of Th ermal-Insulation 
which provides low-interest loans to improve the heating eﬃ  ciency of apartment 
buildings and heating systems;  
        •     Th e Catholic Church’s Foundation for the Support of Rural Areas, which 
provides loans and credit lines for rural local governments for water supply, 
environmental protection and educational endeavors; 
        •     Th e European Fund for the Development of Polish Agriculture,47 which provides 
credit for rural health and environmental projects.  
Also active in Poland are a variety of bilateral and multilateral lending agencies 
such as the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
the European Investment Bank and the Nordic Investment Bank, among others. Th ese 
institutions provide investment credits to local governments either directly or through 
lines of credit managed by Polish Banks.
 
3.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNAL 
      CAPITAL MARKET (1990–2001)
To the end of 1998, the only borrowers on Poland’s subsovereign debt market were 
municipalities. As we have noted, in 1999 they were joined by counties and regions. 
47
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At the same time new regulations were put into eﬀ ect regarding the reporting of mu-
nicipal debt, and Poland’s oﬃ  cial statistics began to contain information on the level 
of municipal borrowing. Th us, we present the history of the market’s development in 
two periods, from 1990 to 1998, and from 1999 on. 
3.1 The Borrowing of Polish Local Governments (1990–1998)
As we have already noted, Polish municipalities were given the legal right to borrow 
at the moment of decentralization in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, in the ﬁ rst years of 
the decade local government borrowing was virtually non-existent, due to the general 
political and economic situation of Poland. It is necessary to remember that these were 
years of radical economic change and even more radical uncertainty about the eﬀ ects of 
this change, making any ﬁ nancial planning extremely diﬃ  cult. Th is was compounded 
by extremely high inﬂ ation rates (70% in 1991 falling to 20% in 1995) and high costs 
of credit.
In addition, Poland’s ﬁ nancial market was new and inexperienced, and its ﬁ nancial 
institutions had yet to develop credit instruments designed for local governments. At 
the same time, local governments were only beginning to learn how to manage their 
ﬁ nancial resources and to execute their assigned responsibilities. Finally, the mental and 
practical habits inherited from the old system had to be overcome. Generally this meant 
accepting the idea that local problems had to be identiﬁ ed and solved locally. 
More speciﬁ cally, it meant moving away from the notion—widely accepted by most 
local government oﬃ  cials—that debt is an unjust way of ﬁ nancing local tasks because it 
encumbers future budgets. Th is idea was in part a carry-over from the dramatic problems 
Poland had with paying the national debt that the previous communist governments had 
incurred. Whatever its source, this attitude acted as a serious brake on the development 
of the municipal capital market in the early years of the transition. 
Indeed, it is fair to say that because Polish municipalities were endowed from the 
start of the transition period with both fairly robust and fairly stable revenues, they 
underutilized their borrowing potential both in ﬁ nancial terms and in relationship to 
their huge investment needs for most of the decade. Th is is because of the political and 
economic uncertainty and because of the time it took to overcome old habits and to 
learn new techniques.
 As a result, Polish local governments were initially extremely cautious about incur-
ring debt, and ﬁ nanced almost all of their investments on a pay-as-you-go basis from 
current operating surpluses (See Table 2.6). At the same time, we should point out that 
the extreme caution with which Polish municipalities approached debt ﬁ nancing has 
meant that  Poland has had few of the problems with local government insolvency that 
have occurred in some other transitional countries. 
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Table 2.6
Local Government Investment Funds by Revenue Type [%] (1995–1998)
1995 1996 1997 1998
Operating surpluses 75.79 69.97 71.99 71.14
National government investment grants 11.36 12.70 11.75 11.85
Grants from Environmental Funds 6.50 6.17 4.57 4.24
Loans from the Environmental Funds 2.58 4.37 3.59 4.48
Bank loans 3.61 6.03 6.87 6.41
Municipal Bonds 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.48
Other 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.40
Source:     Own calculations based on data from the Main Statistical Oﬃ  ce (GUS), the Regional Accounting 
Oﬃ  ces (RIO,) the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) and the National Environmental Fund 
(NFOS).
Figure 2.1
New Loans Contracted by Local Governments (1995–1998)
Source:     Own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance, NBP and NFOS.
*      Data expressed in 2001 constant prices.
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Up until 1999, there were no oﬃ  cial national statistics concerning the level or type 
of local borrowing. Local governments were obligated to include information about the 
size and types of their debt in their ﬁ nancial reports to the Ministry of Finance only with 
the passage of the Law on Public Finance, and particularly the provisions that called for 
the national government to calculate—as per Maastricht—the country’s consolidated 
public debt. As a result, analysis of the municipal capital market prior to 1999 can only be 
pieced together with (not fully commensurable) data from the National Bank of Poland 
(NBP) on the level of local government debt held by commercial banks, surveys of the 
municipal bond markets carried out by the Fitch rating agency (CERA) and data from 
the Environmental Funds about loans to local governments and their utilities. 
Municipalities’ use of debt instruments increased from virtually nothing at the 
beginning of the decade to over six billion PLN (USD 1.3 billion) by the end of 1998, 
equal to approximately 10% of all municipal revenues. But the market’s real growth 
began in 1995, in part because the passage of new securities legislation made the issu-
ance of municipal bonds more feasible, and in part because USAID-sponsored eﬀ orts 
to facilitate municipal borrowing began to have a serious eﬀ ect on the practices of both 
local government and banks. 
3.1.1   Cooperation between Local Governments and the Funds 
           for Environmental Protection and Water Economy
In analyzing the development of the municipal capital market through 1998, it is neces-
sary to observe the important role played by non-commercial sources of (preferential) 
credit. As can be seen from Figure 2.1, non-commercial credit was used by local gov-
ernments signiﬁ cantly more often than commercial loans and bond issues until 1998. 
Unlike some other countries, however, Poland has not created a special-purpose ﬁ nancial 
institution to facilitate local government investments. Instead this role has to a large 
extent been fulﬁ lled by the Funds for Environmental Protection and Water Economy.
Not surprisingly, the often heavily subsidized loans and grants oﬀ ered by the funds 
have enjoyed—and still enjoy—great popularity among local government oﬃ  cials. In-
deed, while most oﬃ  cials were initially opposed to using commercial debt to ﬁ nance 
infrastructure projects, they tended to regard the grants and subsidized loans of the 
funds as an oﬀ er they could not aﬀ ord to turn down. As a result, the vast majority of 
Polish local governments ﬁ rst got involved with debt ﬁ nancing through the funds and 
only later turned to the use of commercial lending.
 As an example, in 1995 only 98 local governments had received loans from com-
mercial banks while more than 1,000 had entered into credit agreements with the 
National and Regional Environmental Funds. Moreover, and again not surprisingly, 
many of them continue to line up for preferential loans from the funds before turning 
to commercial sources of credit. In short, the funds have created and continue to create 
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serious competition for more commercial lenders, and have to one degree or another 
dampened or crowded out the demand for commercial credit. 
Th is crowding-out raises an important question about whether the operation of the 
Funds has facilitated or retarded the development of Poland’s municipal capital market. 
Unfortunately we have not done the research necessary to really answer this question. 
Nonetheless, we think it is probably fair to say that on the whole the Funds have done 
more to facilitate the growth of the market than retard it. 
Th is is mainly because whatever the crowding-out eﬀ ect of the funds’ practices may 
have been, it has not been suﬃ  ciently strong to prevent local governments from turn-
ing increasingly towards commercial sources of ﬁ nance. As can be seen from Figure 2.1 
above, both the volume of commercial debt and its share in overall municipal borrowing 
grew steadily over the course of the 1990’s. Th is trend has continued in more recent 
years, as we shall discuss later. Given this trend, it seems unreasonable to claim that 
the operation of the funds has retarded the development of a market that has in fact 
emerged with them. Indeed, it can be argued that the funds have actually promoted the 
development of a viable commercial debt market by playing an important educational 
role for local governments with respect to debt ﬁ nance. Again, while we lack evidence 
on this, it seems that at least three of the funds’ general practices served to promote the 
willingness and ability of municipalities to use commercial debt.  
First, the funds required local governments to fully document the environmental 
impact of their investment plans and to deﬁ ne clear and realistic construction schedules 
for their realization. Local governments were also required to demonstrate how they 
expected to repay the loan, although these requirements were lax by commercial stand-
ards. Nonetheless, these conditions seem to have helped familiarize local governments 
with loan procedures and to have increased their project-planning capacities. 
Second, and related to the ﬁ rst, the funds typically made the partial forgiveness of 
loans contingent on the timely repayment of debt-service obligations, the completion 
of construction plans according to schedule and the fulﬁ llment of the expected envi-
ronmental impact targets. Together these practices, while clearly not universal, seem to 
have encouraged local government oﬃ  cials to impose some ﬁ nancial and managerial 
discipline on the investment process, a discipline that helped prepare them for com-
mercial borrowing. 
Finally, Table 2.7 below shows that the National Fund in particular, but many of 
the regional funds as well, adjusted loan subsidy levels to measures of local governments’ 
ability to pay (means testing). Th is seems to have impressed upon richer jurisdictions 
the idea that they would be increasingly expected to solve their infrastructure problems 
on their own.
Th e clearly positive role of the Environmental Funds in the development of the 
Polish municipal capital market raises an even more interesting and fundamental 
question. Simply put, why—given the extremely checkered history of special-purpose 
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(municipal) lending facilities in the developing world48—have the Funds worked so 
well in  Poland, not only in providing local governments with low-cost capital for 
environmental infrastructure projects, but in facilitating the development of a truly 
commercial municipal capital market? We have little more than informed speculation 
to oﬀ er in response to this question. But we suspect that a combination of three factors 
has allowed the Polish system of Environmental Funds not only to avoid the bad lending 
practices that have haunted similar institutional interventions in other countries, but 
to actually promote a viable, commercial municipal debt market. 
Table 2.7
Interest Rate Policies of the National Fund for Environmental Protection (2003*) 
Local Governments Percentage of the Rediscount Rate in Relation to the Per Capita 
Income of Local Governments in 2001 (*minus two years)
0.45 
(0.5 in cities)
0.3
(0.35 in cities)
0.2 0.1
Municipalities > 1,511 1,271–1,511 1,134–1,270 <1,133
Cities with county rights > 2,188 1,972–2,188 1,653–1,971 <1,652
The capital city of Warsaw 
and its component 
municipalities
All — — —
Counties — — All —
Source:     Data from the NFOSiGW. www.nfosigw.gov.pl.
First and most basically, the Environmental Funds were not designed speciﬁ cally to 
serve local governments. Indeed, our guess is that their architects had little idea about 
how much of the funds’ ultimate activity would be directed to them. But precisely 
because of this, the construction of the larger municipal ﬁ nance system was considered 
independently of them. 
At a minimum, this meant that nobody looked to the funds as a substitute for a 
healthy system of intergovernmental ﬁ nancial relations. And at a maximum it meant 
that no attempt was made to require that local government revenues (deposits) serve as a 
source of low-cost loan funds. As a result, the funds never pretended to be nor became a 
comprehensive municipal lending system, while elsewhere they have not only tended to 
exclude the commercial banks from the sector but—with a few notable exceptions—to 
implode over time.
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, the funds were designed as oﬀ -budget 
institutions with clearly deﬁ ned revenue streams. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, everybody 
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involved with the funds seems to have assumed that the yield of this revenue stream 
would decrease over time as environmental problems were resolved. 
Taken together, the separation of the funds from the general budget of the 
government and the expectation of a decline in their revenues seems to have imparted 
to fund managers a sense that they were operating not only under a serious budget 
constraint, but a diminishing one. And this in turn seems to have led them to take 
their ﬁ duciary responsibilities seriously. Even though the loans undoubtedly have been 
and remain preferential, they have been treated as loans whose conditions must be 
respected.
Finally but most speculatively, we suspect that the politics inﬂ uencing the operation 
of the funds, particularly in the 1990s, worked in ways that served to minimize the 
crowding-out eﬀ ect. In short, we suspect that because the funds were subordinated 
to the Ministry of the Environment, and throughout the 1990s the Ministry of the 
Environment was almost always controlled by representatives of the Peasant Party, the 
funds’ activities were disproportionately focused on poorer/rural jurisdictions.49 
 Consequently, fund resources tended to ﬂ ow to those jurisdictions that had a harder 
time accessing commercial debt and away from those larger, generally richer jurisdictions 
that could, thus minimizing the crowding-out eﬀ ect. If this is true, the political logic 
of the funds was good for the overall development of the municipal capital market, but 
at the same time probably less eﬀ ective from an environmental economics perspective: 
greater environmental eﬀ ects would probably have been achieved by focusing on the 
problems of larger—yet richer—jurisdictions.
3.1.2   Commercial Banks in the Municipal Capital Market
Th e bank that most frequently cooperates with the Environmental Funds is the Bank for 
Environmental Protection (BOS). BOS was set up by the National Environmental Fund 
in the early 1990s and the fund remains its most important shareholder. BOS provides 
loans for environmental infrastructure projects both on its own and in conjunction with 
the funds. During the 1990s, as much as 80% of its portfolio consisted of preferential 
loans. Recently, however, this ﬁ gure has been declining, and according to bank oﬃ  cials 
only about half of BOS’s portfolio in 2002 was issued at below-market rates. 
Either way, BOS’s ability to lend to local governments on preferential terms has 
allowed it to win a large share of the local government market. Indeed, BOS estimates 
that it is the single largest player on the market and is responsible for about 30% of 
all bank loans issued to local governments. If this estimate is correct, then it is clear 
that even in 1998 (see Figure 2.1) most Polish municipalities were still borrowing on 
preferential terms even from “commercial” banks.
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Nonetheless, what was said earlier about local governments’ increasing willingness 
to borrow on commercial terms remains true, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. Over the 
course of the 1990s local governments progressively overcame their reluctance to deal 
with commercial banks. Th is was partly because more and more of them were becom-
ing more capable and knowledgeable about debt ﬁ nance, and partly because the overall 
economic and political situation was stabilizing and interest rates were falling. Also, 
local governments were under increasing pressure from their electorates to improve 
local infrastructure in areas where support from the funds and BOS was unlikely to be 
forthcoming (e.g., roads, schools and public transport).
Figure 2.2
Local Government Debt Held by Commercial Banks (1995–1998)
Source:     Own calculations based on NBP data.
*      Data expressed in 2001 constant prices.
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Th e role of the banks themselves has been equally important. From virtually the 
start of the reform process, Poland’s new commercial banks have been interested in local 
governments, ﬁ rst as signiﬁ cant depositors and then as potential borrowers. Initially, 
this interest was fairly uninformed and naive. For example, many commercial bankers 
thought that local governments were ideal clients because they could not legally be 
declared bankrupt. Meanwhile, others sought to secure loans with collateral associated 
with essential public services, not realizing that this collateral was unrealizable even in 
the case of non-payment.
Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s banks increasingly found themselves competing 
with each other for local government business and adjusting both their general service 
and credit oﬀ ers to the speciﬁ c needs of local governments. Indeed, as the margins on 
national government treasury bills and bonds fell over the course of the decade and 
turbulence in the industrial sector continued, banks became ever more interested in 
local government debt: after all, not only were their revenues signiﬁ cant and stable, but 
they had been paying back their obligations in a timely fashion. 
By 1998, the national government had recognized this by lowering the risk factor 
associated with local government debt used to calculate the reserve ratio requirement 
of individual banks. Like the debt of enterprises and persons, local government bank 
debt, securities and other obligations have a zero risk factor if the debt is secured by 
cash deposits or appropriately rated securities. But if no such collateral is provided, local 
government debt has a reserve risk ratio of 20% while that of ﬁ rms and individuals is 
50%.50 Similarly, banks can lower the amount they have to set aside for bad debts in 
the case of the non-timely payment of obligations, if the credit is guaranteed by local 
governments.51 Th ese regulatory provisions have further increased the interest of the 
commercial banks in the local government sector (see the earlier sections on banking 
and capital market regulation).
3.1.3   Municipal Bonds
Th e growth of the commercial banks’ interest in municipal clients has also inﬂ uenced 
the nature of the municipal bond market in Poland. If one compares Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 above, two things immediately become apparent: First, the value of municipal bond 
issues rose from zero in 1990 to more than PLN 900,000 million (USD 220 million) 
in 1998. And second, virtually all of these bonds were held by commercial banks. In 
other words, not only were banks ready to organize the issuance of municipal bonds 
and to guarantee their sale, but they were extremely ready to actually purchase the 
securities once issued. 
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Indeed, the competition between banks to get involved in the infant municipal 
credit market has lowered issuance fees to close to zero and made it possible for local 
governments to go to the bond market for very small amounts (See Table 2.8).
Table 2.8
Number of Municipal Bond Issues by Value (1996–1998)
[PLN] 1996 1997 1998
Number of Issues
0–5 million 2 13 12
5–10 million 2 2 2
10–20 million 2 3 0
Over 20 million 4 1 5
All issues 10 19 19
Value of Issues
Minimum 0.9 1.3 0.95
Maximum 99.3 25 2,06.3
Source:     Own calculation on the basis of Rating & Rynek, Fitch Ratings oraz Raport, SRGG.
3.2 The Development of the Subsovereign Capital Market 
      (1999–2001)
As Figure 2.3 shows, local government debt has continued to grow in the three years 
since the second round of territorial reform.  In 2001, the total outstanding debt of all 
local governments in relation to their total revenues stood at 15.4%. Th e highest level 
of debt has been incurred by municipalities and cities with county rights. Th e ratio of 
outstanding debt to income for municipalities in 2001 was 16.7% and for cities with 
county rights 22%. Meanwhile for counties it was 3.8% and for regions 6%.
Figure 2.3 also shows that the municipal bond market has also grown substantially 
since 1999. Th is growth was in both the volume and number of issues; in 2001, 70 local 
governments issued bonds, the largest number since the start of the reform period.  
According to NBP data, local government borrowing from the banks increased even 
more dramatically (see Figures 2.4 and 2.2). By 2001 local government bank debt had 
increased 150% compared to 1998. In addition, the most dramatic increase in bank 
debt was for medium- and long-term credits. Th is is an extremely positive tendency, 
demonstrating both an increase in all actors’ conﬁ dence in the market, and a rise in the 
long-term planning capacities of local governments.
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Figure 2.3
Local Government Debt (1999–2001)
Source:     Own calculations on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance.
*      Data expressed in 2001 constant prices.
Figure 2.4
Local Government Debt Held by Commercial Banks (1999–2001)
Source:     Own calculation based on National Bank of Poland data.
*      Data expressed in 2001 constant prices.
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Th ese data underscore an important shift in the attitudes of local government of-
ﬁ cials to commercial debt. As we have indicated, many local government oﬃ  cials felt 
that commercial credit was an “unjust” way of ﬁ nancing infrastructure improvements 
and resisted borrowing in the early 1990s. With time, however, many more local gov-
ernment oﬃ  cials have come to better understand both the need for commercial debt 
and the operation of the market. 
To an extent this is simply a result of the market becoming more attractive with the 
general fall in interest rates. Competition between banks has also led to the develop-
ment of debt instruments speciﬁ cally designed for local governments. At the same time, 
training and better investment planning and budgeting have helped local governments 
see debt as a tool to improve their circumstances and not as embarrassing evidence 
of their ﬁ nancial weaknesses. Nonetheless, problems in this area remain and will be 
discussed later. 
Since 1999, counties and regions have joined municipalities as borrowers on the 
market. But municipalities remain the dominant players, both because of their experi-
ence and the size of their budgets which, as we have seen, dwarf those of regions and 
counties combined. Th us, at the end of 2001, municipalities and cities with county 
rights accounted for more than 93% of all local government borrowing. Moreover, the 
borrowing of municipalities and cities with county rights has continued to increase 
rapidly from year to year. Nonetheless, the borrowing of counties and regions has also 
increased extremely rapidly (see Table 2.9)
Table 2.9
Growth of Local Government Debt [%] (1999–2001)
Total Municipalities Cities with 
County Rights
Counties Regions
1999/1998 29.26 x x x x
2000/1999 37.65 25.20 43.23 523.26 306.00
2001/2000 23.99 15.39 31.26 33.14 151.73
Source:     Own calculations based on Ministry of Finance data, based on current prices (rates of inﬂ ation 
in that period were 7.3% in 1999, 10.1% in 2000 and 5.5% in 2001).
Th e explosion of borrowing by counties and regions is in part simply a statistical 
eﬀ ect that results from the fact that their borrowing in the ﬁ rst year of their operation 
was near zero. But it also shows that these agents entered the market much more easily 
than municipalities did in the period immediately after their creation. 
Th e increased use of debt by local governments has also translated into a signiﬁ cant 
decline in the percentage of their investments ﬁ nanced on a pay-as-you-go basis. Indeed, 
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debt as a source of investment ﬁ nance has risen from a mere 6% in 1995, to 13% in 
1998 and about 21%  in 2001 (see Tables 2.6 and 2.10). Th is growth is probably the 
strongest evidence of an increase in the long-term planning capacities of Polish local 
governments and their movement away from investment strategies based on attempts 
to do a little bit of everything at once, towards strategies based on quickly completing 
priority projects.
Table 2.10
Project Finance Sources in 1999 and 200052 [%]
1999 2000
Earmarked grants 26.32 25.56
Operating surpluses 60.54 45.19
Deferred surplus 2.05 8.39
Bond revenues 0.82 3.72
Loans/credits 10.27 17.14
Source:     Investment spending by local governments in 1997–2000. Finanse Komunalne 4/2001.
At the same time, however, the above table shows that Polish local governments on 
the whole are still underutilizing their debt-carrying capacities. In short, they are still 
ﬁ nancing more than half of their investments on a pay-as-you-go basis (operating rev-
enues plus deferred surplus), which suggests that a much larger share of their revenues 
could be leveraged through debt,  allowing for higher investment rates and the faster 
completion of projects.
Local government borrowing also remains—at least globally—substantially below 
its statutory limits. At the end of 2001, the total outstanding debt of all local govern-
ments was only 15.4% of their total annual income, even though the statutory limit 
for any individual local government is 60%. Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Finance’s 
report on local government debt stressed that despite the rapid rise in local government 
borrowing, “the collective level of local government debt does not create a ﬁ nancial 
threat to these entities.”
But this statement is not true for all local governments. Indeed, for the ﬁ rst time 
since the emergence of the subsovereign debt market in Poland, the period 1999–2002 
saw some serious indications of distress across individual local governments as well as 
some more general disturbing tendencies.
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3.2.1   Negative Signals in the Development of the Market
Despite this growth in the municipal capital market, there are still many local governments 
that oppose borrowing, and particularly commercial borrowing. Alongside the simple 
rejection of the idea of debt, expressed in statements like “our council members are 
wise and won’t allow borrowing,” one often encounters a “business” approach to local 
government debt. Here, local government oﬃ  cials claim that debt is justiﬁ ed only in 
cases where the return on the investment will pay back the costs of the loan. As a result, 
they will take loans to ﬁ nance the preparation of undeveloped land for sale but not to 
repair roads or build schools where the return on investment is diﬃ  cult or impossible 
to calculate. Such attitudes mean that despite the growth of the municipal capital 
market many local governments remain reluctant to borrow at all, or do so only to a 
very limited degree.53
Table 2.11
Number of Local Governments with Little or No Debt in 2001
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gmina 163 6.4 209 8.5 280 11.2
Rural gmina 145 9.1 168 10.5 202 12.7
Urban–rural 14 2.4 23 4.0 52 9.0
Cities 4 1.6 18 7.1 26 10.2
Counties 15 4.9 143 46.4 63 20.5
Cities with county rights 0 0 1 1.5 7 10.8
Regions 0 0 4 25 3 18.8
Source:     Own calculations based on the Ministry of Finance’s information about the debt  of local govern-
ments for 1999–2001 as well as the ﬁ rst two quarters of 2002.
As Table 2.11 shows, local governments that are the least active on the municipal 
capital market are the smallest and ﬁ nancially weakest ones.  Th is can be seen by 
comparing the borrowing practices of big cities with county rights to those of all other 
local governments. For example, at the end of 2000 only 12% of cities with county rights 
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had incurred no, or minimal debt, while almost 72% of counties and 44% of regions 
were in this situation. Similarly, 26% of gminas  and 32% of rural gminas had little or 
no debt.  In short, it is fair to say that many local governments remain ill-disposed 
towards debt. At the same time, the strong correlation between low borrowing and low 
budget revenues suggests that much of this reluctance is ﬁ nancially justiﬁ ed.54
Alongside local governments that have yet to incur signiﬁ cant amounts of debt, we 
are beginning to see some that are having problems meeting their obligations. Th e data 
available since 1999 indicate that local governments are not quite as reliable borrowers as 
people have come to assume. As seen in Figure 2.5 below, they are increasingly delaying 
payments to their creditors. Th is is particularly true with respect to suppliers of goods 
and services and to public sector agencies like the Health Insurance Fund (ZUS—Group 
3 of the public sector in Figure 2.5), or the hospitals, schools and cultural institutions 
under their control (Group 2). Nonetheless, local governments have thus far been very 
careful to pay their bank debts on time
Figure 2.5
Overdue Liabilities as a Percentage of all Local Government Liabilities (2001)
Gminas Poviats Cities Voivodships
Foreign 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Other domestic 4.60 6.55 2.80 6.34
Commercial banks 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public sector 2.43 6.03 0.94 4.26
Source:          Own calculation based on Ministry of Finance Reports.
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Th is problem of delaying payments to suppliers is very apparent in discussions with 
local government oﬃ  cials. Th ey are very aware of their strong position as buyers in an 
economy in which they are a major source of stable purchasing power. Th ey are also quite 
conscious of the fact that they are more and more frequently postponing payments to 
suppliers in order to meet their priorities. In fact, local government ﬁ nancial liabilities 
to suppliers have grown suﬃ  ciently to become a commodity that the banks have begun 
to buy and sell.  
Th e largest share of delayed payments comes from counties and regions. Th ese 
local governments have been operating on the market for a very short time and, unlike 
municipalities, they have virtually no revenue-raising authority, have been given a much 
smaller share of the ﬁ scal pie and are extremely dependent on transfers from the national 
government. All this makes their ﬁ nancial position much weaker. For example, delays 
in transfer payments that municipalities can make up from other resources immediately 
force counties and regions either to go to the banks or to delay payments to other 
agents. For example, in 2000 counties did not receive funds for the payment of health 
insurance fees for the unemployed. As a result, counties did not fulﬁ ll their obligations 
to the Health Insurance Fund (ZUS) and at the end of 2000 about 50% of all counties’ 
debt obligations were to ZUS.
Problems of a similar though more profound and generalized nature were caused 
by the increase in teachers’ pay that was mandated by the National Government in 
1999 but insuﬃ  ciently accounted for in the education subvention to local governments 
made in 2000. Local governments estimated the shortfall at approximately 1.3 billion 
zlotys (USD 320 million). Eventually the national government made up most of the 
diﬀ erence, but this was paid out in installments at the end of 2000 and the beginning of 
2001.  As a result, local governments had to cover the shortfall on their own throughout 
most of 2000. Some local governments withdrew from other expenditures, particularly 
investment expenditures. Others went to the debt market, in most cases taking loans 
with payment periods of longer than one year, and in some cases longer than ﬁ ve years. 
Such credits were taken by 710 local governments, including 50 cities of county status, 
575 other municipal governments and 81 counties. Th is accounted for almost a quarter 
of all credits taken by local governments in 2000 (Jerzmanowska, 2001).
Th is phenomenon of local governments incurring long-term debt to pay short-term 
operating deﬁ cits has become increasingly and disturbingly apparent in the last few 
years. As we have indicated earlier, Polish regulations state that local governments cannot 
have year-end deﬁ cits. At the same time, they deﬁ ne long-term debt as an instrument 
to prevent a deﬁ cit and not to realize an investment. 
Nevertheless, according to recent RIO reports to the Sejm more and more local 
governments are incurring debt greater than their deﬁ cits in order to pay outstanding 
obligations from previous years.55 In 2000 approximately 11.8% of borrowing proceeds 
were used to ﬁ nance liabilities carried over from previous years, while by 2001 the 
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ﬁ gure had risen to 27.3%. Th is tendency is not only an expression of bad borrowing 
practices but is also against the law. It should be noted that the rolling over of debt is 
a practice not only of municipalities, but also of counties and regions that have only 
begun borrowing in the last three years. As the RIO report suggests, this “means that 
the level of debt that can be safely incurred by these local government units—counties 
and regions—is signiﬁ cantly lower than their statutory limits and much lower than 
what is safe for municipalities.”56
Similar problems are apparent if one compares the volume of local government 
borrowing with the volume of local government investment spending. Long-term 
debt obligations should, both in theory and practice, be used exclusively for capital 
improvements. Nonetheless, in 2001, 160 local governments borrowed considerably 
more than they spent on all new assets (a category wider than simply investment 
expenditures). Th is group included 32 counties, 5 cities with county rights and 123 
municipalities. Diﬀ erences of a few percentage points can be explained by adjustments 
in spending made during the investment process. But in 44 cases the borrowing exceeded 
expenditures on new assets by more than 50% and in ﬁ ve cases more than 90%. 
Th e worsening ﬁ nancial condition of many local governments is also suggested by the 
increasing number of them that are exceeding their statutory debt limits. As noted earlier, 
total outstanding local government debt is still equal to only 15% of their total annual 
revenues, much less than the statutory limit of 60% for individual local governments). 
In 2001, nevertheless, 21 local governments exceeded their statutory limits. And in 
one of these, outstanding debt was more than 116% of the local government’s annual 
revenues. Th is is not only against the law, but has also revealed the fact that Poland 
has not put in place any legal procedures that would allow for the amelioration of the 
problem.57  How serious these problems are or will become remains to be seen. But there 
are enough signs of distress to suggest that the situation should at least be monitored 
closely. At a minimum, it would seem advisable for regulators to clarify the purposes 
for which debt can be incurred (to ﬁ nance investments, not deﬁ cits) and to review the 
equity and adequacy of the intergovernmental ﬁ nance system. 
 At a minimum, the appearance of these problems should be producing more 
circumspect behavior on the part of lenders. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this is 
happening and the banks continue to chase after local government clients in ways that 
suggest  they are not always really examining the creditworthiness of individual local 
governments. Th is behavior can be explained at least partially by the overall credit situ-
ation of the banks. In the ﬁ rst half of 2001, approximately 20% of all bank loans had 
been oﬃ  cially classiﬁ ed as risky because debtors had missed debt service payments. At 
the same time, however, only 0.01% of all local government debt had been so classiﬁ ed. 
In 2001 only ﬁ ve local governments missed debt-service payments on loans (four rural 
gminas for a total of about one-half  million PLN, and one county for a total of PLN 
3,000). 
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Th e comparative ﬁ nancial strength of local governments as borrowers, combined 
with the competition between the banks and the environmental funds as well as among 
each other, has allowed local governments to extract increasingly favorable credit and 
service terms. Th is can be seen in the extremely rigorous terms that local governments 
include in the public tenders they issue for banking services of all sorts. In fact they are 
frequently getting loans with interest rates equal to or even less than WIBOR. More 
disturbingly, bankers are increasingly complaining that local governments are refusing to 
provide information about their ﬁ nancial standing during or after these tenders, because 
they feel that they can always ﬁ nd somebody who will issue them loans on favorable 
terms no matter what information they provide. 
Th e competition between banks for local government business is particular visible on 
the municipal bond market. Between 1999 and 2001, 131 new bond issues were made 
(see Table 2.12). Along with municipalities, 24 counties and 2 regions issued bonds. As 
before, most of the issues were small, with 73 of them being for sums of less than PLN 
5 million (USD 1.2 million) and none of them being public issues.
Table 2.12
Number of Municipal Bond Issues by Value [PLN] 
(1999–2001)  
Year 1999 2000 2001
Number of Issues
>0–5 million 10 25 38
>5–10 million 3 13 15
>10–20 million 2 4 9
Over 20 million 0 5 8
All issues 15 46 70
Value of Issues
Minimum 1 0.7 0.8
Maximum 20 144 105
Source:     Own calculations on the basis of data from Fitch Ratings, Poland.
Such bonds are obviously too small to interest serious institutional investors such 
as investment funds, insurance companies or the newly created private pension funds. 
Th ese institutions, particularly the latter two, possess huge resources that must be in-
vested over the long term because their ﬁ nancial liabilities typically fall in the relatively 
distant future. 
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Elsewhere in the world, municipal bonds are often favored by such institutions 
precisely because of their relative stability and their long maturities. Unfortunately 
this is not yet the case in Poland. Indeed the legal provisions that speciﬁ cally include 
municipal bonds as an acceptable investment instrument for insurance companies and 
pension funds have not helped in this respect: representatives of the pension funds, 
while interested in municipal bonds, say that the size of the issues is too small at the 
moment to make them of interest.58
 As a result, the vast majority of existing municipal bonds have stayed within the 
portfolios of the banks that have organized and underwritten the issues. In 2001, banks 
held 72% of all bonds issued by municipalities, 92% of those issued by counties and 
100% of those issued by regions. And most of those bonds that have been sold to 
outside investors have been from the larger issues of cities with county rights. Here, 
banks held 68% of the bonds, other domestic investors 20%, and 12% were bought 
by foreign investors.
4.   EU FUNDS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEBT MARKET
Accession to the EU will create serious challenges for Polish local governments and the 
subsovereign debt market. Accession will be accompanied by a huge inﬂ ux of grant 
funds, ﬁ rst through various pre-accession programs like SAPARD, and then through 
the EU’s structural adjustment funds. Th e volume of these funds will depend on many 
factors but reasonable estimates suggest that Poland will be eligible for between 10 and 
15 billion zlotys of annual support in the years immediately before and after entering 
the EU. Moreover, the end-users of much of this support will be local governments.
Absorbing these monies, however, with not be easy for at least three reasons: 
      •     First, EU investment grants not only must be included in the investment plans 
of local governments, but they must be enumerated in the regional investment 
strategies of their regions, aligned with the national development plan presented 
by Poland to Brussels; 
      •     Second, under many programs investments must be underway or in some cases 
completed (as under the SAPARD program) before grants are awarded; 
      •     Th ird and most importantly, EU grants can ﬁ nance a maximum of 75% of an 
investment’s total costs. 
Th us, the absorption of EU funds will require from local governments not only 
signiﬁ cant organizational eﬀ ort, but signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial engagement as well. In short, 
many local governments will not have the funds necessary to meet the co-ﬁ nancing 
requirements of EU aid monies, or even to begin investments whose costs are to be 
reimbursed by EU grants. Th is is already a very serious problem with the PHARE and 
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SAPARD program which reimburses rural jurisdictions for local infrastructure projects, 
but only after they are completed. Because many of these jurisdictions are among Poland’s 
poorest, they frequently do not have the funds to begin even modest improvements. As 
a result they cannot access the funds designed to help them, and the consumption of 
SAPARD funds has been slower than expected.
To solve this problem, many Polish banks and also the Environmental Funds have 
begun to oﬀ er so-called bridge credits to local governments for SAPARD-related projects. 
Some local governments have been reluctant to use these loans because they see no reason 
why they should have to borrow at commercial rates to access grants. Others can not 
use them because they have already reached their statutory debt limits. In fact, 23% 
of gminas who did not apply to SAPARD in September of 2002 stated that the main 
reason was that the borrowing they would have had to incur to access the SAPARD 
funds would push them over their debt limits (Majchrzak 2002). A further 61.5% of 
respondents said they did not apply simply because of an overall lack of funds. 
Th ese opinions run parallel to the negative market trends that we have already 
described. It is among rural gminas that we see the greatest number of local governments 
that have not borrowed. Th is is a result both of their ﬁ nancial position and the skill-
level of their oﬃ  cials who do not understand the market and are afraid of it. At the 
same time, it is precisely among rural gminas that we see the greatest number of local 
governments that have crossed or are close to crossing their statutory debt limits: of 
the 21 local governments whose total outstanding debt in 2001 exceeded 60% of their 
revenues, ten were rural gminas and seven were rural-urban jurisdictions, while of the 48 
local governments whose total outstanding debt was greater than 50% of their revenues 
(but less than 60%) 25 were rural gminas, and 13 were rural–urban jurisdictions. 
Many local governments also complain that their obligation to choose lenders 
through the use of the Public Procurement Law takes up too much time and complicates 
already burdensome EU grant procedures. Whether these complaints are really justiﬁ ed is 
hard to tell because many local governments would rather not use the Public Procurement 
Law at all59 and/or have had diﬃ  culty mastering the art of issuing tenders that really 
reﬂ ect their needs.  
Inexperience with the Public Procurement Law may also account for another problem 
raised by local governments with respect to bridge loans. In short, local government 
oﬃ  cials frequently complain that the bridge loans oﬀ ered by the banks are inﬂ exible 
and do not reﬂ ect their real needs. Th is is because the banks typically oﬀ er loans for 
the entire value of the project, when local governments would prefer that they provide 
loan capital on an as-needed basis so as to avoid paying interest costs on the entire sum 
while the project is being built. Much of this problem, however, could be the result of 
the inability of local governments to issue tenders that clearly require banks to present 
oﬀ ers in terms of commitment fees for standby credit, and interest fees for actually 
loaned funds. Finally, local governments would prefer that they repay the credit when 
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EU funds are made available, while the banks insist that loans be repaid on schedules 
independent of EU promises (Bogucka, 2002).  
All of these problems have resulted in less use of the bridge loans by local governments 
than the banks had expected. Nonetheless and despite these problems, the SAPARD 
program is now enjoying considerable popularity and analysts estimate that the number 
of applications prepared by local governments in 2002 will amount to 162% of the 
amount earmarked by the EU for the next round of the program. 
But the larger challenge for Poland raised by the absorption of EU investment 
grants is simply: Where will local governments get the capital they need to meet the 
EU’s co-ﬁ nancing requirements? Th e scale of this problem can be illustrated by making 
a few assumptions and simple calculations. First, assume (conservatively) that Poland 
will receive about 12 billion zlotys (EUR 3 billion) of assistance per year from the EU. 
Th en assume (again conservatively) that about two-thirds of this (PLN 8 billion, or 
EUR 2 billion) should be consumed by local governments for infrastructure invest-
ments. Finally, assume (probably unrealistically) that local governments provide only 
the minimum 25% share of co-ﬁ nancing required by the EU for every project they 
engage in. 
Taken together, these assumption would mean that  Polish local governments will 
have to ﬁ nd a minimum of two billion zlotys (EUR 5 million) a year in new investment 
funds if EU grants are not to substitute for existing investment spending. Or put another 
way, Polish local governments will have to increase their investment spending by 18% 
in order to fully absorb EU grant funds under the above assumptions. Moreover, if all 
of this increase were to be ﬁ nanced from debt, the total outstanding debt of Polish lo-
cal governments would increase in the ﬁ rst year by more than 16%. Th us, even if local 
governments meet a substantial share of their co-ﬁ nancing requirements from current 
operating surpluses, the absorption of EU funds will require a signiﬁ cant expansion of 
Poland’s subsovereign capital market.   
Th e ability of local governments to increase their use of debt capital, however, may 
be blocked by the statutory limits currently imposed on their borrowing. As we have 
seen, an increasing number of local governments has approached or even crossed these 
limits and for many, particularly rural ones, this undoubtedly raises serious questions 
about their creditworthiness. Nonetheless, these limits have little to do with the real 
capacity of many local governments to ﬁ nance debt, and maintaining these limits could 
well block Poland’s ability to absorb EU funds eﬀ ectively. In short, to make full use of 
EU grants, Poland will probably have to liberalize the regulation of municipal debt.
Even more profound and paradoxical questions are raised by the linkage of local 
governments’ right to borrow with the borrowing of the national government. As we have 
seen, Poland wrote into its constitution the Maastricht Treaty’s limits on the consolidated 
public debt of EU members. Unlike other countries, Poland, in its eﬀ ort to bootstrap 
its way into the EU, not only included guarantees in its calculation of the consolidated 
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public debt, but (uniquely) imposed limits on the right of local governments to borrow 
when the consolidated public debt exceeded 50% of the GDP. 
Until recently, exceeding this level seemed only a theoretical possibility. But unfor-
tunately this is no longer the case and in 2003 the Ministry of Finance expects Poland’s 
consolidated public debt to cross the 50% threshold.  As a result, in 2004 the ability of all 
local governments to incur debt will be limited by the ratio of the national government’s 
debt to its current revenues. Th us, if the national government attempts to reduce public 
debt by, for example, lowering its own borrowing to 10% of its revenues in 2004, the 
statutory debt limit for all local governments for servicing loans would fall from 15% 
to 10% of their annual revenues. Obviously this would further limit the ability of local 
governments to increase their investment spending in order to make use of EU loans. 
In short, the measures Poland took to get into the EU may ironically hamper its ability 
to make eﬀ ective use of the gains of EU membership.
5.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Th ere is little question that Poland’s subsovereign debt market is one of the most robust, 
dynamic and sound of the post-communist world. Th is is due ﬁ rst and foremost to the 
fact that Poland managed to avoid the jurisdictional fragmentation that occurred in many 
other countries, and has done a reasonably good job in assigning service responsibilities 
to appropriate levels of government and equipping them with adequate revenues.
Th e major exception here concerns the poviats. Many of them are too small and 
too ﬁ scally weak to support the functions they have been assigned. Th e amalgamation 
of some of the weaker units would be extremely beneﬁ cial for the operation of the debt 
market. Similarly, it would be desirable if their revenues were made less dependent on 
earmarked grants. 
In the same vein, the ability of all local governments to make eﬀ ective use of the 
debt market would be increased if they were given greater revenue-raising authority. For 
municipalities this could be done most easily by increasing their control over the base 
and rate of the property tax, and/or by moving towards a more ad valorem  system of 
property valuation. Th is could be done for all local governments by converting shared 
income taxes into local income taxes. Under such a system, the base of the income tax 
would still be set by the national government, and the national government would 
remain responsible for its collection. But local government would determine the rate 
they would impose on their residents, perhaps between minimum and maximum levels 
set by the national government. 
Poland has also done a fairly good job in establishing a coherent regulatory framework 
for local government budgeting and ﬁ nancial reporting, and for municipal borrowing. 
With respect to the former, the major shortcoming of the current system is the lack of 
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a clear separation of operating and capital budgets at the local level, and a confusing 
deﬁ nition of what constitutes a deﬁ cit. As a result, it would be extremely beneﬁ cial to 
the operation of the market and to the overall transparency of local government ﬁ nances 
if operating and capital budgets were formally separated. Th is would also prevent local 
governments from using debt capital to ﬁ nance operating deﬁ cits.
Probably Poland should also impose some prudent regulations on what local govern-
ments can invest in, because sooner or later a local government will try to maximize its 
revenues by taking risks on the securities market and will get itself in trouble. 
More problematic are the debt regulations that link local government and national 
government borrowing when the consolidated public debt exceeds more than 50% of 
the GDP. As we have suggested, this is both unwise and unfair. More importantly, it may 
seriously impede the ability of local governments to absorb EU structural adjustment 
funds if they must borrow—as they will have to—to meet the co-ﬁ nancing requirement 
attached to these funds. Th e simplest way to cut this link while still ensuring that Poland 
could meet its obligations under the Maastricht Treaty would be to set a global limit of 
3% to 5% of the GDP on the total outstanding debt of local governments (currently it is 
1.5%), while lowering the ceiling on the national government’s part of the consolidated 
public debt to between 55% and 57% of GDP. Th is would at once create the borrowing 
room that local governments will probably need to absorb EU funds eﬀ ectively, while 
also alleviating the moral hazards inherent in the current system. It will also, however, 
force the national government to adopt more rigorous ﬁ scal policies.
In the same vein, Poland might consider removing the current stock and ﬂ ow limita-
tions that are being used to regulate municipal borrowing. Th ere are three reasons for 
this suggestion. First and most importantly, these limitations provide a false sense of 
security that encourages lax attitudes among lenders, because the real creditworthiness 
of a local government has little to do with these limits. Second, as we have seen, the 
limits are diﬃ  cult to enforce in practice. And third, these limits may again restrain the 
ability of local governments to absorb EU funds.
Poland would also do well to make greater use of means testing in the allocation 
of national government investment grants, to ensure that these monies do not crowd 
out commercial borrowing and that those that can pay for infrastructure improvements 
on their own would do so. With the inﬂ ow of EU structural adjustment funds, the 
biggest challenge here probably lies in developing a domestic system of diﬀ erentiated 
co-ﬁ nancing rates for EU monies. Th is would guarantee that the poorest jurisdictions 
were only responsible for the minimum 25% own contribution, while the richer ones 
would have to come up with more.
Finally, there must be a continued eﬀ ort to enhance the planning skills and capaci-
ties of local governments, particularly in rural jurisdictions, in budgeting, ﬁ nance and 
capital improvement. For many years it was outside donors who supported such training 
eﬀ orts. But if Poland is to make maximum use of its subsovereign credit market and 
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prevent mishaps, the national government must make a concerted eﬀ ort to continue 
an endeavor that has clearly seen results.
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NOTES
1 As we explain later, the term “operating deﬁ cit” is not deﬁ ned in Polish law, as there is no formal 
separation between capital and operating budgets (and as we argue in this chapter, we think this is a 
serious drawback of the Polish system). When we use term “operating revenues” further in the chapter, 
we deﬁ ne it in a simplistic form as total revenues net of capital grants received by local governments. 
(In more sophisticated formulation we should also deduct revenues from municipal properties). Th e 
term “operating surplus” we deﬁ ne as operating revenues minus operating expenditures. 
2 Th ere has been considerable inconsistency in the use of the terms “own” and “delegated” functions. 
For example, both pre-school education for six-year olds and primary education are considered own 
functions. Local governments, however, must ﬁ nance the education of six-year olds out of their 
general revenues, while they receive a per pupil subvention for primary education (as part of a freely 
disposable grant). See Levitas, 1999.
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3 Preschool education was made an own function in 1991. Between 1991 and 1996, gminas could 
assume responsibility for primary and secondary education on a voluntary basis. After 1996, 
responsibility for primary education was made obligatory. In 1999, secondary education became an 
own function of counties.
4 Th e 1999 reforms created 17 self-standing health insurance funds, 16 regional funds, and one fund 
for certain groups of civil servants. In 2002, they were reconsolidated into a single national fund 
which is ﬁ nanced by a percentage of personal income taxes. Initially, the Sejmiks were responsible for 
the oversight of these funds. Th ey remain responsible for the oversight of the environmental funds 
discussed later in the text.
5 Th e only major “local” responsibility that has not been transferred to local governments is the police. 
County authorities, however, have a role in nominating local police chiefs and a substantial part of 
public safety spending comes from county budgets.
6 Th ere has been considerable confusion in Poland over the term own taxes, with many people 
considering shared taxes “own revenues” because of their origin basis and their stability. Indeed, the 
Ministry of Finance has recently and regrettably begun to treat shared taxes as own taxes in many of 
its statistical reports.  
7 Th is is a ﬂ at rate tax imposed on the economic activity of business with very low turnover. Over the 
course of the decade the turnover minimums have not been increased in line with inﬂ ation, making 
fewer businesses able to use this form, and hence reducing its importance to gminas as a source of 
revenue.
8 For many years Poland has been discussing placing the property tax on an ad valorem basis. 
9 Gminas do have the right to impose special taxes if approved through a popular referendum. To our 
knowledge, however, only one gmina has successfully used this right. See Swianiewicz, 1996.
10 Not all own revenues are included here. Of those missing the most important is the small business tax 
or octroi, whose rates and base, like most other “own revenues” are set by the national government.
11 Th ere are very signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in the structure of revenues (and expenditures) across rural, 
urban and mixed gminas. It is beyond the scope of this paper to seriously examine these diﬀ erences. 
Not surprisingly, rural gminas are much more dependent on transfers than other jurisdictions. 
12 Municipalities now receive 5% of CIT. For ﬁ rms with headquarters located in other areas, the 
municipality in which the branch oﬃ  ce is located receives an amount prorated on the basis of the 
percentage of ﬁ rms’ employees working in the branch oﬃ  ce. Nonetheless, more than a third of all 
CIT taxes ﬂ ow to the city of Warsaw. 
13 At the same time, local governments whose per capita incomes are more than 150% of the national 
average pay into the equalization system a percentage (20–30%) of the diﬀ erence between their per 
capita revenues and 150% of the national average. 
14 It should be noted that local governments can spend the education component of the general subsidy 
as they see ﬁ t. Indeed, Polish reformers have consistently defended gminas’ right to spend education 
monies on other functions by arguing that since primary education is an own function under the 
law on Local Governments, money received for it from the national government through the Law on 
Gmina Revenues should be freely disposable. In practice, few municipalities do this.
15 Prior to the 1999 reforms, the Sejmiks were composed of delegates appointed by municipal councils 
and not popularly elected representatives. Th eir functions were also purely advisory.
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16 Unfortunately there has been little empirical work on this issue. Th e one study we know of compares 
the allocation policies in two regions for the year 2000. In one region, more than 50% of the funds 
went to poorer jurisdictions, in the other less than 50%. See Goluszek, 2002. 
17 It superceded the Law on the State Budget of 1991. Th e new law introduced signiﬁ cant but not 
radical changes in the regulatory regime governing local government budgeting practices. In the 
following, we discuss the structure of the current regime, indicating in the text or notes where this 
regime diﬀ ers from the past. 
18 Article 11 paragraph 4; Article 24, paragraph 2 reads: “Public resources originating from particular 
sources cannot be dedicated to ﬁ nance speciﬁ cally named expenditures unless another law speciﬁ es 
otherwise.” Th ere are in fact numerous exceptions to the law with respect to the state budget, and 
the control and transparency of oﬀ -budget funds of the national government remains a problem. See 
Gilowska et al., 1998.  
19 Th ere is a debate about the whether it is desirable for the national government to separate its budget 
into operating and capital components. Most countries do not do this because such separation 
might compromise the national government’s ability to perform its macroeconomic, ﬁ scal and 
redistributive functions. Th ere is, however, general agreement that because local governments do 
not—and should not—perform these functions their ﬁ nances resemble those of corporations more 
than those of the national government. As such, most experts feel that they should be required to 
separate their operating and capital budgets. Indeed, many states—both unitary and federal—require 
this separation for local governments. See Levitas, McCullough & Pigey, 1997. 
20 For ﬂ ow limits, guarantees are factored into the debt limit as that portion of the obligation which 
a local government would have to pay in order to meet the normal debt-service schedule of a credit 
if the borrower defaulted. In fact, however, under Polish law a creditor has the right to demand the 
repayment of the entire obligation if a debt service payment has been missed.  For stock limits, the 
value of the entire guarantee is considered part of the outstanding debt. Articles 113 & 114, Law on 
Public Finances. 
21 Article 51, Law on Public Finances. Article 112.2 of the Public Finance Law also states that local 
governments can only borrow from Polish Banks, a limitation which the Article also states will be 
waived when Poland enters the EU. 
22 It is worth adding that local governments are still making use of hard currency loans because of 
the appreciating value of the zloty. Th ey do this by stating the value of the loan in zloty terms and 
then signing standard currency-risk agreements with the banks. According to the NBP 13.4% of 
outstanding local government debt at the end of 2001 was in fact in hard currency, up 41% from the 
previous year.
23 Article 53, Law on Public Finances. Th e term “consolidated public debt” is deﬁ ned by the EU as the 
total debt of the national government plus the total debt of local governments, minus loans between 
levels of government. Th e calculation of the consolidated public debt is governed by EU regulations 
on national accounts. Th e Maastricht treaty states that the consolidated public debt of EU members 
should not exceed 60% of the GDP, and that the deﬁ cit of the national government should not 
exceed 3% of the GDP. Th e way Poland calculates its consolidated national debt is more rigorous 
than EU standards because guarantees are included. Th us, in 2001 the consolidated public debt as 
calculated by Polish standards stood at 43.2% of the GDP while according to EU norms it would 
have been 38.7%. Poland is thus—at least on this front—more “European” than the EU itself. Th e 
Italian consolidated debt was 109% of the GDP in 2001, and both France and Germany currently 
have budget deﬁ cits that exceed EU norms.
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24 According to the Ministry of Finance the consolidated public debt stood at 49.8% of the GDP in 
2002.
25 Th is is particularly true because information on the consolidated public debt is contained in the 
budget law of the national government. As a result, local governments can anticipate when debt 
limits might kick in in subsequent years and thus try to borrow now, to avoid limits later.
26 Th e most famous case in this respect is that of Orange County, one of the richest in America that got 
itself in severe ﬁ nancial trouble by investing in extremely volatile futures markets, and then defaulted 
on its debt when the market turned against it.
27 Ordinance of the Minister of Finance #364 of April 14, 1999, concerning the speciﬁ c principles for 
classifying debt considered part of the state public debt.
28 Attempts by the government to include such provisions in the law in 1999 were rejected by local 
governments on the grounds that they were too costly, and that in fact, local government accounts 
were monitored by the Regional Accounting Oﬃ  ces (see below). 
29 Th e Budget Classiﬁ cation System is a three-tier system composed of chapters (dział), sub-chapters 
(rozdział) and paragraphs (paragraf ). Th e System was developed in the 1980s for use in a radically 
diﬀ erent organizational and political environment. Over the course of the 1990s, incremental 
changes were introduced into the system but it wasn’t until 2000 that major changes were made. Th e 
new system provides better comparative data on gmina ﬁ nances, particularly local government debt. 
Nonetheless, it is still a very detailed, line-item set of reporting requirements and in and of itself will 
not encourage movement towards more output-oriented budgeting practices. It must also be used by 
the budgetary enterprises and auxiliary units of local governments.
30 Cochran, DeAngelis, Levitas, 1998. It is also unclear whether the RIOs have the ﬁ nancial skills to 
determine whether a particular borrowing will actually push a local government over the statutory 
debt limits in future years, since credits can be structured to postpone or substantially reduce 
immediate debt service payments.
31 CERA stands for the Central European Rating Agency.
32 During the 1990s, about a half-dozen Polish cities received ratings from S&P’s or Moody’s for hard 
currency bond issues. In most cases, the ratings were—strangely—equal to those of the national 
government. 
33 Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance of August 1, 1995, concerning the speciﬁ c principles of 
accounting and the uniﬁ ed chart of accounts for state and local government budgetary units and 
their auxiliary units, budgetary enterprises, state and local government targeted funds, as well as local 
governments and their units.
34 High inﬂ ation, poor information on the book values of many assets and the fact that public sector 
entities do not amortize their assets has made local governments very reluctant to spend the time and 
energy necessary to fully inventory and value their capital stock.
35 In the following we examine only the risk coeﬃ  cients for assets on the balance sheets of banks.
36 Th ere is also no adjustment of risk coeﬃ  cients for rated and unrated debt instruments.
37 Information based on interviews with leading underwriters of municipal bonds and representatives 
of CERA and CeTO.  Article 71 of the Banking Law limits the number of bonds or loans that a bank 
may have with a single economic agent to 25% of its own funds. Given the low level of capitalization 
of most Polish banks, and the size of many infrastructure investments, this limit may lead some banks 
to prefer underwriting bonds and purchasing some of the issue, rather than assuming responsibility 
for the entire loan. 
76
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
38 Between 1994 and 1999 USAID invested considerable resources in helping the Polish SEC make 
Polish securities legislation open to municipal bonds. Th ese eﬀ orts were on the whole remarkably 
successful. 
39 It also created the possibility that assets related to essential public purposes could be used to satisfy 
the claims of bondholders.
40 Other amendments removed the requirement that bond issuers have three years of ﬁ nancial 
history, a requirement that impeded the formation of special purpose vehicles and thus blocked the 
development of securitized transactions. 
41 Th e banks have argued that traditional forms of credit will be cheaper. It also seems that they have 
no real desire to issue revenue bonds because at the moment they regard local government general 
obligation bonds and bank loans as credits worth holding in their own portfolios.
42 Th e Polish Banking Association, CERA, CeTO and the KPWiG have requested that this fee be 
eliminated or reduced. Th ere have also been claims that the charges imposed by the National 
Depository for Securities for the registration of dematerialized issues are too high, particularly for 
issues traded on the secondary market.
43 Th e National Environmental Fund was created on the basis of the Law For Environmental Protection 
of January, 1980. Th e regional funds were established in 1993. 
44 For example, in January 1999 the rediscount rate was 15.5% while the three-month WIBOR rate 
was 14.8%, which is typically greater by a margin of 1%–2%.
45 Th e funds also subsidized investments during the 1990s by oﬀ ering loans at ﬁ xed interest rates when 
inﬂ ation was quite high.
46 Th is fund was established on the basis of an agreement between the EU and the Polish government 
as a way to make use of the proﬁ ts made from the sale of food aid provided to Poland during 1989-
1990. 
47 See, for example, Davis, K.J. (1988): “Municipal Development Funds and Th eir Intermediaries.” 
World Bank: Washington; Laidback, J., J. Ahmad, and R. Bird (1999): “Rethinking Decentralization 
in Developing Countries.” World Bank: Washington.
48 Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work devoted to this interesting question. A study of 
the allocation policies of environmental funds in two regions during the 1990s shows that in one 
region, loans did go disproportionately to poorer rural jurisdictions. In the other, however, grants 
went disproportionately to poorer jurisdictions, while lending was concentrated in richer areas. See 
Pozniak, 2000.
49 Ordinance No. 5/98, Banking Supervision Commission of December 2, 1998 concerning the way of 
calculating the solvency of banks and the risk ration requirements of speciﬁ c assets and liabilities. 
50 Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance of December 10, 2001, concerning the rules governing the 
creation of banking reserves. Dz. U. 149.1672.
51 Earmarked grants including investment grants from extra-budgetary funds.
52 Borrowing on preferential terms is treated a little diﬀ erently, as an occasion that must be taken 
advantage of and as a way to show one’s voters that you are quick on your feet. 
53 Research shows also that this correlation is present when borrowing is compared to own budget 
revenues as opposed to total budget revenues. 
54 Some 200 local governments entered into long debt agreements despite running budget surpluses 
in 2001. Moreover, in over 1,000 cases, the planned borrowings for the year exceeded the planned 
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deﬁ cits, raising questions about what the debt was to be used for.  RIO oﬃ  cials explain this as the 
product of a time lag in which “income” from borrowings made in the previous year is realized in 
the next year. Even so, this “extra” credit should be registered in local government budgets as planned 
revenues and expenditure.
55 “Budget execution of Local Government in 2001 in light of the report for the Sejm and Senate.” 
Finanse Komunalne,  April, 2002.
56 As we have indicated earlier, Poland, unlike Hungary, for example, has not passed any municipal 
bankruptcy procedures that would allow for the orderly working out of the ﬁ nancial troubles of local 
governments.
57 It is necessary to remember that these funds are legally restricted from owning more than 5% of 
privately issued securities from a single issuer, and 15% of the publicly issued securities of a single 
issuer. Th ey would probably be interested even in illiquid assets. But it clearly does not pay for them 
to initiate a transaction for extremely small sums. 
58 Local governments oﬃ  cials often make statements like: “We can’t choose the most attractive oﬀ er 
because the bank that oﬀ ers it must also win the tender, and nobody can guarantee that.”
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1.    INTRODUCTION: 
      LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND BORROWING1
Hungary has gone through a radical structural change since the fall of the socialist 
block in Central and Eastern Europe. Two basic processes dominated the transition: 
privatization and decentralization. Hungary’s experiences oﬀ er evidence that political 
decentralization of the state sector can make a substantial contribution to an eﬃ  cient 
economic adjustment during the period of transition. Local governments under ﬁ scal 
pressure but enjoying broad autonomy over spending have chosen a level and a form of 
public service provision that resulted in huge advantages both at the macro and micro 
level. However, the experience has also shown that political, ﬁ scal and administrative 
decentralization is a process that inevitably involves conﬂ icts between diﬀ erent stake-
holders. Th e sector ministries, the local government associations, the diﬀ erent types of 
local government (small towns, big cities and the capital, Budapest) and sectoral business 
groups (e.g., service providers) naturally express diﬀ erent interests in intergovernmen-
tal relations. Th e process of decentralization is not ﬁ nished, and in certain areas some 
movement back towards centralization can even be detected. 
Th e process of Hungarian decentralization has been burdened with several conﬂ icts re-
lated to the typically weak and sensitive points of intergovernmental relations: fragmentation, 
unfunded mandates, unclear expenditure assignments, moral hazard,  the nature of incentives 
and deﬁ cit grants, equity issues and equalization grants, etc. Badly designed instruments such 
as grants or laws have taken a social toll on the transition, but this has not outweighed the 
beneﬁ ts of decentralization. 
Th e three key elements of the process are: the democratic election of the local self-
government, the provision of substantial expenditure responsibility and autonomy, and the 
enforcement of hard-budget constraints on the independent local budgets. 
Since 1990, the law in Hungary has provided these key elements of successful decentraliza-
tion. As a result, local government expenditures decreased by 10% between 1991 and 2000 
in real value, while the level and scope of services provided did not decrease at the same time. 
However, the country was lacking in some important elements of a well-functioning system, 
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such as a well-trained and skilled local administration, a modern accounting system, a tradition 
of public participation, a well-developed statistical system, a process of objective auditing, local 
budgetary and ﬁ nancial management practices, etc. But Hungary has learned a lot in the past 
ten to twelve years; now it is time to start the modernization of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations 
based on the experiences and the expectations of EU accession.
Th e 1990 Local Government Act resulted in the political collapse of the former 
system. A new democratic system was introduced which gave the right to every settle-
ment, even the smallest, to set up a municipal government to manage its own aﬀ airs. 
Th e new system is a unitary government with a two-tier subnational structure, where the 
municipal government provides services at the settlement level, and the county govern-
ment at the regional level. County governments have no right to direct municipalities, as 
they are self-governing units with diﬀ erent responsibilities. Th e basic rights and power 
of local governments are exercised by an elected council, which sets up committees with 
special rights and responsibilities. Th e directly elected mayor is the head of the oﬃ  ce 
with two functions: execution of the decisions of council and delegated state tasks. Th e 
major administrative function is managed by the chief administrator (notary). Th e 
Local Government Act decrees that towns, cities, the capital and its districts as well as 
counties have equal rights as local governments.
After 1990 the number of local governments grew  from 1,523 to 3,154 (1999), as 
many of the local councils separated themselves into discrete units. Th is was a political 
reaction to the forced amalgamation policy of the 1970s. Th e 19 counties (the middle 
tier) that used to be one of the strongest power centers still exist, but their responsibili-
ties have been scaled back. Th e counties are now parallel authorities and unrelated to 
the localities. Th e local governments in Hungary have an average of 3,482 inhabitants, 
quite far from the average of 10,000 considered to be “optimal.” 
Nineteen percent of Hungarians live in the capital, Budapest, and the city accounts 
for one-third of both GDP and capital investment. Th e central role of the capital city 
has been recognized in law by deﬁ ning special procedures in revenue allocation. Th e 
local governments of Budapest have joint revenues that have to be allocated between the 
municipality and the districts according to expenditure needs. Th e central government 
has established general guidelines for revenue division among these local governments, 
but has given the responsibility for setting up a revenue allocation system for the capital 
to the Municipality of Budapest (Balás, Hegedüs, 1999). 
Th e government is currently discussing the future of the regions. Today there are 
formally seven regions with Regional Development Councils that have only limited 
authority. Th ere is a four-year program for regional reform, which would lead to the 
creation of seven regions with elected councils. Th is would establish a regional structure 
that would be a new, locally-elected tier of government.  One of the purposes for creating 
regions is to facilitate the channeling of EU structural funds. However, this new tier of 
governance would call into question the continued existence and role of the counties. 
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One of the weakest points in the Hungarian intergovernmental system is the lack 
of long-term borrowing for capital investments. Th e paper addresses this question of 
why, after twelve years of decentralization, borrowing has not become a normal way of 
ﬁ nancing capital investments. We have organized this discussion in four parts.
In the ﬁ rst we describe the main tendencies in borrowing, and conclude that the 
level of local government indebtedness is very low compared to developed countries. We 
discuss a serious methodological problem of having oﬀ -budget local government enti-
ties such as public works and other institutions, which operate as “private enterprises” 
owned entirely by the local government. Any approach that ignores this “sub-sector” 
could lead to a misinterpretation of the problem. Th e fact is that most of the data and 
information is structured in a way that makes it almost impossible to analyze this “grey 
sector” of local government borrowing. In an earlier study we stressed the importance 
of the oﬀ -budget activities (Hegedüs, et al., 1999), and a paper produced by the World 
Bank (Kopányi, Hertelendi, 2000) also showed its importance. However, no real research 
has been done on this area.  
Th e second part of the paper summarizes the legal environment of local government 
borrowing. We put a special emphasis on the “local government bankruptcy” regula-
tion which was considered to be a path-breaking law to regulate borrowing and to stop 
the “moral hazard” attitude of  irresponsible local governments. However, the authors 
do not have clear evidence on how this law has actually inﬂ uenced local government 
behavior.  
Th e third section investigates the demand side of the municipal credit market and 
tries to identify the factors explaining the low level of municipal loans. One hypothesis 
is that local governments are generally reluctant to borrow. But there are perhaps some 
understandable reasons for this attitude. One could be the political fear of indebtedness, 
since the public considers borrowing as a sign of ﬁ nancial insecurity. Furthermore, local 
governments are not prepared to borrow because they lack the capacity to manage debts. 
Within the present intergovernmental ﬁ nance system, local governments have no means 
of prediction and cannot foresee their future revenue sources with suﬃ  cient certainty 
to take risks with borrowing. Paradoxically, local government borrowing is limited not 
only by the lack of stable resources, but also by the windfall gains from privatization 
that serve as a substitute for loans. 
Th e decentralization policy of central government has a signiﬁ cant impact on the 
borrowing activity of the local governments in four ways. First, changes to regulations 
have set important limits to the indebtedness of local governments, and these have had 
the eﬀ ect of ruling out certain local governments from borrowing at all. Second, the 
central government investment grants and other ﬁ nancial supports for local investment 
decisions tend to discourage municipal borrowing. Because of unclear eligibility criteria 
for access to central grants, local governments prefer to postpone borrowing. To a large 
extent, local government behavior depends on the grant structure. With well-structured 
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matching grants, the conditions for access to the grants require own resources that can 
be provided through borrowing. Th ird, macroeconomic trends in Hungary caused a 
high inﬂ ation rate in the 1990s and also a high rate of interest due to the crowding-
out eﬀ ects of the central budget deﬁ cit. Th ese factors increased the cost of borrowing 
signiﬁ cantly. Fourth, the unpredictability of the central resources, which account for 
more than half of local revenues, increases the risk for local governments in assuming 
long-term commitments.
In the fourth part of the paper we investigate the supply side of the local borrowing 
market. Are there any constraints from the point of view of the ﬁ nancial market against 
lending more to the local governments? Is the banking sector developed enough to serve 
local governments?  Are the banks unwilling to lend more or are they just unable to 
oﬀ er advantageous ﬁ nancial conditions for local government borrowing? Does the lack 
of bond ﬁ nancing originate from the supply side, e.g., the lack of secondary markets for 
local government bonds, or from the demand side, e.g., local governments not wanting 
to be pioneers in this segment of the ﬁ nancial market?
Our research was based partly on the experiences of earlier MRI projects, and partly 
on  small-scale empirical investigations undertaken speciﬁ cally for our present purposes. 
We conducted three case studies on local government borrowing practices (in Szolnok, a 
county seat, Csepel, a district of Budapest and Gyöngyös, a medium size city). We also 
administered a questionnaire to obtain information about facts and attitudes towards 
borrowing. Th irty-eight responses were received, and although this is a small and not 
representative sample, the responses are illustrative of some of the problems regarding 
local government borrowing.2 Additional information was gleaned from newspaper 
clipping services.
2.   TRENDS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
2.1 Local Government Borrowing: Flow
According to the Act on Local Self-Government of 1990 local governments are in 
principle free to ﬁ nance their budget deﬁ cit through the capital market.
Borrowing does not play a determining role in local government ﬁ nance, as Figure 
3.1 shows. It reached almost 6% of total expenditures3 in 1994, but typically it repre-
sents 1% to 3% of the total expenditures. A second observation from Figure 3.1 would 
be that borrowing follows a cyclical pattern: before the elections (1994, 1998, 2002) 
borrowing increased, but in real terms the changes are not signiﬁ cant.
Csepel local government was very cautious about borrowing until 2002. In that 
year the approaching elections generated a signiﬁ cant demand for investment that the 
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budget could not accommodate. To ﬁ nance it, the municipality took a loan from OTP 
Bank—a so-called framework loan—for one billion HUF. Th e contract deﬁ ned the 
eligible purposes for which the municipality could draw the loan, and it can be drawn 
down until the middle of 2003. By the end of 2002 the municipality had taken only 
HUF 200-300 million, because of the delay in public procurement procedures. Th e loan 
was taken with a three-year grace period and a ten-year repayment term, at a ﬁ xed rate 
of BUBOR plus 4.5% (currently slightly more than 10%), and with interest determined 
on a quarterly basis. Th e contract lists nearly all of the municipal investments as valid 
purposes. Larger investments are the public utilities construction on the main road with 
related road construction, and construction of a main collecting pipe. Smaller projects 
are included as well, e.g., water wells in the outer parts of the district.
Figure 3.1
Local Government Borrowing in Nominal Value and Constant Value 
[Million HUF], and as a Percentage of the Total Expenditures
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
A more detailed analysis of trends reveals that the municipal credit framework 
in Hungary evolved in two general phases. In the ﬁ rst phase, from 1990 to 1995, 
there were no formal, central rules constraining local government borrowing—no 
debt service limits, no reporting requirements and no separate speciﬁ cations for the issu-
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ance of municipal bonds.  Probably this is one of several factors explaining the decrease 
in local government borrowing in the second half of the 1990s.
Th e revenue structure of local governments has changed in the last decade, and this 
can be observed from 1994 to 2001 (see Table 3.1) when the share of own revenues 
increased from 20% to 31.9%. Th is was accompanied by a parallel decrease in the state 
grants.  Th e role of loans in the revenue resources of the local governments remained 
marginal from 1995 to 2001, accounting for just 2.2% to 4.4% of the total revenues. 
Th ese data provide evidence of the cyclical nature of borrowing: in 1998 and 2001 
borrowing increased relative to total revenues.
Table 3.1
Main Sources of Local Government Revenues in Hungary by Structure [%] 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Own revenues 20.0 22.2 29.9 34,0 30.0 31.9 33.5 31.9
Transfers 75.1 75.8 68.9 64.9 67.4 67.0 65.4 66.2
Loans 4.9 2.1 1.2 1,2 2.6 1.1 1.1 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
Figure 3.2
Local Government Debt Service Payments as Percentage of Total Expenditures 
[Million HUF]
 
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
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Th e signiﬁ cance of borrowing can be assessed by noting the share of interest payments 
and loan repayments in local government expenditures. By 1995 debt service costs had 
increased to 4% from 1.5% in 1991, and then decreased to 1.5% by 2001.
Th e data show that municipal borrowing exists, but is in a very early stage of develop-
ment. However, the low averages do not necessarily mean that some local governments 
do not have diﬃ  culty managing their debts; rather, our case studies have indicated that 
the loans issued and the repayment burden are allocated very unevenly among local 
governments.
2.2 Local Government Borrowing: Stock
Th e Hungarian National Bank has been publishing more detailed data about the stock 
of local government loans since 1998. Again, these data demonstrate that despite an 
increase of outstanding debt in the past few years, local governments have not been 
utilizing the possibilities of the credit sector. Th e increase in debt is remarkable not only 
in nominal, but also in real value: the long-term liabilities of the local governments 
increased by 142% in real value (in 2001 prices) in the last four years.
Outstanding local government debt decreased from 1.1% of GDP in 1998 to 
0.7% of GDP in 2002, which means that local governments have not contributed to 
an increase in the total government debt/GDP ratio. According to the EU Maastricht 
criteria, the maximum ﬁ gure is 60%.
Figure 3.3
Net Lending Position of Local Governments in the Credit Market [Billion HUF]4 
(1998–2002)
Source:     Hungarian National Bank (data of 2002 is preliminary data in October).
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Despite the increase in municipal borrowing, the local governments are still net 
depositors and there have been no signiﬁ cant changes in this position since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Compared to the total revenues of the local governments, the net 
position accounts for only 10%.
Th e structure of the local debt also shows some changes in the last years. Although 
banks are the most important source of the local government debt, there has been a 
new tendency in the last three years of local governments beginning to issue bonds in 
the domestic market.
Table 3.2
Th e Structure of Local Government Debt, in 2001 Prices [Billion HUF] 
(1998–2002)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002*
Bonds at domestic investors 0.8 0.9 3.4 4.9 7.1
Bonds at foreign investors 15.2 16.6 19.0 19.3 20.6
Loans from financial  institutions 34.1 42.5 52.4 72.7 91.8
Loans from other state funds 4.2 10.1 6.1 5.4 4.7
Loans from abroad 7.2 6.4 13.1 28.0 27.8
Total amount of long-term borrowing 61.4 76.6 94.0 130.3 151.9
Source:     Hungarian National Bank.
*              Preliminary data in October.
Th e data in Table 3.2 show a rapid increase in local bond ﬁ nancing between 1999 
and 2002 in local (domestic) bonds. Although the total  bonds increased more than 
nine times in this period, this fact is mainly a consequence of the previous low level of 
municipal bond issuance. Despite the increase in local government bonds, their im-
portance is still minor in the local credit market. In the Hungarian market, bonds are 
private issues. Th ere are no public issues, and there is no secondary market for municipal 
bonds. Th ese bonds are bought by ﬁ nancial institutions (banks, pension funds and in-
surance companies, etc.) and sometimes by the bank that managed the bond issue. One 
of the constraints to the increase of municipal bond issues is the fragmented structure 
of Hungarian local governments. Small local governments have much less opportunity 
to borrow than the larger municipalities, because they do not have real collateral and 
stable own revenues that are essential to their creditworthiness. Outstanding debt in 
the villages and smaller cities is less than 5% of their total revenues. In big cities it is 
7% and in Budapest, 10% (see Table 3.12 later).
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Foreign participation in the Hungarian local credit market is linked to the devel-
opment of credits at the international ﬁ nancial institutions (e.g., the World Bank and 
the EBRD) and to the bond-issuing policy of the capital. As can be seen in Table 3.2 
this had importance in 2001 and 2002, but there has been no recent tendency for local 
governments to borrow from abroad. On the eve of EU accession it is expected that the 
importance of foreign ﬁ nancing will increase.
Despite the expansion of the municipal bond market, the most important source of 
local borrowing is bank loans. Th e yearly 28% increase between 1998 and 2002  is also 
notable. We can see from the long-term data series that after a contraction in the mid 
1990s, which was the consequence of the strict adjustment policy of the government 
in 1995 and possibly of the legal constraints in municipal borrowing introduced in the 
same year, there is a continuous expansion of bank loans.
2.3 Problems of Measurement: 
      The Role of the Off-budget Local Government Sector
One of the general problems in cross-national comparison is that the ﬁ nancial indica-
tors refer to the budget data, which do not represent the entire local government sector. 
Comparisons are diﬃ  cult not only among countries with diﬀ erent institutional settings, 
but also within one country if the same services can be provided by both budget and 
oﬀ -budget institutions. In one case study (Hegedüs, 2002) the share of the oﬀ -budget 
activity was estimated as 12% to 16% of the total budget.  In Hungary, the water sector 
with a yearly turnover of HUF 100–125 billion is a typical oﬀ -budget activity. Th is is 
5% to 6% of  total yearly expenditures of the local government sector.
In view of these facts, we must wonder whether the scope of borrowing is really as 
weak as it appears in the local government sector data, which ignores the oﬀ -budget 
activities of local governments.5 Th e problem arises from the borrowing activity of the 
ﬁ rms owned partly or totally by the local governments, and also from the borrowing of 
the ﬁ rms that provide local public services in a contracting-out system, behind which the 
local government operates as an explicit or implicit guarantor (“lender of last resort”).
Hungarian municipalities set up, took over or invested in almost 1,600 enterprises 
in the ﬁ rst decade of the democracy (See Table 3.3). Some of these originate from the 
obligatory conversion of previous companies of the local councils6 into limited or joint 
stock companies. More than 75% are for-proﬁ t companies that provide fee-based or 
market services and also manufacturing and agricultural production. One-quarter are 
not-for-proﬁ t corporations providing public services not based on fees, e.g., social, 
cultural or community services (Hertelendy, Kopányi, 2000).
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Table 3.3
Number of Enterprises with Municipal Shareholdings by Legal Form (January, 2000)
Limited partnerships 47
Associations 9
Public-purpose, non-profit corporations 324
Limited companies 1,067
Joint stock companies 99
Source:     SAO Report 2000, in: Hertelendy, Kopányi (2000).
Th ese companies are linked to public ﬁ nance either directly (through in- and out- 
ﬂ ows to the local budget, e.g., operating and investment subsidies or guaranteed and 
non-guaranteed liabilities) or indirectly (through the factors aﬀ ecting their operation, 
like setting local fees or due to concessions and contracts with the local government). Th e 
signiﬁ cance of these companies can be measured by the fact that their activity reached 
2.6% of GDP by the end of the 1990s.
Th e role of the municipal enterprises is more important in local investment decisions. 
While local governments have spent 2.2% to 2.5% of GDP annually on infrastructure 
investments, municipal public service enterprises have carried out investments of an 
additional 1.5% of GDP. With respect to their sectoral contribution, municipal compa-
nies’ investments in basic activities accounted for 30% of the total sectoral investment. 
In the supplementary service sector the proportion was 20%. 
Companies in which municipalities have shares carried out investments of more 
than HUF 400 billion (nearly 5% of GDP). Of these, 31% was undertaken by gas and 
electricity companies and 38% by companies operating in other business services. Basic 
and supplementary public service companies invested nearly HUF 130 billion in 1997 
(1.5% of GDP). Within supplementary services, telecommunication accounts for more 
than half of the investments. In the case of basic service companies, the distribution of 
investments is more even within the various sectors. District heating and the treatment 
of sewage and waste take up about 12% to 13% respectively, with water management 
and local transport accounting for 25% to 29% of the total basic service investment 
(Hertelendy, Kopányi 2000).
Th e role of municipal enterprises is also noteworthy in the ﬁ eld of local borrowing. 
Th ose municipal enterprises that provide basic services borrowed as much as the local 
governments, while all of the municipal enterprises borrowed three times more than 
local governments up to the end of 1997. 
Th e World Bank projected that the local government municipal enterprises would 
play a larger role in local investment ﬁ nance (Table 3.4). Th eir investment would double 
as a share of GDP, while local government investment would increase by 36%. What is 
93
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G  I N  H U N G A R Y
important from the standpoint of intergovernmental ﬁ scal relations is that the role of 
borrowing will continue to grow; that is, it will ﬁ nance an amount of local investment 
equal to 2.5% of the GDP. At the 2003 level of GDP this would mean that around 80 
billion in loans should be issued to local governments and 320 billion to public utili-
ties. Th e real question is the users’ ability to pay for the services in which investments 
are made.7
Figure 3.4
Total Municipal Enterprise Liabilities as Percentage of Municipal Debt (1993–1997)
Source:     Hertelendy, Koppányi (2000).
Table 3.4
Local Investment Finance as Percentage of GDP
Local Government Public Utilities
1997 2003 1997 2003
Total investments 2.2 3.0 1.6 3.2
Investment finance:
Savings (current revenue–current expenditure)
0.8 0.8 –0.3 0.2
External resources: 1.4 2.2 1.9 3.0
     •     EU grants 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.7
     •     Central grants 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.0
     •     Asset sales 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
     •     Borrowing –0.7 0.5 1.3 2.0
Source:     World Bank SNDP report, 2000.
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Th e conclusion to be drawn here is that local borrowing cannot be separated from 
the borrowing of the municipally-owned public service companies. Th eir investment 
needs are very high and the accession to the EU will further increase the possible role 
of the bank sector in capital investment ﬁ nance. Central government policy should be 
revised as well, in order to provide more incentives to borrow as occurred in the housing 
and education sector in 2000–2002.
3.   EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATIONS
Regulation by central authorities has had a signiﬁ cant impact on the evolution of the 
municipal borrowing sector in Hungary. Th e central government inﬂ uences the borrow-
ing activity of the local government through legal acts and through ﬁ nancial incentives. 
Although the ﬁ rst involves direct control or monitoring of the local governments, this 
seems to have less impact than the central programs that provide an opportunity for 
the local governments to use loans as their own share in order to participate in central 
programs. On the other hand, some central investment grants provide opportunities 
for the local governments to avoid using market sources in the development of their 
services in some sectors. Issues arising from changes in the regulations are discussed in 
this section, while the indirect impact of the central government on municipal borrow-
ing will be examined in further subsections.
Th e Act on Local Self-Government (1990/LXV) gave local governments the right to 
ﬁ nance their operation from the credit market, with the constraint that the core assets of 
the local government (the property that is essential for the provision of mandatory serv-
ices), the central grants and contributions, and the taxes and revenues transferred from 
the general government system for operating purposes cannot be used as collateral. 
Regulation of local government borrowing and the eventual consequences of munici-
pal default were implemented through three measures: the introduction of a debt-service 
limit for local governments in 1996, the Municipal Debt Adjustment Act (1996) and 
the Securities Act, which includes rules on issuance of municipal bonds (1997).
3.1 Debt-service Limit
Th e ﬁ rst direct limitations on municipal borrowing were set up in 1995, in the ﬁ rst 
amendment of the Act on the 1995 Budget of the Republic of Hungary. Although it 
was abolished in the same year by the Constitutional Court because of the violation 
of procedural rules, these limitations have been incorporated into the Act on Local 
Self-Governments of January 1, 1996. According to this limitation, the ceiling for an-
nual payments by a local government resulting from debt (borrowing and associated 
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expenses, bond issues, leasing and the provision of guarantees and surety) equals the 
adjusted current own revenues of a local government. Adjusted current own revenues 
are calculated as 70% of the local government’s own revenues (from local taxes, duties, 
interest, ﬁ nes, and other speciﬁ c revenues) net of short-term commitments and liabilities 
(capital repayment, interest payment and lease fees) in the given year. Liquidity loans 
are not subject to this limitation.
Local governments contracting loans must have their budgets independently 
audited, which guarantees that they do not exceed the limits. In principle this procedure 
does not exclude situations where local governments have exceeded the limit because of 
revenue decrease (e.g., in local taxes). But in this case, local governments cannot take 
more loans.
Th e enforcement of the law is a diﬀ erent question. In 2002 there were four cases of 
local governments obtaining loans in spite of the fact that they were above the limits. 
Th e Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for the local governments, learned 
about the cases only much later, as there is no systematic information gathered about 
how close local governments are to the debt limits.8 In principle if a local government 
exceeds the debt limits, it has to announce a bankruptcy situation which is then pub-
lished in the Oﬃ  cial Gazette of Firms. Despite the lack of eﬃ  cient enforcement, the 
debt limits are generally taken seriously by local governments, and this also serves the 
interests of the banks.  
On the other hand, there is no other limitation on borrowing. Th ere is no obliga-
tory approval by any government body. Moreover, there has been no other control 
on borrowing from abroad than what has been required of private ﬁ rms.9 Th ere is no 
limitation on the use of the loans, whether it is spent on investment or operation. But 
the local governments do need  to comply, of course, with the general regulations of 
the ﬁ nancial institutions that provide credit to them.
Th e debt limitation by itself has been so eﬀ ective that according to some experts 
it has excluded 50% of local governments from the market, because they do not have 
suﬃ  cient own revenues.10 While this seems a strong eﬀ ect, it pertains almost entirely to 
small municipalities that most likely could not receive credit from ﬁ nancial institutions 
without limitations. Th us, market control is as strong in this case as the regulations are. 
On the other hand, this limitation was not a real barrier for the larger municipalities 
that normally use loans for ﬁ nancing their investments, because they usually borrow 
less than would be possible according to the Act. 
In our survey, 36 local governments of the 38 asked responded to the question: Up 
to what percentage did your municipality make use of this borrowing limit? Of the 36, 
16 responded that they did not borrow this year, 9 said they had reached less than 50% 
of the limit and 12 were above 50%, including 2 municipalities that made maximum 
use of the legal possibility of borrowing. One, however, indicated that in the end they 
had borrowed more (133%) than the Act permits.11 All three local governments for 
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which the limitation made a real impact  are small towns with budgets of less than 
HUF 3 billion and populations between 10,000 and 20,000. Among the smallest local 
governments there were no municipalities that borrowed this year.
In the case of Szolnok, the debt regulation would make it possible to take on much 
more debt than they actually did. Th e city has a loan of about two billion HUF and 
could take on an additional 1.7 billion HUF.
3.2 Municipal Debt Adjustment Act
Th e core change of the municipal borrowing framework in 1996 was the Municipal 
Debt Adjustment Act, Law XXV, in eﬀ ect from about mid-1996. Th e law deﬁ nes a debt 
adjustment process whose objective is to allow local governments to regain their ﬁ nancial 
health while at the same time protecting the rights of creditors. Th e provisions of the 
Municipal Debt Adjustment Act are quite sophisticated and impose a deﬁ nite ﬁ nancial 
and moral cost on local governments who default on debt or other payments.
In the case of local government insolvency a debt settlement procedure is launched. 
When a local government or its budgetary organization has a debt which is more than 
60 days overdue, the debt settlement procedure may be initiated. Th e initiator may be 
the local government itself, or its creditor, at the court. In its verdict, the court orders 
the launching of the debt settlement procedure and designates the ﬁ nancial trustee. 
Th e only obligation of the local government during the procedure is to provide the 
mandatory services deﬁ ned in the law. It is interesting to note that these are diﬀ erent 
mandatory tasks from those deﬁ ned in the Act on Local Self-Government.12 During 
the procedure, the local government receives statutory grants.
Th e ﬁ rst phase of the procedure is the compromise phase, in which the local gov-
ernment and its creditors have to attempt to agree on the settlement of the debt, on 
the basis of which payments may be made. In this phase the ﬁ nancial trustee has the 
right of  co-signature, without which commitment and payment may not be eﬀ ected. 
Where no compromise is reached between the local government and its creditors, the 
court provides for the allocation of the marketable assets of the local government, 
guaranteeing that the core assets that are essential for the provision of the mandatory 
services will not be auctioned. Th us, the local government will still be able to perform 
its services after the procedure. Th e debts may be settled to the extent of the marketable 
assets. Regular personal payments, receivables covered by lien or bail and public debts 
are ranked ﬁ rst. 
Th e support from the central budget is temporary, aimed at the payment of interest 
on loans taken out by the local government for the purpose of debt settlement and the 
fee of the trustee. Since this support is a loan, the local government is obliged to pay it 
back to the central government after the procedure is complete. 
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In the last seven years there have been only ten cases where debt settlement procedures 
have been completed. All of them were initiated by the local government concerned. 
Debts that were overdue usually ﬁ nanced investment projects of the local governments. 
Th is means either that the law threatening local governments with the negative con-
sequences of the procedure has been successful in its intent, or that local governments 
and banks are cautious in borrowing in any case (Jókay et al., 2000).
Managing the problem of municipal bankruptcy was an important policy step to 
increase market control on municipal borrowing. Th e municipal debt adjustment law 
made it clear that there is no implicit central guarantee behind the loans of the local 
governments. Th is law presents a  message to the supply side of municipal borrowing: 
the risk of the local government loans is borne by the creditor itself. 
3.3 Municipal Bond Regulations
Issuance and trading of local government bonds are regulated by the Act on the Capital 
Market, whose ﬁ rst version came into eﬀ ect in 1997.13 Th ere are no signiﬁ cant diﬀ er-
ences in the issuance and trading of the municipal bonds other than the securities that 
embody a loan. Public oﬀ erings require the publication of a prospectus and bond oﬀ er 
announcement, both of which are subject to approval by the Supervisory Commis-
sion. Th e Securities Act does not regulate private placement of municipal bonds (the 
most common form for local governments to date). Th e Supervisory Commission has 
introduced speciﬁ c regulations: (i) the minimum amount of a private issue must be 
HUF 5 million; (ii) investors must be speciﬁ ed in advance (with a letter of intent); and 
(iii) a brokerage ﬁ rm must be employed in the transaction. In a public placement the 
minimum amount for a bond issue is HUF 10 million.
Issuing bonds increases the administrative cost of borrowing. Th e local governments 
have to provide more detailed information for the investors than they would in the 
case of bank loans. For the issuance they have to prepare a prospectus which, besides 
the compulsory elements, contains all relevant information essential for the investors 
to assess the risk of the securities. Because of infrequent municipal bond issues, there 
is no common practice concerning what information is needed for such an assessment. 
Th e banks or bidders have their own reporting forms that have to be used for this pro-
spectus. All the issuers, thus the local governments too, have to publish a report every 
year with detailed information and send it to the Supervisory Commission. Th e report 
would indicate changes in the state of the issuer and all relevant information about the 
project that the bond ﬁ nances. 
Issuers also have to publish Extraordinary Information in all instances where im-
portant changes occurred in the project or in the local government. For example, after 
a local election they have to publish Extraordinary Information relating to the bonds. 
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While all the regulations for bond issuers are the same for local governments and other 
issuers, the compulsory information they are obliged to publish is slightly diﬀ erent from 
other issuers and thus is regulated in a separate appendix of the Act.
3.4 Other Important Regulations 
      Affecting Local Government Borrowing
3.4.1   Selection of Account-keeping Bank
In most cases, local governments use the same bank for borrowing as the one in which 
they have their main account. It is also important to note that the local government 
has the right to change its account-keeping bank once a year not later than October 
31. Th e institutions of the local government are also obliged to keep their account in 
the same bank.
3.4.2   Accounting Regulation
With respect to constraints on municipal borrowing on the supply side, an important 
factor is the assessment of the risk of lending to a local government. Th e problems partly 
arise from the accounting system of the local governments. Th e regulation prescribes 
cash-basis accounting for the local governments instead of accrual accounting (the latter 
being common in private enterprises), which makes the credit rating of local govern-
ments diﬀ erent from private ﬁ rms’ credit rating, creating a problem for the creditors. 
Cash-based budgeting is especially a problem in recording the capital expenditures. Th e 
local government budget records all the expenses in the year of the investment, rather 
than spreading it out over the life of the asset as is the case in accrual budgeting.
Since 1997 local governments have been obliged to produce a two-year forward 
budget plan attached to the yearly budget. Although it provides important information 
for the creditors, it also has the problems associated with cash-based budgeting, espe-
cially the problem of budgeting of capital expenses. On the other hand, the obligation 
to submit these budgets to the State Territorial Public Finance Oﬃ  ce (TÁH) on a cash 
basis and in a structure that is diﬀ erent from the project view of a long-term loan, urges 
most of the local governments to use this type of budget in their decision-making proc-
ess on capital investment, as well.14
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3.4.3   Regulation of Asset Management
One of the main problems of local government ﬁ nance is the asset management. Ac-
counting regulations require that the assets are accounted for at face value. Consequently, 
most of the asset registry contains an out-dated, underestimated value of the assets, which 
is a problem both for local ﬁ nancial management and for the creditors who must assess 
the ﬁ nancial risk of a municipal loan. From 2003, a new regulation will oblige the local 
governments to reevaluate their assets according to real values.
3.4.4  Monitoring by the State Audit Oﬃ  ce
Hungary’s decentralized local government system requires no central approval of local 
budgets, but the State Audit Oﬃ  ce regularly supervises the local governments’ account-
ing. Although the audit concentrates on the legal aspects of the accounting, the auditors 
frequently point out management problems, e.g., if they identify a risk of asset-loss. Th e 
obligation of  local governments to have their budget audited is an important regulation 
that makes the local government budget more transparent for creditors.
4.  DEMAND-SIDE ANALYSIS
4.1   Municipal Demand for Long-term Investment Sources
In the decentralized system, municipalities identify investment priorities which do not 
necessarily coincide with mandatory and non-mandatory responsibilities. For instance, 
it is not a municipal task to build national freeways or roads bypassing the settlement. 
However, settlements are sometimes more interested in such investments than in invest-
ments related to mandatory responsibilities; they actually compete for such projects and 
are willing to sacriﬁ ce some  alternatives such as building infrastructure, or providing 
local tax exemptions. Infrastructure development projects are typically municipal tasks. 
Some of these investments, such as building housing for sale and servicing plots, are short-
term and tie up municipal capital only temporarily. Th ese are the kinds of investments 
that could be made by the private sector, but the participation of the municipality is 
required due to the high risk involved (partly depending on the municipality itself ), 
the lack of experience in and institutionalization of the cooperation between the private 
and public sectors as well as the underdeveloped level of the private sector.
In general, however, municipal projects are long-term investments that can be sepa-
rated  into two ﬁ nancing categories: (a) investments whose capital costs are covered from 
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earlier government or local savings (known as pay-as-you-go), and (b) investments whose 
capital costs are ﬁ nanced by borrowing where—ideally—the loan is amortized throughout 
the life-cycle of the facility (pay-as-you-use). Municipalities’ investment strategies have 
long-term budget eﬀ ects, as a substantial part of public service developments is subsi-
dized by the central government (e.g., education, social policy, etc.). Since the extent of 
central government subsidies is constantly changing, the higher the share of subsidies 
in the revenues of the municipalities, the greater the uncertainty regarding resources to 
ﬁ nance capacities generated by the developments.
In 1990, local governments in Hungary became responsible for investments in the 
service areas according to their expenditure assignments. Th ese represented huge invest-
ment needs in the  areas of infrastructure and environment, especially with respect to EU 
accession. However, local governments also had to make up for the deferral of capital 
investment. Local government investments have remained quite stable in the last few 
years, between 15% and 20% of total expenditures. But because the local government 
share in the GDP has decreased, their investment share has decreased as a percentage 
of GDP as well.15
Figure 3.5
Local Government Investment in Real Value (1990=100) 
and as a Percentage of Total Expenditures (1991 and 2001) 
 
 Investment needs arise from many diﬀ erent sources. On the eve of the transition, 
local governments inherited a huge number of properties, and some of the investment 
needs are related to the renewal of this property. Basic infrastructure investments (im-
provement of line infrastructure and improvement of unﬁ lled land, e.g., for industrial 
parks) are typical local government needs, even though they are not related to any of 
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their mandatory tasks. Mandatory services (typically the improvement of existing insti-
tutions) also generate investment needs that come from two sources:  the development 
needs of local people, and the need to meet the improving standards that are set by 
central government regulations. Th e forthcoming EU accession also generates invest-
ment needs, e.g., to meet the increasing environmental standards. Last but not least, 
there are prestige improvements that typically arise as the election is approaching. We 
will now investigate these needs in more detail.
Future investment needs are related to the fact that the renewal of municipal prop-
erty has been delayed and the quality of public services has deteriorated. According to 
reports dealing with this issue, municipal investments have for some time been much 
below replacement rates. Municipal assets accounted for HUF 1,800 billion in 1998 (a 
book-value evaluation) or HUF 6,000 billion (an experimental estimation of its market 
value). Th e replacement cost would be around 3%, which is less than investments in 
1998 (HUF 279 billion).
At the beginning of the1990s, one of the main goals was to construct a basic in-
frastructure in the settlements, especially in the eastern part of Hungary. Despite the 
results, in 2000 49% of the dwellings in Hungary were not connected to any public 
sewage system. In the villages the percentage is 84%. Th e supply of piped gas is unavail-
able only in 25% of the households, a major improvement since1990 when the number 
was just below 50%. Future investments will need to ﬁ ll this gap. Improvement of the 
road infrastructure will also be an important goal in the coming years. In the year 2000, 
27% of the urban roads were not paved at all. 
Th e improvement of solid waste collection is also among the most important goals 
of the local governments. In the environmental sector (water and waste management) 
the estimated investment needs in relation to the EU integration strategy are estimated 
to be HUF 1,200 to 2,000 billion, which represents 12% to 20% of GDP (in 1998).
Th e Local Government Act of 1990 transferred a number of important public func-
tions to lower tiers of government. Some tasks are deﬁ ned as mandatory, such as the 
provision of safe drinking water, kindergarten education, primary school instruction 
and education, basic health and social welfare needs, public lighting, maintenance of 
local public roads and the public cemetery and enforcement of the rights of national and 
ethnic minorities. Th e law deﬁ nes the tasks of the local governments in a fairly vague 
way, and leaves a good deal of ﬂ exibility in service delivery. Th e deﬁ nition of tasks in 
the Law on Local Self-Government allows wide room for local governments to deﬁ ne 
the quantity and the quality of the services, and even the way they are organized (con-
tracting-out, privatization or public-private partnerships). Th is feature of the law and 
the ﬂ exible revenue structure make it possible for local governments to adjust. Th ere 
are some exceptions, however, e.g., health care and ﬁ re protection services.
Th e right to make decisions regarding expenditures is not always welcomed by 
representatives of the central government, which is inﬂ uenced by sectoral legislation 
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and the supporting grants system. Th e sector laws redeﬁ ne local government tasks. Th e 
interest of the sector policy-makers in increasing their share of the budget is an important 
motivation for proposed modiﬁ cations to the sector laws. New standards have been set 
that are frequently impossible to meet under the current ﬁ nancial conditions of the lo-
cal governments (Hegedüs, 2002).  For example, local governments with over 10,000 
inhabitants were obliged by law to provide housing for homeless families. However, 
although more than 200 towns fell into this category, only eight of them founded such 
institutions in 2001 because there were not enough investment sources to ﬁ nance the 
initiative in the ﬁ rst years. Local governments usually adjust gradually; the missing in-
stitutions and missing levels of services are gradually matched by new investments, and 
with only a short delay compared to the legal requirement. Local governments usually 
have a few years’ grace period to meet these legal standards. 
As public choice literature has highlighted, the need for investment is inﬂ uenced by 
the political cycles. In electoral years, local politicians have more incentive to “produce” 
tangible results and improvements than to maintain ﬁ scal balance in the local govern-
ments. Figure 3.5 shows clearly that as an election approaches (1998, 2002),  investment 
activity gradually increases in Hungarian local governments. 
Th e attitude of politicians towards loans is very contradictory. Th e general view 
is that local governments should be very cautious in borrowing, because indebtedness 
always brings some risk and naturally limits new governments’ room to maneuver. In 
election periods, it is normal to hear accusations that the city’s successes were achieved 
by making the local government over-indebted. On the other hand, the government 
needs resources to have political success, and their attitude towards borrowing is quite 
positive. Th eir typical way of thinking is that “we will solve all problems through loans.” 
In the case of Csepel, the ﬁ nancial discipline of the representatives was quite weak in 
the budget-making process, and because of this a district with a budget of HUF 12.5 
billion had to deal with a deﬁ cit of HUF 2.5 billion in the year of the 2002 election.
Szeged, among the ﬁ ve biggest cities, is representative of the problem of over-in-
debtedness. Th e city has an outstanding debt of seven billion HUF, which represents 
23% of the yearly revenue. Fifty percent of the debt is a short-term loan for ﬁ nancing 
the operational deﬁ cit, which caused a huge burden on the newly elected local govern-
ment.16    
Lack of predictability is one of the main constraints against long-term borrowing. 
Not only transfers, but also own revenues cannot be predicted properly, because of 
the frequent modiﬁ cations of the regulations. (For instance, procedures for the local 
business tax have been changed every two years.) In the case of Budapest, the special 
equalization grant procedures add to the uncertainty, as the local taxes are redistributed 
among the districts and the municipality, which has the main responsibility for debt 
service. Th e transfers are deﬁ ned each year by the assembly of the Municipal Govern-
ment of Budapest. 
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4.2 Alternative Sources of Capital Investments
Th e main sources of ﬁ nancing local government investment include revenues from 
property (mostly the sale of assets), the grant from central government, other pass-
through grants, loans and the “operating surplus.” Because of changes in accounting 
and budgeting practices, we analyze these factors separately.
Th e role of loans has changed in the last decade. Figure 3.6 shows that in the years 
1993 and 1994, loans covered almost 25% of the capital investments, but this share 
declined to 8% by 2001. Th e ﬁ gure gives further evidence to support the earlier state-
ment about the detectable inﬂ uence of political cycles on local government borrowing 
and investment. In considering the possible factors that crowded out local government 
borrowing from 1994, we can conclude from our interviews that local governments use 
credit as a last resort for investments; they prefer grants, revenues from properties and 
the operational surplus over loans. 
Figure 3.6
Th e Ratio of the Loans Issued to Local Government Investments (1991–2001)
Table 3.5
Th e Financial Sources of Local Government Capital Investment (1994–2001) [%]
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Loans 26 14 10 8 16 8 7 11
Revenue from privatization, 
property, shares etc.
31 54 67 67 30 40 45 31
Capital grants to local governments 33 34 35 37 36 39 42 50
Other (operating surplus) 9 –2 –13 –12 18 13 6 7
Total investment 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
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In Table 3.6 we have tried to illustrate the possible role of other revenue sources 
in local government investments.17 Th e revenue from local government assets was the 
main source, and in some years (especially in 1996 and 1997) it accounted for 67% of 
the total investments. Since 1997 its share has decreased. Th e second most important 
source is the capital grant, which accounted for 15% to 22% of the total investment, 
but continuously increased. Th e pass-through items and the operational surplus or 
deﬁ cit ﬂ uctuated accordingly.
4.2.1   Revenue from Property
On the basis of the Asset Transfer Law (1991), considerable assets were transferred to 
the local governments. Th ese were comprised of: (i) primary assets necessary for the 
functioning of the local administration, basic education, health and social services, which 
may only be sold in a limited way; (ii) assets related to the provision of network and 
infrastructure public services; (iii) publicly-owned housing; and, (iv) other assets to com-
pensate municipalities for original ownership stakes of former council companies. 
It is diﬃ  cult to evaluate the eﬀ ect of the property transfer on the long-term capac-
ity of local governments to ﬁ nance their investments. Th e transferred assets could be 
managed by oﬀ -budget institutions (limited liability companies and foundations, etc.), 
which could generate revenues spent on services outside the LG budget. For example, 
property managed by an LG-owned company could generate revenue that could be used 
outside the control of the local government. On the other hand, many local govern-
ments have no capacity to manage these assets. In many cases, most of the property was 
sold and used to ﬁ nance local government investments and, unfortunately, sometimes 
the operational deﬁ cit as well. Although most of the property transfer was conducted 
before 1995, some other additional transfers occurred during the second half of the 
1990s, such as in the case of the privatization of state-owned companies. Local govern-
ments received compensation for the price of those urban lands that were used by the 
privatized ﬁ rms. Th e compensation was usually paid in shares of public ﬁ rms. As the 
privatization of gas suppliers occurred in 1996, this compensation was an additional 
asset that was transferred to the local governments. Finally, after some debate (and cor-
ruption scandal), local governments received additional compensation for these urban 
lands in 2000.
Th e revenue from property mainly comes from the sales of the assets. Although 
the scope of selling has decreased in the last years, it accounts for more than half of the 
revenues from property. Th e structure of the sales can be seen in Table 3.5.
Csepel, a district of Budapest, did not take any loans until 2002, since ﬁ rst of all 
there were no major municipal investments during the past ten years that would have 
required such a loan, and second, the security for minor investments was provided 
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either from allocated subsidies or from state tenders. Th e Erőmű Joint Stock Company 
(a power plant located in Csepel) paid USD 1.5 million to the municipal development 
fund while the plant was being modernized, which also allowed for the ﬁ nancing of 
minor investments. 
 Th e structure of property sales shows that local governments ﬁ rst disposed of 
their shares to ﬁ nance their investments, but as they gradually ran out of these assets, 
they moved to the sale of less liquid assets such as real estate. As mentioned earlier they 
received additional shares in 1997 and 2000 as compensation from the central govern-
ment, and it is clear from the data that local governments immediately sold those shares 
or at least converted them into other ﬁ nancial assets.
Table 3.6
Th e Financial Sources of Local Government Capital Investment (1995–2001) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Selling physical assets 
[Million HUF]
43,699 42,968 51,242 51,404 60,165 76,059 81,417
As % of total revenue 
from sales of assets
63.0 47.5 36.1 72.4 73.3 67.2 87.9
Selling shares 
[Million HUF]
19,757 27,332 81,251 15,665 17,127 24,548 5,498
As % of total revenue 
from sales of assets
28.5 30.2 57.3 22.1 20.9 21.7 5.9
From privatization 
[Million HUF]
5,938 20,064 9,258 3,969 4,793 12,563 5,713
As % of total revenue 
from sales of assets
8.6 22.2 6.5 5.6 5.8 11.1 6.2
Total revenue from sales of assets 
[Million HUF]
69,394 90,364 141,751 71,038 82,085 113,170 92,628
As % of total revenue
from property
87 85 84 50 50 55 50
Despite these one-time increases, the revenue from the sale of shares signiﬁ cantly 
decreased in the last few years. On the other hand, the privatization of local govern-
ment ﬁ rms provides less important sources for investment, and these ﬁ rms are usually 
privatized not for revenue reasons but to increase the quality of services they provide. 
Th e only sources of further privatization revenues have been those from real estate. Th is 
entails three important problems: (i) it is limited, which could increase the demand for 
loans as investment sources in the near future; (ii) with the sale of real estate the local 
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governments sell oﬀ  the assets that are mostly used as collateral for their loans, so this 
can become a limit on future borrowing as well (e.g., in Gyöngyös the local govern-
ment had to use their local tax revenues as collateral, because of the lack of valuable 
real estate due to previous privatization); (iii) the price of the real estate varies among 
the diﬀ erent regions of Hungary; thus, not only the quantity, but also the value of this 
revenue causes inequality among local governments and makes the credit ratings of local 
governments very diﬀ erent.
For the above reasons, this investment strategy of the second half of the 1990s that 
was based on asset sales will not be sustainable in the future to satisfy local government 
investment needs.
4.2.2   Capital Grants: Targeted and Addressed Subsidies
As mentioned in the previous section, the central government has a stronger impact on 
local government borrowing through those regulations and funds that initiate additional 
investments and push local governments towards municipal bonds or by crowding out 
the bonds from the investment ﬁ nance, than by direct regulations on borrowing. We have 
indicated how the central government generates additional investment needs through 
its regulations on sectors. Here we summarize the ﬁ nancial incentives they apply.
Addressed and targeted subsidies increased to HUF 52.3 billion in 2000. Th ese 
subsidies support municipal investments in priority areas identiﬁ ed by Parliament 
annually (clean drinking water, sewage, education and health care), although in very 
diﬀ erent forms. In the case of targeted subsidies the share of subsidy—as a percent of 
total investment costs—is set in each speciﬁ c target area while addressed subsidies are 
discretionary decisions and often provide nearly 100% ﬁ nancing. Addressed subsidies 
were originally introduced to ﬁ nance the continuation or completion of huge regional 
developments (hospitals and waste water plants) that had begun before the new decen-
tralized municipal system. Th ese objectives seem, however, to have been modiﬁ ed as 
addressed subsidies have been granted for new investments too, making the program 
economically unjustiﬁ ed. Th e volume of the two kinds of subsidy is deﬁ ned by the 
annual budget law. 
Th e targeted subsidy is a matching grant, where the matching rates are determined 
in the Law of Targeted and Addressed Subsidy approved by Parliament. Th e supported 
programs and the matching rates have changed in the last years. In 1999-2000, the 
priorities were building waste treatment plants and sewage networks (50% matching 
rate), investing in solid waste landﬁ ll (40% matching rate), buying special medical equip-
ment (40% matching rate) and reconstructing educational buildings (50% matching 
rate). Recently the water sector has been the most important area for the targeted and 
addressed subsidy, with 47% of the grants being used in this sector.
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Figure 3.7
Targeted and Addressed Subsidies [Billion HUF] (1991–1998)
Figure 3.8
Distribution of Targeted and Addressed Subsidies among Sectors (1991–1998)
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4.2.3   Sectoral Programs
Separate funds of the sectoral ministries are another source of investment ﬁ nancing. 
Since mid-1996, the grants for regional development have been distributed through the 
County Regional Development Councils (CDC). Th ree types of grants are available to 
municipalities through the CDC’s: regional equalization grants, development subsidies 
and earmarked decentralization funds. Each development council sets local investment 
priorities, and the council manages the tendering process. Th e size of this grant program 
was HUF 14.6 billion in 1998 and HUF 16.6 billion in 2001. 
Th e diﬀ erent sectoral ministries manage special programs and allocate resources 
according to tender procedures. One example is the housing program of the Ministry 
of Economics in the year 2000–2002, which launched a program for municipal rental 
housing investment programs. Th is was a grant program for local governments support-
ing ﬁ ve housing areas: the rentals sector, energy-saving renewal, rehabilitation programs, 
land development and the renovation of housing owned by churches.
Table 3.7
Grant Program for Local Governments and Churches (2000–2002)
Type of Program Number 
of Appli-
cations
Demand 
for Grants
Accepted 
Application
Accepted 
Grant 
Request
Acceptance 
Rate by
Acceptance 
Rate by
Number Million HUF Number Million HUF Number Cost
Public rental sector 961 102,997 579 50,129 60% 49%
Energy-savings programs 387 1,612 355 1,553 92% 96%
Rehabilitation 4 254 2 245 50% 96%
Land development 53 3,171 26 1,546 49% 49%
Renovation by Churches 433 1,047 371 821 86% 78%
Total 1,838 109,082 1,333 54,294 73% 50%
Source:     Ministry of the Interior.
Th e most important element in the grant program was its support of the public 
rental sector. Th e program gave an investment grant to the local governments for up 
to 75% of the investment costs for various purposes: social rental, cost-based rental, 
young family housing, homes for the elderly and pension homes.  In the years 2000-
2002, several hundred local governments took part in the program. Th e total investment 
amounted to HUF 50 billion, and more than 10,000 new units will be added to the 
rental housing stock as a result. 
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In 2002, Csepel municipality applied to the rental construction program of the 
Széchenyi Plan.18 Th e own contribution of the municipality is ﬁ nanced through a 
subsidized loan scheme provided by the OTP bank. Since the costs of the project were 
underestimated,19 instead of HUF 150 million of own resources, HUF 400 million 
had to be covered with loans. Of the total HUF 11 billion investment, the government 
has provided HUF 441.9 million subsidy, and the capital (Municipal Government of 
Budapest) has provided HUF 200 million for the right to choose 26 tenants. As part 
of the investment, a public utility development project is included, which was applied 
for in the Széchenyi Plan as well. If the city does not receive this subsidy, this invest-
ment will also have to be ﬁ nanced with loans. Th e municipality already has some loan 
proposals, which in the latter scenario will mean an additional HUF 100 million loan 
at a rate of 10%. 
Th e success of the rental sector program is an indication of the commitment of 
local governments to solving the housing problems. Before launching it there were a 
lot of concerns in the Housing Policy Committee that local governments would not 
be able to participate because the majority of them would not possess the 25% own 
contribution necessary for participation. But the program was judged successful, as 
applications exceeded the grant possibilities. In all, 41% of applications were rejected, 
and the rejection rate was lowest in the social rental category. In the year 2000 there 
were no rejections, but the rejection rate increased to 52% in 2002 in the social rental 
category and to 63% in the cost-based category.
Table 3.8
Allocation of the Rental Program among Sub-groups 
(2000–2002)
Social Cost-Based Elderly Pension Young Couple Total
Approved 73% 66% 41% 71% 44% 59%
Rejected 27% 34% 59% 29% 56% 41%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number 5,759 3,726 4,665 909 1,703 16,762
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
4.2.4   User Charges and Local Taxes
Th e Local Self-Government Act provides for a range of revenue sources to ﬁ nance local 
government functions. Th e local revenues (accounting for 20% to 34% of the total 
revenues in the last ten years) include: ﬁ ve local taxes, user charges and revenues from 
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assets and from entrepreneurial activities from the disposition of rental and commercial 
properties.
Local governments have the autonomy to set their own user fees and charges for 
public services like water, sewage, housing, district heating and garbage collection. 
However, they have no discretion over setting fees in education, social and health serv-
ices. User charges (for water and garbage, etc.) are generally agreed upon by the board 
of directors of the diﬀ erent companies, public enterprises or mixed enterprises, where 
the local government is the main owner or shareholder. In the case of services given in 
concession to the private sector, adjustments in charges follow a procedure set by the 
law and are agreed on with the local government. Th erefore, in principle, local govern-
ments may recover the full cost of service provision. 
Th e 1990 Act on Local Taxes assigns ﬁ ve taxes to local governments: i) the business 
tax; ii) the communal tax (i.e., a poll tax and/or payroll tax); iii) the urban land tax; iv) 
the property tax on buildings; and v) the tourism tax. In practice, local governments 
must decide at their discretion and by resolution of their respective councils which of 
these taxes they want to levy in their jurisdictions. 
Th e respective tax bases and the ranges for tax rates are established by the central 
government.
 Th e share of local taxes in the local government budgets was around 13.4% in 
2001. Th is is less than in the developed countries, but it is gradually increasing. In 2002 
it became the most important local source of the local government sector. Unfortunately, 
the structure of the local taxes is unhealthy. Th e most important local tax is a business 
tax (accounting for 85% of  local tax revenues). Th e tax base of this tax is unequally 
distributed among municipalities. Moreover, it is a mobile tax base and heavily depends 
on the business cycles of the country. As most of the local governments levy this tax with 
the maximum legal tax rate, there is no signiﬁ cant capacity to increase this source. On 
the other hand, it is very important for the municipal borrowing sector to increase the 
revenues from local sources in the municipal budget, as it provides a solid source for the 
repayment of the loans, thus increasing the ﬁ nancial rating of the local governments.
Th e tax capacities of local governments are signiﬁ cantly unequal in Hungary. Th is 
inequality has a spatial and a size dimension. Th e source of the inequality is the tax base 
of the business tax, as mentioned previously. While local taxes account for 24.4% of the 
revenues of the local governments in the Central Region of Hungary, this ratio is only 
14.7% for the Northeastern Region (Szalai, 2002). While along the spatial dimension the 
central and northwestern parts of Hungary have an advantage compared to the eastern 
parts, the size dimension is more striking. Th e tax base of the business tax is concentrated 
in the larger jurisdictions. Most of the villages and small jurisdictions have almost no 
revenue from local taxes. Th ere is a signiﬁ cant positive correlation between the share of 
local taxes in the local government revenues and the size of the local governments. On 
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the other hand, if a large ﬁ rm is established in a small village, it can raise revenues that 
exceed the needs of the local government to spend.
Figure 3.9
Role of Local Taxes in Local Finance (1995–2001)
Source:     Ministry of Finance.
Larger ﬁ rms that are settled in a small local government area make the local govern-
ments very dependent on these ﬁ rms. For example, the national oil company (MOL) 
recognized at the end of 2002 that because of accounting mistakes they spent millions 
of HUF more on local taxes in the village of Algyő (the location of the oil-well)  than 
their actual tax liability. Now they are requesting repayment from the village. Th e “bill,” 
however, is as large as the yearly budget of the village.
While local taxes are the main discretionary sources of revenue for local govern-
ments, this inequality in local taxes is mirrored in the inequality of local borrowing. 
Most of the villages and small cities are excluded from the local credit market because 
of the lack of local revenues that would be the source of the debt service. Th is is not a 
minor issue, as 90% of the local governments are unable to borrow because of the lack 
of local revenues.
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4.3 Local Attitudes and Strategies
While investment possibilities and alternative ﬁ nancial sources signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence the 
probability of local governments borrowing from the credit market, borrowing practices 
are still a matter of local politics, and the question of attitude and strategies plays an 
important role. While the previous factors determine how much local governments can 
and should borrow, the local politicians have to decide how much the local government 
will borrow, from whom, and what kind of loan construction will be selected.
Th e question of attitude toward indebtedness was revealed in the survey, as 50% of 
the 38 respondents answered that the attitude of the local assembly is negative toward 
borrowing and 15% of them explicitly refused to borrow. It is interesting that in large 
cities this negative attitude was even more prevalent, with six out of the ten respondents 
choosing this answer.
As is shown in Figure 3.11, there are diﬀ erent borrowing strategies among the largest 
municipalities (the cities with county-rights). While Salgótarján and Szeged are highly 
indebted, Győr is at the other end of the scale, with no long-term loans at all. Th e head 
of the ﬁ nancial department of Győr said that the local politicians refused to borrow 
despite the fact that the city would obtain a favorable credit rating and it would be a 
cheap source for local investments. Th e ﬁ nancial oﬃ  cer said there is a strong negative 
attitude toward borrowing that determines the local ﬁ nance policy, although it is an 
unreasonable position to hold ﬁ nancially.
While this distribution of the scope of borrowing shows the importance of local 
borrowing strategies, it is important to note that there is a regional disparity in this 
data. At the cautious end of the scale the cities of the developed Northwestern Region 
are over-represented, while at the other end the centers of the less developed regions 
are represented much more.
Another important decision in local politics is how to select the creditor. Th e local 
governments learned in the last decade that there are positive gains from competition, 
and most of the local governments run a bid procedure to decide which bank will be 
chosen as creditor. On the other hand, the account-keeping bank is at an advantage in 
this procedure. In our surveys more than 60% of the local governments responded that 
it is an important factor in the selection of creditor.
In Szolnok, the local government usually borrows from the OTP Bank, the 
account-keeping bank of the city. According to the Head of the Financial Oﬃ  ce, in 
those cases when the local authority oﬀ ers a bid or selects another bank, they are not 
just interested in obtaining a better loan, but they also want to create an incentive for 
OTP to develop positive conditions in the future. In Gyöngyös, the banks were selected 
by bidding procedure except for the bond issuance of the city, which will be discussed 
later. In contrast, the Csepel district government of Budapest did not consider the pos-
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sibility of a bidding procedure at all. Th ey feel it is natural that the account-keeping 
bank should also provide the long-term loans for infrastructure investments.
Th e third important decision is the form of the credit. Should it be a bank loan or 
a bond issue? While this question seems on the surface to be a strictly ﬁ nancial one, it 
involves other factors too. Th e lack of bond issues in the local government credit market 
is not only the consequence of the underdeveloped secondary market, but is really a 
matter of local attitude. While some local governments have experimented with bonds, 
they are still not commonly used and the lack of best practices available in this ﬁ eld 
limits the spread of bond issuance.
Figure 3.10
Stock of Long-term Loans as a Percentage of the Annual Budget 
in Cities with County-rights (2002)
Source:     Association of Cities with County-rights.
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In the case of Csepel, a bond issue was not an option. Th is was not for ﬁ nancial 
reasons or because of political fears. Rather, it was not regarded as a possible form of 
loan and therefore was not considered at all. Th e experience of Gyöngyös is quite the 
opposite and is very interesting. In November 2000, Raiﬀ eisen Bank organized a prod-
uct promotion in the city, where bond construction was professionally presented. Th e 
representative of the bank described cases where medium-size cities similar to Gyöngyös 
(e.g., Komárom) were successful in using a bond issue to ﬁ nance their infrastructure 
investments. Th e politicians found this attractive, and thus decided to use it for ﬁ nanc-
ing the year’s investments. In 2001, the city issued bonds valued at HUF 300 million 
with the cooperation of the bank, at 8.88% ﬁ xed interest for a ﬁ ve-year term with two 
years’ grace period. Some other expenses came up related to the issuing: a one-time 
charge for organization and a sales charge at issuing, at 1% and 1.25% of the face value 
respectively. On top of this was the annual charge of the pay-oﬀ  agent of 0.15% and an 
annual warranty charge of 0.5%. Th is bond was a private issue. Th at is, the city does 
not know who subscribed it or who possesses it. Th e bank was not chosen through an 
application process.
To summarize, there is a huge investment need at the local level that arises from the 
need to improve local services that suﬀ er from delayed investments in the past, from 
the EU accession demands and from the lack of basic infrastructure in some parts of 
Hungary. On the other hand, alternative sources of funds determine how much the local 
government should borrow from the market. Th ese sources are revenue from property, 
central investment sources, local taxes and user charges. Such revenues have not only 
crowded out credit from the ﬁ nancing of investment, but have also determined how 
much the local governments are able to borrow. Th e inequality in valuable property 
and further inequalities in the local tax base exclude 90% of the local governments 
from the credit market, mostly the small ones. Th e remaining 10% are the potential 
borrowers. Th e ﬁ nal decision on borrowing will be taken by local politicians and there 
is a signiﬁ cant fear of indebtedness among Hungarian local politicians that limits the 
scope of local borrowing.
5.  SUPPLY SIDE: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
      IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CREDIT MARKET
Th e ﬁ nancial sector plays two roles in local government management. First, banks 
provide a service as the account keepers of the local governments. Second, along with 
other ﬁ nancial institutions they provide loans for the local governments. Th ese roles 
are interconnected, but their relationship seems to have become less close in the last 
few years. 
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Th e Hungarian treasury system was introduced in 1996. Th ere was a plan to in-
clude the local government sector in the treasury system, but this plan was abandoned 
because neither the local governments nor the banks (especially the National Savings 
Bank—OTP Bank) were interested. Beside this there were other concerns, such as the 
potential for hampering the independence of the local governments, etc. 
5.1 The Market and Competition for Account-keeping
Th e market for banking services to local governments has been dominated by the OTP 
Bank, which had a monopoly in local government bank accounts until the end of 1991. 
Since the Local Government Law of 1990,  local governments have been free to choose 
their account-keeping banks. Th e decision can be made only once a year, by October 31, 
and it takes eﬀ ect from the beginning of the following ﬁ scal year. Nevertheless, after more 
than ten years, OTP Bank still has the leading role in this market; in 2003 81% of the 
local governments still have their accounts with the OTP bank. In 1995 OTP handled 
banking for 95% of local governments.  Th e second bank in terms of the number of 
local government accounts is the Saving Cooperatives, which is not one bank but rather 
several independent banks keeping the accounts of the small local governments. 
Th e real “newcomer” in the market is the Raiﬀ eisen Bank, which has 91 clients. 
Th ey are typically cities, and represent 8% of the volume of the total budget of local 
governments. Raiﬀ eisen started a local government branch in 1994. Th ey had high 
expectations, as the head of the branch was recruited from the local government depart-
ment of the Ministry of Finance.20 Th ey were quite successful in Budapest and other 
cities. Th ey did not want to move to the market of small local governments because 
in small settlements the cost of the local unit can only be recovered if they have other 
ﬁ nancial products as well, like the small saving cooperatives. 
Some local governments are pleased with their bank. For example, Csepel opened a 
competition for banking service only once, in 1997. Th e municipality never introduced 
a loan tender to select the account-keeping bank. Th e banks did not show great interest 
and ﬁ nally OTP won again.
Th ere is continuous competition among the banks in this market. In the beginning 
there was price competition, but today the quality of the services (computerized system, 
local cash management, local treasury and loan conditions, etc.) is an important feature. 
Other factors too, such as the personal connection between the bank’s representative and 
the decision-makers at local governments21 play a more important role in the selection. 
Th e fact that the bank can be changed once a year makes it very consumer-oriented, 
especially in the cities and with larger local governments. Raiﬀ eisen has lost clients in 
only 5% of the cases. With smaller local governments the competition is not so severe, 
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as the ﬁ nancial advantages are much smaller. Th e banks managing local government 
accounts generally provide a cash-ﬂ ow credit line, and are willing to make medium-term 
loans for the local governments.
 A typical way to get new clients is to oﬀ er a specialized loan product before the 
competitors, such as rehabilitation loans for condominiums, or by oﬀ ering a well-de-
signed local treasury system, water association loans, etc.  In our small survey, 15% of 
the local governments indicated that they changed their bank in the last ﬁ ve years.
 In terms of the market share of OTP Bank, there are no huge regional diﬀ erences. 
Th ere are only three counties in which OTP Bank has less than a 70% share of local 
governments: Komárom, Csongrád and Heves, which are located in very diﬀ erent parts 
of the country. In Budapest OTP Bank retains the market in 16 districts and the Mu-
nicipal Government of Budapest, but it has lost seven districts. 
Management of the local government accounts is considered to be a proﬁ table busi-
ness, provided that the local government is above a certain size. Although OTP Bank 
has lost some of its positions, it has kept its determining role in banking services for 
local governments.  Th ere are a number of factors which explain this fact. OTP Bank 
has the biggest network of local branches oﬀ ering a wide range of ﬁ nancial services, and 
there is a perceived lack of experience of other commercial banks in handling municipal 
accounts and transactions.
Table 3.9
Share of the Account-keeping Market among the Banks (2003)
Banks Local Governments
 Number Share [%]
OTP Bank 2,589 81
Saving Cooperatives 395 12
Raiffeisen Bank 91 3
Postbank 50 2
Erste Bank 20 1
CIB Bank 16 1
K and H 15 0
Budapest Bank 3 0
HVB Bank 5 0
Volksbank 1 0
Konzumbank 2 0
Total 3,187 100
Source:     OTP Bank, Local Government Division.
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5.2 The Supply of Municipal Credit
Th e normal type of credit is “credit with ﬁ nancial institutions,” which accounts for 55% 
to 62% of total liabilities (the structure of municipal credits has been presented in Table 
3.2). Two other important types are the loans by foreign banks in the form of bonds 
and direct loans, which accounted for 30% to 37% in the period 1998–2002. Bonds 
held by Hungarian residents are less than 5% of the total. Foreign loans are essentially 
issued to the city of Budapest. For example, after a tendering procedure in December 
2002, Budapest contracted a loan of HUF 30 billion on the foreign market with 3.3% 
interest rate and two years’ grace period, from a consortium of ABN Amro Bank, Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt/HVB Hungary and KBC.
Table 3.10
Th e Composition of Municipal Credit [Billion HUF] End of Year22
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bonds owned by residents 1.0 1.1 3.8 4.9 6.7
Bonds owned by foreigners 20.0 19.9 20.7 19.3 18.7
Credits with financial institutions 45.0 50.9 57.2 72.7 91.7
Credits with the government 5.5 12.1 6.7 5.4 4.4
Foreign loans 9.5 7.7 14.3 28.0 26.4
Total liabilities 81.0 91.8 102.7 130.3 148.0
Th e market for the loans has been dominated by the OTP Bank, in the same way 
as the banking services. Th e competition in lending is as strong as in bank services for 
local governments. OTP Bank’s market position has fallen from 85% to 48%, excluding 
loans to the water associations. Th e OTP Bank share is still 63.2% of the total market, 
which is lower than its share in bank services. (Source: OTP Bank)
Raiﬀ eisein Bank controls around 18% of the market, and they have HUF 30 bil-
lion in outstanding loans. In lending there is tough competition among the banks, and 
local governments have started to turn this competition to their own advantage. Th e 
newcomers have to take more risks, and have to be more innovative in lending.
If OTP Bank manages the local government’s accounts, the local government will 
often turn automatically to OTP Bank for a loan instead of inviting a tender from 
other banks as well. In the case of ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, OTP is quite ﬂ exible in ﬁ nding 
solutions. OTP Bank argues they can oﬀ er the best conditions for local governments 
in terms of interest rate, the maturity of the loan and the collateral. Th e competitors 
accuse them of oﬀ ering a “below-market interest rate” to out-price the competitors. 
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Th e OTP Bank in fact has the lowest cost of money, as they control the majority of 
household savings. On the other hand, the new banks oﬀ er risky loans (ﬁ nancially and 
legally) that would not be prudent for OTP Bank.
Figure 3.11
Estimates of the Market Share of OTP Bank Medium-term Lending 
Excluding Water Associations (*loan at the end of the year)
Source:     NBH and OTP Bank.  
Table 3.11
Size of Outstanding Loans Issued by Raiﬀ eisen Bank [Million HUF]
   
 
    1999     2000     2001 2002
Short-term loans 1,207    1,166    1,723    3,932    
Long-term loans (longer than 1 year) 5,569    5,038    10,813    13,885    
Water Association loans 1,400    2,700    8,200    13,850    
Source:     Raiﬀ eisen Bank.
Th e banks providing loans to local governments exercise ﬁ nancial control over the 
local budgets. In the case of Csepel, OTP Bank provided an advance loan for housing 
investment in 2001. However, the bank realized that the municipality’s liquidity situa-
30
40
50
60
70
[%]
1991
80
90
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
119
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G  I N  H U N G A R Y
tion had worsened and it was regularly late with payments, despite the fact that it had 
ﬁ nancial reserves. For this reason, OTP has changed the ceiling of the frame-agreement 
from the HUF 900 million that was originally set in 2001, to a lower amount of HUF 
200 million in 2002. Additional negotiations are needed to raise the sum to HUF 500 
million in 2003.
In the case of bigger loans there is almost always a tendering procedure, which has 
an eﬀ ect on the interest rate and the conditions of the loan. Th e public procurement 
law does not make it compulsory to announce a tender, but politicians want to make 
sure they are not accused of mismanagement or corruption. 
Th e issuance of bonds by municipalities is even less developed than borrowing 
from commercial banks. Some of the limiting factors include the lack of regulations 
(until the passage of the 1996 Securities Act), the lack of a secondary market and the 
higher costs associated with issuing bonds. Since 1992 there have been several bond 
issues, none of these by counties. All but three were private placement issues. Th e three 
public issues were a HUF 100 million bond by Debrecen in 1995 and a eurobond is-
sue by the Budapest municipality in 1998 for DM 150 million and in 2002 for HUF 
30 billion in EUR.
Th ere are two reasons why local governments use bonds. In the case of Budapest, for 
example, it seemed to be reasonable to issue bonds in order to increase the reputation 
of the capital. Budapest issued a bond in the period when the city did not really need 
the money. But presenting the capacity to borrow on the international ﬁ nancial market 
has enhanced the reputation of the city among potential investors. Th e other reason, 
which is particularly true for the medium-size cities, is that ordinary people view bonds 
diﬀ erently from loans. To be indebted has a bad connotation, whereas bonds are not 
tied directly to the notion of indebtedness. 
Small local governments cannot borrow as they do not have real collateral and own 
revenues. Th is is a direct consequence of the fragmented local government system. Th e 
villages and cities control less than 5% of their total revenues. In big cities this is 7% 
and in Budapest 10%.
Table 3.12
Outstanding Debt by Type of Local Government (March, 2002)
Villages Cities County Seats Budapest Total
Total revenue 
[Billion HUF, in 2001]
419.5 481.5 361 527 1,789
Outstanding debt
[Billion HUF, in 2001]
19 19 25 55 117
Outstanding debt/revenue 4.5% 3.9% 6.9% 10.4% 6.5%
Source:     GKI and TÖOSZ survey, 2002.
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OTP is trying to strategically assess future changes in the local government system. 
Th e small regions would be one market possibility for them. Today small settlements can 
have access to loans for infrastructure investment whose catchment area extends beyond 
one local government. In this case a “gestor” system is used where one local government 
is assigned as a main contractor, but the others take on individual responsibilities for the 
repayment of the loan. Th is is not a pool system because every local government has an 
individual underwriting procedure and individual collateral for the loan. In principle, 
other local governments can oﬀ er collateral for those that do not have any, but this is 
very rare. Th ere is universal liability. 
Th ere are three diﬀ erent kinds of credits for local governments: short-term and 
medium-term credit and the soft loan for water association. Th e next ﬁ gure shows the 
change in the OTP Bank portfolio. Th ere are some interesting conclusions that can be 
drawn on the basis of the OTP Bank data. Lending increased in 1994 and 1998, in the 
election years, but in the period 1999–2002 there was also a constant increase. Th us 
the election cycles have been broken.
Figure 3.12
Th e Composition of the Outstanding Loan by OTP Bank
 
Source:     OTP Bank.
5.2.1  Subsidized Loan Programs
Several loan programs with diﬀ erent subsidies have been launched for the local govern-
ments, to support speciﬁ c initiatives such as energy rationalization, the reconstruction 
of prefabricated housing stock and investment in the water sector.  
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Water Association loans are a special scheme used for water investments. Th e ma-
jority of people living in a particular area can set up an association with a foundation 
deed to invest in the water sector. Th e water association is entitled to take loans with a 
joint guaranty of local government. Th e loans are structured so that all individuals who 
are  members of the association will take responsibility for their own share. In the case 
of default, the local government pays and can collect the arrears as a local tax. It means 
that the arrears can be applied as mortgage on the property. 
Another example would be the future development of the housing program. Th e 
government announced at a conference on January 14, 2003, that the total grant amount 
for the public rental housing program for 2003 will be HUF 10 billion, which is ap-
proximately 50% of the amount used in 2002. Th is means that in order to continue 
the program the government should decrease the share of grants and increase the local 
government contribution. Local governments deﬁ nitely want to continue the program. 
According to their plans, in 2003 approximately 6000-8000 new rental units will be 
built, and 800-1000 units will be bought by local governments. Th e share of social rent 
would be 40%, and of the cost-based rent 60%. For 24% of the new investment, local 
governments plan to take loans. Th e loan/value ratio would be 44%. 
Local governments have been oﬀ ered an opportunity to take subsidized loans for 
new public rental housing investment, energy-saving investment in housing estates 
(prefabricated housing stock) and for rehabilitation programs. Th e housing law of 1993 
(LXXIVIII) declared that loans taken for the renewal of the public housing stock will 
be supported by the government. Th e loan (to a maximum of 50% of the total invest-
ment) will be guaranteed by the government and the interest rate will be subsidized. Th e 
conditions have been set by a government decree on housing subsidies (12/2001), which 
says that the loan is subsidized if local government revenues from the housing sector do 
not exceed the housing expenditures. Th e subsidy is equal to 70% of the interest rate 
calculated as the interest of a one-year treasury bond plus 2%. Th e construction of new 
rental housing is supported by the government as well, and the local governments are 
eligible for this subsidized loan.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
Local government borrowing plays a limited role in the Hungarian local government 
ﬁ nance system. Th e bank sector is quite open to expanding its role as a lender since 
local governments are generally “good debtors.” But due to the fragmented structure 
of the local governments, only approximately 200 of the largest local governments are 
able to take loans, while the remaining 3000 small local governments have diﬃ  culty 
getting into the credit market.
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Th e most important constraint on local government borrowing is the unpredict-
ability of the intergovernmental ﬁ nancial system. On the supply side, Hungary has quite 
a stable banking system, which operates prudently and is open to expanding its lend-
ing activities. On the demand side, local governments have diﬃ  culty predicting future 
ﬁ nancial perspectives.  On the revenue side, transfers dominate their budgets. Although 
these are quite stable at the macro level, for the individual governments the transfers 
can be substantially volatile. Th us the only possible collateral for borrowing is the own 
revenues and the property, representing 35% of  total local government revenues.  
Th e central sources have a signiﬁ cant impact on local government borrowing in 
the following three ways: ﬁ rst, these cheap sources initiate an investment decision in 
the sector the local government will invest in, and since they provide a cheaper source 
than the market sources, they crowd out borrowing as an alternative method of funding 
these investments. Second, the targeted subsidies are matching grants that require own 
sources from the local governments. Many local governments would like to beneﬁ t from 
a central program, but do not have the kind of resources that would create suﬃ  cient 
incentive for borrowing. Th ird, the form of the central subsidy determines the borrow-
ing of the local governments. In case of preferential loan schemes, local governments 
have more incentive to increase their borrowing than in other forms of subsidies. Th is 
was clearly the case when the central government provided preferential loans for local 
governments to build social housing in 2002.
In our survey of local governments, 64% of respondents said that the most important 
incentive for borrowing is ﬁ nancing the own source of the initiated central investment 
programs. It is interesting that the small towns (with budgets less than HUF 4 billion 
in 2002) found it a more important factor, with 77% identifying it as the most impor-
tant factor in their borrowing decision. Among the biggest towns (with budgets larger 
than HUF 10 billion in 2002) only 44% found it an important incentive. Among local 
governments that contracted loans in 2002 the number  was 68%, above the average.
Th e main problems concerning borrowing vary across the diﬀ erent segments of the 
local government sector. Because of Hungary’s extremely fragmented local government 
system there is a substantial part (the smallest ones that make up two-thirds of all local 
governments), that are unable to enter the municipal credit market. Th e reasons for 
this are: ﬁ rst, the lack of own sources of revenue; second, the lack of capacity to man-
age municipal credits; and third, the small size of their individual demand, making 
it unproﬁ table for the ﬁ nancial institutions to lend. With this group the solution is a 
higher level of cooperation among these local governments, which can be stipulated by 
diﬀ erent incentives and legal rules by the central government. Some “pooling” instru-
ment (local government bank or state guarantee system) would also be needed for small 
local governments to have access to loans.
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For the medium-size local governments the problems are diﬀ erent. Here there is 
a substantial need for external investment resources, but they have to pay a high-risk 
premium for the credits. Th e reasons for the premium are that their ﬁ nancial situations 
are the most unpredictable, and also that they have a capacity problem making it hard 
to exploit the market competition of the ﬁ nancial institutions. Th ey usually have some 
own revenues, but these are volatile and insuﬃ  cient. Th eir local economy depends on 
a few large ﬁ rms (if not just one) that provide the main source of local taxes and de-
termine the economic condition of the city. Th e market conditions of these ﬁ rms are 
what determine the city’s own resources. While the own revenues are thus not stable, the 
main funds of these local governments still come from the central government. Th eir 
ﬁ nancial uncertainty mainly results from the general problem of the unpredictability 
of the central ﬁ nancial regulation, and this uncertainty leads banks to ask a higher 
risk premium for the credit they provide to these local governments. Moreover, these 
cities have not had enough experience with municipal credit to be able to exploit the 
competition of banks. Usually the account-keeping bank provides the cheapest but still 
expensive credit, because this is the only one that has some insight into the ﬁ nancial 
condition of the city. 
Th e state could help these local governments through two measures. First, the 
stabilization of central sources, as mentioned before, is extremely important for them. 
Second, central measures are needed to decrease the transaction cost of borrowing for 
these cities. Th is would mean providing training to local ﬁ nancial oﬃ  cers to increase 
their capacity. Also, central government could help to increase the transparency of ﬁ -
nance of these local governments for the investors (e.g., a state rating agency). A rating 
and monitoring agency should be set up, private or public, or PPP form (public-private 
partnership). A loan guarantee scheme is needed to decrease and share in the risk of 
local government borrowing.
In the case of the large cities, mainly those with county rights, the diﬃ  culties are 
not in lack of access to the market or the competition of ﬁ nancial institutions, but in 
their current  utilization of the market. Th ey have some experience of bonds as well, and 
with these they usually have a better capacity to utilize market competition. While the 
unpredictability of central regulations causes a political fear of indebtedness, these local 
governments often obtain suﬃ  cient credit to meet their needs. In this part of the market, 
the state should help to improve the bond market, by creating a secondary market for 
these securities. Tax exemptions for the buyers of the local government bonds would 
help the sector, while the previously-mentioned improvement in the  predictability of 
ﬁ nancial regulations would increase the political will to ﬁ nance long-term investment 
from long-term external sources.
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NOTES
1 Th e paper draws on the research reports  MRI has prepared in the last few years (in partnership 
with the Urban Institute, Washington, and the World Bank Institute), especially in the program 
of SNDP (Subnational Development Program), which was a joint eﬀ ort of the World Bank and 
other donor agencies (USAID, British Know-How Fund, etc.) (Balás–Hegedüs, 2000, Hegedüs, 
2002). We would like to thank József Kéri, Head of Financial and Strategic Department of Szolnok, 
Róbert Kovács, Head of Financial Department of Gyöngyös, Istvánné Halmos, Head of Financial 
Department of Csepel District Local Government of Budapest for the interviews and information 
they provided about their local government borrowing practice. Th anks should also go to László 
Tordi, Director, and Jánosné Potoczky, Deputy Head of the Local Government Section of OTP 
Bank, Ildikó Keményné Koncz, Raiﬀ eisen Bank and Ákos Szalai (Budapest University of Economics) 
for the information and data they provided for us.
2 Th e sample of local governments is not representative of the local governments of Hungary, as only 
38 of the 3,200 local governments were surveyed in a self-selection method. However, this sample 
could be considered as representative for the most relevant segments of the sector, as 7 of the 22 cities 
with county rights are represented, and 19 of the 230 other cities were surveyed in the sample.
3 We used the expenditure data for the analysis of longer trends, because the changes to the budget 
system in 1996 do not make the comparison of the revenues side possible.
4 Th e exchange rates in the period 1996–2002 [HUF].
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1 EUR 191.15 210.93 240.98 252.8 260.04 256.68 242.97
1 USD 152.57 186.75 214.45 237.31 282.27 286.54 258.00
5 Th e data for this section is from Hertelendy-Kopányi (2000). Th e issue of the oﬀ -budget companies 
requires more research attention. In this project we did not have the capacity to update the data based 
on the tax reports of the companies.  
6 Act on the Conversion of the Companies, XIII/1989.
7 SNDP Report (2000), World Bank.
8 HVG, June 2, 2003.
126 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
9 Before 2001 the National Bank of Hungary as the Foreign Exchange Authority had to approve any 
borrowing from abroad. Since 2001 the Hungarian Forint is fully convertible and there is no such 
control on the currency market.
10 Interview with Ildikó Koncz, Unicbank In: Figyelő (07.10.1997).
11 Th e legal control on local governments is rather weak in Hungary. Although they have to comply 
with all the regulations that any sectoral law imposes on them, there is little possibility to enforce the 
law on local governments.
12 Th e uncertainty in expenditure assignment of the local government goes beyond the limits of this 
study. Th e local government tasks are continuously redeﬁ ned by the sectoral laws and regulation, 
which is understandable in the constantly changing world, but it can create a lot of uncertainty in 
the system.  
13 Th e Act on the Issuance of Securities, on Investment Services and on the Stock-Exchange (CXI./
1996) was built into the Act on Capital Markets CXX/2001 in 2001.
14 For more information on the local government budgeting system of Hungary see Hőgye et al. 
(2002).
15 We have to note that “oﬀ -budget” local government investments have not been shown in the ﬁ gure.
16 HVG, January 3, 2003, p.112.
17 Th e table is based on the Ministry of Finance report on local government revenues and expenditures. 
Th e category “other” is the diﬀ erence between the total investments and the revenue for capital 
investments. Th ese are aggregate data, which means that the data do not show exactly the ﬁ nancing 
source for investment because some part of the revenues could be used for operating expenditures. 
However, it shows the main trends.
18 Széchenyi Plan was the name of the national development program of Hungary between 2000 and 
2002.
19 Underestimation of the expenses related to the housing construction tender is a common experience 
among municipalities, since the decision also depends on the per-unit cost. Th e ministry  sanctions 
overspending only in rare and extreme cases. It is customary that higher expenses than approved in 
the tender are indicated when submitting invoices.
20 It is a typical strategy for the banks entering the market to hire people from the Ministries dealing 
with local governments. In the case of CIB bank, the head of the department came from the Prime 
Minister’s Oﬃ  ce.
21 To oﬀ er a board membership is not an unusual technique to inﬂ uence the bank selection.
22 In 2002, the data refer to October.
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1.   INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION 
      OF MUNICIPALITIES AND REGIONS AFTER 1989
Th e post-1989 political changes in the Czech Republic were reﬂ ected in the structure 
of state administration and self-government. Public administration was reformed, and 
after a hiatus lasting many decades self-government was restored and space for the 
independent functioning of municipalities was created. Th e municipality became an 
independent legal and economic entity, a fundamental element of local self-government. 
State administration included both institutions with broad functions (the government 
and district authorities) and institutions with specialized functions (ministries and other 
central administration authorities, and decentralized authorities at the district level such 
as land registry oﬃ  ces, revenue authorities and labour oﬃ  ces, etc). 
On January 1,1993, the splitting of Czechoslovakia resulted in the creation of an 
independent state, the Czech Republic (CR), with a new Constitution that secured 
a relatively strong constitutional anchor for local self-governing units. Th e whole of 
Chapter Seven of the Constitution of the CR is devoted to local self-government. Under 
the Constitution the country is divided into municipalities, considered fundamental 
self-governing units, and regions, deﬁ ned as higher local self-governing units.  In this 
new, “mixed model” of governance, both municipalities and regions have dual functions. 
On the one hand, they act within a framework of independent operations; on the other, 
they perform tasks delegated by the state administration.
Although the higher local self-governing units, the regions, were included in the 
text of the constitution of 1992, they only became functional in practice in the autumn 
of 2000. Th eir position was gradually strengthened and consolidated as responsibilities 
were transferred to them in 2001. In a subsequent phase of the reforms, culminating 
on December 31, 2002, district authorities were abolished and their functions were 
transferred to regional authorities and newly institutionalized “municipalities with ex-
tended operations” (a total of 205), which should ensure some administrative activities 
for neighbouring municipalities. 
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Th e role of municipalities is primarily deﬁ ned in the Act on Communities and 
Municipalities (a special Act on the Capital City of Prague applies to that city). A mu-
nicipality may independently issue generally binding ordinances, i.e., legal regulations 
that must comply with existing laws. Th e scope of a municipality’s activity is limited 
only by law; thus, state bodies and regional authorities can intervene only for the pur-
pose of protecting the law. Besides self-government, each municipality is responsible for 
certain aspects of public administration delegated to it by the state. Within this sphere, 
municipal authorities can issue by-laws such as subsidiary legal regulations. However, 
the state does not delegate its power to all municipalities in the same manner. Rather, 
there are three diﬀ erent levels of delegation of public administration functions to mu-
nicipal authorities: 
      •     All municipalities (6,258) execute self-government to the same extent, as well 
as the basic scope of operations delegated by the state;
      •     More than 380 municipalities receive extended areas of state-delegated respons-
ibility or authority;
      •     An even greater scope of authority is delegated to 205 of these 380 municipali-
ties. 
A characteristic trait of local self-government in the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia 
until the end of 1992) has been the growing number of municipalities, primarily as a 
result of involuntary integration. In 1989 there were 3,527 municipalities. By January 
1994 the number had grown to 6,231 and at the present time there are 6,258 munici-
palities in the Czech Republic. Th e average number of inhabitants per municipality 
is 1,500, ranking this country among those with the lowest average population per 
municipality in Europe.   
2.   FINANCING OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING UNITS
2.1 The Evolution of  Local Financing from 1990  
Th e years 1990–1992 can be considered a period of transition between subsidy-based 
ﬁ nancing of municipalities and the clearly deﬁ ned transfer of tax revenues as stipulated 
in law. At the beginning of 1993 a decisive change in the redistribution of taxes collected 
nation-wide occurred within the framework of a comprehensive tax reform. Th e law 
stipulated exactly what portion of the general tax revenues should go to the munici-
palities and the criteria for allocating these revenues among them. Municipalities then 
operate their budgets independently. 
On January 1, 2001, an act on the budgetary designation of tax yields was adopted. 
Th e following taxes are shared with municipalities:
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      a)   Tax yield from real estate in their territory; 
      b)   20.59% of  revenues from the gross value added tax and and income taxes col-
lected nationally;
      c)   30% of the yield from the pre-tax income of natural entities resident in the 
territory of the municipality. 
Each municipality receives a deﬁ ned share of the overall municipal pool of nation-
wide gross tax yields. Th e allocation is based on each municipality’s population and 
coeﬃ  cients of the size category of the municipality. 
An appendix to the act deﬁ nes the allocations to the regions. In their ﬁ rst year of 
operation (2001) the regions were ﬁ nanced directly from the state budget, and with a 
minimum of actual revenues.  Only in early 2002, following an amendment to the act, 
did they begin to receive speciﬁ cally deﬁ ned revenues from taxes collected nation-wide. 
Tax revenues for budgets of individual regions include 3.1% of the national gross value 
added tax and of income taxes. 
Total expenditures of municipalities in 2000 amounted to CZK 1641 billion, or 
8.3% of GNP. In the following year expenditures grew by 19.2% to CZK 195 billion, 
9.1% of GNP. However, this relatively high year-on-year growth primarily resulted from 
a new method of ﬁ nancing schools through municipal budgets.  
 
2.2 Financing Municipal Investment Expenditures 
In the year 2000 capital expenditures of municipalities amounted to CZK 56 billion 
(34.1% of total municipal expenditures), and in 2001, CZK 65 billion (33.4% of the 
total). Th ere still remains a great demand for capital expenditures related to the devel-
opment of local infrastructure. Th e improved community facilities and appearance of 
the towns and villages are clear evidence of municipal investment over the past several 
years; however, it is doubtful that this will be sustainable over the long term. 
Since the early 1990s municipalities have developed a variety of ways of ﬁ nancing 
their investment needs. First of all, municipalities had virtually no indebtedness at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and could thus rely on the surplus from their operating budgets 
as a source of funding.  Unfortunately, this source has been gradually diminishing as 
operating costs have been going up. 
Another source of funds is the revenues from the sale of municipal property. In 
the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s, municipalities acquired substantial assets at no cost within 
the framework of the privatization and restitution process. Th is was generally property 
owned by them prior to 1948, as well as property they administered prior to 1989 (e.g., 
roads, school facilities, administrative buildings and state-owned ﬂ ats in the locality). 
A signiﬁ cant asset was the equity shares in former state or local companies that were 
transferred gratis to municipalities within the framework of large privatization. 
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Because towns and municipalities were not able or willing to take care of all the 
property acquired in this way, part of it was and still is being sold,  which adds consider-
able revenue to the municipal budget. Municipal (former state) ﬂ ats are mostly sold to 
existing tenants at preferential prices, though some are excluded from this process and 
remain in municipal ownership. Equity shares of municipalities are also frequently sold, 
in many cases for signiﬁ cant sums. Th is process, termed “secondary privatization,” is 
closely scrutinized by local citizens, especially in cases that personally aﬀ ect them. But 
this source of funds is obviously coming to a close as most commercially interesting 
assets and equity shares have already been sold. Th us, municipalities must seek other 
sources to ﬁ nance their investment needs.
Finally, municipalities are increasingly taking loans from domestic and (to a much 
lesser extent) foreign banks. Recourse to loans of this sort is more common than the 
issuance of bonds. In the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s banks gave preference to companies 
and entrepreneurs, as municipalities were not considered suﬃ  ciently transparent and 
trustworthy. But the situation has changed quite radically over time, as the banks have 
become familiar with the system of municipal management, the security of a signiﬁ -
cant part of municipal revenues and, in the vast majority of cases, responsible ﬁ nancial 
discipline. As the ﬁ nancial credibility of the towns and municipalities increased, the 
banks began to experience some diﬃ  culties with the business sector. At the present 
time municipalities are contracting loans from both large and small Czech banks (or 
banks operating in the CR) and, to a lesser extent, foreign banks. Th e largest number 
of loans has been granted by Česká spořitelna (Czech Savings Bank) and Komerční 
banka (Commercial Bank).
In the mid-1990s, a near boom occurred in the issuing of municipal bonds (for 
details, see further sections of this report). Th e ﬁ rst issue was carried out in 1992, and 
the largest number of issues (nine) occurred in 1994. After this, activity in this area 
signiﬁ cantly decreased and  was mainly restricted to the biggest cities, since the issuing 
of bonds entails relatively high additional costs and is a rather lengthy process. Another 
factor that appears to have limited their use is the still underdeveloped Czech capital 
market. On the other hand, the advantage of bonds is that property is not required 
as collateral, and if issuers can aﬀ ord to enter foreign markets they will have access to 
cheaper long-term money. 
 
2.3 Structure of Revenues of Municipalities and Regions 
Th e largest portion of municipalities’ revenues comes from the allotted share of national 
taxes (see Table 4.1). For the regions, the share of tax revenues is roughly 20%. How-
ever, this average may diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly in the case of a speciﬁ c town in a speciﬁ c year, 
depending on other sources of municipal revenues such as capital income.  
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Municipalities have little discretion in inﬂ uencing local tax revenues. Th eir only 
direct possibility is through the real estate tax. By means of an ordinance, municipali-
ties can alter the coeﬃ  cient deﬁ ning the basic tax rate for some buildings and land. But 
this tax represents less than 5% of tax revenues of municipalities, approximately 2.5% 
of total revenues. Local charges, which can also be inﬂ uenced by local governments, 
constitute a very small proportion of local revenues. 
Th e number of inhabitants remains the decisive criterion for distribution of shared 
taxes among municipalities. Th is indicator aﬀ ects up to 80% of tax revenues. From one 
point of view, this is a stabilizing factor ensuring a comparable revenue base for munici-
palities throughout the CR. From the other, it does not take into account local economic 
eﬃ  ciency and related expenses. Th e classiﬁ cation of municipalities into size categories 
with signiﬁ cantly graded coeﬃ  cients (which aﬀ ect the level of tax revenues along with 
the number of inhabitants) also gives rise to many questions, mainly regarding the mar-
gins of the determined intervals. Th e entire system is relatively new and is constantly 
monitored by all parties concerned. Undoubtedly, it will be further modiﬁ ed.
Table 4.1
Structure of Revenues of Municipalities (2001)
Type of Revenue Percentage of Total Revenues Amount [Million CZK]
Tax and fee revenues2
•    national tax shares
•    real-estate tax
•    local and management charges
•    other taxes
52.8 89,900 
80,900 
4,500 
3,800 
700 
Subsidies
•    from the state budget
•    from state funds
18.4 31,258 
18,230 
6,737 
Non-tax revenues3 14.9 25,000 
Capital revenues4 9.0 15,300 
Other revenues5 4.9 8,300 
Total 100.0 169,758 
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3.   INDEBTEDNESS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS 
3.1 Total Public Debt of the Czech Republic 
Th e total public debt of the CR has been rising inexorably since 1996.  Whereas in the 
middle of the 1990s it was approximately 12% of gross national product (see Table 4.2), 
by the end of the past decade it represented almost 15%. In terms of the Maastricht 
criteria this ﬁ gure is by no means frightening; however, it is always necessary to keep a 
close eye on the trend—and the trend is not exactly satisfactory, having a permanently 
upward tendency. 
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of municipal indebtedness, this accounts for 
much less than 20% of total public debt.
Table 4.2
Indebtedness of the Czech Republic [Billion CZK]
Debt 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Municipalities 3.4 14.3 20.3 28.3 34.4 39.0 40.0 41.0 48.3
•    loans 2.5 4.9 8.7 11.6 13.5 18.0 17.6 18.4 22.6
•    bonds 7.6 8.5 11.9 13.2 11.9 10.9 10.1 13.3
•    other 0.9 1.8 3.1 4.8 7.7 9.1 11.5 12.5 12.4
State 158.9 157.3 154.4 155.2 173.1 194.7 228.4
Total 162.3 171.6 174.7 183.5 207.5 233.7 268.4
Source:     Ekonom 36/2001(Ministry of Finance of the CR, World Bank).
Table 4.3
Indebtedness of the Czech Republic [% GNP]
Debt 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Municipalities 0.3 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.2
•   loans 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0
•   bonds 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6
•   other 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6
State 15.9 13.3 11.2 9.9 10.4 10.8 12.4
Total 16.2 14.5 12.6 11.7 12.4 13.0 14.6
Source:     Ekonom 36/2001(Ministry of Finance of the CR, World Bank).
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3.2 History and Structure of the Indebtedness of Municipalities
 Table 4.2 shows clearly how the indebtedness of municipalities has been gradually grow-
ing, while in 2001 it rose by a whopping 18% in comparison with the previous year. 
Th e growth in comparison with 1994 is thus more than threefold. A positive feature 
of this trend is that the loans are primarily directed to infrastructure, environmental 
protection projects, housing construction, school buildings and the like. Looking at 
indebtedness more closely, we can observe a standstill in other types of loans and aid. 
In the case of credits, there was hardly any increment in 1998–2000, while municipal 
bonds even decreased signiﬁ cantly. Higher year-on-year indebtedness between 2000 and 
2001 was roughly equal to the increase in new credits and bond issues. 
Table 4.4
Indebtedness of Local Governments According to Size
Municipality Size 
Category According 
to the Number 
of Inhabitants 
Number of 
Inhabitants 
per Size 
Category
Number of 
Inhabitants 
per Size  
Category
[%]
Outstanding 
Debt on 
Dec. 31, 2001 
[Thousand 
CZK]
Outstanding 
Debt on 
Dec. 31, 2001
in % of Total 
Municipal Debt
Debt 
per Capita
[Thousand 
CZK]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(3)/(1)
0–100 39,202 0.4 27,628 0.1 0.7
100–200 166,092 1.6 220,524 0.5 1.3
200–300 221,370 2.2 403,404 0.8 1.8
300–1,500 1,871,562 18.2 4,704,525 9.7 2.5
1,500–5,000 1,503,952 14.6 6,038,091 12.5 4.0
5,000–10,000 888,492 8.6 3,446,387 7.1 3.9
10,000–20,000 960,821 9.3 3,226,634 6.7 3.4
20,000–30,000 672,704 6.5 1,761,904 3.6 2.6
30,000–40,000 387,096 3.8 783,155 1.6 2.0
40,000–50,000 187,419 1.8 188,344 0.4 1.0
50,000–100,000 1,245,458 12.1 2,707,053 5.6 2.2
100,000–150,000 103,299 1.0 595,583 1.2 5.8
150,000–500,000 865,456 8.4 6,034,129 12.5 7.0
More than 500,000 1,179,920 11.5 18,206,444 37.7 15.4
Total 10,292,843 100.0 48,343,761 100.0 4.7
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the CR.
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Table 4.5
Evolution of the Number of Indebted Municipalities (1994–2001)
Size Category of Municipalities 
According to 
Number of Inhabitants
Number of Indebted Municipalities
1994 1997 1999 2001
0–100 155 80 112 52
100–200 265 214 325 249
200–300 211 214 311 275
300–1,500 823 1,237 1,585 1,636
1,500–5,000 302 443 495 516
5,000–10,000 88 128 131 125
10,000–20,000 60 65 65 68
20,000–30,000 24 28 28 27
30,000–40,000 11 10 10 11
40,000–50,000 2 6 6 4
50,000–100,000 16 16 17 17
100,000–150,000 3 2 1 1
150,000–500, 000 3 3 3 3
More than 500,000 1 1 1 1
Total 1,964 2,447 3,090 2,985
Table 4.6
Indebtedness of the Four Largest Cities Compared to Remaining Municipalities
[Billion CZK]
Index Four Largest Cities(*) All Other Municipalities 
1994 1997 1999 2001 1994 1997 1999 2001
Loans 1.1 0.8 4.7 8.3 3.8 12.7 12.9 14.3
Bonds 7.3 11.6 10.0 13.3 0.3 1.6 0.9 0.0
Other 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.6 1.4 6.5 9.8 9.8
Total 8.8 13.6 16.4 24.2 5.5 20.8 23.6 24.1
*      Prague, Brno, Ostrava, Pilsen.
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the CR.
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Table 4.6 divides the total indebtedness of the municipal sector into two groups: the 
four largest cities and all others. Interestingly, the ﬁ gures show that municipal indebted-
ness excluding the four largest cities has not been rising, as debt from municipal bonds 
has been repaid. On the other hand, other types of loans have increased, primarily in 
connection with the start-up of many support programs ﬁ nanced from the state budget 
and state funds. More attention to this issue is paid in the following sections.
In 2001 exactly half of the total indebtedness of municipalities resulted from bor-
rowing by the four largest cities. Th e jump in indebtedness in the last year (2001) is 
also exclusively accounted for by them, and is fairly equally divided between credits 
and municipal bonds.  
It goes without saying that large cities have incomparably higher investment de-
mands. It is also true that in a way they serve a much larger territory than that belonging 
to them in administrative terms. When we look at the use of money borrowed by these 
large cities, it mainly includes projects pertaining to transport, water management and 
other infrastructure demands. But it is also true that part of the debt is allocated to 
repayment of municipal bond issues from previous years. 
To conclude, these large cities, having incomparably higher investment demands, 
also have greater economic strength, which allows them—while keeping proper ﬁ scal 
discipline—to successfully meet their obligations.  
In general, larger towns have greater possibilities of acquiring external ﬁ nancial 
means. On the one hand, they can issue municipal bonds. On the other, they are favor-
ably regarded by banks due to their extensive property and higher volume of secured 
future revenues. To a certain extent—in comparision with entrepreneurial subjects—this 
applies to all local self-governing units regardless of their size. 
With small municipalities, a problem may be the size and consequent ﬁ nancial 
burden of some investment projects. It is often diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd ﬁ nancing with an eco-
nomically reasonable credit level within the framework of one municipality.  In this case, 
associations or unions of municipalities for a speciﬁ c purpose allows for the pooling of 
ﬁ nance and property, thus improving the chance of obtaining the necessary credit.
Although the banks began to view towns and municipalities as creditworthy during 
the 1990s, they have nevertheless become much more cautious when granting credits, 
because of some negative experiences over the past few years. Veriﬁ cation of potential 
debtors is much more thorough now, and requirements for information is more strin-
gent prior to granting a credit and during the repayment period. While developing 
their own assessment methods, the banks have also improved their understanding of 
the functioning of municipalities and other non-proﬁ t organizations. Th e resulting 
procedure of credit acquisition is not entirely simple; nevertheless, it is not harmful for 
the sound functioning of the system.
Greater caution on the part of the banks is also connected to the privatization of the 
banking sector, which took place after 2000. New foreign owners introduced stricter 
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procedures for granting credits to all clients, including municipalities and regions. Th is 
can only be seen as positive, since increased demands placed by banks upon municipalities 
when granting credits leads to more responsible practices by individual applicants. One 
of the important measures that can prevent unsound indebtedness of local self-governing 
units is a well-functioning banking sector. Th e sober view of a specialist independent of 
local self-government, who is directly engaged in the ﬁ nancing of a project, can prevent 
the ﬁ nancing of some unfeasible projects or can facilitate their change.   
  
4.   REGULATING THE DEBT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING UNITS
 
Debt regulations for municipalities and regions are addressed in the relevant laws: the Act 
on Municipalities, the Act on Regions and the Act on the Capital City of Prague. Th e 
basic framework for the ﬁ nancial management of municipalities and regions is further 
elaborated in the local budget regulations. Other relevant legal stipulations are found in 
the Act on Bonds, deﬁ ning the terms for issuing municipal bonds, and, last but not least, 
the Constitution of the CR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 
 It is important to note that both municipalities and regions are viewed as being 
like any other owner. Property protection is stipulated in Article 11 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.6 Under constitutional law, the provision of owner-
ship rights has the same content and oﬀ ers the same protection for all owners; there are 
no speciﬁ c regulations applying to municipalities and regions. 
Th e limitations on ownership rights of municipalities and regions are expressed 
in the Act on Municipalities, the Act on Regions and the Act on the Capital City of 
Prague. Th ese texts establish limits on the right of regions and municipalities to issue 
guarantees for liabilities of natural and legal entities, except in speciﬁ ed cases where 
they may issue a guarantee: 
      •     With liabilities arising from a credit contract, if ﬁ nancial means are intended 
for an  investment implemented with ﬁ nancial support from the state budget, 
state funds or the National Fund;
      •     With liabilities arising from a credit contract, if ﬁ nancial means are intended 
for an investment in real estate owned by a municipality or region;
      •     With entities instituted by a municipality, region or the state, Prague or city 
districts;
      •     With entities whose level of participation either alone or together with another 
municipality or other municipalities, region or the state exceeds 50%;
      •     With housing associations in the case of municipalities.
Th e respective provisions of Act No. 328/1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settle-
ments, do not refer to municipalities and regions. Th at is, neither municipalities nor 
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regions can actually go bankrupt. However, in practice there may occur cases (and such 
cases are known) when the property assets and ﬁ nancial possibilities of municipalities 
and regions are reduced to such an extent that they are not able to ensure fundamental 
services for their citizens. 
Th e current legal regulations deﬁ ning the economic management of municipalities 
and regions already include provisions that contribute to the prevention of excessive 
indebtedness. Act No. 250/2000 Coll., on ﬁ scal rules of local budgets, contains the 
following stipulations: 
      •     Th e annual budget must be drawn up according to an obligatory forecast 
balance sheet. Th e forecast balance sheet is an auxiliary instrument of a local self-
governing unit, serving in the medium-term ﬁ scal planning of its economic de-
velopment. It is drawn up on the basis of concluded contractual relationships and 
accepted liabilities, normally for two to ﬁ ve years following the year for which the 
annual budget is compiled. Th e forecast balance sheet contains a summary of basic 
data on revenues and expenditures, primarily long-term liabilities and receivables, 
ﬁ nancial sources and requirements of goals implemented over the long term.
      •     Th e annual budget must be drawn up as a balanced budget. It can be approved 
with a surplus if the revenues of the year in question are speciﬁ cally intended 
for use in the following years or intended for repayment of a credit principal 
from previous years. A deﬁ cit budget can be approved only if the deﬁ cit can be 
paid down using ﬁ nancial means from past years or a contractually secured loan, 
credit, returnable ﬁ nancial aid, or by the yield from sales of the municipality’s 
own bonds. A positive balance in the current year is transferred for use in the 
next year to cover budget expenditures, or is transferred to money funds.  An 
economic deﬁ cit is paid from the surplus from past years or is covered from 
returnable sources payable from the budget in subsequent years. Neither the 
Ministry of Finance nor anyone else may aﬀ ect the level of the proposed budget 
deﬁ cit of a municipality or region since this decision is made exclusively by 
boards of representatives who operate independently.
      •     Th e budget must be drawn up on the basis of the break-down of a valid state 
budget (regions or municipalities can approve their budgets prior to the state 
budget’s approval). Th e speciﬁ c details of the ﬁ nancial relationship between 
the state budget and regions and municipalities are not required. But after the 
state budget has been approved, a revised budget must be approved, in which 
the relationships between the state budget and municipal and regional budgets 
set by law are integrated.  
Another new regulatory instrument, internal auditing, was established by Act 
320/2001 Coll., on ﬁ nancial control in public administration. An internal audit is an 
independent and unbiased check and assessment of the operations and the internal 
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control system of a public administration body, including both regional and municipal 
authorities. Th e audit ascertains that there has been compliance with relevant legal 
regulations, and that the appropriate measures have been adopted and procedures set. 
Furthermore, it checks to see that risks relating to the operation of a public adminis-
tration body are detected in time, and that adequate measures for their elimination or 
reduction are taken. Other issues to be examined within the framework of an internal 
audit are whether or not control checks provide the public administration executive 
body (normally understood as the district administrator, mayor or lord mayor) with 
reliable operating, ﬁ nancial and other information, and whether or not operating and 
ﬁ nancial criteria are met.7 Finally, the audit will check whether or not the established 
internal control system is suﬃ  ciently eﬀ ective and able to react promptly to changes in 
economic, legal and operating conditions. Th e intent is to provide suﬃ  cient security 
so that the adopted plans and goals of this body can be fulﬁ lled. 
 On the basis of its ﬁ ndings, the internal audit unit submits to the public admin-
istration executive body (administrator, mayor or lord mayor) a recommendation for 
improving the quality of the internal control system, preventing or reducing risks and 
taking measures to rectify the faults detected. At the same time, this unit provides con-
sultancy services to the public administration body. 
Internal audits include in particular:
      •     Financial audits, to verify whether or not the data stated in ﬁ nancial, accounting 
and other statements truly describe property, the sources of its ﬁ nancing and 
its management; 
      •     System audits, to check and assess the systems for securing revenues of public 
administration bodies, including debt recovery, ﬁ nancing of their activity and 
securing administration of public means;
      •     Performance audits, to selectively check the eﬀ ectiveness, eﬃ  ciency and pur-
posefulness of operations, as well as the appropriateness and eﬃ  ciency of the 
internal control system. 
Th e internal audit unit is directly subordinate to the public administration executive 
body, which ensures its functional independence and organizational separation from 
top management structures.
Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants are not required to provide an 
internal audit if they take other suﬃ  cient measures. In this case, they ensure continu-
ous monitoring and assessment of the eﬀ ectiveness of these measures and, at the same 
time, consider the establishment of an internal audit unit. If the measures taken are not 
suﬃ  ciently eﬀ ective, municipalities are obliged to set up an internal audit unit without 
unnecessary delay. Th ere have been no such cases to date.
Other legal regulations on the debt of local self-governing units are stipulated in 
the Act on Bonds. Furthermore, there is a compulsory annual check of economic man-
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agement by an external auditor or a regional authority (formerly, a district authority). 
Th ese legal controls are discussed in detail in later sections.     
5.   CREDITS USED BY SELF-GOVERNING UNITS 
5.1 Credits in General
Local government units can use credits as a source of ﬁ nancing their budgets. Credits 
and loans are sometimes thought to be identical, but they diﬀ er in their legal status.8 A 
credit might be granted on the basis of a contract pursuant to the Commercial Code. 
On the other hand, a loan is a legal contract deﬁ ned in the Civil Code. In this case, 
money or another type of determined item is granted to a borrower by a lender, while 
the borrower pledges to repay the debt within a ﬁ xed period. In principle (legally), the 
loan is thus interest-free, although agreement on interest is not ruled out.  
Credit can be oﬀ ered on a short-term, medium-term or long-term basis. Short-
term credit matures within one year or by the end of the business year, and is mainly 
drawn for ﬁ nancing current (“operating”) needs of local self-governments. It is useful 
in bridging  the time lag between income and expenses. Medium-term credits mature 
within ten years, and long-term in more than ten years (Markova 2000). 
Short-term credit is usually granted to a local self-governing unit by the bank 
maintaining its budget accounts. Large towns and regions, however, do not normally 
hold their accounts at one bank. Instead they keep an entire portfolio of them so that 
they can use the most advantageous products of a speciﬁ c ﬁ nance company and, at the 
same time, cover the possible risk of a bank failure. Bank failure was not an uncommon 
phenomenon in the Czech Republic in the recent past.  
Although there is no such legal stipulation, medium-term and long-term credits 
serve in practice as a source of capital for expensive long-term projects such as waste-
water treatment plants and refurbishment of the housing stock.  Long-term credits are 
primarily used for infrastructure projects where indirect return is expected—e.g., local 
thoroughfares. 
 
5.2 Legal Regulations on Granting Credits 
      to Municipalities and Regions
As mentioned above, the credit contract is deﬁ ned in the Commercial Code. Th e creditor 
pledges to provide a certain amount of money to the debtor, while the debtor (in our 
case, a municipality or region) pledges to repay the money with interest. Both munici-
144 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
palities and regions can also accept credits from abroad and in foreign currencies.  Since 
1990 the granting and acceptance of credits and loans by municipalities and regions 
have been subject to approval by the municipal board of representatives. 
From April 26, 1991 to December 31, 1992, another type of limit came into force 
under Article 9 of Act No. 172/1991 Coll. Th is limit applied to the transfer of certain 
items from the property of the Czech Republic to municipal owernship. According to 
this limit, the consent of three-ﬁ fths (instead of a simple majority) of all members of 
municipal boards was necessary for certain property transactions, including credit (loan) 
acceptance, credit (loan) granting, assumption of debt, alignment of debts and assump-
tion of a guarantee if required by at least one-tenth of all municipal board members. Th e 
limitation was conditional on the request of at least one-tenth of the municipal board 
members, and only if such a situation occurred was it necessary to obtain the consent 
of a three-ﬁ fths majority of board members to accept debt.  
For ﬁ ve months from the beginning of 2002, the amendatory Act on Munici-
palities set new limits on acceptance of credits and loans and the issuing of municipal 
bonds by municipalities. Speciﬁ cally, this concerned Act No. 450/2002 Coll., which 
amended the Act on Municipalities, the Act on Regions and the Act on the Capital 
City of Prague.9 
Pursuant to the Act on Municipalities, the following limits were established for 
granting credits to municipalities in the period from January to June, 2002: 
      •     Approval by the Government was necessary for acceptance of credits from 
abroad. Th e purpose of this was to protect municipalities and regions against 
foreign exchange risk.  
      •       A local self-governing unit could not accept a credit if its debt service exceeded 
15% of the previous year’s actual budget.  
If a credit contract or other legal transaction was carried out in contradiction with 
these limits, it would be considered retroactively invalid from the start of the contract. 
Th is particular provision had a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on the credit policy of individual ﬁ -
nance companies towards municipalities and regions. Th e problem was that the law did 
not precisely deﬁ ne the term “debt service.”10 From an economic viewpoint this term 
is relatively unambiguous, but it is problematic in legal terms, especially in connection 
with the sanction of absolute invalidity. 
Banks were aware of the problem from the very ﬁ rst days of operation of the new 
provisions in the Act on Municipalities, the Act on Regions and the Act on the Capital 
City of Prague. For this reason, many banks stopped granting credits until the situation 
was cleared up. Within a short time, the Ministry of Finance of the CR also realized 
the problem and initiated discussions on the new wording of the respective provisions 
of the acts. However, since the legislative process in the Czech Republic lasts several 
months and it was not possible to signiﬁ cantly speed up the process of passing the nec-
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essary amendment, a new solution had to be prepared promptly. Hence, the Ministry 
of Finance of the CR issued a methodological instruction for how to interpret the term 
“debt-servicing of last year’s actual budget,” which was used in all three acts.
According to this special instruction from the Ministry of Finance, debt-servicing is 
to be understood as “interest, instalments of principals, bills, leasing instalments, and, 
in the case of one-oﬀ  instalments payable after an agreed term has expired, the relative 
part of the instalment for one year.”  In addition, the term “last year’s actual budget” is 
deﬁ ned as “the total attained volume of the budget for the last calendar year,” i.e., all 
revenues of the budget of a local self-governing unit for the last year. Th ese terms were 
deﬁ ned in the same manner for Prague and the regions.  
Since the summer of 2002, the legal regulations have not imposed these limits. Also 
scrapped was the condition that a municipality, region or the city of Prague must not 
accept credit if its debt-servicing exceeds 15% of last year’s actual budget. 
Nevertheless, the new legal regulation has aﬀ ected the possibility of issuing guarantees 
by municipalities, regions and Prague. Under current legal regulation, a municipality, 
region or Prague must not stand surety for liabilities of natural and legal entities, except 
for:
      •       liabilities arising from credit contracts, if the funds are intended for investment 
carried out with ﬁ nancial support from the state budget, state funds or National 
Funds;11 
      •       liabilities arising from credit contracts, if the funds are intended for investment 
in real estate owned by the municipality or in legal entities set up by the munici-
pality, region or Prague, as well as legal entities in which the municipality, region 
or Prague possesses majority decision-making rights and housing associations. 
 
5.3 Granting Credits to Local Self-governments
Municipal credit is considered credit with minimum risk (on the part of the credi-
tor), for whose coverage banks12 use municipal (regional) property as a pledge. Local 
self-governments mainly issue pledges for credits with immovable assets owned by a 
municipality or region, and also very often with future budget revenues. Th ird-party 
guarantees, pledges issued against stock (loans against securities) and various combina-
tions of these possibilities can also be used. For banks, municipalities are welcome clients 
precisely due to the low risk when granting credits. In 2001 banks granted 631 credits 
to local governments. Th e most important creditors were Česká spořitelna (268 cases), 
Komerční banka (187 cases), Raiﬀ eisenbank (53 cases) and Českomoravská hypoteční 
banka (44 cases).
To date, the regions have not played an important role in incurring debts since they 
have only recently been established. In the period until the end of 2001 they took a 
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minimal volume of loans, worth the paltry sum of CZK 2.7 million! Almost the entire 
amount was paid back by the end of the year, while by 2002 regions recorded outstand-
ing loans amounting to a mere CZK 0.7 million.
Credits contracted by municipalities from ﬁ nance companies are primarily chan-
nelled into projects related to environmental protection, mainly construction of gas 
distribution lines, sewage systems, waste water treatment plants, water mains and waste 
sites, as well as municipal housing construction, refurbishment of primary schools, 
pavement repairs, etc. Th e terms of credit maturities are ﬁ xed within the range of two 
to twenty years. In most cases municipalities stand surety with their property, and to a 
lesser extent with their future revenues (Ministry of Finance data).
Table 4.7
Summary Data on Credits Contracted by Municipalities [Billion CZK]
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Current prices 2.5 4.9 8.7 11.6 13.2 18.0 17.6 18.4 22.6
Constant prices, 2001 4.4 7.8 12.6 15.5 16.2 20.0 19.1 19.3 22.6
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the CR.
Table 4.7 shows summary data on credits contracted by municipalities between 
1993 and 2001. One should bear in mind that the municipal elections in the CR took 
place in autumn 1994, 1998 and 2002. Another important factor is that there was a 
signiﬁ cant slump in  the entire Czech economy in 1997, and the Czech government 
also fell in the autumn of the same year. 
Th e growth of the sum total of incurred credits can serve for comparison with the 
growth of the total indebtedness in this period. Th e willingness of municipalities to take 
credits was signiﬁ cant until 1997, with a great increase recorded each year. It is especially 
interesting that only a slight growth in credits occurred in 1996 and 1997 when we 
recorded a real growth of 5%, compared with growth of over 20% in 1995–1996 and 
1997–1998.  Th is can be explained by so-called “packages” of strong, restrictive meas-
ures taken by the central government in reaction to the relatively deep and unexpected 
slump of the Czech economy after several years of boom. Connected with this was also 
the unwillingness of municipalities to accept more credits. Nevertheless, the following 
year bore witness to a new growth in accepted credits.  
It is interesting to compare individual items in the year-on-year growth indexes of 
individual types of loans. Th e total growth of municipalities’ indebtedness decreased 
in nominal terms from 121.6 in 1996–97 to 113.4 in 1997–98. Similarly,  the index 
of year-on-year growth of accepted ﬁ nancial aid decreased from 160.4 in 1996–97 to 
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118.2 in 1997–98 as a result of saving measures taken by the central government. Th e 
index of year-on-year growth of issued municipal bonds also decreased, from 110.9 in 
1996-97 to 90.2 in 1997–98.  Th e only growth recorded in this period was in the case 
of credits accepted by municipalities, from 116.4 in 1996–97 to 133.3 in 1997–98.
 An explanation of why the quantity of accepted credits grew in the period when the 
quantity of issued municipal bonds, accepted ﬁ nancial aid and other debts decreased, can 
be found in the fact that in autumn 1998 municipal elections were held and politicians 
tried their hardest to complete semi-ﬁ nished projects. Also, it was partially a reaction to 
the decline of ﬁ nancial aid from the state or state-derived organizations.  
Th e overall economic situation of the CR did not entirely improve in 1999 (the 
index of accepted credits in 1998–99 was 97.8) and since it was not an election year 
we can record a  signiﬁ cant year-on-year decrease in accepted credits. On the other 
hand, the willingness of municipalities to accept credits grew again in 2000 and 2001 
together with the economic recovery in the CR (index of 104.5 in 1999–2000 and 
122.8 in 2000–2001). 
Th ese ﬁ gures reveal that even without legal regulation for credit acceptance, mu-
nicipalities monitor the national economic situation and naturally adapt to it, except 
in the period immediately preceding municipal elections.  
5.4 Future Outlook
According to the preliminary version of the public ﬁ nance reform prepared by the 
Ministry of Finance, certain limits are being planned for acceptance of credits by mu-
nicipalities and regions.13 
As regards the granting of subsidies to municipalities and regions, one idea being 
considered is that in the case of ﬁ nancial participation covered by returnable sources 
(credit, loans, returnable ﬁ nancial aid or the issue of municipal bonds) the ﬁ xed limit 
of debt-servicing must not be exceeded.  
An eﬀ ort is being made to clearly deﬁ ne the content of debt-servicing as the sum of 
all liabilities from returnable sources of a municipality or region by December 31 of the 
past year. Debt-servicing deﬁ ned in this manner should be proportional to the volume 
of actual revenues attained in the last calendar year. Th e proportion thus derived will 
provide a “debt-servicing index” whose excess would mean a limitation for a municipal-
ity or region, in the sense that it would not be possible to obtain an investment subsidy 
from the state budget.  
Also being considered is a return to the necessary three-ﬁ fths majority of all municipal 
or regional boards of representatives in certain cases stipulated by law. Th is could apply 
speciﬁ cally to cases where a debt was accepted in excess of 50% of actual revenues of 
a municipality or region in the given calendar year. Th e proposal for the three-ﬁ fths 
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majority decision aims at increasing the responsibility of municipal and regional board 
members when deciding on credits and loans that represent a large volume of ﬁ nancial 
means in comparison with the actual revenue budget, because such decisions aﬀ ect 
municipal and regional management for a long time to come.  
Another limit being considered is to clearly stipulate that local self-governments 
can use sources from long-term loans (credits and issues of municipal bonds) only for 
capital expenditures.     
6.   BOND ISSUING BY LOCAL SELF-GOVENMENTS
6.1 The Development of Legal Regulation for Issuing Bonds
Within a relatively short time after 1989 municipalities were given the opportunity to 
issue their own bonds. Legal regulation of municipal bonds was inherent in Act No. 
530/1990 Coll., on bonds. After several amendments, this act is still valid today and 
the provisions concerning municipal bonds remain basically the same. 
Rather paradoxically, municipal bonds can be issued by a bank if this bank granted 
a credit from the yield of sales of municipal bonds to a municipality that requested 
their issue and that also stands surety for the issue with its property. Such a bond was 
termed (and still is) a “municipal bond,” although in fact it was nothing more than a 
diﬀ erent form of the municipality’s standing surety for the credit granted by the bank 
to the municipality. Th e reason for the inclusion of this provision in the Act on Bonds 
could be the fact that in the given period banks did not have enough free ﬁ nancial means 
to grant suﬃ  cient credits to municipalities and this unusual solution oﬀ ered itself as a 
substitute. Although this provision has been in operation since the beginning of 1991, 
no municipality has used it to date. 
Another possibility was for a municipality to issue a municipal bond directly or, 
more commonly, a municipality concluded a contract on issuing municipal bonds with 
a specialized company or bank with whose help it subsequently issued bonds bearing 
the adjective “municipal.” In this case, too, the municipality had to stand surety with 
its property.   
However, there was nothing preventing municipalities from issuing bonds without 
the adjective “municipal” if they stood surety with, for example, their “good reputation” 
instead of their property. Th is could occur with large municipalities with a good rating, 
or when municipalities used another, third party as a surety. No municipality, however, 
has yet issued a bond in this way.  
When regions were created they became excluded from issuing bonds, of course, 
since the Act on Bonds applied only to municipalities.
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Th ere are two phases involved when we consider the conditions for issuing bonds. 
Th e ﬁ rst phase was from 1990 to January 1, 2001, and this is the period we will examine 
in our discussion of the development of legal regulations for issuing bonds. Th e second 
phase, from 2001 to the present, will be described in the next section dealing with the 
current legislation on regulation and limits for issuing bonds and municipal bonds.  
During this period from 1990 to 2001, each bond had to contain the name of the 
issuer, the name of the bond, the nominal value of the bond, an assessment of the yield, 
the issuer’s pledge to repay the bond’s nominal value within a certain term or terms, 
the date of the bond’s issuance, as well as the details on the decision by the Ministry of 
Finance to permit the issue of bonds with the exception of cases where this permission 
was not required (solely bonds issued by the state). Each issue of bonds needed con-
sent from the Ministry of Finance, as stated earlier. But the entire system was further 
strengthened by a rule requiring the approval of the Czechoslovak State Bank (the 
former central bank) in addition to permission from the Ministry. Permits had to meet 
all the necessary requirements, while the issuer had to state the purpose for the issue, 
its present and presumed ﬁ nancial situation, and to declare that it was able to secure 
return of the issue and how it would be materially ensured. If a natural or legal entity 
assumed liability for the repayment and interest, the application also had to contain 
data on the surety and its ﬁ nancial situation and, of course, the consent of the surety 
to assumption of the surety commitment.  
Another instrument used by the Ministry of Finance to ascertain the issuer’s ﬁ nancial 
situation (even more in the case of municipalities) was a rule requiring the applicant to 
attach to the application the most recent annual ﬁ nancial statement with commentary 
checked by an auditor. Th e Ministry of Finance was obliged by law to refuse a permit 
if the applicant did not prove its capability to ensure repayment of the requested issue; 
until April 1,1998, it was even obliged to do so when the considered issue was inconsist-
ent with the national ﬁ nancial policy or did not comply with the needs of the ﬁ nancial 
market, which were reasons providing plenty of scope for rejection. On the other hand, 
the reasons for not granting a permit did have to be disclosed to applicants.  
If bonds were issued without permission, the sanction imposed on the issuer was the 
forfeiting of all ﬁ nancial means acquired in this manner, to the beneﬁ t of the state budget. 
Th e state did not stand surety for liabilities arising from the issue of municipal bonds 
and bonds issued by municipalities unless it explicitly assumed this liability (which did 
not happen).  
Th e system for preventing bonds being issued by subjects that could have problems 
with their repayment was extremely comprehensive. Despite this fact, it was precisely 
during this period that all bonds of municipalities that could not be paid later (or paid 
only with great diﬃ  culty) were issued. Th ese municipalities had to face an extremely 
unfavourable economic situation; one of them, also owing to this, is not even able to 
meet its obligations.   
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6.2 Current Legal Regulation on the Issuing of Bonds 
At the present time, the relevant act pertaining to the issuing of bonds is Act No. 530/
1990 Coll., henceforth the “Act on Bonds.” Pursuant to the Act on Bonds, the issuer 
can only be a legal entity unless the legal entity is prohibited from issuing bonds by a 
special law. Th is also applies to municipalities and regions, since a special law does not 
prohibit them from issuing bonds. Th us, municipalities, regions or the city of Prague 
can issue bonds, while municipalities and Prague can also issue municipal bonds.  
Municipal bonds are issued in accordance with Article 20 of the Act on Bonds. In 
line with the act, a municipal bond is understood as a bond issued by a bank if the bank 
grants a credit from the yield of bond sales to a municipality that applied for issuance 
of bonds and stands surety with its property for repayment of the bond, including its 
accessories. It is this form of municipal bonds which did not and does not have any real 
justiﬁ cation, nor is it used in practice. Another form of municipal bond is a bond issued 
by a municipality that is liable (stands surety) for the issued bond with its property. 
Municipal bonds cannot be issued by regions. Like municipalities, regions can issue 
bonds without the adjective “municipal.” 
To issue any bond at the present time, a municipality primarily needs the approval 
of the municipal or regional board of representatives. Crucial for issuance of bonds is 
approval of issue terms by the Securities Commission pursuant to Article 2 of Act No. 
530/1992 Coll., on Bonds, as amended by later regulations.  Th e Securities Commission 
(the position of the Securities Commission is deﬁ ned by Act No. 15/1998 Coll., on the 
Securities Commission, which amends other acts) is a state institution supervising the 
issuance of and the market in securities and, among other things, is in charge of issuing 
bonds, including municipal bonds.  
Issue terms for statement of bonds must contain the following compulsory requisites: 
data on the form of the bond issue, the term of issuing the issue, the presumed volume of 
the bond issue, data on persons participating in ensuring the issuance of the bond, and 
many other conditions. Th e term that must be stated concerns information on whether 
and by whom the ﬁ nancial solvency of the issuer was assessed (rating) and with what 
result, or that the evaluation was not carried out. Th e total volume of the bond issue 
must not be lower than a sum in CZK commensurate with the sum of EUR 200,000. 
Th e state only stands surety for bonds issued by municipalities, regions or Prague if it 
does not directly assume this surety, but to date there has not been such a case. 
An issue of bonds can be ensured by the issuers themselves or through a person 
who takes care of the issue or contractually pledges for it, which is also prevalent with 
municipalities. 
After January 1, 2001, the relatively thorough system of control for issuing bonds 
was abolished. Instead of being approved by the Ministry of Finance, bond issues are 
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approved by the Securities Commission. Th e condition requiring approval of issues by 
the central bank was also abolished, the purpose of using the issue need not be stated, 
information about the current and presumed ﬁ nancial situation need not be provided, 
and it is no longer necessary to submit a statement of whether a municipality or region 
is capable of securing the return of the requested issue. Th e applicant need not attach 
to the application the most recent annual ﬁ nancial statement with the commentary 
checked by an auditor. Th e act also ruled out the possibility of the Ministry of Finance 
not granting permission for issuance of a bond if the applicant does not prove its ability 
to secure the return of the requested issue. 
However, all these novelties are still aﬀ ected by what happened during the short 
period between the beginning of 2002 and May 2002, which was characterized by the 
attempt to reduce the incurring of debts by municipalities and regions in the Czech 
Republic. In this period, issuing municipal bonds was conditional on the government’s 
approval (the condition did not apply to bonds without the adjective “municipal” or 
to bonds issued by regions). Th is limit did not exist for Prague at all. It is not necessary 
to ponder the reasons why such a half-baked solution was chosen, nor is it necessary 
to create complicated structures. Th e amendatory act that stipulated these new terms 
was simply badly written, which was soon admitted by the Parliament of the CR, and 
within a short time the previous status was renewed. In this period, merely one munici-
pal bond, issued by the city of Brno, was issued with the approval of the government. 
Nevertheless, this misconceived and imperfect solution showed that indebtedness of 
local self-governments had already become a generally discussed topic that would have 
to be tackled in an appropriate manner as soon as possible.  
Th e only limits for issuing bonds by municipalities, Prague and regions are their 
internal terms, i.e., limits approved by boards of representatives, and external limits, 
i.e., approval of issue terms by the Securities Commission. Th e sole instrument the 
Securities Commission has for assessment of the ﬁ nancial situation of a municipality 
or region is the information about whether or not a rating was carried out and with 
what result. For municipalities or regions, just the information that a rating was not 
carried out at all is suﬃ  cient. 
Th is all goes to conﬁ rm that at the present time in the Czech Republic there are 
hardly any limits for municipalities if they want to issue bonds besides approval by the 
Securities Commission, whose approval procedure can be qualiﬁ ed as being focused 
primarily on the formal side of the matter, while the actual capability of a municipality 
or region to meet its obligations remains in the background.   
Neither municipalities nor regions have any legal barrier to issuing their own 
bonds.  
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6.3 Reasons for Issuing Bonds
According to the Ministry of Finance of the CR, in the period 1992–2001 a total of 
23 issues of municipal bonds were carried out. Th e following table shows which mu-
nicipalities were issuers, in which year and at what level. For a more vivid description 
and a better idea of the issuer, the table also includes the number of inhabitants of the 
municipalities (issuers). Since the authorization to issue was not acted on in all cases, the 
table also gives information about the real number of issues carried out. Important to 
our topic are the maturity term, interest rate and the purpose of using ﬁ nancial means 
attained through the issue of municipal bonds.
Table 4.8
Issues of All Municipal Bonds
Size of Municipality 1992–1993 1994–995 1996–1997 1998–1999 2000–2001 Total
Over 100,000 1 3 2 1 3 10
50,000–100,000 0 2 3 0 0 5
10,000–50,000 1 3 0 0 0 4
Below 10,000 0 3 1 0 0 4
Total 2 11 6 1 3 23
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the CR.
After the initial boom in municipal bond issues in 1994–1996, a certain disil-
lusionment followed in 1997–1998 as the economic situation worsened in the CR. 
Characteristic of the latest period (1999–2001) is that municipal bonds were only 
issued by large cities. Issuing bonds is economically advantageous when done in large 
volumes. To obtain smaller volumes of ﬁ nance, towns and municipalities in the CR use 
the increasingly available credits from commercial banks.  
As for municipal bond issues in past years, some towns managed to fully settle their 
liabilities and some handled their installments of issues by means of accepting credits 
from ﬁ nance companies. Issuing bonds is rather expensive, especially the printing costs. 
Yields from bonds are capital income; therefore, towns must pay taxes on this income 
and furthermore regularly pay annual yields to investors. A town must secure a so-called 
bond manager to sell the bonds and in a way guarantee their quality, an extremely com-
plicated and expensive process. From this viewpoint, obtaining credits is easier, regardless 
of the fact that issuing bonds is also a relatively time-consuming matter.
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6.4 Future Outlook
Future legal regulations on the issuing of bonds by municipalities and regions should 
tighten up state supervision to ensure municipalities do not issue bonds that they can 
not repay. Two groups of questions must be confronted when dealing with the matter 
of regulations: 
First, judging from current experience, issuing bonds does not cause big problems 
in general. Of all the instances when bonds were issued by municipalities, the situation 
of a municipality not being able to meet its obligations only occurred once, while in 
one additional case repayment has been extremely diﬃ  cult. Both cases occurred in the 
period when the strictest criteria were set for issuing bonds. Approval was required by 
the Ministry of Finance on the basis of an expert opinion of the central bank, while the 
applying municipality had to prove its ability to secure return of the requested issue. Both 
cases involved small municipalities (up to 4,000 inhabitants). To date, issuing bonds has 
not resulted in any serious troubles for medium-size and large towns. Having separate 
criteria for diﬀ erent size categories of municipalities would alleviate such problems; 
however, this would contradict the legal order of the CR, primarily the Constitution of 
the CR, which asserts that identical criteria must be set for all municipalities. Because 
bonds are mainly issued by large municipalities, the criteria for issuing bonds should 
be adapted to them above all. Also, the limits should be as small as possible and should 
be reduced to the submission of a rating of a town or region and subsequent approval 
by an assigned institution. 
Selection of a suitable institution is the second problem that must be tackled in 
the regulation of issuing activity. Th e question is: which state institution is best able to 
assess whether or not a municipality’s economic situation is such that even in the future 
it can easily secure return of the bond issue? Basically, only the Ministry of Finance, 
the central bank and the Securities Commission come to mind. Th e Securities Com-
mission checks that the issue terms are met, but it only focuses on the administrative 
side of the matter and does not have an appropriate apparatus for assessment of these 
questions. Th e mission of the central bank is somewhat diﬀ erent than monitoring the 
economic situation of individual municipalities. Th at leaves only one solution, namely, 
the Ministry of Finance should issue permits for issuing bonds by municipalities and 
regions despite the fact that it did not fulﬁ ll its task perfectly in the past when it also 
approved applications for issuing bonds for municipalities unable to repay. Th e Ministry 
possesses the necessary specialist apparatus for assessment of these matters and, crucially, 
it collects the necessary statistical data on the basis of which it can assess the economic 
conditions of a particular municipality.
At the present time, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a new act on bonds that 
should deal with the municipal bond issue in a new manner. According to the proposal, 
“municipal bonds” are redeﬁ ned as all bonds issued by local self-governing units, i.e., 
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municipalities and regions. Local self-governments are liable for their repayment, includ-
ing yields, with their own property. Th ere is an evident endeavour to renew compulsory 
approval by the Ministry of Finance. Th e applications by local governments are to in-
clude the purpose of issuing municipal bonds, fundamental data on future issue terms, 
economic analysis of the reasons for issuing municipal bonds and the impact on the 
economic and ﬁ nancial situation of local self-governing units, including facts essential 
for judging their ability to meet the obligations arising from municipal bonds. In ad-
dition, according to the proposed wording the Ministry of Finance could request other 
unspeciﬁ ed documents relating to the intention of issuing municipal bonds. However, 
the ﬁ nal version of the rules for issuing bonds is not yet known.             
7.   OTHER FORMS OF MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL LOANS
As mentioned previously, apart from taking credits from ﬁ nance companies or issuing 
their own municipal bonds, local self-governing units have other ways of borrowing 
money. Th is form of borrowing is frequently used and its importance seems to be gradu-
ally increasing. It primarily applies to towns and municipalities, with the exception of 
the four largest cities. 
7.1  Returnable Financial Aid
In order to cover a temporary time lag between the drawing of budget expenditures 
and the fulﬁ llment of budget revenues intended for their settlement, a municipality 
can use returnable ﬁ nancial aid from the state budget, a regional budget or a budget of 
another municipality. Such returnable ﬁ nancial aid is interest-free. Th e date of maturity 
depends on the speciﬁ c agreement with the provider, usually ranging between one and 
ten years. In the past, the possibility of ﬁ nancial aid from district authorities was used 
very frequently.  
Th is aid is mainly used by small municipalities. At times municipalities run into 
trouble with cash-ﬂ ow management without being entirely at fault. Th e problem is that 
shared revenues from taxes collected by the state do not arrive as regularly as munici-
palities may need. Th is primarily concerns the value added tax, which became revenue 
of the municipalities in 1996. On the other hand, income taxes—both personal (PIT) 
and corporate (CIT)—are very stable. 
As regards regions, pursuant to budget rules a valid approach used by this type of 
local self-governing unit is to access interest-free ﬁ nancial aid from the state budget or 
from the budget of another region.  
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7.2 Loans from State Funds and the State Budget 
7.2.1   Th e State Environmental Fund
Th is fund supports the implementation of measures beneﬁ cial in areas such as water 
conservation, air pollution control, waste management, environmental management, 
natural resource conservation and utilization, technology and production. Th e fund is 
ﬁ nanced by charges and ﬁ nes for using or polluting the natural environment as well as 
by subsidies from the state budget. 
Support from the State Environmental Fund can also be requested by municipalities 
and regions (and other non-entrepreneurial bodies). A special directive determines the 
maximum possible percentage of direct support, i.e., subsidy or loan, for each program. 
In the case of a loan, the maximum possible level of the total sum is again stipulated; 
the debtor repays soft interest, while a several-year delay of repayment is possible. For 
municipalities, the soft interest rate is 1.5%, instalments may be delayed up to two years 
and the maturity date of loans is up to 20 years. 
Another program through which the State Environmental Fund grants support 
pertains to energy-saving and utilization of renewable energy sources. Here, non-entre-
preneurial subjects, including municipalities and regions, can obtain subsidies or soft 
loans. Th e system is the same as that described above. 
In 2002 two special aid programs for ﬂ ood-aﬀ ected areas were also announced. 
Total expenditures of the fund from 1992 to 2001 were CZK 32.52 billion. In 2001 
the  expenditures totalled CZK 3.70 billion, of which CZK 1.02 billion was in loans. 
Between 1992 and 2001 the fund gave ﬁ nancial support in the implementation 
of:
      •     972 wastewater and sewage treatment plants;
      •     120 projects for mitigating ﬂ ood damage (1997 and 1998 ﬂ oods);
      •     151 contracts to assist with purchasing drying devices;
      •     3,407 all-round gas provision to municipalities and boiler plants, including 
other types of technology;
      •     1,087 projects aimed at reducing the burden on nature and the landscape, 
including waste management projects.
From the beginning of the fund’s activity in 1992 until the end of 2001, a total 
of 5,466 positive decisions of the Minister on granting support were issued, represent-
ing the sum of CZK 35.61 billion. Of this number, a total of 1,512 projects were 
deﬁ nitively completed, including possible settlement of loan and credit repayments. 
In the case of 1,297 projects, implementation was ﬁ nished and support conclusively 
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awarded through approval of the ﬁ nal project evaluation, while the paying back of the 
loans continues.
 
7.2.2   Th e State Housing Development Fund
Th is fund is mostly ﬁ nanced by subsidies from the state budget and returns from granted 
loans. As regards loans, the fund uses its own means for covering parts of interest on 
credits granted by banks to legal and natural entities for repairs, modernization and 
restoration of prefabricated blocks of ﬂ ats. 
Support may be received by an owner or co-owner, a natural entity, a legal entity 
or an association of owners. Support is provided at the level of the diﬀ erence between 
credit installments commensurate with the reduction of interest on credit by 3% (in 
some cases, 4% and 5%).
Another form of support is granting credits to municipalities to cover partial costs 
connected with repairs and refurbishment of ﬂ ats. For this purpose, a municipality 
must set up a special money fund and issue rules for its use. Th e annual interest rate on 
a credit granted by the fund is 3%.
Interestingly, the fund also grants subsidies for construction of tenant ﬂ ats in the 
ownership or co-ownership of municipalities, as well as for repairs of prefabricated 
blocks of ﬂ ats and construction of houses with care facilities. Th ere is also support for 
restoration of prefabricated housing estates administered by the Ministry of Regional 
Development. 
Financial support for municipalities stricken by ﬂ oods is also proposed. 
Th e fund has ﬁ nanced 478 applications to the tune of CZK 2.999 billion under 
the program supporting the construction of tenant ﬂ ats and technical infrastructure, 
which represents the construction of 8,409 residential units. 
Within the framework of the program supporting construction of houses with care 
facilities, the fund has ﬁ nanced 64 applications for a total of CZK 959.5 million, which 
represents construction of 1,415 residential units.  
Th is support in the form of subsidies was intended for towns and municipalities.
7.2.3   Other State Funds and Support
Th rough its agency for foreign investment, CzechInvest, the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade organizes support for municipalities and regions for the development of industrial 
zones, i.e., area development, technical equipment (infrastructure) and the necessary 
land reallotments.  Support is provided in the form of subsidy for partial payment of 
interest on bank credits, or as returnable ﬁ nancial aid or direct subsidy.  
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Furthermore, through the Czech Energy Agency, the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade supports municipalities and regions in energy-saving and utilization of renewable 
and secondary energy sources (e.g., support for drawing up territorial energy plans and 
energy audits), but it oﬀ ers subsidies, not loans.  
Another possibility is the Housing Guarantee Program which, through the company 
MUFIS, supports the development of municipal infrastructure by means of long-term 
credits with maturity of up to 15 years with ﬁ xed interest rates. Using this credit, a 
municipality, town or their associations can ﬁ nance in particular:  
      •     construction and refurbishment of engineering networks (gas introduction, 
water mains, sewage, and electriﬁ cation), including investing in land for hous-
ing construction; 
      •     construction and refurbishment of wastewater treatment plants and facilities 
for solid household waste disposal; 
      •     improvement or conversion of heating systems for municipal houses; 
      •     construction and refurbishment of the housing stock owned by municipalities 
and the restoration of housing estate units; 
      •     construction of houses with care facilities for senior and disabled citizens; 
      •     construction and/or improvement of small thoroughfares inside housing estates 
and residential quarters, small transport buildings (terminals and local public 
transport stops, etc.);
      •     possibly other projects connected with the  improvement of housing conditions 
and the environment of municipalities. 
It must be emphasized, however, that the use of these credits must always result 
in a signiﬁ cantly positive eﬀ ect on the residential sector in the locality. Th is program 
of ﬁ nancing municipal infrastructure is implemented on the basis of an agreement 
concluded between the Government of the Czech Republic and the US Government. 
Its main objective was to stimulate in our banking system the granting of long-term 
loans with an acceptable interest rate for the development of towns and municipalities 
in the Czech Republic. 
Using the ﬁ nancial means of this credit line, 121 credits have been granted to 112 
municipalities for a total sum exceeding CZK 1.4 billion, mainly to ﬁ nance projects 
such as heating system conversions, insulation, gas introduction, construction and 
refurbishment of water-supply mains and sewage, wastewater treatment plants and 
municipal waste landﬁ lls. Th e vast majority of these credits were granted with a long-
term maturity of 10 to 15 years. 
Th e Ministry of Agriculture of the CR grants subsidies to cover the interest on 
credits for construction and technical renovation of water lines and water treatment 
plants, construction and renovation of sewage and wastewater puriﬁ cation plants. Th e 
maximum participation of the state in covering interest is set at 75% of the interest on 
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credits with a maximum maturity term of seven years. For this purpose, it is also pos-
sible to grant non-returnable subsidies.   
Th e Ministry of the Environment of the CR grants a subsidy for minor water-man-
agement constructions, to cover payment of the interest on credits at the level of 5% 
for a maximum of ﬁ ve years from the start of a credit not exceeding 30% of total costs. 
Non-returnable subsidies can be granted for this purpose too.
Table 4.9
Summary of Loans Issued to Local Self-governing Units from Budgets 
of Individual Departments in 2001 [Th ousand CZK]
Department Loan14
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 60.0
Ministry of the Environment15 100,145.5
Ministry of Regional Development 827.6
Ministry of Agriculture16 116,650.5
National Fund 1,626.0
General Treasury Administration17 864.0
State Environmental Fund 889,593.7
Total 1,109,767.3
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the CR (Subsidies and loans from the state budget and state funds received 
by local self-governing units in 2001).
8.   LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING UNITS 
      INCAPABLE OF MEETING THEIR LIABILITIES
At the present time, there are cases of municipalities in the Czech Republic that have 
not been able to meet their liabilities. Th at is, their indebtedness has reached such a 
stage that they are not able to repay their liabilities at all. Unfortunately, data on the 
total number of these municipalities is not available.  
Analyzing this situation presents many problems, one being the criterion according 
to which we classify a municipality as being indebted at a risk level. We can only take 
into account municipalities whose debt is higher than total municipal revenues. However, 
such an approach would not correspond with reality since the future development of 
the municipality will be signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected by a debt much smaller. Th erefore, we will 
hold to the deﬁ nition used by Ing. Luděk Tesař, who in 2000 was a specialist employee 
of the Ministry of Finance of the CR.      
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Tesař considers a municipality to be indebted at a risk level when its debt exceeds 
50% of tax revenues and, at the same time (when introducing the new tax distribu-
tion), its tax revenues fall by more than 20%. According to this loosely set criterion, 
approximately 5.6% of municipalities in the CR were indebted at a risk level in 2000. 
In the same year, the number of municipalities indebted at a non-risk level was 67.3%, 
while 27.1% were not indebted at all. We should keep in mind that municipalities in 
the CR prevalently use credits for ﬁ nancing investments in infrastructure. In this regard, 
the often omitted connection between municipalities’ indebtedness and their property 
must be pointed out. Property value greatly exceeds the current indebtedness rate. In 
terms of covering municipalities’ liabilities, the indebtedness share in their total assets 
is well under 5%, which is fully satisfactory (Tesar 2002). 
Th e study monitored the eﬀ ect of change in tax revenues on municipalities’ indebt-
edness. Table 4.10 shows that the highest number of those indebted at a risk level is 
among small towns and municipalities. Th e highest number of municipalities indebted 
at a risk level can be found in the category of municipalities with 300–1,500 inhabitants. 
As for the volume, the highest number of municipalities indebted at a risk level is in 
the category of municipalities with a population of 1,500–5,000. Somewhat surprising 
is the fact that municipalities indebted at a risk level are also to be found in the group 
of medium-size towns in the category of 10,000–20,000 inhabitants, which have suf-
ﬁ cient ﬁ nancial means to ensure the necessary professional expertise (by having their 
own permanent professional staﬀ  of oﬃ  cials).
Th e data in Table 4.10 indicate that the number of municipalities that can be labelled 
as indebted at a risk level is not signiﬁ cant. A minimal number of them are not able to 
meet their liabilities (unfortunately, the exact ﬁ gure is not available). Nor does the average 
debt per capita cause problems since as the average debt per capita grows according to 
individual size categories of municipalities, so do tax revenues from shared taxes. For a 
better idea of the issue of over-indebted municipalities, let us give two examples.  
Th e ﬁ rst example is the municipality of Podhořany, with approximately 300 inhab-
itants. Revenues of its municipal budget in 2002 were CZK 1.5 million. According to 
the mayor, the municipality needs at least CZK 0.5 million for its annual operation. 
Th is represents expenditures that the municipality is obliged to pay by law.18 Basically, 
the municipality can secure collection of municipal waste, but cannot provide public 
lighting. 
Th e municipality owes a total of CZK 8 million. Th e major part of the debt is 
directed to repayment of water supply lines, roughly CZK 6 million. Th is debt will be 
repaid by the municipality in 2004—2018. Another part of the debt, which is already 
mature today, is the sum not yet repaid for gas introduction into the municipality. Th e 
municipality owes CZK 1.17 million (+ a contractual penalty of CZK 315,000 + dis-
traint costs of CZK 216,00019), which must be paid immediately. At the present time, 
the municipality has hardly any property. Municipal land, the municipal oﬃ  ce building 
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and the building of the former nursery school do not have much value. Neither the sale 
of the municipal oﬃ  ce building nor municipal land would suﬃ  ce for covering the debt. 
Th e estimated value of the nursery school is approximately CZK 1.5 million, but it can 
be expected that the market price is much lower. At present, the municipality cannot 
dispose of its account since, within the framework of distraint, it has been frozen.  
Table 4.10
Risk-indebted Municipalities According to the Stated Criterion (2000)
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0–100 31,895 814 262 11 547 8,103
100–200 290,495 1,749 649 28 1,107 89,755
200–300 410,163 1,853 531 25 900 98,832
300–1,500 4,952,109 2,644 1,968 115 2,855 669,027
1,500–5,000 5,860,988 3,898 539 38 581 894,638
5,000–10,000 3,272,230 3,685 133 10 128 411,277
10,000–20,000 3,236,427 3,368 66 7 68 610,711
20,000–30,000 1,666,015 2,477 28 0 27 0
30,000–40,000 997,746 2,578 10 0 11 0
40,000–50,000 41,789 233 5 1 4 –129,133
50,000–100,000 2,705,154 2,173 16 0 17 0
100,000–150,000 600,779 5,816 1 0 1 0
150,000–500,000 4,938,666 5,706 3 0 3 0
Over 500,000 11,948,846 10,125 1 0 1 0
CR in total 40,953,301 3,979 4,212 235 6,250 2,653,211
Source:     Tesař L., Obec a ﬁ nance (Municipality and Finance), January, 2002. 
Th e second example is a small town with approximately 3,500 inhabitants, located in 
an attractive skiing resort (Rokytnice nad Jizerou). Municipal budget revenues in 2001 
were CZK 43 million. Th e town’s total debt in 2002 was CZK 417 million. In 1994 
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the town acquired CZK 120 million from an issue of municipal bonds. Th e acquired 
funds were used for a wastewater treatment plant, reconstruction of the upper square 
and the lower square. 
On November 20, 1996, the municipal councilors were notiﬁ ed that the town did 
not have one crown left; therefore, it had to borrow money for repayment of the coupon 
from the bond issue. At that moment, the town virtually collapsed. In November 1996 it 
did not even have money for repayment of the coupon in the sum of CZK 14,400,000. 
In 1998 a commercial bank requested that the town pay its liabilities of CZK 70 million; 
however, the town could only pay less than CZK 14 million. Th us, the town owed CZK 
57 million for 1998, and it attempted to negotiate with the commercial bank. After one 
year of fruitless negotiations, the debt was transferred to Konsolidační banka Praha, s.p.ú 
(Consolidation Bank Prague). Th e town tried to reach an agreement on a long-term 
installment calendar, but negotiations were unsuccessful. Konsolidační banka Praha 
annnounced that an auction would be carried out.20 According to available information, 
the auction of municipal property brought in approximately CZK 70 million. 
Th e respective provisions of Act No. 328/1991 Coll., on bankruptcy and settlements, 
do not apply to municipalities and regions; i.e., neither municipalities nor regions can 
actually go bankrupt. However, in practice, the property assets and ﬁ nancial possibilities 
of municipalities (the same may occur in the case of regions) could be reduced to such 
an extent that they would not be able to provide fundamental services to their citizens. 
Consequently, the state began to feel some pressure to deal with the situation. Hence, 
the Acts on Municipalities, Regions and the Capital City of Prague unambiguously 
stipulate that the state does not stand surety for ﬁ nancial management and liabilities 
of a municipality, region or Prague, unless the state assumes this liability contractually. 
Th e situation of the municipalities aﬀ ected remains unresolved. 
9.   THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC CHECKS, 
      AUDITING AND RATING
9.1 Economic Checks and Auditing
Th e ﬁ rst version of the Act on Municipalities of 1990 already stipulated their annual 
duty to verify the results of their economic management for the past calendar year. 
Municipalities could decide themselves whether to have the check carried out by a 
district authority or by an independent auditor. 
In the early 1990s, auditors or audit companies had to familiarize themselves with 
diﬀ ering conditions in towns and municipalities since there was virtually no one special-
izing in non-proﬁ t organizations. 
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Th e vast majority of municipalities in the CR had their economic management 
audited by district authorities (free of charge). Only large cities were willing to pay for 
auditors.  
Since the beginning of 2003 municipalities with a population of at least 5,000 
must have their economic management checked by auditors. In territorially divided 
statutory towns, economic management of wards and districts is checked by municipal 
councils of these towns.  Municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants can still 
choose between regional authorities or auditors to check their economic management 
for the past calendar year. 
Furthermore, stricter sanctions have been introduced, and revenue authorities are 
entitled to impose fairly substantial penalties for non-fulﬁ llment of this duty.   
As for regions, at the beginning of 2001 they were required to have their economic 
management for the past calendar year checked by an auditor or the Ministry of Finance. 
Th e amendatory act valid from the beginning of 2003 changed this so that only audi-
tors may perform the check. Th e capital, Prague, can still choose between an auditor 
or the Ministry of Finance.  
At the beginning of 2002 the Ministry of Finance of the CR issued a special regula-
tion on auditing the economic management of local self-governing units and voluntary 
unions of municipalities. It deﬁ nes the subject in detail, including the content and 
terms of the check.  
Th e conclusion of the report on the results of an audit must state that: 
      •     No faults were ascertained; or 
      •     Faults were ascertained but violation of ﬁ scal discipline was not ascertained, nor 
incompleteness, non-evidence or incorrectness in conducting accounting; or 
      •     Some of the following faults were ascertained:
            –    violation of ﬁ scal discipline;
            –    incompleteness, non-evidence or incorrectness in conducting accounting;
            –    alteration of records and documents inconsistent with the legal regula-
tion;
            –    violation of competencies and duties of authorities of local self-governing 
units and voluntary unions of municipalities stipulated in special regula-
tions;
            –    faults ascertained during previous auditing were not removed; or
            –    conditions for auditing were not created.   
Th e regulation guaranties a comparable level of economic checks, independent of 
whether or not they are performed by a regional authority or an auditor. 
Th e amendatory Act on Municipalities is essential in the sense that a large number 
of towns will have to request audit companies to check the results of their economic 
management. It will mean a certain ﬁ nancial burden for them and a rather diﬀ erent 
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way of cooperating. On the other hand, there will be more work for audit companies 
since there are 260 towns with populations over 5,000 in the Czech Republic. As for 
regional authorities, the number of potential “clients” (i.e., municipalities with less than 
5,000 inhabitants) will be approximately 6,000. 
Since the beginning of 2002 another law with a direct eﬀ ect on this issue has been 
in operation—the Act on Financial Checks in Public Administration. Th is issue was 
dealt with in detail in Section 6. 
9.2 Rating                 
Unlike auditing the results of economic management, rating is not imposed upon 
municipalities by law; i.e., it is not compulsory. Basically, it provides an independent, 
comprehensive assessment of a subject’s ability to meet its obligations. It is a compre-
hensive description of all known risks. Th is service is generally used abroad, and Czech 
towns are making increased use of it. Several well-known agencies have been operating 
worldwide for a long time, among them Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. Th e 
Czech Rating Agency has established itself on the Czech market.  In 1998—2002 this 
agency carried out ratings of approximately 30 Czech towns, with good short-term and 
long-term rating and stable outlook. 
Of course, rating is most often used when someone wants to borrow money, either 
directly through a bank credit or through a bond issue. For instance, when Prague de-
cided to issue municipal bonds on a foreign market, rating from an established global 
agency was necessary.   
Successful rating of the examined subject has two main beneﬁ ts. On the one hand, it 
provides potential creditors—purchasers of bonds or credit grantors—with the detailed 
information they have no time to ascertain themselves. Th e set mark rating the level of 
one’s ability to meet short-term or long-term obligations then serves as a recommenda-
tion for whether or not to establish a business relationship with the given subject and, 
if so, under what conditions. Th us, rating signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ects the value of money the 
subject in question is borrowing. During the rating procedure, it is also possible to order 
subsequent continuous monitoring.
Rating is not only useful in obtaining the cheapest possible external ﬁ nancial means. 
For towns and municipalities, it is also suitable when applying for various subsidies 
and loans from the state budget and state funds. Recently, Czech municipalities began 
using this manner of evaluation as another advantage when negotiating the entry of 
foreign investors to their territory. Information in rating records is comprehensive and 
can serve as one of the many factors to be considered during investors’ complicated 
decision-making on the selection of the most suitable locality for implementation of 
their intentions.
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It must be added that rating services are not free; in the case of major foreign agen-
cies, the minimum sums required amount to hundreds of thousands of Czech crowns. 
For municipalities this cost is decisive; however, there are situations when rating is 
necessary and useful. 
10. STANDING SURETY FOR THIRD-PARTY LIABILITIES
Th e issue of local self-governments’ standing surety is interesting for two reasons. First, 
legal regulation on standing surety aﬀ ects the real possibility of a local self-governing 
unit incurring debt, i.e., accepting a credit, accepting a loan or issuing municipal bonds. 
Th e other, no less important, reason to pay attention to this question is the fact that in 
the past municipalities supported local entrepreneurs by means of standing surety for 
their accepted credits. For example, there were cases when a municipality stood surety 
for a liability of a private company that introduced a gas system for the municipality. 
In such cases the municipality secured the credit or loan either with its property or its 
future revenues. It was precisely this standing surety for third-party liabilities that led 
to the growth of indebtedness in (mainly small) municipalities. However, we do not 
have at hand exact data on the level of such liabilities. 
Th e situation was dealt with by the World Bank in its report of 2000. Point 5.28 
of this report states: “On the other hand, municipalities themselves21 granted loans and 
stood surety for local companies with the aim to support local development activities. 
Although these ﬁ nancial activities of municipalities in the Czech Republic are subject 
to the approval of municipal boards of representatives, the procedures are unclear,22 and 
the lack of monitoring and supervising mechanisms provides scope for soft ﬁ scal limits 
and also brings moral risks, which are signs of high ﬁ scal risk.”
10.1      Legal Regulation and Practice
Limits for standing surety are almost identical for municipalities, regions and Prague. 
Th ey must not stand surety for liabilities of natural and legal entities, apart from the 
case of exceptions speciﬁ ed in detail by law.  
Th e ﬁ rst exception concerns liabilities arising from credit contracts, if the ﬁ nancial 
means are intended for investment implemented with ﬁ nancial support from the state 
budget, state funds or the National Fund. Th is formulation not only includes construc-
tion of a new ﬂ at, residential or family house, but also many other cases where a certain 
type of investment is supported by the state from the state budget, by the state through 
state funds set up by it (e.g., the State Environmental Fund and the State Housing 
Development Fund) or where investment will be implemented using money from the 
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European Communities. A practical example is investments in construction of industrial 
zones pursuant to a special law on investment incentives. Another practical example is 
gas introduction in a municipality for which the municipality can obtain state ﬁ nancial 
support (from the State Environmental Fund), but since the municipality itself does not 
possess the necessary ﬁ nancial resources, it stands surety for the liabilities of the natural 
or legal entity implementing this investment. 
Th e second exception from the rule that a municipality must not stand surety for the 
liabilities of natural and legal entities concerns liabilities arising from a credit contract if 
the ﬁ nancial means are intended for investment in real estate owned by the municipal-
ity. Th is exception was set in order to minimize the risk of a municipality suﬀ ering a 
loss since, in the case of an unsuccessful investment project, the municipality keeps the 
actual investment in its own real estate. In practice, this exception is to allow for cases 
when a municipality rents a certain real estate or part of it provided that the tenant 
valorizes it. Th us, the tenant can take a credit that will all be invested in the municipal 
real estate, adding value to the municipal property. If a natural or legal entity does not 
fulﬁ ll its debt towards the creditor (as a rule, a bank), the municipality has to stand 
surety. However, the municipality’s loss in this case will be smaller since the unpaid debt 
will be invested in its property.  
Th e third exception concerns legal entities set up by a municipality, region or the 
state. Mainly this relates to contributory organizations23 set up by a municipality or 
region, or state contributory organizations.24
Th e fourth exception again concerns merely legal entities established25 or created26 
by a municipality itself or together with another municipality (municipalities), together 
with an optional region (i.e., not only the region in the territory where the municipality 
is located) or the state. At the same time the condition must be met that requires higher 
than 50% share of one or more municipalities, or together with one or more regions, 
alternatively the state. Th is ensures that a local self-governing unit can stand surety for 
the liabilities of a legal entity it “controls” itself or together with another local self-gov-
erning unit or the state. Th e assumption here is that if local self-governing units have a 
majority share in such a legal entity, they also control its functioning.  
Th e last exception concerns housing associations. A local self-governing unit can 
stand surety for the liabilities of housing associations, including those in which it is not 
a member. Th is exception is to allow municipalities to stand surety in an area as speciﬁ c 
as association housing and, above all, it should prevent barriers being placed against 
association housing construction with state support.   
All this shows that by means of signiﬁ cant restrictions, the current legal regulation 
in operation since July 31, 2002 has tackled the problem of a local self-governing unit 
standing surety for a third party. In the case that the third party does not fulﬁ ll its 
obligations, the duty is transferred to the guarantor. Th ese cases have only concerned 
municipalities (there is no known case involving regions during their short history). 
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Th us, municipalities’ debts grew due to their assuming the debts (liabilities) of someone 
else. In particular, this problem occurred with small municipalities without a suﬃ  cient 
legal and economic background.27
Th roughout the 1990s there were no limits on local self-governing units’ standing 
surety for third-party liabilities. Just as today, municipalities could stand surety for their 
own liabilities entirely according to their own deliberation, without any limits. Most 
frequently, municipalities stood surety with their property or future revenues.
Th e new regulation limiting local self-governing units’ standing surety for third-party 
liabilities needs a certain time for deﬁ nitive assessment. Th e working material relating 
to public ﬁ nance reform that is to be prepared by the Ministry of Finance of the CR 
does not indicate that this legal regulation should change in the near future. Hence, we 
assume that the limits on standing surety will remain in their present form.  
We must stress that statistics on local self-governing units’ standing surety for third-
party liabilities do not exist at the present time.     
 
11. MAIN ISSUES IN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT BORROWING:
      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1  Main Issues 
As a result of the totally diﬀ erent method of ﬁ nancing and dividing competencies between 
the state and local administration, there was no experience with borrowing prior to 1990. 
Th ere was no need for borrowing given the subsidy system of granting sources.  
However, the original system caused extreme investment debt, mainly pertaining 
to local infrastructure. Th erefore, from the very beginning of the 1990s citizens and, 
subsequently, elected representatives applied great pressure aimed at removing this debt 
as quickly as possible in order to continue with the essential work of repairing local 
thoroughfares, constructing wastewater treatment plants, providing gas and sewage for 
more municipalities, repairing school and theatre buildings, sports grounds and so on. 
Naturally, municipal budgets were not suﬃ  cient to carry out all these tasks, irrespective 
of the fact that since the early 1990s their volume was gradually growing.  
As a result of all this, a necessary discussion was launched in municipalities— ﬁ rst 
about whether to borrow money, and then later, how much. In most municipalities the 
prevailing opinion was that it was sensible to use ﬁ nancing other than one’s own revenues 
for infrastructure investment projects that should serve for many decades. However, at 
the beginning of the 1990s the big problem was that banks did not have cheap long-
term money available. Th us, municipalities were forced to borrow for a short term at 
relatively high interest rates. Th is situation has gradually improved. 
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Another issue is how big a debt to incur. Only over time did banks draw up their 
own systems for assessing the creditworthiness of individual towns and municipalities, 
i.e., their ability to repay all liabilities. In the early 1990s, rating as a form of assessing 
municipalities’ creditworthiness hardly existed, and analyses on the part of municipalities 
was impeded by the lack of aﬀ ordable, high-quality specialists, especially in the case of 
smaller municipalities. In addition, banks did not require such information very much, 
or did not take it into account when setting credit terms. 
Connected with this is another issue: the requirements of banks for security of money 
borrowed. Initially, in practically all cases municipalities were required to provide surety 
in the form of pledging some municipal immovable asset. Most in demand, of course, 
were commercial buildings with a deﬁ nite market value; however, there are not a vast 
number of such buildings in municipal ownership. It was also possible to stand surety 
with negotiable shares, but municipalities have gradually rid themselves of these shares 
over time. At present, standing surety with future revenues is accepted, but only after the 
ﬁ nancial situation and behaviour of the potential debtor has been checked in detail. 
In the Czech Republic there are a lot of municipalities with few inhabitants, and 
consequently with a relatively small annual budget. Despite this, they are obliged to 
execute all self-governing functions pursuant to valid laws, without exception. Natu-
rally they face major problems with the ﬁ nancing of necessary investments, primarily 
of an infrastructure nature. Many projects are not only beyond the ﬁ nancial means of 
the municipalities, but it is also diﬃ  cult to borrow for them from a well-established 
ﬁ nance company. 
Th ere is minimal room for maneuver when it comes to autonomy over municipal 
revenues. In other words, in the case of regular, repeatable revenues, municipalities 
have virtually no possibility of reacting to ﬂ uctuations or additional requirements for 
expenditures through a signiﬁ cant increase in their income. One possibility is to sell 
municipal property, which has occurred on a large scale and is still occurring. However, 
this signiﬁ cant source of municipal revenues is ﬁ nite and will gradually play a diminished 
role. Another possibility is to exert great eﬀ ort to obtain investment subsidies from the 
state budget or some of the funds set up by the state. Th is is also happening, but it is not 
an entirely systemic approach and is subject to discussion at the present time, especially 
in connection with the strengthening of the regions’ role in the entire system. 
Th e only other path open to municipalities is to incur debt. Basically, the issue is 
that municipalities have a high ratio of capital costs against total expenditures, and not 
only in recent years. Operating costs have been gradually rising while total revenues 
have not been increasing signiﬁ cantly. Irregular capital revenues have been gradually 
exhausted while the necessity of investments has not decreased.  Th is is very evident in 
the data provided in this report. 
A major diﬃ  culty pertaining to Czech municipalities incurring debts is the frequently 
changed rules for redistribution of taxes collected by the state. Th e amendatory Act of 
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1996 had a directly negative ﬁ nancial impact on many municipalities, while an even 
more fundamental change was introduced in 2001. Th e issue is that if a municipality 
wants to borrow for a large investment project, it needs a stable outlook on its ﬁ nancial 
situation for the period covering the repayment of the entire ﬁ nancial liability. If in 
the meantime the conditions of the revenue side signiﬁ cantly change, problems with 
repayment of credit or its interest may occur. At the same time, municipalities have few 
other possibilities besides selling something or borrowing money.  
A more thorough examination of the various forms of lending reveals that a big 
problem in the early 1990s was the lack of banks’ conﬁ dence in municipalities. For 
them, municipalities were not suﬃ  ciently transparent since their budget and account-
ing systems diﬀ er from those of entrepreneurs, to which banks are accustomed.28 Nor 
is municipal property a simple matter to deal with, especially not its market evaluation 
or its writing oﬀ . On the other hand, municipalities certainly possess the advantage of 
having a large proportion of guaranteed revenues (real estate tax, shared state taxes and 
local charges) that are not dependent on any speciﬁ c business plan.  
As regards bonds, these were initially a completely new product for municipalities; 
their representatives and municipal oﬃ  cials had no experience of them after many years of 
living in a totally diﬀ erent system. Th erefore, some municipalities issued municipal bonds 
without having the necessary expertise. If a municipality wanted to issue a municipal 
bond, there was always a bank (throughout the 1990s, the main banking institutions in 
the Czech Republic were owned by the state) willing to provide the necessary adminis-
trative backing to municipalities issuing municipal bonds. State supervision in the area 
of issuing municipal bonds failed too. Issuing municipal bonds is a demanding matter 
and in order to be able to enter this process, a municipality needs a reliable long-term 
forecast of its ﬁ nancial management. 
Th e example of issuing municipal bonds underscores the importance of the profes-
sionalization of oﬃ  cials within the local authorities. Th e privatization of the banking 
sector has also been a major factor, leading to greater awareness when providing the 
necessary professional background. 
Since the early 1990s two contradictory tendencies have been at work. On the one 
hand there has been a reduction of the control functions of the state when municipal 
bonds are issued. We described earlier the strong powers of the Ministry of Finance 
and the former central bank, but this permission system gradually weakened and was 
ﬁ nally fully abolished. On the other hand,  the phenomenon developed that small and 
medium-size municipalities with up to 50,000 inhabitants ceased issuing municipal 
bonds. At the present time, only the largest cities in the Czech Republic issue bonds. 
We can assume that regions will also issue bonds in the future; nevertheless, this process 
can be only expected after their competencies and related revenues have stabilized.  
It is precisely in this matter of municipal bonds that we ﬁ nd conﬁ rmation of local 
self-governing units’ natural ability to learn and to gain experience. Th erefore, any future 
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regulation function of the state should not assume responsibility for local self-governing 
units, but rather should be set up in a way that prevents the worst excesses.           
On the other hand, we have provided some evidence that legal actions or other 
legislative measure on the part of the state to limit municipalities borrowing money have 
thus far been minimal. It is quite an interesting phenomenon that Czech municipalities 
have little room for maneuver in inﬂ uencing their own revenues but, at the same time, 
are suﬃ  ciently free to acquire external ﬁ nancial sources in the form of loans, credits or 
municipal bonds. 
11.2      Conclusions and Recommendations
If one thing is certain, it is the ineﬀ ectiveness of either exclusively following the path 
of legal restriction, or of leaving unlimited scope for local self-governing units’ running 
into debt. Th e solution is a suitable combination of legal limits on local self-governing 
units’ indebtedness on the one hand and a responsible approach on the part of elected 
municipal and regional authorities on the other.    
One of the important factors that appear to prevent excessive indebtedness of mu-
nicipalities and regions is for them to have greater room to aﬀ ect the revenue side of 
budgets. At present, they have only minimal possibilities to increase their tax revenues. 
Regions do not have this possibility at all. In other words, we believe that a method of 
controlling the growth of local self-governing units’ indebtedness would be to reinforce 
their ﬁ nancial autonomy precisely by granting them the possibility of aﬀ ecting their 
tax revenues. All this, of course, must occur in compliance with the total tax burden of 
citizens and companies. 
Hand in hand with the enhancement of municipalities’ tax autonomy and the in-
troduction of partial autonomy of regions, the motivation component of redistributed 
taxes should be increased. Th e linkage between tax payers and their local self-governing 
unit should be signiﬁ cantly strengthened using such tax revenues. In this kind of system 
a citizen can expect to know what will happen to his or her taxes. As tax-payers, they 
would also become more interested in the operation of local self-government and in 
the control of the spending. If excessive indebtedness of a local self-governing unit were 
also to mean an increased tax burden on its citizens, we may expect the development 
of stronger pressure upon elected authorities aimed at preventing “unnecessary” debt. 
Th is “political” component need not be overestimated or considered the sole and most 
suitable self-regulating element. On the other hand, this important element is almost 
overlooked in the Czech Republic, even though it is considered one of the foundation 
stones of local democracy. It is beyond the scope of our report, however, to make precise 
recommendations on possible changes in the local tax system.
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To summarize, we believe that local self-governing units need greater autonomy to aﬀ ect 
their tax revenues, and that some form of suitable linkage needs to exist between tax-payers 
and their local self-governing units. 
Another reason for the growing indebtedness of local self-governing units in the 
Czech Republic was the change in the rules governing municipalities’ ﬁ nancing. As 
for regions, which are relatively new, their rules of ﬁ nancing have changed every year. 
Th is is understandable and also correct in our opinion, since they have been gradually 
assuming more and more new competencies. Th e change in the ﬁ nancing rules for mu-
nicipalities can also be seen as justiﬁ ed, as it was necessary to seek an optimum model 
for their ﬁ nancing. However, the sudden changes without a long transition period in 
municipal ﬁ nancing have deﬁ nitely had a detrimental impact on municipalities. As a 
result, the ﬁ nancial planning of municipalities and regions has lost its information value 
and justiﬁ cation since the methods of their ﬁ nancing have frequently changed without 
a long transition period. All changes in the ﬁ nancing of local self-governing units are 
certainly closely monitored by banking institutions as well, since for them standing 
surety with future revenues is not an entirely convincing guarantee. 
Our second conclusion, therefore, is the requirement for as stable as possible a system 
of ﬁ nancing of local self-governing units, without any abrupt changes. If  changes are to be 
made to the system, a transition period of several years is necessary to allow local self-govern-
ing units to adapt their ﬁ nancial plans to the future system.   
Another positive measure leading to higher eﬃ  ciency and thus also to abatement 
of municipalities’ running into debt is the association of small municipalities for joint 
investment projects. At present, municipalities can cooperate for the purpose of execut-
ing independent operations. Such cooperation is primarily carried out on the basis of a 
contract concluded with the aim of fulﬁ lling a speciﬁ c task, on the basis of a contract 
on the creation of a voluntary union of municipalities, or by means of establishing 
joint-stock companies or limited liability companies. Th is conﬁ rms that municipalities 
have an entire spectrum of cooperation possibilities. In addition it allows for profes-
sional assessment of the possibilities for individual municipalities to participate in such 
projects. Small and also medium-size municipalities frequently use these cooperation 
possibilities in practice.  
Th e third conclusion, then, is the signiﬁ cant value of maximum cooperation between 
small municipalities in joint investment projects.  
One of the many factors preventing municipalities from excessive indebtedness 
is the internal ﬁ scal discipline of local self-governing units. Th is includes the creation 
of responsible budget outlooks that municipalities and regions must draw up for the 
period of between two and ﬁ ve years.  In the case of expensive projects, it is also suit-
able to use the services of experts whose expertise, however, is often very expensive. As 
an alternative, small municipalities can also use the services of the banking institutions 
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holding their accounts. Th orough ﬁ nancial control is of great importance. Th e level of 
indebtedness of local self-governing units is aﬀ ected by high-quality annual audits that 
should provide them with suﬃ  cient information about their economic situation.  
Another factor preventing local self-governing units from incurring excessive debt is 
thorough external and internal control when planning investment projects, using either 
their own or external ﬁ nancial experts who can choose the optimum method of ﬁ nancing 
the investment project.   
Last but not least, legal regulation of municipal and regional debts is important. But 
when setting rules to limit the incurring of debt, it is essential to learn from the imperfect, 
non-systemic attempts from past years that had to be promptly rectiﬁ ed, and which in no 
way contributed to the stability and trustworthiness of the system. When setting criteria 
it must be borne in mind how sensitive this whole area is; therefore, all economic terms 
used in the legal rules must be clearly deﬁ ned in advance. When determining limiting 
measures, rather than having unachievable criteria there should be a process for obtain-
ing permission from competent institutions (in this case, most probably the Ministry 
of Finance of the CR) after exceeding a certain limit. When deﬁ ning legal criteria, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that a generic legal rule cannot react to all the possibilities of 
individual local self-governing units, which diﬀ er from case to case.  
As regards credits and loans, we assume that a legal limit on debt-servicing could be 
set at 15% of total municipal revenues. Th is ﬁ gure is unoﬃ  cially recognized by banks 
as a kind of limit up to which they grant credits to municipalities without any major 
problems. We believe it is possible to support the proposed deﬁ nition of debt-servicing 
as described in Section 6. A sanction for exceeding this limit would be the impossibility 
of being granted an investment subsidy from the state budget and insistence upon prior 
approval of each credit or loan by the Ministry of Finance. 
Despite certain failures in the past, we believe that issuance of municipal bonds 
should be preceded by approval from the Ministry of Finance. As for the future, we feel 
it is advisable that municipal bonds should be issued only by large towns and regions. 
Th is way, the state administration will encounter few signiﬁ cant problems in assessing 
individual applications, both in terms of the factual content and of future impacts on 
economic management.  
Last but not least, the excessive running up of debts should be precluded by means 
of a suitably set system of legal regulations.       
To conclude, the indebtedness of local self-governing units in the Czech Republic, 
despite occasional alarms in the media, is by no means critical. Nevertheless, certain 
preventive measures as outlined above should be introduced.
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NOTES
1 Th e study gives data in Czech crowns (CZK). For better understanding of the text, we state the 
exchange rate of CZK against EUR and USD as of March 11, 2003. 
1 EUR 31.50 CZK
1 USD 30.00 CZK
2 Tax revenues of municipalities consist of: national tax shares, real-estate tax, local and management 
charges, and payments pertaining to environmental protection.
3 Th ey include revenues from organizational sections of municipalities and taxes from contributory 
organizations set up by municipalities, estate lease revenues, revenues from ﬁ nancial assets, revenues 
from interest and other non-tax revenues.
4 Primarily yields from ﬁ xed assets. Capital revenues have shown a decreasing trend for two years, 
mainly due to the fact that revenues from shares for which municipalities used to sell voting rights 
have been basically implemented in signiﬁ cantly lower values. 
5 Th ese revenues are formed by transfers from economic activity funds, donations, etc. 
6 Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is part of the constitutional order in the CR.
7 Th e main objectives of ﬁ nancial control are to check compliance with legal regulations and measures 
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adopted by public administration bodies within the scope of these regulations during management of 
public means for securing the set tasks by these bodies; securing protection of public means against 
risks; discrepancies or other faults primarily caused by violation of legal regulations, uneconomical, 
unsuitable and ineﬃ  cient management of public means or criminal activity; due and reliable 
informing of public administration executive bodies about  management of public means, operations 
carried out and their conclusive accounting, aimed at eﬃ  cient regulation of the operation of public 
administration bodies in accordance with tasks set, and the economical, eﬃ  cient and purposeful 
execution of public administration.
8 However, apart from the formal distinction made in the current section, in the rest of the chapter 
we use the terms loans and credits to describe any sort of borrowing from banking and non-banking 
institutions. 
9 As a speciﬁ c entity, Prague has its own Act. Th e capital can be considered a hybrid between a muni-
cipality and a region. 
10 Th e problem also lay in the term “last year’s actual budget.” Th e text of the respective legal norm did 
not clearly deﬁ ne if it concerned last year’s revenues or last year’s expenditures. 
11 Th e National Fund is the sum total of ﬁ nancial means entrusted by the European Communities 
to the Czech Republic for implementation of joint programs in the CR and money pledged to be 
provided for implementation of these programs by other foreign sources, the state budget, budgets 
of local self-governments and other public sources and private sources unless use of these ﬁ nancial 
means for the determined purpose is proved. Th rough the National Fund, the Ministry of Finance 
of the CR coordinates management of ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows and adherence to the procedures deﬁ ning 
implementation of joint programs of the Czech Republic and the European Communities. 
12 Credits to local self-governing units in the CR are mainly granted by banks (see Table 3.12). 
13 It merely concerns an outline from which we can only imagine the direction the deliberations of the 
responsible oﬃ  cials at the Ministry of Finance will take in the future.  
14 It concerns loans in the form of returnable ﬁ nancial aid. 
15 Loans were directed to construction or refurbishment of sewage and wastewater treatment plants in 
individual municipalities. 
16 Th e largest volume of this sum was represented by loans for support of construction and technical 
refurbishment of water lines, as well as sewage systems and  wastewater treatment plants. 
17 Revenues and expenditures of the state budget having a general nature and not being in the scope 
of power of a certain chapter’s administrator, or expenditures of the state budget whose level for 
individual chapters is not known for the respective year at the time the Act on the state budget was 
passed, form the chapter of General Treasury Administration. Th e decision on inclusion of other 
expenditures in the chapter of General Treasury Administration can be taken by the Government at 
the time of preparation of the draft state budget, or by the Assembly of Deputies at the time of its 
passing. Th e chapter General Treasury Administration also includes the government budget reserve. 
Th e administrator of the chapter General Treasury Administration is the Ministry of Finance of the 
CR.
18 For example, contributions for pupils. If a municipality does not have its own school,  it must pay 
part of the expenses per pupil (at the contractual level) to the municipality whose school the child 
attends (in this speciﬁ c case, CZK 3,800 pupil/year).
19 At the present time, the municipality’s property is under distraint.
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20 Information from www.mesto-rokytnice.cz/tastupiteltsvo/zapisy/20020710.shtml. 
21 Regions did not exist at that time. Nor at present do we see similar tendencies with regions. 
22 We believe that the procedures are clear and there is no need to harbour doubts about them.  
23 Legal entities that can be set up by a local self-governing unit (municipality or region) for activities 
within its competence are usually non-proﬁ t-making and their scope, structure and complexity 
require an independent legal personality (e.g., kindergartens, primary and secondary schools).
24 State contributory organizations are legal entities and manage state property. Th ey are set up and/or 
controlled by central authorities.
25 In particular, trading companies are established. Local self-governing units can only be partners in 
joint-stock companies or limited companies. Furthermore, local self-governing units can be founders 
of public-beneﬁ t organizations.    
26 Pursuant to the Act on municipalities, “unions of municipalities” are created. 
27 No statistics exist about these facts; information only concerns individual cases. We may presume 
that in general these phenomena do not signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ect the total indebtedness level of local self-
governing units in the CR.
28 At the present time, the Ministry of Finance of the CR is trying to make the accounting systems 
of local governments similar to that used in private enterprises, with the assumption, however, that 
these two systems cannot be absolutely identical.
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From Deregulation to Regulation 
and Stabilization in Slovakia
Jaroslav Kling and Viktor Nižňanský
1.    INTRODUCTION
1.1 Major Developments in Public Administration
Changes to public administration in Slovakia began immediately after the fall of the 
communist regime at the end of 1989. Local self-government was re-established with 
the approval of Municipal Law 369/1990, and a dual model of public administration 
comprised of state administration and territorial self-government was implemented. 
Th e state administration was represented by 38 districts (okresy) and 121 sub-districts 
(obvody). Th e regional level (kraje) was abolished, and only one tier of territorial self-
government was created: the municipalities. After years of forced amalgamation of 
“municipalities,”1 the beginning of the 1990s saw a rapid growth in their number. When 
the Municipal Property Law was approved and municipalities took over a portion of 
formerly state-owned property in 1991, the conditions for the operation of territorial 
self-government were established. At that point, public administration reform came to 
a stop for the next ﬁ ve years.
In 1996 further reforms were introduced as the central government reorganized the 
administrative and territorial units of state organization. Th e elections of 1998 were a 
breaking point for the reform of public administration. Th e winning parties claimed 
support for decentralization and in 1999 appointed a plenipotentiary for the reform 
and decentralization of public administration. In 2001, under the strong inﬂ uence of 
governing political parties, 79 districts (okres) were established of varying size ranging 
from 13,000 to 163,000 thousand inhabitants. At the same time the subdistrict level was 
abolished and a new, higher tier consisting of eight regions (kraj) was created, territorially 
identical to the state administration regional level. A range of responsibilities was to be 
transferred from the local state administration to territorial self-governments.
After the elections of 2002, the government claimed to have completed the process of 
decentralization, not only of responsibilities and mandate but also ﬁ scal decentralization. 
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A new plenipotentiary was appointed to coordinate the implementation of the reform. 
Th e political parties recognized that the state administrations (ministries) could not 
easily accomplish this task and a cross-ministerial body would need to be established 
to coordinate the steps of individual ministries.
1.2 Organization of Public Administration
Since January 1, 2002, the establishment of a regional tier of territorial administration 
has completed the recent stage of local government reforms. Today, both the state ad-
ministration and territorial self-government consist of two tiers (Table 5.1). Th e latest 
plans of governing political parties are to abolish the district level of state administration 
by 2004, leaving only networks of specialized state administration as the lowest tier of 
state administration.
Table 5.1
Th e Organization of Public Administration in Slovakia 
 
Number 
of Units
Population Average 
Territory 
[km2]Average Range
Local 
self-government
Municipalities 2,883 1,874 2–447,345 17
Self-governmental regions* 8 675,318 551,441–87,483 6,129
Local state 
administration
Districts 79 68,387 12,597–163,419 621
Regions 8 675,318 551,441–787,483 6,129
Note:       ﬁ gures as of December 31, 2000.
               *  data aggregated for the territory as of December 31, 2000.
Source:     Statistical Oﬃ  ce of the SR.
1.3 Basic Political Mechanisms
Th e main political principle involved in running the state administration is the pre-
rogative to make appointments. After the parliamentary elections the winning political 
parties appoint the chairpersons of the state administration bodies in order to secure 
commitment to their political directions. On the other hand, the driving political 
principle in territorial self-government is the election. Every mayor/chairperson of the 
self-governing regions as well as every councilor in the municipal and regional councils 
is elected in direct elections. As such, these elected oﬃ  cials are accountable to the citizens 
of the particular municipality or region.
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1.4 Distribution of Responsibilities
With the changes implemented in 2001, the responsibility for delivery of public services 
has shifted towards territorial self-government. Prior to 2001, municipalities did not 
have much responsibility for public services, while the state administration took care 
of such services as healthcare, education, social assistance, culture, etc.2 Th e process of 
decentralization is not yet complete, but the local governments have assumed a very 
large portion of the responsibilities of the former district oﬃ  ces. 
2.   THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS
2.1 Financial Mechanisms
2.1.1   Basic Legal Framework
Th e ﬁ scal context in which municipalities must carry out their obligations is deﬁ ned 
by three major laws. Th e Constitution of the Slovak Republic stipulates that they fund 
themselves from own resources as well as from state subsidies. Further regulations 
are included in special laws. Th e Municipal Law (369/1990) deﬁ nes the revenues of 
municipalities in more detail as well as the essentials of the municipal budget process. 
Th e Law on Budgetary Rules (303/1995) provides the most detailed description of the 
ﬁ nancial operation of municipalities, their revenues and expenditures. It also stipulates 
the limitations on municipal borrowing, the measures to be taken when a municipality 
runs into ﬁ nancial problems and the nature of its ﬁ nancial relations with others.
2.1.2   Regulations on the Structure of Municipal Revenues
Th e funding requirements of municipalities are obtained primarily from own revenues, 
state subsidies and other sources. Major sources of municipal revenues are:
      a)   Th e share of state taxes. Th e revenue from state taxes (e.g., personal income tax, 
corporate tax and road tax) is distributed to the municipalities in compliance 
with the given rules. Th e revenues from income tax and road tax are distributed 
according to the size of population of the municipality. Th e distribution of 
corporate tax revenues reﬂ ects the locality of the corporation. Sixty percent is 
distributed proportionally by population, and forty percent according to the 
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constituency of the taxpayer. Th e overall portion of state taxes to be received by 
the municipalities is deﬁ ned annually by the state budget (except for the share 
of road tax revenues which is set at a stable 40% level); 
      b)   Revenues from local taxes and local fees. Real-estate tax is an exclusively municipal 
tax. It is calculated as a multiple of the rate for individual types of real estate set 
by the Ministry of Finance. Th e multiple changes according to the number of 
inhabitants of a particular municipality or the importance of the municipality 
(whether district, regional seat or spa). A wide variety of local fees are collected: 
for owning a dog, selling alcohol and tobacco products, operating entertainment 
and slot machines, making sales from dispensing machines, driving a car into 
the historical center of a city, lodging, advertisements, entrance fees, spa and 
recreation fees, fee for using an apartment for something other than housing, 
fee for public property use, air pollution fee, waste disposal and other fees;
      c)   Other minor sources of revenue such as income from municipal property, 
administrative fees and received dontations;
      d)   Transfers and other subsidies from the state budget. Subsidies to municipalities 
for the provision of services belong under this category. Until 1995, all 
municipalities up to 5,000 inhabitants were eligible for this subsidy. Th e 
subsidy was given according to the quality of soil in the territory deﬁ ned by the 
Ministry of Agriculture of the SR and the size of the municipality. Since 1996 
the size limit has dropped to 3,000 inhabitants. Further subsidies are: subsidies 
for local public transportation in Bratislava, Košice, Prešov, Žilina and Banská 
Bystrica; subsidies to ﬁ nish the construction of a housing complex; subsidies 
for regional development; other speciﬁ c transfers and subsidies provided by 
individual sections of the state budget. In 2002 a new, decentralization subsidy 
was introduced to cover the costs of transferred responsibilities. Th is subsidy is 
based on the ﬁ nancial norms calculated for the given service.  
      e)   Funds distributed within the system of horizontal equalization—this provision 
has been incorporated in principle into the law since 2001. However, at the 
time of writing, the system has not been legally elaborated or implemented. 
      f )   Subsidies from state funds.3 Th is category mainly consists of the transfers from the 
State Environmental Fund for construction of technical infrastructure facilities 
(sewage, wastewater treatment facilities, etc.), the state fund Pro Slovakia for 
funding cultural activities, the State Water Management Fund mainly for 
supporting the construction of water supply systems, and the State Fund for 
Housing Development for housing construction.
      g)   Received credits and revenues from municipal bonds.
Municipalities can also use joint funds of several municipalities or other economic 
entities, funds of the European Union and international associations and the sources 
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of extra-budgetary ﬁ nancial funds. Municipalities can provide returnable ﬁ nancial 
assistance to municipal companies as well as private companies. 
2.2 The Financial Situation of the Municipalities4
In terms of the distribution of public funds, Slovakia is one the most centralized coun-
tries in Europe. Local governments in Slovakia allocated only 7.4% of total public 
budget expenditures in 2001. Despite preparing deﬁ cit budgets, municipalities end 
each budgetary year in a surplus position (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2
Public Budgets and GDP5
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Local budget revenues [SKK bill.] 20.1 22.2 25.4 28.8 28.9 27.3 33.7 32.7
Local budget expenditures [SKK bill.] 19.1 18.9 23.2 26.6 27.4 26.1 31.2 30.6
State budget expenditures [SKK bill.] 162.0 171.4 191.9 192.8 199.5 234.9 241.1 249.7
GDP in current prices [SKK bill.] 466 546 606 686 751 815 887 965
Revenues of local budgets/GDP 4.3% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 3.8% 3.4% 3.8% 3.4%
Expenditures of local budgets/GDP 4.1% 3.5% 3.8% 3.9% 3.4% 3.2% 3.5% 3.2%
Source:     State ﬁ nancial statements, Statistical Oﬃ  ce of the SR.
2.2.1   Municipal Revenues
Municipalities are fairly dependent on the central government ﬁ nancially. Every year, the 
state budget contributes about one-third of the total revenues of the municipal budgets. 
Th is contribution is approved along with the state budget. Each year municipalities 
actively lobby the government and the parliament to increase their allocation from the 
state budget. Th eir share in state tax revenues depends on a decision of parliament each 
year; the only stable and predictable revenue they receive is the share of road tax. Since 
the state budget is often approved as late as the end of the year, municipalities have no 
certainty about what funds they will receive from the state budget until the very last mo-
ment of the year. Th is obviously creates problems for approval of municipal budgets. 
When municipalities took over areas of governance and provision of services from 
local state administrations in 2001, the respective funds were transferred to municipalities 
in the form of the so-called decentralization subsidy.  But according to the municipalities 
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these funds are not suﬃ  cient to provide the required services and they call for full-scale 
ﬁ scal decentralization as a remedy. Th e devolution of tasks and responsibilities without 
proper ﬁ scal decentralization has brought about risks in the area of municipal indebted-
ness (to be  discussed further in section 3.5).  
Starting in 1993, tax revenues have accounted for the largest portion of revenues 
to local budgets. Th ey reached their maximum in 1993, accounting for 52.2% of total 
revenues, and since then the share has persisted at around 40% of total revenues of 
local budgets.
Table 5.3
Development of Local Budget Revenues in 1996–2001 [Million SKK]
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1. Tax revenues 10,163.1 10,569.4 11,402.2 11,608.5 12,799.2 13,992.1
 Personal income tax 4,656.0 5,284.2 5,459.2 5,875.1 6,440.2 6,888.5
 Corporate tax 1,200.4 786.3 1,357.9 980.0 1,226.7 1,515.4
 Real-estate tax 2,861.0 3,124.1 3,199.5 3,352.6 3,606.2 3,689.5
 Road tax 425.7 411.7 450.6 515.4 629.1 959.3
 Local fees 960.7 866.8 840.7 866.9 885.1 939.4
 Other tax revenues 58.4 96.3 94.3 18.4 12.0 0.0
2. Non-tax revenues 8,992.6 10,294.8 10,646.6 9,116.6 10,691.6 10,924.8
3. Grants (subsidies) 3,608.7 5,026.3 3,784.6 3,362.3 3,739.4 4,773.3
 Current 1,377.4 2,155.9 1,950.0 1,859.6 1,843.7 2,134.4
 Capital 2,231.3 2,870.4 1,834.6 1,502.6 1,895.7 2,639.0
4. Credits received 2,565.7 2,733.2 2,942.7 3,162.9 6,302.8 2,730.5
5. Other revenues 93.8 161.9 96.5 93.4 124.3 297.1
Revenues total 25,423.9 28,785.5 28,872.6 27,343.5 33,657.4 32,717.8
Source:     Berčík 1999, State Financial Statement 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001.
2.2.2   Municipal Expenditures
Th e development of municipal expenditures indicates a relatively stable ratio of op-
erational and capital expenditures. On average, capital expenditures account for about 
30% of total expenditures. Th e periodic increase in capital expenditures every four 
years suggests the inﬂ uence of the municipal election cycle on the investment activities 
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of local governments (Kling et al. 2002). Higher investment activity before elections 
is not unexpected—elected representatives will try to increase their chances of being 
re-elected. 
Separating operational and capital expenditures and expenditures related to 
municipal debt6 over the period since 1990 reveals that debt-related expenditures 
increased gradually up until 2000 (Figure 5.1). Th e sudden increase in 2000 occurred 
because Bratislava’s bonds were due in that year. A comparison of 2001 with 1999 in the 
ﬁ gure reveals a small decrease in debt-related expenditures, suggesting an improvement 
in the debt behavior of local governments in the most recent years.
Figure 5.1
Development of Local Budget Expenditures [Million SKK] (1991—2000)
Source:     Berčík 1999, State ﬁ nancial statement 1997—2001; note: ﬁ gures in constant prices of 1995 
calculated through the gross domestic product price deﬂ ators as published by the Statistical Of-
ﬁ ce of the SR 2002.
Th e highest expenditures were reached in 2001 in the category of administration of 
municipalities; the operation of municipal oﬃ  ces and costs of elected local representatives 
accounted for 34% of local expenditures. In comparison to previous years the share of 
these expenditures increased by over 10%. Expenditures for housing and construction 
accounted for the second largest portion of total expenditures.
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Other signiﬁ cant groups of expenditures in 2001 were transportation and local 
economy expenditures. Transportation includes such services as local public transporta-
tion, and construction and maintenance of local roads. Services under local economy 
mainly include public lighting, funeral services and public utility services. Th e next 
highest expenditure was for the protection of the environment. Th is group consists of 
such services as public green care, cleaning and winter maintenance of local roads, and 
waste management. 
3.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING 
3.1 General Regulations and Practices of Local Borrowing
Municipalities in Slovakia can use returnable ﬁ nancial sources to fulﬁ ll their tasks. 
Until  2001, regulations on the conditions, limitations and use of such sources did not 
exist. Th e increasing indebtedness of municipalities and the critical ﬁ nancial situation 
of some big cities led to a legislative action to prevent further ﬁ nancial troubles of local 
governments.
Th e basic provisions on local government borrowing are speciﬁ ed in the Municipal 
Law, under which crucial power in the use of returnable funds is put into the hands of the 
municipal council. If the municipality wants to use such funds, any credit acceptance or 
bond issue must be approved by the councilors. Originally the Municipal Law included 
the obligation to publish an intention to use returnable funds for at least 15 days prior 
to its approval in the municipal council. Today, such a provision is not included in the 
law. More detailed regulations on local government borrowing can be found in the Law 
on Budgetary Rules (303/1995), which deﬁ nes the rules for municipal budgeting, the 
proper behavior of municipalities when engaging in indebtedness as well as actions to 
be taken when a  municipality cannot deal with its liabilities.
3.1.1   Basic Fiscal Environment
Th e ﬁ scal year of municipalities is identical with the calendar year. Municipalities operate 
according to their budget which is approved in the municipal council. It is comprised of 
two parts, the operating (current) and the capital budgets. Th e current revenues include 
all revenues except those from the sale of the capital assets, real estate and intangible as-
sets, revenues from the use of ﬁ nancial assets of the municipality, revenues from capital 
grants and transfers and revenues from the sale of property shares. Th ese are revenues 
of the capital budget. Current expenditures are the costs related to salaries, services and 
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consumables, etc. Capital expenditures consist mainly of expenditures on procurement 
and appreciation of ﬁ xed and intangible assets, and expenditures on the creation of 
tangible and emergency reserves.
Th e current budget must be balanced, but it can show a surplus if some revenues of 
the current budget in the given year are to cover the principal of received credits, loans, 
returnable ﬁ nancial assistance and the nominal value of issued bonds, expenditures of 
the capital budget, or if they are to be used in the coming years. 
Th e capital budget can be drawn up to show a deﬁ cit only if the deﬁ cit can be 
covered by funds from previous years or by returnable ﬁ nancial sources covered by the 
current budget in the following years. In exceptional situations where the autonomy 
of a municipality is endangered, the municipality with council approval can use funds 
from the capital budget to cover current expenditures, except for wages and salaries, up 
to 25% of budgeted capital revenues for the given year.
Municipalities have an obligation to report to the Ministry of Finance on their 
economic performance, the budget and the ﬁ nancial statement.
3.1.2   Limitations on Borrowing 
Municipalities can use returnable ﬁ nancial sources to cover capital expenditures only 
(Act on Budgetary Rules, No. 303/1996, art. 29a). Th ese sources can also be used to 
bridge the time diﬀ erence between revenues and expenditures of the current budget 
within a ﬁ scal year. Such a debt must be settled from the revenues of the current budget 
by the end of the budgetary year. Municipalities can only take on such credit obliga-
tions when their fulﬁ llment does not negatively inﬂ uence the balance of the current 
budget in the following years. A municipality cannot take over the guarantee for the 
credit provided to a physical entity (entrepreneur) or legal entity of which it is not a 
founder or establisher. 
Municipalities (as well as regional self-governments) are allowed to receive credits 
totaling more than SKK 75 million in one budgetary year only upon written approval 
from the Ministry of Finance. Th is limit applies to all size categories of municipalities. 
Th e total does not include credits that do not increase the overall debt, or returnable 
sources coming from state support programs such as the housing support program. Th e 
ministry is supposed to issue written approval or refusal not later than 30 days after 
receiving the request. Failure to issue the decision is considered approval of the credit. 
Th e ministry must issue the written approval when the municipality fulﬁ lls the criteria 
regarding the ratio of debt versus current revenues. Municipalities as well as regional 
self-governments can use returnable sources of ﬁ nancing only if:      
      a)   overall debt by the end of the budgetary year does not exceed 60% of real cur-
rent revenues for the previous budgetary year, and
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      b)   total annual installments for returnable sources including interest do not exceed 
25% of real current revenues for the previous budgetary year.
Total annual installments do not include one-shot premature repayment of return-
able sources of ﬁ nancing. A municipality is obliged to report the receipt of returnable 
sources of ﬁ nancing in the given year to the Ministry of Finance by January 31 of the 
following year. Th e rules on ratio of debt versus current revenues will be used for the 
ﬁ rst time in 2005. By then only the provisions on ministerial approval of the credits 
exceeding SKK 75 million will be eﬀ ective. 
If the government of the Slovak Republic approves a special program for debt regu-
lation of public administration, the ministry should proceed in line with this program 
when approving the credits. It is expected that the ministry will discuss such a program 
with the representatives of the territorial self-government associations. 
3.1.3   Reactions to Excessive Indebtedness
Th e amendment to the Law on Budgetary Rules of 2001 also elaborated the proce-
dures to be followed when the debt of municipalities exceeds a bearable level. Th ese 
provisions were a reaction to cases where some municipalities basically defaulted and 
even had to auction oﬀ  their own oﬃ  ce premises to address the claims of lenders. Th is 
amendment introduced such terms as “recovery regime” and “forced administration” 
in local self-government.
3.1.3.1    Recovery Regime
A municipality is obliged to introduce a recovery regime if it did not pay a recognized 
liability by 60 days after the due date and if the total of overdue liabilities exceeds 15% 
of real current revenues of the municipality in the previous budgetary year. Within 
seven days after such conditions are met the mayor of a given municipality must prepare 
measures leading to the introduction of a recovery regime, including a proposed recovery 
budget. Th e proposed measures and budget must be submitted to the municipal council 
meeting within 15 days. 
During the recovery regime, a municipality can use its ﬁ nancial funds only in 
compliance with the recovery budget. Every use of ﬁ nancial funds of the municipality 
must have written approval in advance from the chief auditor of the municipality. Th e 
mayor must present monthly reports to the municipal council meeting on the fulﬁ ll-
ment of the recovery regime, including fulﬁ llment of the recovery budget. Th e chief 
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auditor is obliged to present to the municipal council a written report on the proposal 
of the recovery regime, the recovery budget and on every report on fulﬁ llment of the 
recovery regime and budget. 
Th e municipality must immediately report its adoption of a recovery regime to the 
Ministry of Finance. Within seven days after the 90 days of recovery regime implemen-
tation, the municipality must inform the ministry about its fulﬁ llment of the recovery 
regime including the recovery budget and the state of municipal liabilities, together with 
the statement of the chief auditor. If the municipality is able to demonstrate that by 
adopting a recovery regime its performance improved and its overdue liabilities decreased, 
the ministry can agree to extend the recovery regime for a speciﬁ ed time. 
     
3.1.3.2    Forced Administration
If the conditions for the introduction of a recovery regime were fulﬁ lled but the munici-
pality did not introduce it, or if the recovery regime did not lead to improvement after 
120 days of its implementation, the ministry has the authority to introduce a forced 
administration on the municipality. Th is decision can be based upon the report from 
the mayor, the creditor or the state institution.
Th e mayor must discuss the notice with the municipal council and send it to the 
ministry within 15 days of the end of the 120 days of recovery regime implementation. 
Before the introduction of forced administration, the ministry veriﬁ es the facts in the 
notice and the reasons for not paying the liability. Th e municipality must fully cooperate 
in this process of veriﬁ cation. Th e decision on forced administration also includes the 
identiﬁ cation of an administrator to oversee the forced administration. Th e Ministry of 
Finance appoints the administrator after agreement with the Ministry of the Interior. 
Th e administrator is selected from the staﬀ  of the regional or district oﬃ  ce. He or she 
must have a university education and at least ten years of experience in ﬁ nancing, can 
not be the mayor or member of the self-governing body of the municipality, and can 
not be personally close to the mayor, members of the municipal bodies or municipal 
employees. An appeal of this decision will not mean postponement of the forced ad-
ministration. 
Th e decision on forced administration will also be communicated to the local tax 
oﬃ  ce and relevant regional or district oﬃ  ce. Within seven days after the decision is 
delivered, the municipality is obliged to open a separate, forced-administration bank 
account and transfer to this account all funds left in all accounts of the municipality 
except for those that must be kept in separate accounts (state budget funds and funds 
coming from the European Union). During the forced administration all revenues com-
ing to the municipality go to this forced-administration account except for the funds 
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to be kept separately. Th e municipality can use the funds in all its accounts only after 
the written approval of the administrator, who has an obligation to ﬁ nd out about the 
economic situation of municipality. In doing so the administrator has full authorization 
to go through all necessary bills and books of the given municipality. Based upon his 
or her ﬁ ndings, the administrator can request the municipality to adopt a special pro-
gram of economic performance consolidation, including organizational and personnel 
measures. Th e administrator has the right to participate and have an advisory vote in the 
municipal council and its committee meetings, where the municipal budget, perform-
ance and property are on agenda. Th e opinion of the administrator must complement 
any reports presented to the municipal council meeting regarding municipal budget, 
economic performance and property. 
Within seven days after delivery of the decision to introduce a forced administration, 
the municipality must communicate the situation to all banks where it has accounts, to 
the regional self-government and to creditors.
Within thirty days of the decision, the municipality is obliged to prepare and ap-
prove a crisis budget for the period until the end of budgetary year. Th e crisis budget 
must include necessary expenditures (e.g., liabilities stemming from the legal obliga-
tions of municipalities, expenditures on delivery of services and the delegated  state 
administration functions). If the forced administration is not over by the end of that 
budget year, the municipality must prepare and approve a crisis budget for the following 
budgetary year by December 31 of the regular year. When preparing the crisis budget 
the municipality is not obliged to divide the budget into current and capital budgets. 
If the municipality does not approve a crisis budget by 30 days after the decision on 
forced administration, then the municipality will operate on the basis of a crisis budget 
prepared by the administrator.
Th e ministry can make a decision to cancel the forced administration based on the 
proposal of the administration or on a request from the municipality.
3.2 Scale of Local Indebtedness
An elemental problem in analyzing local indebtedness is the deﬁ nition of debt. Should 
the debt of municipalities include all liabilities? Should it consist of all obligations to 
banks, providers of loans, owners of municipal bonds and suppliers of goods and services? 
Should we separate the operational debt (liabilities to suppliers of goods and services) 
and investment debt (bank loans, municipal bonds and loans from state funds)?
Another problem is the identiﬁ cation of local indebtedness. Th e municipalities 
in Slovakia have an obligation to submit their municipal budget, ﬁ nancial statements 
and other accounting reports such as balance sheets or reviews of assets and liabilities 
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to the Ministry of Finance of the SR. Th ese reports provide the only comprehensive 
basis for the analysis of local indebtedness. While municipal ﬁ nancial statements give 
data on annual revenues from returnable sources of ﬁ nancing and annual expenditures 
to settle the debt, the balance sheet and review of assets and liabilities give data on the 
accumulated liabilities of municipalities.
Th ere are two major groups of municipalities in Slovakia in terms of accounting. 
Th e municipalities under 3,000 inhabitants are considered small municipalities and 
do not have to use a double accounting system. Th ese municipalities do not submit 
balance sheets to the ministry. Th ey submit only the annual review of assets and liabili-
ties. Th e municipalities over 3,000 inhabitants use the double accounting system and 
submit the full balance sheet. In 2000 there were only 224 municipalities over 3,000 
inhabitants (out of 2,883). Th e structured information on local indebtedness7 is avail-
able only for these municipalities (from their balance sheets). Th e overall indebtedness 
of the entire municipal sector is provided in the state ﬁ nancial statement, which also 
contains information on public sector debt, including the debt of local governments. 
Th is indebtedness is calculated from the accepted returnable ﬁ nancial assistance (from 
other public sector organizations, e.g., state funds), the issued bonds, the long-term 
promissory notes and bank assistance and loans of municipalities over 3,000 inhabit-
ants and from the accepted returnable ﬁ nancial assistance and the balance of non-repaid 
credits of municipalities under 3,000 inhabitants. At the end of the following section we 
provide a review of local indebtedness as calculated from the balance sheets and annual 
reviews of assets and liabilities as well as the alternative calculation of local indebtedness 
and total indebtedness of municipalities.  
3.2.1   Local Indebtedness
Municipalities  have been forced to look for credit ﬁ nancing in the form of loans and 
municipal bonds because of their acute need to ﬁ nance their investment projects (mostly 
construction of infrastructure) while at the same time facing a continuous shortage of 
funds coming from tax and non-tax revenues. Th e indebtedness of municipalities is 
growing annually (Figure 5.2).
In 2001, the accumulated indebtedness of local self-governments in Slovakia reached 
SKK 12,724 billion (state ﬁ nancial statement 2001). Th is accounted for 3.05% of the 
public sector debt by the end of year. Th e largest indebtedness was recorded by the 
largest cities (Table 5.4).
Th e regional seat cities accounted for 68% of total municipal debt in 2001. At the 
same time these cities are the largest cities in Slovakia. Th e debt per citizen in this group 
was SKK 7,414  in 2000, compared to SKK 668 in municipalities under 3,000 inhabit-
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ants. In municipalities over 3,000 inhabitants, every citizen “owed” SKK 3,681 SKK 
(taken from the balance sheets of municipalities and the annual review of municipal 
assets and liabilities in 2001). Th e debt per person was highest in Bratislava, where every 
citizen was burdened with a municipal debt of  SKK 11,381 in 2000. Košice and Banská 
Bystrica follow with above SKK 8,000 of debt per person. Th e rest of the regional seat 
cities lag far behind with a more favorable debt situation  (between SKK 1,000  and 
SKK 3,000 per person). Košice and Banská Bystrica fell into such a critical debt situation 
that they basically cross-defaulted and needed to initiate a recovery regime. Bratislava, 
due to its size and capacity as the capital city, can deal with this debt.
Figure 5.2
Public Sector Indebtedness [Billion SKK]
Notes:     Capital revenues of local budgets do not include capital grants and transfers.
               Figures for the entire period of 1993–2001 are available only for local indebtedness.
Source:     State ﬁ nancial statements 1996–2001.
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Table 5.4
Indebtedness of the Regional (kraj) Seat Cities [Million SKK]
Population 
as of Dec.
31, 2000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Debt per 
Citizen
(2000)
Bratislava 447,345 1,764.4 1,756.4 2,247.0 3,884.6 5,091.2 4,581.0 11.4
Trnava 69,681 65.2 84.5 143.9 119.6 76.5 70.9 1.1
Trenčín 59,094 0.0 136.6 161.3 151.3 147.6 138.3 2.5
Nitra 87,575 66.4 83.8 144.6 108.5 112.0 174.2 1.3
Žilina 86,679 441.5 395.3 339.8 334.9 227.1 396.6 2.6
Banská Bystrica* 84,000 259.5 520.3 596.7 630.7 689.3 592.2 8.2
Prešov 94,058 84.0 164.0 198.2 235.9 281.6 257.3 3.0
Košice** 242,080 331.3 793.8 1,178.1 1,362.1 2,052.6 2,210.1 8.5
Regional seats 
total
1,170,512 3,012.4 3,934.6 5,009.7 6,827.6 8,677.9 8,420.5 7.4
Note:       *   the indebtedness reported by the city (1.2 billion SKK in 2001) diﬀ ers from the indebtedness 
reported by Datacentrum by about half. Th is fact only conﬁ rms the unavailability of sound 
aggregated data on indebtedness in Slovakia.
               **  the indebtedness reported by the city (1.8 billion SKK in 1998) diﬀ ers from the indebtedness 
reported by Datacentrum.
Source:     Datacentrum 2003, Statistical Oﬃ  ce of the SR 2001; calculations: authors.
Table 5.5 shows that small municipalities up to 500 inhabitants and those with 
4,001–5,000 inhabitants are the least active in loan-taking. In 2000, credit revenues 
accounted for over a quarter of total revenues in municipalities over 5,001 inhabitants. 
Th e majority of this debt was created by the cities mentioned above. In municipalities 
over 100,001 inhabitants, credit revenues accounted for as much as 48.6% of total 
revenues of local budgets.
In 1998 an analysis of the ﬁ nancing of cities was undertaken (see Figure 5.3), in 
which the authors analyzed 34 selected cities of diﬀ erent size categories and locations. 
In the period from 1993 to 1996, loans accounted for about 6.8% to 11.0% of overall 
revenues of the selected cities. Th e analysis showed that the volume of credits per capita 
increases with the increasing size of the city. As the volume of received credits grew an-
nually the debt-related expenditures grew as well. In 1993 they accounted for only 3.8% 
of total expenditures while in 1996 it was already as much as 10.1%. Th e debt-related 
expenditures were diﬀ erentiated among individual cities according to their ﬁ nancial 
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policy. In the cities, which experienced parallel growth of the current (operational) 
expenditures, the capacity to use external ﬁ nancial sources was signiﬁ cantly reduced. 
Table 5.5
Received Credits* per Capita [SKK]
1995 1996 1997 2000 % of Total 
Revenues 
per Capita 
in 2000
to 500 63 106 71 67 1.3
501–1,000 139 174 183 101 2.2
1,001–2,000 178 203 198 84 1.9
2,001–23,000 243 335 272 139 3.3
3,001–4,000 134 308 229 179 4.1
4,001–5,000 55 130 186 62 1.3
over 5,001 368 695 764 2,020 26.5
  • 5,001–10,000 316 6.9
  • 10,001–20,000 481 9.5
  • 20,001–50,000 277 5.7
  • 50,001–100,000 487 7.9
  • over 100,001 7,881 48.6
Note:       * including municipal bonds. 
Data for 1998 and 1999 were not available.
Source:     Berčík 1999, Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001
According to the authors, the acceptable level of the debt-related expenditures might 
be 20% of constant revenues, which consist of local taxes and fees, the share in the state 
tax revenues and the revenues from municipal property use (not sales). In 1996, the 20% 
limit was not exceeded in 19 cities. Th e cities that exceeded this limit decreased their 
chances to receive a larger volume of external sources for ﬁ nancing development projects, 
since the councilors approved the growth of operational expenditures instead. 
Th e level of debt-related expenditures, however, does not reﬂ ect the need to fulﬁ ll 
the tasks of self-government. Th erefore, the constant revenues must be cleared of op-
erational expenditures. Th e ratio of the debt-related expenditures and “clear” constant 
revenues is the local indebtedness, or the capacity to pay out the unsettled debts. If the 
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ratio reaches a value lower than 1.0, the municipality is not able to pay the debt-related 
expenditures. If the ratio exceeds a value of 1.0, the municipality can pay credits and 
related interests.
Figure 5.3
Indebtedness of Selected Cities
Source:   Nižňanský, V. (1998). Financie miest (Financing of the Cities). M.E.S.A. 10, Bratis-
lava.
Of the 34 cities analyzed only nine had the capacity to accept further returnable 
external sources of ﬁ nancing for the development programs. A large portion of the mu-
nicipalities—eleven—have absolutely no capacity in their budget for new loans unless 
they gain some revenues from the sale of municipal property. Th e remaining cities might 
be able to pay back further loans only if they reduce their current expenditures.   
If the credit burden on municipalities increased only moderately from 1996 to 1999, 
the volume of received credits almost doubled in 2000 as compared to 1999 (Table 
5.6). In 2001 the dependency of local self-governments on the credits decreased. Until 
1999, revenues from credits and municipal bonds accounted permanently for about 
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10% of total revenues of local budgets. Th is portion has risen since 1999. It reached 
18.7% in 2000, mainly due to the loan provided by the Deutche Bank Luxemburg S.A. 
to Bratislava in the amount of SKK 4.7 billion.
Table 5.6
Credit Financing of Municipalities [Million SKK]
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenues 20,966 20,072 22,236 25,424 28,786 28,873 27,344 33,657 32,718
Received credits* 1,004 927 3,231 2,566 2,733 2,943 3,163 6,303 2,731
% of total revenues 4.8 4.6 14.5 10.1 9.5 10.2 11.6 18.7 8.3
Note:       * including municipal bonds.
Source:     State ﬁ nancial statement 1993–2001.
Comparing the received credits in 1993-2000 (Table 5.6) and expenditures related to 
debt8 in this period (Table 5.7), we see that debt-related expenditures exceeded revenues 
from received credits and issued municipal bonds only in 1994 and 1999.
Table 5.7
Debt-related Expenditures of Local Budgets
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Debt service 
[Million SKK]
664.4 928.4 1,136.4 1,795.1 2,015.7 2,515.9 3,195.8 6,258.4 2,717.6
% of total 
expenditures
3.4 4.9 6.0 7.8 7.6 9.2 12.3 19.8 8.9
% of operational 
expenditures
5.2 7.2 8.8 12.2 12.1 14.2 16.8 25.8 12.4
Source:     Berčík 1999, State ﬁ nancial statement 1997–2001.
 Until 1995 the expenditures related to debt did not exceed 10% of the overall 
expenditures of municipalities. After a slight increase to 16.8% in 1999, expenditures 
further increased to 25.8% in 2000 and then dropped back to 12.4% in 2001. As illus-
trated in Tables 5.9 and 15.10, developments in the use of credits suggest that Bratislava’s 
behavior has played a leading role in the overall development of local indebtedness. 
Both in 1995 and 2000, when Bratislava issued municipal bonds, there occurred a 
sudden increase in the signiﬁ cance of credits in the local budgets (credits accounted for 
14.5% of total revenues in 1995 and 18.7% in 2000). Bratislava, as the capital and the 
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largest city in Slovakia with a budget turnover exceeding SKK 5 billion,9 has the largest 
capacity for taking credits. Since the Bratislava bonds issued in 2000 are due in 2003, 
we may expect a signiﬁ cant increase in credit-related expenditures as well as an increase 
in the volume of  credits taken.  
Th e ratio of debt and credit-related expenditures varies according to the size of 
municipality. In 2000, the largest payments per capita for debt settlement were spent 
in municipalities over 100,001 (Table 5.8). Bratislava’s municipal bonds, due in 2000, 
accounted for the majority of these expenditures. In a contrary fashion, the lowest ex-
penditures were achieved in the smallest municipalities, which did not take on as much 
debt as the larger ones. Partly, this is because small municipalities do not have a suitable 
property base that can be used as collateral for bank loans.
Table 5.8
Debt-related Expenditures per Capita in 2000 [SKK]
Debt Service % of Total Expenditures
to 500 102.6 2.3
501–1,000 211.6 5.2
1,001–2,000 128.4 3.2
2,001–3,000 284.1 7.4
3,001–4,000 262.1 6.4
4,001–5,000 208.2 4.6
5,001–10,000 421.7 9.8
10,001–20,000 781.8 16.4
20,001–50,000 544.9 12.0
50,001–100,000 1,232.9 21.0
over 100,000 6,071.3 39.0
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the SR 2001.
An alternative way of calculating local indebtedness can be formulated as follows. 
Th e balance sheet of the municipality also provides the ﬁ gures on short- and long-term 
liabilities,  bank assistance and loans. Th e annual review of assets and liabilities provides 
information on unpaid invoices and other liabilities (e.g., tax liabilities). Th e sum of 
these ﬁ gures could represent the real picture of local indebtedness, since it also includes 
arrears in payments such as liabilities to suppliers of goods and services, liabilities to 
employees or liabilities to the tax oﬃ  ce, etc. (Table 5.9). Th e content of columns A to 
H in Table 5.9 is elaborated in the chart beneath.
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Table 5.9
Alternative Calculation of Local Indebtedness [Million SKK]
Year Municipalities above 3,000 Inhabitants Municipalities under 3,000 Inhabitants Total 
Alternative 
Indebtedness
Published 
Indebtedness
A B C D E F G H
1996* 35.7 2,903.3 3,272.4 1,831.7 71.9 298.9 685.0 667.5 9,766.3 5,286.5
1997 83.1 3,683.0 3,934.3 2,323.0 89.5 403.5 853.7 746.5 12,116.7 7,005.3
1998 57.4 4,697.2 4,861.9 3,407.6 41.0 552.8 1,094.7 459.1 15,171.6 8,450.4
1999 263.3 5,625.5 4,500.6 4,386.9 69.7 501.8 1,140.8 733.3 17,221.8 10,590.2
2000 203.3 3,459.7 5,150.9 8,354.6 66.9 497.3 1,083.1 549.5 19,365.3 12,260.6
2001 176.3 2,826.7 3,726.6 9,265.4 53.9 453.7 1,356.8 717.2 18,576.7 12,724.0
Notes:      Based upon balance sheets of municipalities over 3,000 inhabitants and the annual review of assets and liabilities of municipalities   under 3,000 
inhabitants.
               Figures as of December 31.
               * as of January 1, 1997.
              Total alternative indebtedness is calculated as sum of A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H.
Source:     Datacentrum 2002; calculations: authors.
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Municipalities 
above 3,000 people
A—Accepted returnable assistance Loans from special state funds
B—Long-term liabilities •    Issued bonds; 
•    Liabilities from rental; 
•    Long-term accepted advance payments (to customers); 
•    Long-term promissory notes; other long-term liabilities 
C—Short-term liabilities •    Liabilities from trade (debt to suppliers of goods and services); liabilities to partners 
and associations; 
•    Liabilities to employees; 
•    Liabilities to mandatory insurance funds (health, welfare, illness, employment); 
•    Tax liabilities; 
•    Liabilities of budgetary organizations to their founder; other short-term liabilities
D—Bank assistance and loans •    Long-term bank loans; 
•    Regular bank loans (short-term up to one year loans and discount loans); 
•    Accepted financial assistance (short-term up to one year municipal bonds and loans 
from other entities than banks)
Municipalities 
under 3,000 people
E—Accepted returnable assistance Loans from special state funds
F—Unpaid invoices By the end of year (listed in the book of invoices)
G—Unpaid credits Long-term and short-term loans
H—Other liabilities Short-term liabilities from trade (such as complaints); tax liabilities; other liabilities 
(as listed in the book of liabilities)
Notes:      Based upon the balance sheets of municipalities over 3,000 inhabitants and the annual review of assets and liabilities of municipalities under 3,000 
inhabitants.
               Th e items included in the published municipal indebtedness are in bold. 
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Th e limitations on the scale of local indebtedness as stipulated in the Law on Bud-
getary Rules will become eﬀ ective on January 1, 2005. Th e law gives the municipalities 
time to settle their debt by this date. Even today, we can model the situation in the past 
if these limits had been in eﬀ ect (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10 
Model of Local Governments’ Indebtedness Limits 
Year Debt as of      
Dec. 31
[Million SKK]
Real Current 
Revenues for the 
Previous Year 
[Million SKK]
Annual Debt 
Installments in 
the Given Year
[Million SKK]
Overall Debt 
as% of Current 
Revenues
 (Legal Limit–60%)
Debt Service 
as% of Current 
Revenues
(Legal Limit–25%)
1996 5,215.000 17,404.100 1,795.100 30.0 10.3
1997 6,311.000 20,926.000 2,015.700 30.2 9.6
1998 9,240.000 22,825.700 2,515.900 40.5 11.0
1999 11,223.000 24,249.592 3,195.800 46.3 13.2
2000 12,261.000 23,715.524 6,258.400 51.7 26.4
2001 12,724.000 29,151.149 2,717.563 43.6 9.3
2002 12,878.000* 27,405.630 2,320.400** 47.0 8.5
Municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants (Bratislava and Košice)
2000 7,143.793 6,315.218 3,989.393 113.1 63.2
2001 6,791.010 9,589.238 531.891 70.8 5.5
Notes:      * debt of local governments as of June 30, 2002.
               ** as budgeted in municipal budgets for 2002.
Source:     State ﬁ nancial statements 1995–2001, ﬁ nancial statements of Bratislava and Košice 2001, Ministry 
of Finance of the SR 2000 and 2001; calculation: authors.
Th e inﬂ uence of Bratislava’s debt behavior mentioned earlier can also be seen here. 
Th e 25% limit of annual installments in real current revenues was exceeded only in 
2000, when the ratio of overall debt in real current revenues reached its maximum for 
a seven-year period. In terms of legal limits on municipal indebtedness, the situation in 
Slovakia is not critical yet.  Th e preliminary ﬁ gures for 2002 suggest that the indebted-
ness of local governments is increasing its inﬂ uence on the local budgets. Th e budgeted 
ﬁ gure for annual installments indicates that the debt behavior of municipalities becomes 
more prudent and provides a lower threat to their ﬁ scal balance. An optimistic evalua-
tion of the debt situation of Slovak municipalities is further supported by the fact that 
the two largest cities basically account for the majority of indebtedness problems in the 
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municipal sector as a whole. If the legal limits had been eﬀ ective in 2000, these two 
municipalities (mainly Bratislava) would have huge problems in fulﬁ lling them.
3.2.2   Bank Loans
Ever since they were created, municipalities have balanced their lack of funding for 
development projects with bank loans. Yet in 1991, they took credits totaling SKK 
404 million. Available ﬁ nancial reports of aggregated data do not allow for the full 
reconstruction of the structure of municipal credit ﬁ nancing due to the inconsistency 
of the state ﬁ nancial statements over last decade (Table 5.11).
Table 5.11
Th e Role of Bank Loans in Municipal Revenues [Million SKK]
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Revenues total 20,966 20,072 22,236 25,424 28,786 28,873 27,344 33,657 32,718
Received credits* 1,004 927 3,231 2,566 2,733 2,943 3,163 6,303 2,731
Of which bank loans n. a. 886 1,173 n. a. 2,259 2,865 2,910 5,968 2,710
Bank loans as % of 
total revenues
n. a. 4.4 5.3 n. a. 7.8 9.9 10.6 17.7 8.3
Note:       * including municipal bonds
Source:     State ﬁ nancial statements, 1993–2001.
Similarly, the available aggregated data does not provide any insight into the use 
of bank loans. Research has not been done on this issue in Slovakia, and it would be 
necessary to compile data from all municipalities in order to ﬁ nd out the exact use of 
the sources gained from bank loans. 
3.2.3   Municipal Bonds
Issues of municipal bonds are regulated by a special Law on Bonds (no. 530/1990). 
Municipal bonds can be issued by:
      a)   the banks, using revenues from the bonds’ sale to provide a municipal loan to 
self-governed regions or municipalities that have asked for the issue and that 
use real estate as their guarantee;
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      b)   the municipalities, which guarantee the issues with their entire property;
      c)   self-governed regions, which guarantee the issue with their entire property.
If the bonds are issued by a municipality or self-governed region, the bank can take 
over the guarantee for the issue. Th e supervision of municipal bonds issues is put under 
the jurisdiction of a supervisory body for the ﬁ nancial and capital market, the Oﬃ  ce 
for Financial Markets. 
Slovak municipalities have used municipal bonds to ﬁ nance their investment activi-
ties since 1993. Th ere has been a total of 37 issues in Slovakia since 1990, and these were 
traded in the public market of the Bratislava stock exchange (Burza cenných papierov 
Bratislava). Th e ﬁ les of this stock exchange were used as the primary source for the 
analysis of municipal bonds that follows (Table 5.12). Th e capital city, Bratislava, has 
issued municipal bonds twice since 1990. Both issues were in YENs and were traded 
in the foreign markets.
Table 5.12
Municipal Bonds in Slovakia since 1990
Domestic 
Market [SKK]
Foreign Markets
2,365,880,000 1995—US$ 80 million (SKK 2.37 billion), coupon 4.1%, 5-year maturity, in YENs
2000—US$ 100 million (SKK 4.74 billion), coupon 4%, 3-year maturity, in YENs
Source:     Bratislava stock exchange (www.bcpb.sk), authors.
Overall, 28 cities have issued municipal bonds so far in Slovakia, for a total volume 
of SKK 2.366 billion.10 All these issues were realized in Slovak crowns. Th e development 
of the issues in individual years is presented in Figure 5.4.
Th e highest number of issues can be seen in 1995, but this does not correspond 
to the highest volume. In 1995 bonds totaling SKK 265 million were issued, while in 
1997 the volume reached SKK 742.5 million. Th e group from 1995 primarily consisted 
of seven cities under 20,000 inhabitants and only one city of more than 40,000. Th e 
group of cities was similar in the following year, but unlike 1995 it was cities over 40,000 
inhabitants that accounted for the majority of issues (seven), while cities over 80,000 
accounted for ﬁ ve. In 1997, one city accounted for the majority of the volume of bond 
issues; Banská Bystrica issued two issues of municipal bonds totaling SKK 500 million. 
In 1999, the second largest city made the largest issue of municipal bonds by volume, 
SKK 560.88 million. In 1998 no municipal bonds were issued in Slovakia, partly because 
this was a parliamentary election year, but primarily because of municipal elections. Th e 
municipalities were probably more concerned about preparing for the election.
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As for the size categories of the issuers, a clear pattern does not exist. Only the mu-
nicipalities with the status of city have issued bonds; more precisely, cities over 5,000 
inhabitants. Municipal bonds are an attractive means of ﬁ nance for the mid-size cities. 
Th is category (10,000–40,000 inhabitants) accounts for half of the cities issuing bonds. 
By volume, however, municipalities with more than 80,000 inhabitants account for the 
largest portion of the total volume of issued municipal bonds (Table 5.13).
Figure 5.4
Development of Municipal Bond Issues in Slovakia [Th ousand SKK]
Source:     Bratislava stock exchange (www.bcpb.sk), calculations and ﬁ gure: authors.
Th e coupon of the bonds varies between 10% and 20% per annum. Only the ten-
year bonds have a 10% coupon. Th e bonds with the 10% coupon have another common 
feature. In all cases the nominal value of one bond is SKK 100,000. Th e volume of 
these “cheapest” bonds is fairly high, around SKK 100 million, except for one issue that 
reached SKK 37.5 million, mainly stemming from the size of the issuing city. At the 
other end of the scale we can ﬁ nd bonds with a 19% or 20% coupon. Th e maturity of 
these bonds is only three and four years respectively.
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Table 5.13
Municipal Bonds by Population of Municipality [SKK] 
Size Category Number of Issues Number of Cities Total Volume
to 9,999 5 5 80,000,000
10,000–19,999 8 7 190,000,000
20,000–39,999 8 7 252,500,000
40,000–79,999 4 4 205,000,000
80,000–99,999 9 4 1,042,500,000
over 100,000 3 1 595,880,000
Total 37 28 2,365,880,000
Source:     Bratislava stock exchange (www.bcpb.sk), calculations: authors.
Table 5.14
Municipal Bonds by Maturity in Years
Maturity Number of Issues Number of Cities Total Volume
2 1 1 15,000,000
3 4 3 85,000,000
4 8 7 155,000,000
5 18 17 1,655,880,000
6 2 2 140,000,000
10 4 4 315,000,000
Source:     Bratislava stock exchange (www.bcpb.sk), calculations: authors.
Municipalities use this source of funds for several purposes: housing construction, 
road construction, street lighting, water and sewage infrastructure, sport facilities (in-
cluding commercial ones such as winter sports centers), city hall renovation and health 
care facilities. 
At least one clear trend can be noted. Th e bonds with the longest maturity, ten 
years, are used to fund housing construction, i.e., apartments. Municipal bonds are 
also used to ﬁ nance construction of technical infrastructure such as water supply, gas 
distribution and sewage systems. Even though municipalities have invested money in 
their construction, the infrastructure is not owned by them. Water supply lines belong 
to the state utility company, which is in the process of free-of-charge privatization in 
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favor of municipalities. Th e gas pipelines have had a similar history. However, the state 
gas company was privatized into the  hands of foreign investors. Th e municipalities 
were reimbursed for their investments, with the reimbursement of 2002 exceeding 
four billion SKK.
3.3 Types of Local Borrowing
Although bank loans and municipal bonds are the most typical forms of local borrowing 
in Slovakia, further types of municipal borrowing exist:
      •     ﬁ nancing from special state funds;
      •     arrears in payments to suppliers of goods and services;
      •     arrears in payments to the tax oﬃ  ce, insurance system and other mandatory 
payments.
While the ﬁ nancing from special state funds is included in the published indebted-
ness of municipalities, the arrears are not. If these types of borrowing were counted in 
the indebtedness of towns and villages, the ﬁ gure would increase signiﬁ cantly (see Table 
5.13). Th e available data, however, does not allow all the arrears to be speciﬁ ed.
3.3.1   Financing from Special State Funds
Special state funds played a role in the ﬁ nancing of investment activities in Slovakia 
until 2001. Th ey operated as part of the public sector, with a special budgetary section 
in the state budget. Th ere were 12 special state funds, of which four provided signiﬁ cant 
funding for municipalities: 
      •     the State Environmental Fund for environmental construction such as sewage 
systems and waste water treatment facilities;  
      •     the state fund Pro Slovakia for cultural activities; 
      •     the State Water Management Fund for the construction of water supply sys-
tems; 
      •     the State Fund for Housing Development, for both housing construction and 
the maintenance and repair of existing housing. 
Th is funding consisted primarily of subsidies, as well as loans. Th e key players in 
funding the investment activities of municipalities were the State Environmental Fund 
and the State Fund for Housing Development. In 2002, the state funds were included 
under the organizational structure and budget of the respective ministry, with the ex-
ception of the State Fund for Housing Development. 
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3.3.1.1    Th e State Environmental Fund
Th is fund had been established in 1991 to provide funding for protection of water, air, 
landscape and nature, and for waste management. Starting in 2002 it was included under 
the organizational structure of the Ministry for the Environment. Th e main activities 
that can be ﬁ nanced through its funding are: activities towards fulﬁ llment of the goals 
of the state environmental policy; procurement of physical planning documents and 
other environmental documentation; support for research and development; prevention 
of and response to ecological catastrophes; environmental monitoring; protection of 
endangered species; and establishment and maintenance of public parks in municipali-
ties. Th e returnable funding can be provided as loans, with a maximum interest rate of 
8% per annum.
Table 5.15 
 Municipal Borrowing from the State Environmental Fund 
Year 2000 2001
Number of municipalities supported* 38 36
Total loans [SKK] 201,976,813 210,662,439
•   sewage and water treatment facility 132,584,213 98,799,451
•   water supply system 12,000,000 20,900,000
•   landfill 51,392,600 34,067,388
•   other 6,000,000 56,895,600
Note:       * including one association of municipalities.
Source:     Ministry for the Environment of the SR (www.lifeenv.gov.sk).
Th e distribution of use of the loans is provided in the Table 5.15. Th e municipalities 
used loans to construct brand new facilities, to ﬁ nance certain phases of construction, 
and to reconstruct or improve existing facilities. Th e item “other” consists of investments 
in municipal heating systems, either for their reconstruction or adaptation to a more 
ecologically sound operation.
3.3.1.2    Th e State Fund for Housing Development
Th is fund was established in 1996 to support a variety of housing projects:  the con-
struction of apartment houses, family houses or their ﬁ nishing; the construction of 
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accommodation for citizens in need of assistance (i.e., disabled people); the upgrading of 
insulation to prevent the loss of heat; the renovation of apartments, apartment houses or 
family houses; the repair of structural problems in apartment houses; and the completion 
of social care facilities and other facilities for technical services that had been initiated 
during the socialist era as part of the construction of housing complexes. Th e interest 
rate for these funds changes with the change in the discount rate of the National Bank 
of the Slovak Republic, and the maturity of the loans varies between 10 and 30 years. 
Table 5.16
Supports for which Municipalities Can Apply (Eﬀ ective January 1, 2003)
Maximum support Maturity
[Year]
Interest
Rate [%]
Targeted-purpose support
Construction and purchase of apartment 40% of OC, 
maximum 6,400 SKK/m2
20 6.5
Construction of social services facility 60% of OC, 
maximum 3,500 SKK/m2
20 6.5
Insulation of apartment 80% of OC, 
maximum 1,800 SKK/m2
10 4.9
Changes in finished construction 80% of OC, 
maximum 2,900 SKK/m2
10 6.5
Removal of static shortcomings 80% of OC 20 4.9
Complex housing construction project (KBV) 80% of OC 10 6.5
Programs 
Program for construction of rental housing 80% of OC, maximum 
700,000 SKK/apartment
30 3.3
Program for construction of social services facility 60% of OC, 
maximum 3,500 SKK/m2
20 4.9
Program to enable greater mobility 
of the working force
80% of OC, maximum 
700,000 SKK/apartment
30 3.3
Program for apartment house renewal
•      insulation 80% of OC, 
maximum 1,800 SKK/m2
20 3.3
•      changes in finished construction 80% of OC, 
maximum 2,900 SKK/m2
20 3.3
•      removal of static shortcomings 80% of OC 20 3.3
Note:       OC—the budgeted costs of construction.
Source:     State Fund for Housing Development, www.sfrb.sk. 
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Of the various programs oﬀ ered by the fund, the support for construction of rental 
houses has had the greatest signiﬁ cance for municipalities. In 2000 applications for 
this funding began to increase, and municipalities can apply for support from other 
programs as well (Table 5.16).
Th e volume of loans provided to municipalities from the State Fund for Housing 
Development totaled over SKK 2.5 billion in 2002 (see Table 5.17).
Table 5.17 
Returnable Support to Municipalities
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003*
Number of contracts n. a. 137 257 n. a.
Loans total [Million SKK] 161.10** 1,534.37 2,577.67 150
Notes:      *  budget for 2003: the support for construction of rental housing
              In 2002 the total volume of loans to municipalities corresponded to the volume of loans provided 
in the support program for construction of rental housing.
Source:     State Fund for Housing Development (www.sfrb.sk); 
               ** State ﬁ nancial statement 2000
Th e support to municipalities for the construction of rental housing should decrease 
dramatically in the 2003 budget. 
3.3.2   Bank Loans to Local Municipalities
In Slovakia the banking system consists of 20 banks, all of  which provide bank loans. 
Only six, however, have special credit products for municipalities (Table 5.18). Th e 
table contains information on ﬁ ve banks, while the sixth (Prvá komunálna banka) is 
discussed in more detail in later sections of the chapter.
All but one of the banks in Slovakia provide loans to municipalities with no special 
requirements in terms of rating. Th e conditions of the banks are fairly similar, requiring 
the municipalities to provide:
      •     documents showing the economic and ﬁ nancial situation of the municipality;
      •     the municipal budget;
      •     statistical and accounting ﬁ les;
      •     approval of the municipal council to take a credit;
      •     documents proving further sources of ﬁ nancing of the intended project;
      •     the business plan for the project;
      •     proof of ability to repay the credit;
      •     a rating  prepared by the Slovak auditing company.
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Table 5.18
Special Credit Programs for Municipalities Oﬀ ered by Slovak Banks
Bank Product Maturity
of Loan
Interest
Rate [%]
Volume
Min.–Max.
Use of the Loan/Type of Loan Special Conditions
VÚB
Communal credit
4–15 years 9–13 SKK 300,000–up to 
60% of collateral
Investments in real estate used for  publicly 
helpful purposes
No
Tatrabanka
Communal financing
n.a. n.a. n.a. Short-term financing of operational needs
Long-term financing of publicly helpful 
projects and development investments
No
Ľudová banka
Communal credit
4–30
years
9.15–10.2 SKK 100,000–up to 
70% of collateral
Mortgage-type  loan
Investment in real estate used for:
•   municipal rental housing
•   housing as part of social care for citizens
•   buildings for cultural events—community 
centers, cinemas 
and theaters, etc.
No
Unibanka
Communal credit
4–30
years
n.a.
fixed for 
1 or 5 years
SKK 1.5 million–up to 
70% of collateral
•   rating from Slovak 
auditing company 
is required
•   co-financing of the 
project must be 
indicated
Instrobanka
Communal credit
4–20
years
n.a. n.a. Publicly helpful purpose No
Source:     Banks, authors.
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Th e banks also have requirements for how the credit is to be guaranteed. Collateral 
must be provided in every case, and it cannot be under pledge to a third party. Munici-
palities are permitted to use as collateral:
      •     real estate owned by the municipality, including plots of land, storage and 
production space, administrative buildings and technology (all appraised by 
the bank);
      •     securities (shares, state bonds and other securities).
Further securing of the credit is also required, in some combination of the follow-
ing possibilities:
      •     insurance on real estate against damage and destruction, with beneﬁ ts bound 
in favor of the creditor;
      •     receivables assigned to the creditor (for existing and future contracts);
      •     binding of the time deposit account to the creditor;
      •     promissory note;
      •     bank guarantee, company guarantee;
      •     notary note;
      •     further guarantees based upon the creditworthiness of the debtor and the type 
of credit operation.
3.3.2.1    Th e Municipal Bank
Prvá komunálna banka (First Communal Bank) was established by several municipali-
ties as a specialized bank for the municipal sector in 1993. In 1996 the bank obtained a 
universal banking license allowing it to operate as a regular commercial bank. Currently, 
367 municipalities have a 19.62% share in the bank. Of these, the city of Žilina owns 
the largest share, 2% of total shares. Th ere are four more municipalities having a stake 
higher than one percent: Bratislava-Petržalka (1.32%), Bratislava-Nové Mesto (1.2%), 
Prievidza (1.02%) and Skalica (1.01%). Th e majority stakeholder in the bank is Dexia 
Kommunalkredit Holding with a 78.4% stake. Th is group took over the bank in 2000 
as part of its strategy to become the key bank for the municipal sector in Central and 
Eastern Europe.
During its ten-year history the bank focused on the municipal ﬁ nancing sector, 
as well as the retail and corporate sectors. After the entry of the Dexia Group, PKB 
decreased its activities in the corporate sector and focused primarily on the municipal 
sector and utilities. According to the bank, the municipal sector is less risky to do business 
with than corporations. Th e overall volume of credit funds provided to municipalities 
is around 3.5 billion Sk. Of this total, about one percent of the loans have repayment 
problems. Starting in 2000, the bank decreased the volume of credits provided to 
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the private sector and increased its credit involvement in the municipal sector. In the 
course of the last ﬁ ve years over 75% of all credit funds provided to municipalities11 
has come from the bank. In 2001 the bank provided 289 municipal loans and credits. 
Th e volume of loans to municipalities and utilities totaled 1.1 billion Sk in 2001, and 
PKB accounted for 83.5% of all municipal credit funds in that year. In the most recent 
years the bank restructured the debt portfolio of two of the three most indebted cities 
in Slovakia, Banská Bystrica and Košice. Despite the fact that PKB was not the ﬁ rst 
bank serving these cities, it oﬀ ered a solution to their “cross-default” ﬁ nancial situation 
and now the cities are recovering. 
Further areas of service to the municipal sector are deposits and consultancy in 
municipal and project ﬁ nancing. PKB accounts for about 40% to 50% of total municipal 
deposits in the Slovak banking sector. About 65% of Slovak municipalities use PKB as 
the ﬁ rst or only bank.    
Th e bank also engages in the ﬁ nancing of environmental and investment projects 
supported by special state funds or pre-accession funds (PHARE). Th e bank is an ad-
ministrator for the ﬁ nancial funds of the State Environmental Fund and the State Fund 
for Housing Development. In 2001 and 2002 the bank organized several seminars and 
conferences on project ﬁ nancing for utilities and environmental projects. Additional 
activities of the bank include:
      •     mobilization of sources and funds of municipalities;
      •     municipal bonds issues;
      •     funding of activities directed to renewal of municipalities;
      •     separate care of the municipal ﬁ nancial funds;
      •     depository activity for the forest-owners’ associations;
      •     leasing and consultancy.
Th e bank oﬀ ers the following products to municipalities:
      a)   Current accounts—with low minimum deposit and privileged interest rates; 
      b)   Housing development fund accounts and road fund accounts—these accounts 
have similar conditions as a current account, with a more favorable interest rate. 
Th e following resources can be transferred to the housing development fund 
account, for the construction of infrastructure:
            •     revenues from municipal apartments and the sale of facilities;
            •     revenues from the sale of ongoing construction of facilities;
            •     revenues from the sale of non-residential premises or plots of land 
connected with the transfer of apartments to the ownership of residents;
            •     sanctions for non-legitimate use of resources provided from a fund;
            •     repayment of loans;
            •     contributions and donations of legal entities and individuals;
            •     the annual allocation from the town (municipal) budget.
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            Th e road fund account is intended for the construction, repairs and maintenance 
of local communications and other related expenses. Th e following resources 
can be transferred to the road fund account, along with other resources as long 
as they are used for the same purpose:
            •     revenues from the road tax;
            •     the annual contribution from the municipal budget.
      c)   Credits for towns and villages—the PKB provides:
            •     short-term loans with a maturity of up to one year;
            •     mid-term loans, up to ﬁ ve years;
            •       long-term loans, up to twenty years. 
      Th e projects that can be ﬁ nanced are:
            •     gas distribution; 
            •     sewage; 
            •     waste water treatment plants; 
            •     water supply; 
            •     landﬁ lls; 
            •     reconstruction or construction of local roads; 
            •     purchase of measuring and regulating devices; 
            •     schools and school facilities; 
            •     reconstruction and purchase of real estate; 
            •     residential apartments, etc.
            After receiving a loan application the bank assesses the credibility of a town or 
village and its ability to repay the principle and interest. PKB has elaborated a 
system for creditability assessment and capability to repay a loan while setting 
up the maximum possible loan for the speciﬁ c size of the municipality.
            Th e loan must be guaranteed with any one or a combination of the following: 
ﬁ nancial collateral, real estate, tangible assets, securities or bank guarantee.Th e 
collateral must account for a minimum of 130% of the provided loan. Th e 
municipality draws the loan through a special account with zero interest and 
commission. Th e loan can be repaid through regular equal monthly installments 
(annuity system) or through regular installments of principal with interest rate 
repaid monthly. Th e ﬂ oating interest rate on the loan depends on the reﬁ nancing 
costs of the bank. If a municipality wants to get a loan from PKB it must have 
a current account with this bank and the municipality must deposit its annual 
tax revenues from the state budget to this account during the period of loan.
            Since 2001 the bank has provided three special credit programs for municipali-
ties:
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            •     PKB-Prvý municipálny úver (First Municipal Loan)—a ten-year credit 
provided as a revolving line of credit to ﬁ nance the investment needs of 
municipalities or to reﬁ nance existing liabilities from investment activities. 
Every village and town has a credit limit (maximum credit) as assessed by 
PKB. Th is credit line has several advantages: it can be obtained quickly; the 
bank manages the process of drawing or repaying the credit according to the 
ﬁ nancial needs and abilities of the municipality; and, the municipality does 
not have to guarantee the loan with municipal real estate, as a promissory 
note from the municipality is suﬃ  cient.
            •     PKB-Superlinka (Superlink)—a one-year bank overdraft credit. Munici-
palities can use the funds in their current account up to the set debt. Th is 
credit is targeted at municipalities that want to manage their ﬁ nance ef-
fectively and ﬂ exibly and also manage their short-term liabilities. Th e only 
guarantee for this credit is the creditability of the municipality.
            •     PKB-Klasik (Classic)—a long-term investment credit with a 15–20 year 
maturity to ﬁ nance bigger projects in the areas of ecology, infrastructure 
and housing. Th e conditions are tailor-made for each project. It can also be 
used for the construction of rental housing where the municipality can get 
a bonus of up to 6% of the interest rate from the State Fund for Housing 
Development after special conditions are met. 
      d)   Bank guarantees, and discount and acceptance of their promissory notes. 
3.3.3   Municipal Rating
Municipal rating emerged in Slovakia in 2001, after a decade of municipal sector op-
eration. In this year two local rating agencies were constituted: CRA Rating Agency, a 
Moody’s Investors Service aﬃ  liate, and Slovak Rating Agency (SRA) as the rating agency 
with no aﬃ  liation to any major international rating agency. Until 2001, Bratislava was 
the only Slovak municipality that was considered to have a rating. However, this was 
not actually a rating of Bratislava as a municipality. Rather, it was for the purpose of 
receiving a foreign credit in the middle of the 1990s—the rating was awarded for the 
issue of a municipal bond arranged by a Japanese bank. Th e ﬁ rst municipality that 
obtained a “true” rating was the city of Spišská Nová Ves in April 2001.
Th e municipal sector is not the only client of rating agencies located in Slovakia.Th ey 
provide ratings for regional self-governments, industrial companies, banks, investment 
funds, bond issues as well as individual investment projects. While the CRA Rating 
Agency was the ﬁ rst one to be established in Slovakia, the Slovak Rating Agency has a 
lead in the number of municipalities that have been assessed (twelve, while the CRA 
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has completed eight). In the  municipal sector both agencies provide credit ratings—an 
assessment of creditability and of the entity’s ability to pay the liabilities on time and 
in full scale. Th ey provide short-term and long-term, public and non-public ratings; 
ratings of creditability in local and foreign currency (SRA); and local and international 
ratings (CRA).
A review of awarded ratings indicates that mid-size as well as large municipalities 
use ratings. Five of the eight regional seat cities (Bratislava, Žilina and Banská Bystrica 
are the exceptions) have been provided with ratings. Some municipalities that were 
evaluated can oﬀ er a positive example of how sound ﬁ nancial behavior leads to a good 
reputation and creditability (e.g., Nitra and Trnava). On the other hand, rating agencies 
also evaluated municipalities with serious ﬁ nancial problems, such as Košice and Nové 
Zámky. So far only the administrative centers of districts have taken steps to receive a 
rating, with the exception of Nováky and the municipality of Bratislava-Rača (a section 
of Bratislava with the status of local government).
Th ere has been no research on what motivates municipalities to get a rating, but 
it can be assumed that this activity has something to do with “image.” Th e cohort of 
rated municipalities includes three of the four cities that participated in the USAID-
funded project, “Strategic Plan for Local Economic Development.” Th e Statement on 
Rating for the participating cities (Trnava, Humenné and Prešov) includes a comment 
on their participation in the project. Th e rating agency considered it a positive feature 
contributing to a better rating. Th e cohort also includes seven municipalities that used 
municipal bonds for their investment activities in the past (Prešov, Košice, Ružomberok, 
Komárno, Nitra, Nové Zámky and Trenčín). With the exception of Nové Zámky and 
Košice, all received a favorable rating. 
In total, the ratings of municipalities in Slovakia are not bad. It may suggest that 
municipalities with ﬁ nancial problems are reluctant to have some agency going through 
their books. Such municipalities might be afraid of facing the true picture of their ﬁ nanc-
ing, and even more so if it were a public rating. On the other hand the results support 
the opinion that the overall situation of the municipal sector in the area of indebtedness 
is strongly inﬂ uenced by the “misbehavior” of selected municipalities.   
 
3.4 Local Policies on Borrowing and Debt Management
Th e worst cases of municipal ﬁ nancial problems emerged after the local elections of 
1998. Th e problems of Banská Bystrica and later on Košice stemmed from the ﬁ nancial 
misbehavior of the previous city administration. Th is included acceptance of unfavo-
rable interest on credits, acceptance of unfavorable maturity and the underestimation 
of or failure to consider at all the ﬁ nancial feasibility and returns of the project. Th e 
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misbehavior can also be attributed to the populist way of managing city ﬁ nances for 
the sake of reelection.
Th e central government addressed these problems by setting up some limits on bor-
rowing and by specifying what should be done if a municipality is not able to clear its 
liabilities. Th e reaction of the municipalities was extremely negative from the beginning. 
Municipalities considered the limits on borrowing as an attack on their autonomy. With 
local governments that are less experienced, and where the elected representatives may 
not fully understand the nature and role of local government, a certain level of control 
seems necessary. Th e following case studies show why.
3.4.1   Case Studies of Municipalities in Severe Financial Situations 
•     Dolná Lehota
Dolná Lehota is a village with 739 citizens. In the 1990s it took a credit for the con-
struction of a waste water treatment facility, and in the next four years the municipality 
paid about SKK 10 million. Th e inability of the municipality repay this credit resulted 
in distress sales where it lost some of its facilities for only a portion of their real value, 
and all other property was collateralized. Even the mayor’s chair bears a stamp “under 
the distraint of debtor.” Th e situation would not be so bad if the waste water facility at 
least served its purpose. However, not all the people in the village are connected to this 
facility, so the environmental problem still exists and the municipality faces a severe 
ﬁ nancial situation. 
By coincidence, the ﬁ rst Slovak astronaut was born in this village. When he was 
in orbit, many state authorities visited the village and promised state help but none 
arrived. Th e municipality did not get into these diﬃ  culties through its own negligence. 
Its credits were from banks that went bankrupt, and in this situation loans are repayable 
immediately (or as agreed with the assignee of the estate of the bank). Th e mayor has 
been asking for state assistance, arguing that if the state helps citizens in the case of 
bankruptcy of a bank, it should also help the aﬀ ected municipalities.12 Moreover, the state 
should provide assistance if the municipality used the money for a necessary purpose, 
not just an image investment such as the renewal of a municipal center or for cultural 
events as happened elsewhere (Pravda, June 2002). Th e municipality’s debt reached 
SKK 25 million as of June 2002.
•     Pohorelá
Th e mountain village of Pohorelá is the home of 2,677 people. Excessive debt caused 
the municipality to undergo a forced administration, but the village has no means of 
covering its debt as all its property was sold in the process. Th e local government even 
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has to rent the premises of its municipal oﬃ  ce. All revenues coming from the state 
budget go to debt repayment, and the municipality operates solely on the revenues 
from local fees. 
Th e “debt story” began in 1993 with the loan of SKK 4.2 million to construct the 
infrastructure for cable television. Th e current mayor has judged this investment as “an 
unreasonably expensive, populist act without a necessary purpose” (Pravda, July 2002). 
Moreover, a part of the municipality cannot use the cable due to technical problems. 
With the taking of this loan, the ﬁ nancial pressure on the municipality had only just 
started. Soon it needed money for a waste water treatment facility, a sewage system, 
and in 1992 a funeral house was started (the mayor does not foresee its completion in 
the near future).
Th e overall debt of SKK 8 million was not particularly high, but in ten years not much 
of it was cleared. Despite the fact that the municipality repaid SKK 6 million in 2001, the 
overall liabilities of the municipality amounted to SKK 7.89 million in April 2002. 
•       Banská Bystrica
Banská Bystrica, a regional seat, has more than 83,000 inhabitants. By the end of 1998 
the liabilities of Banská Bystrica exceeded SKK 1.2 billion. In 1999, the city was paying 
for a total of seven loans (one from 1995 and six from 1998). Th ese credits were due at 
diﬀ erent times, with the last installment due in 2006. In 1998 the city did not pay the 
coupon from some municipal bonds totaling SKK 42 million. Th ese bonds are due in 
2006 in the amount of SKK 1.064 billion. Th e funds gained from the loans were not 
used for projects with a short-term return, despite the fact that they were short-term 
loans (ﬁ ve-year, two-year and even one-year). For example, the city received about SKK 
500 million from bonds for housing construction, a further SKK 150 million for hous-
ing construction, and SKK 100 million for the “development of the city,” which in fact 
was for reconstruction work to improve the look of the city. 
In 1999 the situation of the city was close to cross-default. It also did not fulﬁ ll its 
obligations to the suppliers of goods and services. In 1999 several companies (suppliers 
of construction works and public lighting) initiated an execution of debt. In March, 
the executor froze the city’s bank accounts (except for the social fund account). Th e city 
had to draw up a list of property available for sale, which included 22 items amounting 
to more than SKK 200 million. Based upon this list the court stopped the execution 
and reopened the accounts. Th e list included real estate as well as shares in the Banka 
Slovakia. 
In July 1999 the municipal council approved a short-term revolving loan of SKK 
5 million at 24% interest from Banka Slovakia (in which the city is a shareholder), to 
stabilize municipal ﬁ nance. Th is loan was to be used to cover installments of other out-
standing loans. In November of that year the city accepted another short-term loan from 
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Dopravná Banka,  amounting to SKK 16 million at a 22% interest rate. Th is loan was 
to cover the penalty interest for one particular budgetary organization of the city. Th e 
settlement of this penalty was a requirement of the bank in order to assist in restructuring 
the debt portfolio of the city organization. Th is loan was due in September 2000. 
One can consider 1999 as a year of desperate searching for a solution to the debt 
situation of the city. Th e overdue liabilities reached almost SKK 100 million by the 
middle of 1999. Th e municipal budget for 2000 could be calculated neither with 
expenditures for the municipal bonds coupon (almost SKK 70 million) nor with the 
creation of funds for repayment of the principal (SKK 40 million).
Th e investment activities prior to 1998 may have improved the look of the city, but 
it was the new mayor and municipal council that solved the ensuing ﬁ nancial problems. 
In 2000 PKB (Prvá komunálna banka) stepped in. By that time the bank was not the 
largest creditor of the city. Th e bank prepared a recovery plan for the local government, 
which included taking over the debts owing to the other bank and the provision of a 
long-term loan of almost SKK 600 million to restructure the remaining debt. Th is loan 
was provided for 15 years with a ﬂ oating interest rate exceeding the basic interest rate 
in the state by three percent (11% in total in 2001). Th e agreement between the city 
and the bank also included a provision that the bank controls the ﬁ nancial activities of 
the city and all municipal property management. 
Th is solution is in fact one of the best ways to educate local governments in sound 
ﬁ nancial management. Th e only shortcoming is that the municipality almost cross-
defaulted before such management was introduced. Th e response of the mayor on the 
question of legal limitations on borrowing was to criticize the central government’s 
intervention into the “autonomy of local governments” (Obecné noviny 39/2001). On 
the other hand, the same mayor criticized his predecessor for unreasonable ﬁ nancial 
and investment activities. In the same interview the mayor praised the introduction 
of forced administration into law. His opinion about this basically conﬁ rms the fact 
that municipalities expect the state to resolve the ﬁ nancial problems of cross-defaulted 
municipalities. Th e idea of municipal autonomy vanishes when the municipality gets 
into problems, as is seen again in the following case study.
•     Košice
Košice is the second largest city in Slovakia totaling almost 240,000 people. In 1998 its 
debt was almost SKK 1.8 billion. Th e city councilors attributed this debt to excessive 
investment activities of the city hall that had been initiated by the mayor in the period 
before 1998, mainly the massive reconstruction of the main square in the city (Trend, 
March 1998). Th e mayor in question, who is today the president of Slovakia, argues he 
is not responsible for it. He blames the legislative environment, mainly the existence of 
special laws on Bratislava and Košice, which oblige these cities to ﬁ nance services that 
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should be, in his opinion, ﬁ nanced by the state (e.g., road management, ﬁ reﬁ ghters, 
etc.). He also points to the bi-level nature of local government in the city, which makes 
administration costly. A third problem, he claims, is that the city councilors in Košice 
caused obstructions in the approval of the city’s bonds issue in 1997. Th eir delays caused 
the failure of this issue in 1998, resulting in the need to search for other sources of 
ﬁ nancing the debt (Pravda, May 2002). 
In 2000 the city’s debt exceeded SKK 2 billion, mainly due to unfavorable credits 
accepted by the previous city management to cover the investment activities to improve 
the look of the city. Th e new management had to struggle with a cross-default threat 
just like the situation in Banská Bystrica. Th e central government was seen as the only 
option for help, despite the city’s poor credit policy in the past when it accepted high 
interest on credits. As in the case of Banská Bystrica, the PKB oﬀ ered a hand, with 
similar conditions. PKB also required  cutting the debt by a billion, which the city de-
cided could be achieved by selling the city forests. Th e expectation of revenues of over 
SKK 3.5 billion was gradually reduced to SKK 1 billion. But there was little interest 
in buying the forests and the state was the only possible buyer. When local politicians 
initiated negotiations on this, other municipalities protested because they would like 
to get such assistance as well. Th e liberal governmental oﬃ  cials did not want to accept 
such a solution either. When the government ﬁ nally decided not to buy the forests, 
other solutions were sought. 
In the beginning of 2002 the central government approved a 15-year loan of SKK 
580 million at 5% interest, secured by city property valued at SKK 650 million. Th e 
loan is to be used for repayment of selected overdue debts and this is the ﬁ rst time that 
central government has oﬀ ered an interbudgetary loan. Many voices warned that this 
could set a precedent for the future, but there have not yet been any other examples 
like this. 
At the same time, the city had to elaborate a plan to clean up the municipal ﬁ nances 
and also a plan to redeem the government loan using ﬁ nancial sources from the sale or 
rent of the city forest. After these conditions were met PKB agreed to assist in restruc-
turing the city debt. In August 2002 three banks provided a syndicated loan of SKK 
700 million. Th e loan is due in 15 years with an interest rate of almost 11%. PKB plays 
the leading role in the consortium of three banks. Th e loan was secured with municipal 
property valued at 130% of the loan. Th e use of municipal property and the ﬁ nancial 
operation of the city must be under the supervision of the board of creditors. When all 
the tranches are in the city accounts and the revenues for the forests are in the municipal 
budget, the debt situation of Košice should be stabilized.
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3.5  Future Threats to Local Government Financing 
Th e municipal debt was for the most part created by 2000. Th e municipalities were 
not responsible for the delivery of many services at that time. In 2002 the process of 
decentralization entered its second stage, and many powers  were transferred to the 
municipalities (see introduction). Th is phase of decentralization has raised new prob-
lems for local governments, as ﬁ nancial decentralization has lagged behind the transfer 
of powers. Th e present government will need to address this discrepancy and proceed 
with ﬁ scal decentralization. Th e current system of ﬁ nancing the local governments 
mainly through revenues from centrally collected taxes does not reﬂ ect their increased 
responsibilities. 
Th e ﬁ nancing of the transferred powers is currently organized through a so-called 
decentralization subsidy, which is insuﬃ  cient to guarantee the adequate operation of 
facilities such as schools, hospitals, etc. At the same time the law discourages local gov-
ernments from the more eﬃ  cient delivery of these services, since funds that are saved 
in one area cannot be transferred to cover another area or service.  
A further potential threat for the municipalities is the fact that the property being 
transferred to local governments bears not only operational but also capital costs. Th e 
buildings are in very poor physical condition. Th ere have been no renovations or invest-
ments in their renewal for many years. Th e most critical situations were often addressed 
in an ad hoc manner without addressing the underlying structural and technical problems 
of the facilities. Local governments, the new owners of this property, will have to deal 
with these costs using own resources (only the operational debt of transferred facilities 
is settled as of the date of transfer).
After the transfer, the operational debt from services such as education, healthcare 
and social services will have to be covered with the funding sources of local govern-
ments. However, they do not have much power to make major changes to the system in 
order to lower the deﬁ cit provision of such services as education and healthcare. Th ese 
systems must be restructured by the central government. Until then the municipalities 
will have to cope with the operational debt being created.
In the framework of  potential threats to local government ﬁ nances there is one 
crucial threat inﬂ uencing them all, and this is the tax reform in Slovakia. Th e central 
government has announced a reform of direct and indirect taxes to ease up the tax 
system and accelerate economic development. Th e tax reform has become a priority 
of the government and has shifted ﬁ scal decentralization to a lower priority. Th is fact 
together with a shortage of sound ﬁ nancial management in municipalities is the big-
gest potential threat to the future ﬁ scal operation of local governments and to their 
continued existence as well. 
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4.   CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Conclusions
Local Financing
Th e ﬁ nancial status of local budgets is healthier than the ﬁ nancial situation of the public 
sector as a whole. In total, local budgets have been permanently in surplus throughout the 
last decade. Major sources of local budget revenues are the share in revenues from state 
taxes, real-estate tax, local fees, municipal property ownership and enterprise revenues, 
transfers from public budgets and loans. Th e decentralization of public administration 
does not address the issue of ﬁ scal decentralization, which leaves local governments in 
a risky ﬁ nancial situation.
Regulations on Local Borrowing
In 2001 the central government addressed the issue of increasing municipal debt and 
amended the Law on Budgetary Rules. Th e amendment introduced limits on the size 
of local indebtedness as a percentage of their current revenues. It further stipulates the 
process to be followed when a municipality cannot pay its liabilities, including such 
measures as the recovery regime and forced administration. Although these measures 
are not systemic ones and local governments criticize them a lot (mainly the borrowing 
limits), they are nevertheless relevant in the environment of immature local governments 
in terms of sound ﬁ nancial and investment behavior. 
Th e Scale of Local Indebtedness
In Slovakia the municipal debt is deﬁ ned as the sum of unpaid credits and municipal 
bonds and the ﬁ nancial assistance from special state funds. But this formula is compli-
cated by diﬀ erentiated accounting and reporting systems for municipalities under and 
above 3,000 inhabitants. In line with this deﬁ nition the municipal debt was SKK 12.7 
billion in 2001, which accounted for 3.05% of total public sector debt. Th e majority 
of this debt is created by the largest cities. Th e regional seat cities accounted for 68% 
of total municipal debt in 2001. In municipalities under 3,000 inhabitants the overall 
debt per capita was SKK 668. In municipalities over 3,000 inhabitants, every citizen 
“owed” SKK 3,681. Th e debt per citizen culminated in Bratislava, where every citizen 
was “burdened” with a municipal debt of SKK 11,381 in 2000. Košice and Banská 
Bystrica follow with more than SKK 8,000 of debt per citizen. Debt service accounts 
for about 12% of total local expenditures with maximums in the largest cities.
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If short-term and other liabilities were included, the overall local government debt 
would jump to a level one-third higher than the oﬃ  cial number. On the other hand, 
when looking at the development of such debt we can see a decreasing trend since 2000, 
suggesting the improved ability of municipalities to clear their short-term liabilities. 
Taken together with the slow-down of the oﬃ  cial indebtedness of municipalities, this 
suggests that municipalities are improving their debt behavior.
Municipal bonds
Slovak municipalities have used municipal bonds to ﬁ nance their investment activities 
since 1993. Since 1990 there has been a total of 37 issues in 28 cities in Slovakia. Th e 
municipal bonds in these issues were traded in the public market of the Bratislava stock 
exchange. 
Financing from Special State Funds
Until 2001 there were 12 special state funds, of which the State Environmental Fund, the 
fund Pro Slovakia, the State Water Management Fund and the State Fund for Housing 
Development were the most signiﬁ cant. Th eir funding consisted of subsidies as well 
as loans.
In 2000 and 2001 the State Environmental Fund provided loans of SKK 200 mil-
lion to municipalities each year. Th e loans were primarily used for the construction 
or reconstruction of sewage systems and waste water treatment facilities. In 2001 and 
2002 the State Fund for Housing Development provided very favorable loans of SKK 
1.5 billion and SKK 2.6 billion respectively. Th e primary purpose of these funds was 
to support the construction of rental housing. Th is type of state support should be 
decreased in the following years and shifted to the commercial banks.
Bank Lending to Municipalities
Major banks in Slovakia oﬀ er special products for municipalities (credit and deposit 
products). Th e requirements of the banks for securing the credits are very similar. 
Basically, a municipality needs collateral that exceeds the credit value. In 1993 the 
municipalities established a special bank for the municipal sector—Prvá komunálna 
banka. Since 1996 it has operated as a universal commercial bank with a special focus 
on the municipal sector and utilities. Th e municipalities are almost a 20% stakeholder 
in this bank. Th e majority belongs to the Dexia Kommunalkredit Holding—a European 
leader in municipal sector banking.
Municipal Rating
Municipal rating in Slovakia is quite new. Th ere was neither a rated municipality nor a 
rating agency until 2001 when two local rating agencies were constituted in Slovakia: 
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CRA Rating Agency, a Moody’s Investors Service aﬃ  liate and Slovak Rating Agency 
(SRA) as the rating agency with no aﬃ  liation to a major international rating agency. 
Overall 20 municipalities have been rated since then. It is mostly larger cities that are 
involved in the rating process, both ﬁ nancially sound and ﬁ nancially troubled.
Debt Management
Th e ﬁ nancial and investment malpractice of local governments resulted in several 
cases of “cross-default.”  In some small municipalities that were unable to pay their 
liabilities, the creditors initiated the execution of municipal property. In such cases the 
local government basically cannot fulﬁ ll its tasks since all available funds must go to 
the settlement of the debt. On the other hand there are municipalities that got into a 
severe ﬁ nancial situation due to excessive and unfavorably structured debt and still can 
deal with it. Th is is mostly the case with large cities such as Banská Bystrica and Košice, 
which were described earlier. Th ey, of course, could not deal with it by themselves. With 
the assistance of the municipal bank (PKB), and in the case of Košice with the further 
assistance of central government, they restructured their debt portfolio and introduced 
sound ﬁ nancial and investment management.
Potential Th reats to Local Financing   
As the decentralization of public administration proceeds, there are two major threats. 
First, ﬁ scal decentralization did not accompany the decentralization of powers. Th e 
decentralization of powers established conditions that do not motivate municipalities 
to operate more eﬃ  ciently. Second, the transferred property carries with it not just 
operational debt (which is continually created) but also a so-called technological debt. 
Th e buildings have not been renovated or maintained properly for years, and they will 
require major investments that will come solely from the local budgets. Indirectly, there 
is also one background threat to local ﬁ nancing. Th is is the tax reform announced and 
prioritized by the government. Th is may deﬂ ect attention away from ﬁ scal decentraliza-
tion and consequently lead to its non-realization.  
4.2  Recommendations 
Recommendations to Central Government
Meaningful ﬁ nancial planning by municipalities cannot occur when the funding from 
the state budget to local governments is unstable and unpredictable. Without strict 
rules surrounding the state’s contribution, local budgets and investment plans are of-
ten prepared under stress. Th erefore, we recommend strengthening and stabilizing the 
ﬁ nancial circumstances of local governments. 
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With the ongoing decentralization of powers from the state administration to ter-
ritorial governments, ﬁ nancial decentralization should be implemented as an important 
step in increasing the economic independence of local governments.
New regulations on the limits to local borrowing seem satisfactory, but their impact 
should be carefully reviewed after they come into eﬀ ect in 2005. 
Recommendations to Local Governments
When deciding on the use of returnable sources of funding, the municipality should fairly 
assess its capability to pay the debt back. If the loan can be repaid by the ﬁ nanced project 
itself, the municipality should provide an analysis demonstrating that the returns from 
the project can cover both the operational costs and the repayment of the loan (interest 
plus principal). Predictions for future revenues from the project should be conservative. 
Th e costs  should be presented in full, including depreciation as well as operational costs 
after the project is ﬁ nished, to avoid hidden subsidies from other expenditure items of 
the local budget or a potential decrease in the operational eﬀ ectiveness of the project in 
the future. When the investment is not returnable directly, the loan must be reﬁ nanced 
through current revenues. Finally, if the project is not proﬁ table the municipality has 
even more reasons to accurately assess its debt capacity.
Th e debt capacity should be calculated as the diﬀ erence between current revenues 
and current expenditures, installments of actual liabilities and future liabilities stemming 
from the present investment activities and guarantees taken over by the municipality. 
Th is calculation is more precise than the ratio of debt service in the current revenues of 
municipalities since the latter does not consider current expenditures.
We recommend that local governments use their capabilities and potentials more 
eﬀ ectively through the development of sound economic, ﬁ nancial and budgetary poli-
cies. Th erefore, they should:
      a)   improve budgeting;
      b)   implement standard techniques of “company calculations;”
      c)   improve their multi-year ﬁ nancial  planning; and
      d)   with regard to a severe ﬁ nancial situation and limited sources, they should:
            •     limit their activities primarily to delivery of public services and focus on 
only a limited number of investment projects after a thorough analysis of 
their eﬀ ectiveness and return;
            •     shift gradually towards multi-year strategic ﬁ nancial planning;
            •     use tax revenues primarily to ﬁ nance delivery of public services not invest-
ment projects;
            •     abandon the idea of swift improvement of technical and social infrastructure 
and clearly deﬁ ne priorities for the coming years;
            •     not reduce investments dramatically, as they have multiplication eﬀ ects;
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            •     consider consequent operational costs of the intended facility and their 
impact on the municipal budget prior to investing in such a project;
            •     invest in measures leading towards improvement of the organizational, eco-
nomic and technical eﬀ ectiveness of municipal tasks delivery, including the 
enhancement of the skills and capacities of staﬀ .
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NOTES
1 In state socialism municipalities did not exist as they are deﬁ ned today. Th ere were, however, 
settlement units that can be referred to as today’s municipalities.
2 For more detailed information on distribution of powers in Slovakia by 2001 see Horváth 2000, 
Kling et al. 2002.
3 Most of the state funds were incorporated in 2001 under the respective ministries, but the roles and 
provisions of the subsidies (grants) remain basically the same.
4 For a more detailed account see Kling et al., 2002.
5 USD1=SKK33.20 (1993); USD1=SKK31.43 (1994); USD1=SKK29.57 (1995); USD1=SKK31.90 
(1996); USD1=SKK34.78 (1997); USD1=SKK36.91 (1998); USD1=SKK42.27 (1999); 
USD1=SKK47.39 (2000); USD1=SKK49.27 (2001); USD1= SKK40.04 (2002) (www.nbs.sk).
6 Debt-related expenditures comprised of credit interest, principal payments and fees for credit 
administration.
7 Structured in terms of dividing banks loans, municipal bonds and other types of liabilities.
8 Debt-related expenditures = debt service.
9 In 2001, revenues reached SKK 2.85 billion and expenditures reached SKK 2.77 billion; in 2002 
revenues were SKK 6.08 billion and expenditures were SKK 5.24 billion; in 2003 the draft budget 
proposes revenues and expenditures being even, SKK 9.8 billion.
10 Plus Bratislava, two issues totaling SKK 7.11 billion.
11 Th is ﬁ gure excludes the credit funds for Bratislava, which used foreign markets. If these funds are 
included in the calculation, PKB accounts for about 60% of all credit funds to municipalities. 
12 In Slovakia, the state repays a certain amount of the citizen’s savings in a bankrupt bank (up to 
a certain multiple of minimum monthly wages). Th is provision does not apply to legal entities. In 
the process of “stabilization” of the bank sector when many banks bankrupted, many municipalities 
lost part of their savings deposited in such banks (for example Bratislava lost about SKK 350 million 
deposited in the account in Slovenska kreditna banka that ﬁ led for bankruptcy in 2001). 
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Local Government Borrowing: 
Regulations and Practices in Estonia
Annika Jaansoo, Sulev Liivik, Andrus Jőgi, Tähve Milt 
1.   INTRODUCTION
Estonia has adopted an autonomous model of local government (LG) from the very be-
ginning. Th us, the central legislation may prescribe various functions to the LG but only 
a few obligatory standards, structures and procedures apply. Th e central legislation has 
established a framework that every LG should adapt to its own needs and capacity. 
Th e size and capacity of Estonian LG units are so varied that it is almost impossible 
to speak about universal practices. Even strictly regulated areas like borrowing, which 
requires a great deal of precision and comparability, are enormously diversiﬁ ed. But this 
variability, which could cause diﬃ  culties for research, also has its positive dimension: 
the operation of LGs in Estonia can oﬀ er a variety of potential solutions for problems, 
thus helping to meet the practical and very pragmatic needs of LGs. 
2.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ESTONIA
Estonia today has a one-tier local government with 241 units—39 towns and 203 rural 
municipalities. Th ey are all covered by the same regulations, despite the fact that their 
size and real capacity are rather diﬀ erent. 
Th ere are also 15 county governments, which are the general administrative agen-
cies representing the state interests on the regional level and supervising the actions of 
LG units.
State authorities only supervise the legality of LG actions.
Local governments cannot delegate their functions as prescribed by law to the 
upper tier of (county) government. On the other hand, municipalities may delegate 
their functions to the lower level and may found municipal districts. Usually these 
subgovernments are established in larger cities (e.g., Tallinn) but also in spatially larger 
municipalities, with several centers having sub-units to better represent the interests 
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of the remote areas. Municipalities may found voluntary associations with the aim of 
mutual cooperation in service delivery and in representing the interests of local govern-
ments at the county and state levels.
Th ere are six general legal acts regulating local government, including two acts regu-
lating their ﬁ nances. Th eir functions are prescribed unambiguously by the Local Govern-
ment Organization Act (LGOA) and cannot be negotiated with state authorities.
Table 6.1
Mean Population and Number of Municipalities (2003)
Number 
of Inhabitants
Number 
of Municipalities
Proportion 
of Municipalities
Proportion of the Whole 
Population in Municipalities 
within the Population Range 
[%]
–999 27 11 1
1,000–1,999 98 40 10
2,000–4,999 72 30 16
5,000–9,999 30 12 14
1,000–49,999 11 4 17
50,000–9,999 1 0 5
>100,000 2 1 35
Table 6.2
Distribution of Responsibilities Between Central Government 
and Local Governments
State Government Local Government
Defense Entire responsibility
Justice/Internal safety Entire responsibility
Foreign/Economic 
relations
Entire responsibility
Education and culture All universities and research 
institutions; teachers’ training; 
preparation of textbooks and 
methodological materials; some 
investment grants
Construction, operation and 
maintenance of primary and 
secondary schools, kindergartens 
etc. Salaries and social security 
of teachers in primary and 
secondary schools. Sports 
facilities, houses of culture and 
community centers, vocational, 
hobby and sport schools
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Health Research institutes, special 
services hospitals and tertiary 
hospitals (there is a national 
health fund which covers 
individual medical expenses)
Capital investment and 
maintenance of municipal 
hospitals and polyclinics
Roads Construction of national 
highways, maintenance of state 
highways and other roads linking 
cities and villages
Maintenance of local networks 
and town streets
Public Transportation Intercity buses by state 
enterprise, airports, railway 
subsidy and subsidy for local 
transportation
Local public transport
Fire protection All fire protection services and 
emergency services
All fire protection services and 
emergency services
Culture National library and museums Local libraries, cultural centers 
and museums
Police service National police Participation in criminal 
prevention
Sanitation Garbage collection and street 
cleaning
Water and sewage Some investment grants Operation and capital 
expenditures
Public utilities Electricity and gas provided by 
state enterprises
District heating
Housing Housing maintenance and 
communal services
Social welfare Unemployment benefits,
pensions for elderly and disabled 
persons, benefits to families with 
children
Care for elderly, home visits and 
other social services.
Subsistence benefit for low-
income persons and other social 
benefits.
Environment Responsibility for national 
environment issues
Local environment issues
Even when it is obvious that a local government is unable to fulﬁ ll its responsibilities, 
it has no right to delegate them to the upper tier; neither is the central government 
responsible for assuring the provision of a certain level of service to citizens in that local 
government unit. 
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On the other hand, the central government has no means of forcing the local gov-
ernment to implement its functions. Th is has become a tacit agreement between LGs 
and the state. Th e central government does not control the ways the money from the 
state budget is used and does not pay attention to the failure of LG units to perform 
their functions appropriately. 
As is demonstrated in Figure 6.1, the economy accounts for the major portion of 
LG expenditures, primarily for the ﬁ nancing of the water supply, sewage or heating. 
Capital repair expenses are mostly connected with repairs of the existing schools and 
kindergartens (to replace windows, heating and ventilation systems). 
Figure 6.1
Local Government Investments and Capital Repairs (1998–2000)
Others
200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000
Economy
Social welfare
Healthcare
Sports and recreation
Culture
Education
Defence and public order
General administration
0
Sum in EEK
1999
2001
2002
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3.   FINANCING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
3.1 Structure of Revenues 
From the beginning of 1994 local governments have received the main part of their 
revenues from taxes. Th ere are state taxes (personal income tax and land tax) and local 
taxes.
3.1.1   State Taxes
Personal income tax forms the largest proportion of LG revenues. According to the 
Income Tax Law, 44% of personal income tax goes to the state budget and 56% to the 
budget of the LG where the person is registered. Personal income tax is levied on all 
permanent residents of the LG. Th e Tax Board holds the only authentic information 
about the precise number of taxpayers. 
Land tax is the second most important tax in LGs’ revenue structure. Along with 
the local taxes, the land tax comprises that part of LG revenues over which they have 
a considerable amount of discretion. As the LGs may set their own tax rates in the 
framework of the centrally set limits (from 0.1% to 2.5% of the assessed value of the 
land per year) and because 100% of land tax is transferred back to the LG budget, this 
tax has all the prerequisites the local tax must have. However, the absence of tax col-
lecting capacity as well as major possibilities for tax evasion may be  reasons why this 
tax still is a state tax. 
3.1.2   Local Taxes
According to the Law on Local Taxes the LG may impose eight taxes on its territory: 
      •     Poll tax—paid by the citizens of the municipality aged 18—65 according to 
the rate established by the municipal council, though rarely implemented in 
spite of theoretical beneﬁ ts because it is not connected to any kind of revenue 
source;
      •     Sales tax—applied to the enterprises and to self-employed persons registered in 
the territory of the municipality, with the tax rate established by the municipal 
council, but not to exceed 1% of the sale price of the goods or services;
      •     Boat tax—applies to boats, motorboats and yachts with a length of less than 12 
meters. Th e tax rate is established by the municipal council;
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      •     Advertising tax—the most widely used local tax, applying to advertisements 
located within the LG’s territory and producing approximately 30% of local 
tax revenues or 0.3% of total local revenues;
      •     Tax on closing the streets—used only in towns, and imposed on those who require 
the closing of all or parts of public streets, parks and other public areas for repair 
works, demonstrations, processions and other events;
      •     Tax on motor vehicles—generates the main part of local tax revenues (approx. 
60%) but only 0.5% of total local government revenues;  
      •     Tax on keeping animals—implemented only in towns; 
      •     Entertainment tax—imposed on the owners of amusement businesses and or-
ganizers of amusement events, and levied on the sold tickets. It has remained 
only a declaration in the Law on Local Taxes, and has never been imposed by 
any municipality. 
 Despite the ineﬀ ectiveness of local taxes, the Ministry of Finance is insisting on 
their more intensive use. During negotiations over the support fund, as well as on 
investments from  central government, the absence of  suﬃ  cient local tax revenues is 
sometimes used as the argument for refusal. We are of the opinion that this is used, 
however, as a bureaucratic device in situations where there are no real arguments to be 
oﬀ ered. 
3.1.3   Grants
According to the State Budget Act, transfers to LG can be of two diﬀ erent kinds:
      •     Unconditional grants through the equalization fund;
      •     Single-purpose allocations (conditional grants).
Th e size and distribution of the grant fund among LGs in the draft state budget 
is determined by agreement between the authorized representatives of LG associations 
and the central government. If those parties cannot reach an agreement, the central 
government itself will decide the size of the grant fund and its distribution in the draft 
state budget. 
3.1.3.1    Unconditional Grants
Th e purpose of this grant is to supplement and equalize the revenues of LGs coming from 
diﬀ erent revenue bases. General grants are provided for regions with speciﬁ c geographic 
conditions (remote areas, islands, etc.). If LGs had total ﬁ nancial autonomy (i.e., the 
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revenues were formed only from their own incomes), they would not be able to oﬀ er all 
the public services to which citizens are entitled under the laws, even if the income tax 
were paid 100% into their own budgets. Th e distribution of the support fund is based 
on the equalization of revenues and the calculated expenditure needs. 
3.1.3.2    Conditional Transfers
Th ere are various types of conditional grants depending on the purpose for which the 
grant is targeted. Th e strategy of the government is to decrease the number of conditional 
transfers. LGs share the same viewpoint on this, as they would like to see a decrease in 
conditional and an increase in unconditional transfers. 
3.1.3.2.1  National Investment Program
In 1995 the National Investment Program (NIP) was launched. LGs were granted invest-
ment supports by central government, with resources being allocated only to investments 
that exceeded 0.1 million kroons (or EUR 6,391). LGs’ own ﬁ nancing had to be not 
less than 10%, although the latter requirement was often ignored in practice. 
Resources for LGs’ investments are allocated from the budgets of ministries, pri-
marily the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Social 
Aﬀ airs. According to the new system, the LG is required to submit its application for 
investment support to the county governor, who then creates a list of investment needs 
in order of their priorities. Th e county government then submits the list of investments 
to the relevant ministry, where the inclusion of projects for the NIP is decided. A min-
istry must submit its application to the Ministry of Finance for inclusion of a project 
in the NIP. Also within this system, the members of Parliament can always include new 
investments via political lobby, thus increasing the total amount of NIP grant by adding 
extra projects. But often ministries have changed the list of priorities without approval 
or consultation with county government or LG regional unions. Th is is the negative 
side-eﬀ ect of the centralization of ﬁ nancing in the framework of NIP.
When deciding about allocations, the ﬁ rst priority is given to investments for projects 
that are already in the building process. Some LGs keep this principle in mind when 
applying to the new investment program. Th ey ask for smaller amounts of money than 
are actually needed to  ﬁ nalize the ﬁ rst investment application. After the LG receives 
the grant, they claim the following year that they need supplementary money to ﬁ nish 
the project.
For the preparation of the state budget of 2001, ministries and other institutions 
were asked to submit a four-year investment plan. Th e aim of long-term planning of 
investments and resources of the NIP was to ensure consistent ﬁ nancing of investments 
and eﬃ  cient and prudent use of resources. 
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3.1.3.3    Other Transfers
LGs also get grants from the state budget through the budgets of ministries. Th ese 
transfers partly cover the costs of LGs in implementing state functions or policies, and 
they are frequently conditional. In these cases the transfers are expressed in the budget 
of the ministry. Th e sectoral structure of these transfers is illustrated by Table 6.3.
Table 6.3
Conditional Grants by Ministry (2002)
Ministry (Function) Role of Expenditure Item in LG Budget [%]
1. Education 1.6
2. Defence 0.0
3. Environment 0.3
4. Culture 1.1
5. Economy 0.1
6. Agriculture 0.1
7. Finance 0.1
8. Internal Affairs 0.7
9. Social 0.7
10. Transportation & Communication 0.1
Total 4.8
3.1.3.4    Allocations from Foreign Aid Programs
All LGs can apply directly for aid from the various local and foreign funds and programs. 
Of the local funds the most important are the Centre of Environmental Investments 
and the Agency of Estonian Regional Development. Th e problem with applying for 
foreign aid is the diﬃ  culty of the process for LGs. All foreign aid programs have very 
strict requirements and LGs do not have the knowledge or experience to fulﬁ ll them. 
Th ey are not familiar with how to prepare the project documentation, and are unable to 
carry out the necessary analysis or to obtain co-ﬁ nancing, which is quite often required. 
Th e diﬀ erent LG associations could help with this, but so far their activity has been 
quite low. Th e Cooperation Assembly of Local Governments Associations and the As-
sociation of Local Governments have not applied for aid at all; some bigger towns and 
municipalities have applied directly. Th ere has been some cooperation with the Danish, 
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Finnish, Swedish and Dutch Association of Local Governments, but in these cases the 
foreign partners have been the applicants.
Th ere are also some programs that require that applications be made through the 
ministries. Th is presents possibilities for local governments because the ministries will 
help to prepare the documentation and also help with co-ﬁ nancing through local aid 
programs.
3.1.4   User Charges 
Th ere are almost no services provided directly by LGs as authorities. Exceptions are 
certain legal services oﬀ ered by the town secretary (e.g., business licenses, veriﬁ cation 
of documents and issue of sales, and hunting and ﬁ shing licenses (permissions)). Most 
services are provided by organizations subordinate to the local authorities. Th ese include 
childcare and education, health and social care, maintenance of public parks and support 
of sports and cultural institutions (sports schools, theatres, culture houses, etc.). LGs are 
quite autonomous in establishing user charges for services. Usually services with charges 
are not provided by public organizations. Exceptions are payment for food at schools 
and kindergartens and  penalties in libraries. Th e oﬃ  cial strategy is to prevent public 
organizations having their own revenues which could cause fraud and other complica-
tions. Presumably that is the reason LGs are not subject to VAT.
Table 6.4
Th e Structure of LG Revenues (2002)
Role of Exp. Item in LG Budget [%]
1. Personal income tax 34
2. Landtax 3
3. Revenues from economic activities and property 0.6
4. Transfers from other LGs 17
5. Equalization fund 1.5
6. General block-grant 12
7. Earmarked grants from ministries 15
8. State budget investment grant 1.5
9. Funds and agencies 2
10. Surplus 1
11. Taken loans 4
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Many of the other services at the local level, particularly infrastructure and public 
utility services, are provided by the private sector: either by companies with LG shares, 
foundations, NGOs or private companies. Inhabitants of an LG unit should pay the 
full price for these services, although payments for communal services would be partly 
subsidized for low-income persons. Besides, almost all social services that are provided 
by public organizations on a general basis are paralleled by non-public organizations 
(schools, special education for children, sport, health, social care, etc.). 
Th e overall structure of LG revenues is presented in Table 6.4.
3.2 The Role of Local Revenue in Capital Investments
LGs should have a substantial revenue basis for large investments on its territory. Dif-
ferences in the revenue basis of communities can be overcome by other sources of 
investment funds. Ministerial investments are obviously targeted to the equalization of 
the revenue basis of the smallest local communities (more than half of the population 
lives in communities with fewer than 2000 inhabitants). At the same time larger com-
munities rely on loans and foundations for funding.
Th e share of self-ﬁ nancing is the ﬁ rst indicator that credit institutions consider in 
assessing loan applications. Th e income base also determines the possible loan burden 
that a local government is allowed to carry pursuant to law. Further, the income base 
determines the extent of ﬁ nancial obligations that a municipality is capable of assuming 
without issuing its obligations.
4.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING
4.1 Limitations to Municipal Capital Spending and Borrowing
4.1.1   Borrowing Practices from 1991 to 1993
Th e borrowing policy of Estonian LGs dates back to the year 1992. With the restoration 
of LGs starting at the beginning of 1990, the monetary functions were also changed. 
In 1991 the budgets of LGs were separated from the budgets of county councils. As a 
result the budgets of LGs became independent and had to be balanced.
Th e LGs did not have systematic loan practices because of the following:
      •     Legal acts were missing which would have provided the regulations;
      •     Th e half-prepared investments that were transferred with the functions and 
responsibilities were covered from the state budget;
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Table 6.5
Sources of Investments in Local Communities of Diﬀ erent Sizes (2002) 
Local Government Group 
as per Number of Inhabitants
Own Income Loans Government 
of the 
Republic 
Reserve
Transfers 
1999
Investments 
via 
Ministries
Funds, 
Foundations 
etc.
Other Total
Rural municipalities < 1,500 27.4 9.9 0.5 0.4 49.4 11.6 0.6 100
Rural municipalities 1,500–3,000 50.9 7.4 0.5 0.0 30.7 9.9 0.6 100
Rural municipalities > 3,000 56.7 6.1 0.0 3.9 30.4 2.8 0.1 100
Towns < 10,000 26.8 15.0 0.5 0.5 36.7 20.4 0.0 100
Towns > 10,000 52.9 6.6 0.1 1.3 24.7 3.9 10.4 100
Tallinn 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 100
242 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
      •     Th e monetary policy was incomplete—the banking sector was in the process 
of development;
      •     Th e rapidly growing inﬂ ation also produced uncertainty in the ﬁ nancial actions 
of LG;
      •     Lack of foreign experience.
As the Republic of Estonia developed, it also established its own ﬁ nancial goals. 
Th e priority was to establish a new monetary system with its own currency and on June 
20, 1992, Estonia’s own currency, the kroon, was introduced. Until that day Estonia 
was dependent on the Russian ﬁ nance system, which in those days was characterized 
by rapidly growing inﬂ ation.
Th e borrowing of LGs has been regulated since the beginning of 1993 when the 
Local Government Organization Act and Th e Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act 
were accepted by Parliament. Until 1993 the budget law in force was the one adopted 
during the ﬁ nal years of Soviet rule. Th e law provided that loans were LG revenues and 
other loans could be taken to cover the necessary costs. 
During this period LGs were not active on the capital market and the loan portfolios 
consisted mainly of loans from the state. Th ere were no limits set for the loans, and the 
size of LG budgets and their ability to administer the loans were not considered. Th e 
Local Government Organization Act (LGOA) provides general rules for the operation 
of LG, that have remained essentially unchanged until now. Development plans as basic 
documents for planning the activities of LG serve as the legal basis for taking loans to 
LG. Th e conclusion of the borrowing contract requires both that it be based on the 
development plan, and that it has received a decision from the city council.
According to the Local Government Organization Act the LG development plan 
(DP) is “the document that contains the analysis of economic and social processes and 
the situation in the environment. [Th e document contains] the long term plan of actions 
and priorities for future development.” Th e plan must cover a period of at least three 
years, and if the LG unit has ﬁ nancial or other obligations for a longer period, then the 
DP must cover the whole of this period.
According to the law the DP must be the basis for the composition of the LG 
budget, for applications for investments, including investments funded from external 
sources, and for taking loans and issuing obligations. In practice the role of the DP as 
a management tool is far from being eﬀ ective.
Th e LGOA also set the principle that LGs are prohibited from giving or guaran-
teeing loans, but in the budget law of Soviet Estonia the guaranteeing of loans was 
permitted. Th e reason for prohibiting the giving of loans is to avoid situations in which 
LGs as organizations established for public services start taking risks in investing or in 
gaining additional resources that in unfavourable circumstances might lead LGs into 
ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties. On the other hand LGs may oﬀ er study loans to their employees 
from their budgets.
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4.1.2   Developments in Borrowing between 1994 and 1997
Th e State Budget Act came into force in 1994, giving LG the opportunity to apply for 
short-term loans from the state budget in case of insuﬃ  cient revenues. Th e loans had 
to be repaid by the end of the budgetary year. Th e applications for the short-term loans 
were examined in the Ministry of Finance and the law provided for granting the loan 
from the state budget according to the resolution of the minister.
In the Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act, which was passed at the beginning 
of 1994, the ﬁ rst steps were taken to deﬁ ne the budgetary limits for borrowing. Th e law 
stipulated that rural areas and towns could take loans on condition that the amount 
taken and interests paid would not exceed 20% of the accepted budget revenues from 
which the amounts borrowed in any budgetary year were to be deducted. When the 
guarantor was the state, then that amount could be exceeded. Th e act permitted LGs 
to take short-term loans for covering their current expenditures, but long-term loans 
could be taken only for investments or for re-ﬁ nancing existing loans. However, no legal 
deﬁ nitions of short-term or long-loan were provided. Th e act also stated that loans of 
LG could not be guaranteed by LG real estate. Th e above restriction comes from the 
property law which provides that LGs are not allowed to mortgage real estate. On the 
other hand, using movable property as a guarantee was allowed until 1998. Budgetary 
incomes of LG most often served as assurance of loans. 
It should be stressed that during this period the approval of the Ministry of Fi-
nance for borrowing was not obligatory, nor was it necessary to present a duplicate of 
the loan contract to the supervisory authority (i.e., the Ministry of Finance or county 
government). In addition, there were no speciﬁ c sanction mechanisms for resolving 
the cases of exceeded limits of borrowing. Administrative supervision over LG borrow-
ing was exercised by county councils, which had the right to challenge actions of LG 
(including the decision to borrow) and require harmonization with the legal acts and 
regulations. Unfortunately, this mechanism has not been very eﬀ ective in controlling 
LG borrowing.
In 1994, Estonia ratiﬁ ed the European Charter of Local Governments. Point 8 of 
Article 9 provides that LG shall have access to national capital markets under deﬁ ned 
circumstances for taking loans for capital investments. Accordingly, Estonian LGs have 
the right to borrow from domestic and international capital markets and in addition 
are allowed to use any ﬁ nancial instrument with loan characteristics.
In 1995 the Law on Taking Foreign Loans for the Republic of Estonia and Ensuring 
State Guarantee of Foreign Contracts came into force. Th e law deﬁ ned the norms for 
second-hand loans, i.e., for giving loans to the ﬁ nal user. Until then the use of foreign 
loans and the terms of usage of such loans were examined case by case. Th e procedure 
for usage was ﬁ xed by the contracts signed by the state and the user of the loan.
In 1996 the earmarked Reserve Fund for Property Reform was established, based 
on resources coming from privatization. LGs could apply for the loan with low interest 
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rates or support, to solve problems which had arisen from property reform (e.g., for 
renovating heating systems).
In the mid-1990s many programs and foundations were set up in the public inter-
est. In addition to transfers they could give loans to the LGs based on the warranties 
deﬁ ned in the statutes.
4.1.3   New Controls on Borrowing: 1998 to 2002
To manage the general debt of the public sector (state organizations, LGs and other 
public organizations) and to ensure the solvency of LGs, new restrictions were worked 
out for the arrangement of LG borrowing. Th e limits were based on the allowed amount 
of deﬁ cit in the GNP. With amendments to the Rural Municipality and City Budgets 
Act, limits were established for the annual servicing of the debt, in addition to the 
total amount of the borrowed sum. Th e deﬁ nition for the annual servicing of the debt 
remained generally unchanged, but a 20% limit was established, replacing the income 
of the previous budgetary year by the income of the budgetary year when the loan was 
taken.
In borrowing or issuing bonds the following scheme was applied: the total of all 
unpaid loans, bond issues and other liabilities proceeding from them, together with 
loans to be taken and bonds to be issued, must not exceed 75% of the planned budget-
ary revenues (net or own revenues) in the current year. Conditional grants from central 
government are excluded from the total. “Other liabilities coming from the loans and 
obligations” refers to loan interests on the entire sum until the end of the borrowing 
period. Th is amendment introduced the principle that the county government must be 
informed of decisions about taking loans and concluding loan contracts. In addition, the 
loan contract had to be presented to the Ministry of Finance. Th ere are still problems 
with the application of this principle.
In the period 1997 to 1999, a regulation of the Bank of Estonia was in force which 
obligated  credit institutions to apply for written approval from the Ministry of Finance 
before concluding loan contracts with LGs. Th e written approval had to indicate that 
the Ministry had no objections to the borrowing of the speciﬁ c LG.  After a conﬂ ict 
between the capital city, Tallinn, and the Ministry of Finance over permission to take 
a loan, the city appealed the case to the Chancellor of  Justice whose decision was that 
the obligation to seek government approval is contrary to Estonian law.
Until the Law on Taking Foreign Loans for the Republic of Estonia and Ensuring 
State Guarantee of Foreign Contracts was implemented, every case of borrowing from 
foreign countries was examined separately. Under the provisions of this law, application 
can be made for a state guarantee for enterprises owned by the state or municipalities, in 
cases where the guarantee is creditworthy enough to obtain a loan from a foreign creditor, 
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but the creditors are not willing to give loans without the guarantee of the Republic of 
Estonia. In practice this article has not been in the case of municipal foreign loans.
Th e possibility of getting short-term loans from the state budget was ruled out with 
the amendment of the State Budget Law in 1999, and then reinstated again in 2002 
in a new, more extensive form, i.e., the municipalities can now obtain loans from the 
state budget to fulﬁ ll public functions. 
At the end of the 1990s the Ministry of Finance faced diﬃ  culties in getting back the 
second-hand loans. As a solution, a principle was included in the State Budget Law that 
if a local government was indebted to the state, the state could withhold grants given to 
the municipality and erase the debt with that. So far that principle has not been used.
4.1.4   Regulations in Force until 2003 
Th e borrowing of Estonian LGs is today regulated by the European Charter of Local 
Governments, Th e Local Government Organization Act, Th e Rural Municipality and 
City Budgets Act, the Law on the State Budget and the Law on Taking Foreign Loans 
for the Republic of Estonia and Ensuring State Guarantee to Foreign Contracts.
Municipalities can take loans or issue bonds under following conditions:
      •     Th e total repayment cost of  loans, interest and obligations may not exceed 20% 
of planned budget revenues during any budget year;
      •     Th e total of all unpaid loans, bond issues and other liabilities arising from them 
together with loans to be taken and bonds to be issued may not exceed 75% 
of the planned budgetary revenues in the current year (excluding conditional 
grants from the central government);
      •     Th ese restrictions do not apply to short-term loans taken by municipalities 
to cover current costs (e.g., for holiday pay in May or June, when all budget 
revenues have not yet been received). Such loans must be returned by the end 
of the budget year;
      •     Th e restrictions also do not apply to loans having state guarantees that are given 
to foreign loans when creditors demand them, or if the state guarantee derives 
from the law. Th e state may give a guarantee up to 15% of the budgetary income 
of the current year;
      •     Loans will be taken or bonds issued for investments outlined in the development 
plan of municipalities;
      •     Borrowing and assuming other ﬁ nancial obligations is the exceptional right of 
the municipal council;
      •     Th e municipality or town government must present a copy of the loan contract 
or bond issue to the Ministry of Finance within 30 days after concluding the 
contract, to ensure that it is within the range of the legally deﬁ ned loan limit.
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4.1.5   New Principles Applied since 2003
Beginning in 2003 new principles for managing LG borrowing were established. Th e 
limits that are currently applied to LG borrowing and the issuing of bonds (in practice 
also for leases and capital rent) were set in the Local Government Organization Act. 
With the amendments in the law, limits were established on all kinds of short-term and 
long-term loans. Th e purpose was to obtain stricter control over the ﬁ nancial activities 
of LGs because diﬀ erent ﬁ nancial instruments (like rotating bonds, factoring, etc.) have 
been used by LGs to get around the established limits.
Likewise, the book value of interest on the gross loan commitment will no longer 
be considered, and only interest payable during the upcoming period will count. Th ese 
amendments were necessary because the previous method of accounting clogged the 
long-term borrowing, where the amount of interest may have been equal to the amount 
lent. 
Th e third essential amendment will lower the limit of the gross borrowed sum from 
75% to 60% of total funds required. Lowering of the limit arises from rearrangements 
in the structure of the LG support fund from which single-purpose grants for things like 
teachers’ salaries were covered. With an increase in their own revenues, municipalities 
can borrow more even when the limit remains the same.
Since there were no sanctions for punishing LGs that surpassed the set limits, the 
amendment will make it possible to deduct the amount owed from the support funds 
destined for the speciﬁ c local government. Th e central government also has the right 
to stop the transfer of the equalization fund if the LG fails to submit a copy of the loan 
contracted. 
4.2 Sources of Borrowing
4.2.1   Borrowing from Local Financial Institutions 
LGs can use the following as debt instruments:
      •     Ordinary loans pegged to EEK or to a foreign currency, mostly EURO;
      •     Bonds issued and bought by both local banks and insurance companies and 
international ﬁ nancial institutions;
      •     Lease or capital lease, mostly from local companies specializing in leasing and 
being subsidiaries of local banks.
In reality, LGs are not concerned about whether to borrow through loans or  bond 
issues. Practice shows that they take loans from the institutions oﬀ ering more favorable 
(cheaper) conditions. 
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4.2.2      Loans Based on Sources from the State Budget
4.2.2.1   Loans Allocated from the State Budget
Th e State Budget Law of 1994 permitted short-term loans to LGs in case of temporary 
shortages of revenues. Th is was used mostly from 1994 to 1996, but the practice diﬀ ered 
somewhat from the provisions in the law, and included such arrangements as:
      •     Short-term loans from special sources in the state budget or in the state govern-
ment reserve fund for ﬁ nancing reconstruction work and for covering the debts 
in the same ﬁ eld. Th e loan had to be paid oﬀ  by the end of the same budgetary 
year;
      •     Long-term loans from the state government reserve fund to resolve problems 
that occurred because of the property reform (e.g., for moving out of a build-
ing that had been given back to the pre-soviet owner and for purchasing new 
housing). Th e term of the loans was mostly two to four years;
      •     Short-term loans that were not paid oﬀ  on time and were redrafted as long-
term loans (for example, repayment time for some loans allocated in 1998 was 
extended until 2005) or were turned into non-returnable aid.
 Loans were mostly given in response to applications ﬁ led by the speciﬁ c LG, con-
solidated applications made by associations of LGs, or by virtue of so-called political will. 
Th e law states that: “Th e Ministry of Finance examines the loan applications together 
with the representatives of the municipality(ies), agreeing on the amount of the loan, 
loan guarantees, interest rate and the term. Short-term loans are given by decision of 
the Minister of Finance who is in charge of the cash reserve.” In most cases the state 
government decided upon the loans, authorizing the Minister of Finance to conclude 
the loan contract as in the regulation. Th e extension of the loan period was generally 
based on the application of the LG or the ministers who found that due to a complicated 
economic situation it was appropriate to extend the borrowing contracts.
In general the interest rates of state budget loans were several percent lower than 
for loans from commercial banks. As the state government had absolute freedom to 
make decisions, the rate depended on political will and in some cases could be as low 
as 0%.
4.2.2.1.1  Loans from the Earmarked Property Reform Reserve Fund 
Th e general aim of the Property Reform Reserve Fund was to allocate resources for the 
costs related to moving out of the buildings which had illegally been taken away from 
people during the Soviet era, costs related to the taking over of state assets by munici-
palities, etc. Th e activities of the Fund are now complete.
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Applications ﬁ rst had to be ﬁ led at the county government, which forwarded it 
with its opinion to the Ministry of Finance. If a local government was applying for 
the loan, the municipal council’s decision and also data about existing loans had to be 
presented.
Fund regulations stated that in addition to the grant (returnable money) the resources 
could be allocated as loans, but the interest could not be lower than the bank interest 
that would be received when the funds were deposited.
4.2.2.1.2  Loans from the Energy-saving Program 
Th e state budget includes resources for ﬁ nancing a program whose intent is to create 
energy savings. Th e program is administered from within the  Ministry of Economic 
Aﬀ airs, and a special unit of the Ministry makes decisions on the ﬁ nancing of primarily 
environmental projects.Th e Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs holds a competition to choose 
the projects, or decisions are based on expert assessments. Applications for ﬁ nancing of 
the selected projects are submitted to the Ministry of Finance and the latter allocates 
the resources to the Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs. Th e Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs 
can decide whether the loan will be on favorable terms (which according to current 
regulations cannot exceed ﬁ ve years) and the loan will be executed without interest or 
with annual interest up to 5%. Th e Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs concludes the contract 
with the applicant.
4.2.2.1.3  Loans from the Security Fund of the Estonian Regional Development Agency 
In the years 1997 to 2001 a security fund for special economic situations was available 
at the Estonian Regional Development Agency. LGs could apply for resources from 
that fund in case of ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culty. LGs presented their applications to the council 
of the Agency through county governments. Th e council made their decision based 
on the seriousness of the situation and by estimating the achievable objectives through 
the implementation of the appropriate measures—grant or loan. Th e council had full 
authority in determining the interest rate and the duration of the loan contract.
4.2.2.1.4  Loans with State Guarantee
LGs or municipal enterprises can apply for state guarantees for their loans if the collateral 
is creditworthy enough to get a loan from a foreign bank, from another non-residential 
legal person or from an international organization, and when the organization refuses 
to give a loan without the guarantee of the Republic of Estonia.
To get the state guarantee for a loan, LGs or enterprises owned by LGs ﬁ le applica-
tions to the Ministry of Finance. Th e application must describe the exact purpose of the 
loan, what the material and non-material obligations are, how resources will be found 
to repay the loan and to co-ﬁ nancing it. Th e Ministry of Finance will assess the condi-
tions of the applied loan and the LG’s or enterprise’s ability to meet interest payments 
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based on the feasibility of the loan project and the ﬁ nancial status of the borrower. Th e 
Ministry of Finance also veriﬁ es that the loan conforms to the legally set limits.
Th e Ministry of Finance may reject the application if it deems the project to be not 
worthwhile or to have adverse results, or if the loan applicant has not enough resources 
to fulﬁ ll the obligations arising from the loan. In that case the loan applicant has the right 
to resubmit the application. If the Ministry of Finance agrees to give the state guarantee, 
it presents the corresponding documents to the state government for authorization to 
conclude the guarantee contract and issue the guarantee letter. A fee is established for 
covering the guarantee risk and administrative costs.
Th e procedure described above remains a theoretical possibility, since the state 
government has not ever given a guarantee to the loans of LGs even though they have 
applied for it many times, but one was given to the LG-owned enterprise, Tallinna Vesi 
(Tallinn Water) in 1996. 
4.2.2.2    Second-hand Loans by the State 
Between1992 and 1994, the Ministry of Finance lent money received from interna-
tional organizations to LGs using contracts for second-hand loans. In 1992, when 
the Republic of Estonia was preparing to take the ﬁ rst foreign loans (from the World 
Bank and the EBRD), the banks recommended using second-hand loan schemes for 
directing the money to the required economic sector. Th e second-hand loan schemes 
required repayment of the loans to the state by the lenders after the projects ﬁ nanced 
by the loan were completed. Likewise, the banks recommended adding a margin to the 
interest when the state used second-hand loans. Th e margin was to cover the costs of 
bank transfers and loan administration.
During the years 1992–1999, the Ministry of Finance had second-hand loan re-
sources from 12 foreign loans,  totalling 2.7 billion kroons covered by 381 contracts. Th e 
LGs were involved mainly with the four biggest foreign loans: the black oil loan from the 
World Bank (a part of the rehabilitation loan), the energy loan from the World Bank, 
the energy loan from the EBRD and the heating loan from the European Union.
Th e second-hand energy loans and black oil loans have involved several diﬀ erent 
processes:
      •     Th e Ministry of Finance concluded the contract with LGs and gave the loan;
      •     Th e LGs gave the second-hand loan directly to an enterprise (e.g., a municipal 
heating enterprise);
      •     Th e Ministry of Finance concluded the contract directly with a heating enterprise 
(with LG as an intermediary). Th e responsibility for paying back the loan lies 
with the LG or with the enterprise, depending on details of the contract;
      •       Th e Ministry of Finance concluded the contract directly with the heating 
enterprise and gave the loan money to them;
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      •     Th ere are also situations when LGs concluded the contracts but did not get the 
loan.
Table 6.6
Second-hand Loans from the State (2002)
Loan Borrowed 
Amount 
[EEK]
Receivers Debtors Total 
Amount of 
Debt [EEK] 
(Without 
Interest)
Including 
Sums Unlikely 
to be Repaid 
(Without 
Interest)
Black oil loan from 
the World Bank
92,374,240 County 
Governments
15 29 43,680,478 36,816,000 
LGs 60
Heating 
companies        
121
Energy loan from 
World Bank
487,891,462 LGs 39 17 475,000,000 7,663,940
Energy loan from 
EBRD
355,676,110 LGs 56 10 222,000,000 22,940,896
Loan for small 
boiler-houses from 
the EU
72,779,615 LGs 57 17 29,203,508
Municipal 
enterprises       
47
In Table 6.6, LGs who have refused for diﬀ erent reasons to pay oﬀ  a loan are repre-
sented in the columns “debtor” and “unlikely repaid sums.” Th e interests and ﬁ nes for 
delay are not shown here because the amounts are disputable according to each contract. 
Residual loans are not  presented in this table either.
4.2.2.2.1  Black Oil Loan from the World Bank
Th e purpose of taking the black oil loan from the World Bank was to disconnect the 
Estonian heating business from the Russian energy system. With this loan, black oil 
was bought and immediately distributed between counties. Th e amounts and the re-
cipients were announced later. Th e state did not conclude the contract directly with 
LGs or heating enterprises, but through county governments (at this time counties were 
the upper-tier of LG). Th e Ministry of Finance as the representative of the state was in 
contractual relations with the county governments. Th e latter should have concluded 
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contracts with the municipalities and heating institutions located in their territory, but 
in most cases this did not happen. 
Many problems have occurred with black oil loans:
      •     Some county governors took the resources as non-repayable aid and refused to 
sign the contracts;
      •     In some cases written contracts were not concluded and people are denying 
their debt or, even if they admit it, are refusing to repay;
      •     Contracts were concluded with LGs that have not received money or black oil 
themselves;
      •     Th e delivery of black oil was not possible to prove afterwards, because the docu-
ments were not available;
      •     Th ere was no correct calculation on contract provisions until the end of the 
1990s (a thorough record of the amount and to whom it was given is missing, 
as well as a complete account of repaid sums);
      •     Many heating companies which had received black oil have been liquidated or 
have gone bankrupt;
      •     Th e contracts were not concluded in a consistent way and may be interpreted 
diﬀ erently;
      •     After the reforms of 1994, the counties were transformed into state agencies 
and according to the law one state agency (ministry) cannot reclaim a loan from 
another.
 Forty-four recipients of black oil loans have completed their repayments. Th ere 
are still 28 debtors with contracts who are refusing to pay and 17 without contracts. 
New contracts have been concluded with 13 LGs.
4.2.2.2.2  Energy Loans from the EBRD and the European Union
Th e purpose of the loans from the EBRD and the EU was to allocate resources for 
reconstructing small boiler houses operating on local fuel. Th is was based on the no-
tion that as heating consumption was increasing and black oil diﬃ  cult to obtain, it was 
necessary to ﬁ nd alternative energy sources. 
Th e Energy Oﬃ  ce arranged a competition for projects to rebuild the boiler houses 
to start operating on wood pulp and turf. Th e Minister of Finance concluded the con-
tracts mainly with LGs, but in some rare cases contracts were concluded with a heating 
enterprise (if the latter was a business association). LGs gave second-hand loans to these 
municipal or private sector heating enterprises.
A number of problems occurred with repayment of these loans:
      •     Switching the boiler houses to burn local fuel was a failure because:
            –    Th is form of heating was ultimately more expensive and the local citizens 
were not able to pay for it (they preferred heating with electricity);
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            –    Th e economic forecasts proved to be false, as the consumption of heat 
decreased;
            –    Th e boiler houses were uneconomical and their administration too expensive 
for LGs, so they are now not operating.
      •     Some LGs are refusing to pay oﬀ  loans for failed investments, since central 
government planned the whole initiative and caused the failure;
      •     Some of the heating enterprises have gone bankrupt;
      •     Many of the heating enterprises have become privatized and cannot pay oﬀ  the 
loan because of their diﬃ  cult economic situation;
      •     Some LGs have transferred the loan to the heating enterprises and are saying 
that it is not their business any more to repay it, claiming the responsibility rests 
with the Ministry of Finance to retrieve the money from the user of the loan.
4.2.2.2.3  Administration of Second-hand Foreign Loans
Repayment of the second-hand energy loans has been fraught with problems, as described 
above, and this situation is typical of the problems in administering second-hand foreign 
loans in general. Some LGs refuse to pay, others are late or irregular with their payments, 
and some simply ﬁ le application with the Ministry of Finance to cancel the foreign bor-
rowed loans, to exempt interest payments or to extend the repayment schedule. 
For many LGs the funds from the second-hand loans have exceeded the loan limit 
set by law. In the early 1990s, although there were no loan limits, some LGs obtained 
loans that exceeded their budgets many times. It is surprising that this occurred, as the 
ability of LGs to administer the loan must have been considered. Th e guilty parties 
in this are both the LGs (for assuming  the state would cancel the loans) and also the 
representatives of the state who were not particularly interested in the ability of LGs to 
administer the loan in the future. Th e Ministry of Finance is in a diﬃ  cult situation now 
because in concluding new loan contracts with LGs, laws can be violated. 
Th e Ministry of Finance has not gone to court on this issue because there is a very 
weak legal basis for doing so. First of all there is no legal deﬁ nition of second-hand loans 
in Estonian acts. Th ey are mentioned only in the Law on Taking Foreign Loans for the 
Republic of Estonia and Ensuring State Guarantee to Foreign Contracts, but a deﬁ nition 
is not found there either. Th us, there was no legal basis for concluding second-hand 
loan contracts between the Republic of Estonia (represented by the Minister of Finance) 
and county governors or enterprises. Instead, the contracts were made under civil law 
between two persons. Th e problem is that the Minister of Finance is not an independent 
person under the law, but has legal capacity based on orders of the Ministry. As a result, 
the Minister of Finance did not actually have the authority to conclude loan contracts 
or to give loans. Moreover, the state government has not authorized the Minister of 
Finance to conclude second-hand loan contracts by decree.
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If the contracts for second-hand loans were declared illegal in court, LGs who are 
currently   administering their loans properly might discontinue paying. In the worst-case 
scenario they might even demand compensation for loss from the state. Th is explains 
why to date there has been no legal action regarding the LGs that have failed to repay 
their loans. Despite these problems,  the Republic of Estonia has been repaying foreign 
loans on time and in the amounts demanded. Th e EU loan for small boiler houses has 
been ﬁ nally paid oﬀ  and the last payment of the EBRD energy loan will be made in 
the year 2003.
4.2.2.3    Long-term Bank Loans 
In Estonia LGs started to procure loans independently from the capital market in 1993-
1994. Usually the loans are long-term investment loans for infrastructure projects. As 
co-ﬁ nancing is required by the National Investment Program, PHARE and by foreign 
creditors, LGs usually receive co-ﬁ nancing through loans because of the lack of resources. 
Th e foreign institutions most active in giving loans to LGs have been the Nordic Envi-
ronmental Investment Fund (NEFCO) and the Swedish National Development Bank 
of Industry and Technology (NUTEC). Th e European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have given less to 
Estonian LGs, because for them the loan-taking ability of Estonian LGs is too small. 
4.2.2.4    Lump-sum Long-term Loans for Investments 
               or Reﬁ nancing of Existing Loans
LGs in Estonia take loans for investments foreseen in the development plan and for 
re-ﬁ nancing of an existing loan. Th e banks use the following criteria to assess whether 
to give loans to LGs:
      •     Th e application must be based on the development plan and the investments 
to be ﬁ nanced must be in accordance with the plan;
      •     Existing loans and other liabilities must also be within the legal limits (in 
many cases the banks ﬁ nd the LGs creditworthy even though the limits are 
exceeded);
      •     Size of the budget (the percentage of own revenues in the budget), fulﬁ lment of 
the budget (forecast compared to actual income from taxes) and the possibility 
of additional budget revenues;
      •     Forecasts concerning employers situated in the LGs’ territory (existence of only 
one big employer in the LGs);
      •     Structure of the population (percentage of unemployed and population not 
studying).
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Th e banks consider LGs to be low-risk clients, and therefore they do not thoroughly 
investigate the feasibility or costs of the project. As one of their conditions banks may 
ask LGs to keep their assets only in their bank.
Contracts are concluded as follows:
      •     Th e contract is usually for up to 5-6 years (the national credit institutions are 
not willing as a rule to give loans for a longer period);
      •     Th e interest on the loan is based on the EURIBOR with added margin (in 2000 
it was 6%, in 2002 it decreased to 3%);
      •     In taking loans LGs will be given one year of payment relief in paying back the 
principal of the loan, but the interest must be paid right away;
      •     Th e contract identiﬁ es a period when LGs can receive the loan (usually one 
month).
      •     Th e penalty for delayed payments is usually 0.1% per day;
      •     In situations where the LGs cannot fulﬁ ll the obligations, the bank may freeze 
the LG’s account in that bank and ﬁ rstly fulﬁ ll its own demands;
      •     LGs may be obligated to harmonize loans taken from third parties with the 
bank if they exceed, for example, some speciﬁ c percentage of the residual of 
obligations;
      •     LGs have to inform the bank if enforcement procedures have been initiated 
with regard to the requirement which exceeds a speciﬁ c sum;
      •     LGs must present the approved budget, amendments to the budget and addi-
tional budgets. If the bank requires it, the budget report has to be presented.
4.2.2.5    Bullet Loans
During the last few years a new product, called the bullet loan, has come to the market 
and it has been used mostly by bigger cities. Th e purpose of the bullet loan is to increase 
the ﬂ exibility and decrease the bureaucracy involved in taking loans, and also to increase 
the speed since loans are essential ﬁ nancial instruments required at any moment in time. 
In administering the loans, repayment relief can be obtained for some years.
Th e general principles of the bullet loan are:
      •     Th e contract will normally be concluded for three years and the maximum 
amount of the loan will be ﬁ xed in the contract;
      •     When the size of the budget increases the loan limit also increases;
      •     LGs may take loans any time within the range of set loan limits without another 
contract being necessary;
      •     Th e principal of the loan will be paid oﬀ  after the loan period set in the contract 
is over;
      •     Interest paid is based on the borrowed amount.
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But there are drawbacks to bullet loans, especially at the LG level. If the loan is 
concluded for three years, i.e., for the election period, the party in power can fulﬁ ll all 
the promises made in the election period by postponing the payments for their promises, 
leaving the ﬁ nancial burden to be dealt with by the parties to be elected. Moreover, 
linking the loan limit to the increase in the budget that may occur in the so-called good 
times can leave the LGs in serious diﬃ  culty when they must deal with an increased loan 
burden during an economic downturn. In addition, the municipal council may lose 
control over the LGs in that kind of borrowing scheme.
4.2.2.6    Overdrafts
Overdrafts may be considered short-term loans, i.e., loans that do not extend beyond the 
current year, and they can be used in the event of a shortage in revenues for ﬁ nancing 
current costs. Th ere is no single approach to short-term loans in the legal acts: according 
to accounting practices, the short-term loan is an obligation that does not exceed one 
year, but for budget purposes it is a loan that will be paid oﬀ  by the end of the budget 
year, otherwise it automatically becomes a long-term loan. Th us the diﬀ erent acts treat 
short-term loans diﬀ erently. 
Th e principles for concluding overdraft contracts are:
      •     Th e contract will be concluded for one year and the LG will be given a ﬁ xed 
sum;
      •     LGs may take credit at any time;
      •     Interest is usually higher than in the case of long-term loans;
      •     Interest is calculated from the credit taken on that day and the bank takes the 
payable interest from the LGs account on the last day of the month.
4.2.2.7    Bond Issues
In the mid-1990s many LGs, especially in towns, started to issue bonds. Th e ﬁ rst LG 
to go to the international capital market with its bonds was the capital city, Tallinn, in 
1996. On the one hand this shows trust in the Estonian LGs, but in reality Tallinn has 
remained the only LG to do this. Th e loans of other Estonian LGs would be too small 
to attract serious ﬁ nancial investors. Similarly, local banks are not interested in issues 
under ten million kroons.
Bigger LGs prefer issues with a shorter time period. Th is may be because of the need 
for  ﬂ exibility and maneuvering. If the issue is for a half-year or less, the LG may use 
re-ﬁ nancing, i.e., a new  bond issue to repay the old one. Th e precondition is that new 
interest rates may be negotiated with the new issue. In addition, the amount of loan 
can be increased or decreased without delay. General bonds with ﬁ xed interest rates and 
low liquidity are mainly issued.
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Th ere are many circumstances that explain the low liquidity of bonds:
      •     Low quantity of single issues;
      •     Lack of information at the start of issuing bonds and lack of information after-
wards that could trigger bargaining with those bonds;
      •     Short validation of bonds, though the investors are willing to keep the bonds 
themselves until the deadline;
      •     Th e condition of local banks that if they take responsibility for organizing the 
issuing of bonds, the LGs must keep their resources in that bank.
4.2.2.8    Capital Leases
Th e second half of the 1990s saw a quick development of the capital lease market within 
Estonian ﬁ nancial markets. Several banks established special subsidiaries specializing in 
rendering capital lease services. One reason for incorporation of independent companies 
is the possibilities arising from the value-added tax. While in the beginning the focus 
was just on the lease of movable properties, now real estate is also being leased. Th e 
capital lease is essentially just a form of lending. Th e peculiarity of this kind of lending 
is that the loan security is not represented by the budget of LGs, but by property which 
is delivered to LGs only after repayment of the loan. Th us, this kind of lending enables 
the avoidance of restrictions on borrowing established by law, at least in the case of 
movable property and newly constructed real estate. Moreover, capital lease payments 
are not reﬂ ected in the budget reports submitted to the Ministry of Finance. An operat-
ing lease oﬀ ers even better possibilities in this context, as the LG does not have to buy 
out the thing. Instead, the thing is used as long as is necessary and thereafter the lease 
contract is terminated either according to its term or ahead of time. Estonian LGs use 
both capital and operating leases in the case of movable property, particularly vehicles. 
Real estate leases are less frequent.   
4.2.3   Borrowing from Foreign Credit Organizations
According to Estonian laws LGs have the right and freedom to take loans from the 
domestic and international credit markets by taking on the currency risks themselves:
      •     Unlike domestic banks, foreign ﬁ nancial institutions normally want to see 
proﬁ tability studies and expert assessments of reconstruction work;
      •     As a rule the approval of the Ministry of Finance is required and if the Ministry 
is against taking the loan it may not be given;
      •     The loan period may exceed ten years and the interest is equal to the 
EURIBOR;
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      •      Th e loan amounts will be transferred in several phases according to the duration 
and extent of the project;
      •     Th e loan schedule may be drawn up very ﬂ exibly and it is possible to get relief 
on the interest payment for several years;
      •     Th e loan is strictly a single-purpose loan and the usage of the loan resources 
will be monitored.
4.3 Loan-taking by Local Governments—Practical Aspects
Estonian LGs took their ﬁ rst loan in 1992, and year after year loan-taking has increased. 
In 1993, borrowing by LGs increased rapidly for many reasons:
      •     LGs realized that it is diﬃ  cult to make investments without borrowing;
      •     Foreign loans became more frequent;
      •     Local banks became active and were interested in lending to LGs whom they 
regarded as secure partners;
      •     Diﬀ erent funds emerged as loan resources;
      •     Th e economy was improving.
Th ough good prospects for lending to LGs emerged, credit organizations proved 
to be the most active lenders at ﬁ rst. Most of the loans were targeted at infrastructure, 
energy, water and sewage pipes, recycling, etc. Th ese cases also included foreign loans 
that were more proﬁ table than loans oﬀ ered in the domestic market (e.g., the loans 
given to the energy sector  to purchase heating equipment, reconstruct local heating 
systems, draft development plans concerning the economy of heating, etc.). Th e loans 
were given at very low or no interest rate. Th ey were strictly single-purpose and could 
not be used for LGs’ operating costs.
Th e loans by the state were oﬀ ered on favorable conditions, where the repayment 
consisted of only the basic payment without interest (e.g., loans for environmental 
investments from the Environment Fund).
Increasingly, LGs required loans for reconstruction projects in the educational, cul-
tural or social domains, but the earmarked loans could not be used for these projects. To 
cover such expenditures, the LGs turned to the credit organizations such as commercial 
banks or funds through which loans were taken or bonds issued. Most popular was the 
issuing of bonds through the Compensation Fund.Th e LGs became more and more 
active in taking loans, and today it could be said that there is virtually no LG that has 
taken no loans. Th e sums vary, but every LG has taken a loan.
In the following section, the mechanisms for borrowing by LGs are described.
258 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
4.3.1   Determining the Need for a Loan
A continuous need for loans exists for LGs. As a rule, those needs are targeted to the 
reconstruction of premises (to improve thermal insulation), water and sewage systems, 
electricity mains, etc. Th ese projects must be based on a development plan that is con-
nected with the loan strategy and investment plan. Th e investments set in the plans 
serve as basis for taking loans, and are prioritized in the plans.
Loans can be divided into diﬀ erent kinds. Th e most common way to cover the 
investment needs of a project is through state funding—the National Investment 
Program—and the rest is covered by LGs’ own contributions (mainly loans). Th is is a 
common scheme for investment in the education sector, because the National Invest-
ment Program has mostly supported improvement in this sector. 
Th ere is hardly an LG in Estonia, the buildings of which do not need renovation. 
But the funds given to LGs for investments are inadequate compared to their substantial 
investment needs, so borrowing becomes a necessity for LGs.
4.3.2   Negotiations with the Credit Organizations
When the decision to borrow has been taken, the LGs start to negotiate with the credit 
organizations—banks or foundations. For the negotiations, the credit organizations need 
background information, certiﬁ ed by several documents to be submitted concerning 
the LG’s economic situation:
      •     A report about fulﬁ llment of the previous year’s budget (or more than one 
year);
      •     Comments of the auditing commission about fulﬁ lling the budget;
      •     Comments of the auditor on the proposals;
      •     An accepted budget;
      •     A balance sheet;
      •     Information about previously taken loans;
      •     Application for investment, presenting reasons.
In addition, the credit organizations are able to request additional documents or 
information. Th e need for additional information depends on how well the LG’s ap-
plication conforms to the legally set loan terms.
If the LG has borrowed a lot, then a higher risk occurs when taking a new loan. 
Th e credit organization is deﬁ nitely interested that its client—LG—would not exceed 
the legally set limits. Th e negotiations concentrate mainly on the capacity of the LG to 
fulﬁ ll the ﬁ nally signed contract. 
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4.3.3   Taking of a Loan
If there is an agreement about taking the loan, then negotiations will commence about 
loan conditions with the credit organization. When the contract is signed, the credit 
organization will transfer the agreed amount of money to the LG’s account in bulk or 
in several portions according to the agreement.
4.3.4   Repayment of Loans—Fulﬁ lling the Contracts
Th ere are several LGs that have problems with loan repayments, largely stemming from 
improperly planned budgets. In the main, the error is in overestimating the budgetary 
resources in the following years. Other possible mistakes include inaccuracies in the 
estimation of:
      •     Th e proﬁ tability of the investment;
      •     Th e solvency of the consumers;
      •     Th e economic situation.
 Credit solvency and overall loan policy are improving. Th ere are fewer LGs who 
have exceeded the legally set loan limits. Th is is because the LGs are administrating 
their budgets better, but also the state has interfered more seriously with the problem 
of exceeding the legally set loan limits, which have been amended in law. In addition, 
they have cooperated with the credit organizations.
Improvements in LG loan activity bring about an increased perception of reliability 
of LGs in the eyes of credit organizations. Increased trust means better loan conditions 
and that enables LGs to make more investments.
4.4 Actions of the Ministry of Finance in Collecting Loan Contracts
According to the law, the LGs are obligated to present a copy of the loan contract to 
the Ministry of Finance during the next ﬁ ve workdays (earlier it was 30 days) after 
concluding the contract. If the LG  fails to do this, the transfers from the support fund 
may be withheld.
Th e Ministry of Finance handles the copies in the following way:
      •     It reviews the contract and checks for compliance with the law and whether the 
loan conforms to the limitations;
      •     Based on the monthly budget report, it checks the LG borrowing case and if the 
loan contract is not available in the Ministry of Finance, sends a reminder;
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      •     In the event of a breach of the law, the Ministry of Finance sends a note to the 
LG (although this has not been used in practice).
4.5 Case Studies
Th e following are examples of particular cases where some Estonian LGs incurred 
payment diﬃ  culties. Vormsi rural municipality was the ﬁ rst to announce its payment 
diﬃ  culties and to declare itself bankrupt in 1997. In 1999, Kallaste, Tőrva, Paldiski 
and Püssi expanded the list. Th e list is presented in the ﬁ nal part of the report. See 
Appendix 6.1.
4.5.1   Tőrva City
Tőrva is a remarkable example of the corruption existing in many LGs. On  September 
23, 1999, the Council of Tőrva City, located in the South of Estonia in Valga County, 
adopted a resolution pursuant to which the city was permanently insolvent, as the deﬁ cit 
of the city’s budget of 13 million kroons (EUR 830,851) amounted to 4 million kroons 
(EUR 255,646), which the city could not recoup even with a negative supplementary 
budget. Of the debts, 1.4 million (EUR 89,476) were constituted by outstanding invoices 
and a debt to the Tax Board, and 1.5 million kroons (EUR 95,864) were outstanding 
for renovation of the city’s historic inn. A lot of money was tied up by state debts. Th is 
diﬃ  cult situation faced by the city occurred upon acceptance of documents and assets 
from the former city mayor. 
Tőrva’s diﬃ  culties began in 1997, as the renovation of the historic inn was begun. 
Th e building, situated on the central square and one of the symbols of the city, is subject 
to heritage conservation. Th e initial budget for repairs amounted to 8 million kroons 
(EUR 511,293) and was ﬁ nally increased to 9.5 million kroons (EUR 607,160). Th e 
city invested 1.5 millions (EUR 95,867) in the renovation of the inn and 2 million 
kroons (EUR 127,823) were received from the government. 4.5 million kroons (EUR 
287,602) originated from the advance payments of lessees. Th e economic situation of 
the city was further aggravated by the cost of improvements to Vanamőisa beach for 
700,000 kroons (EUR 44,738), and for bringing street lighting up to the European 
standard at a cost of 1.2 millions (EUR 76,693). 
At the beginning of 1998, the Financial Department of the Valga County Govern-
ment controlled the use of speciﬁ c-purpose appropriations by Tőrva City Government. 
It was discovered that not all the invoices were paid out of the 700,000 kroons (EUR 
44,738) appropriated by the Ministry of Environment in 1997. Th e state’s money 
(484,887 kroons) was not there either, as it had been spent for other purposes. Th e 
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money had been allocated speciﬁ cally for the construction of a sewage system, waste-
water treatment plant and water intake for Tőrva. Th e city was not allowed to cover any 
other expenses with it. By March 30, 1998, the money was recovered somehow and the 
environmental debts were paid. Th e budget for the year 1998 should have presented 
the expenditure of 484,887 kroons (EUR 30,989), but it did not.
Due to bankruptcy, the city gave up several planned repairs. Although the street 
lighting was preserved, only half of the lamps were lighted. Further eﬀ orts were made 
to minimize the oﬃ  ce expenses of the institutions managed by the city, almost to the 
level of zero expenses. Existing pencils were used to write on existing paper, but nothing 
was bought in addition. 
Tőrva did not ask for money from the state, but tried to manage the situation by 
itself, by passing a negative supplementary budget and cutting down on all kinds of 
expenses (e.g,. by laying oﬀ  employees in the city government and institutions man-
aged by it).
4.5.2   Paldiski City
Paldiski is a sad example of the demise of a city that was ﬁ rst looted by the Russian 
Army, and then gradually allowed to collapse by the Government of the Republic and 
through the subsequent failures in the management of the city. 
Estonian inhabitants were removed from Paldiski in 1940. When the Russian Army 
left, the city had enormous military structures but lacked most of its population. Th e 
infrastructure of the city was in a state of absolute deterioration and was haunted by 
the storage of radioactive waste. Th e initial plan for reviving the city was based on plac-
ing the Consolidated Training Centre of Defence Forces in the huge military complex 
situated in the city (the so-called Pentagon). Under the plan, the boiler-house and the 
utility network routes of the city were to be repaired using loans from the European Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development, totalling 19 million kroons (EUR 1,214,321). 
However, the Government of the Republic and the Riigikogu “forgot” to transfer these 
loans to the city when it became an independent local government. According to an 
evaluation by Swedish experts, the need for investments to restore the living environment 
in the city to a minimum level amounted to 380 million kroons  (EUR 24,286,426). 
Several campaigns were initiated with the hope of restoring and re-populating the 
city. Attempts were made to attract enterprises that would oﬀ er work to the popula-
tion, as the former employers had left. Much hope was placed on the construction of 
a port complex. 
But unfortunately, the city government’s attempts to establish new enterprises were 
marred by greed. Media frequently accused city authorities of corruption and transac-
tions detrimental to the city. At the same time, the city mayor repeatedly failed to fulﬁ ll 
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the city’s tax liabilities to the state, claiming lack of resources (no personal income tax 
or social tax were paid), so that the debt to the Tax Board grew to 3.5 million kroons. 
Th e city promised to settle the debt by the summer of 1999, and when it was still not 
paid at the time, the accounts of the city were frozen on September 16, 1999. 
Paldiski’s tax debt increased to almost 10 million kroons within four years. Further, 
according to a court judgment, the city owed 1.7 million kroons to a private company. 
As for current invoices, the city still owes 1.5 million kroons. Th e mayor of Paldiski 
who generated the tax liabilities is still an inﬂ uential person in the City Council, besides 
being engaged in real estate (the city’s real-estate transactions deprived it of consider-
able potential revenues). Th e current chairwoman of the Council sent petitions to the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Regional Aﬀ airs and the Harju 
County Governor, applying for 5.6 million kroons in order to balance the budget of 
the city. On October17, 2000, the Government of the Republic decided to allocate 
3.3 million kroons as non-refundable aid to Paldiski from the oﬀ -budget Ownership 
Reform Reserve Fund to cover expenses relating to the municipalization of state assets 
and expenses incurred in organizing the process. With this action, the state partially 
satisﬁ ed the application of Paldiski for appropriation of additional resources for the 
purpose of balancing the budget. 
4.5.3   Püssi City
On August 28,1996, the Püssi City Government (with a budget of 9.3 million kroons) 
organized an issue of bonds through Eesti Maapank, for 6 million kroons at an annual 
interest of 14%. Th e due date for redemption was August 15, 2002. On December 
12, 1997, the issue was sold to the Compensation Fund in the course of a repurchase 
transaction. Th e bonds issue was organized with a view to buying a boiler-house for 
the city. In addition, a loan was obtained from the Environmental Fund for 750,000 
kroons at 10%, and the term for repayment was December 2003. By assuming these 
large loan obligations, the city violated the Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act 
due to an inexpedient loan allocated by the Estonian Environmental Fund.  
Th e purchase of the boiler-house was motivated by the desire to become independent 
of the heating services provided by AS Repo Vabrikud, which was the largest employer 
in the city. Th e option to make the purchase was selected on the basis of research 
carried out by OÜ EnPro Inseneribüroo, and it turned out to be the worst possible 
decision. Further, even though  the Ministry of Economic Aﬀ airs had concerns about 
the expediency of buying the boiler-house, the project went ahead based on the justi-
ﬁ cation that the city would save a lot of money and achieve independence in fulﬁ lling 
its responsibility for heating.
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Th e ﬁ rst ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties occurred as soon as the heating period of 1996 began, 
as the old debt to AS Repo Vabrikud was still outstanding while the city also faced new 
expenses related to the project and also its payment of bond interests. At the same time, 
the debts to Kohtla-Järve city, Lüganuse rural area and Kiviőli city relating to education 
continued to grow. 
Although the city managed meet the the payment schedule for the bonds until 
November 1998, within the ﬁ rst months of independent heat production debts relat-
ing to fuel were already growing. To ensure that public utility services would not rise in 
price for the population and to be able to claim that the purchase of the boiler-house 
was reasonable in all respects, the City Council established 236.00 EEK/MWh as the 
selling price of heat for dwellings (to match the price previously oﬀ ered by AS Repo 
Vabrikud). But by February 1997 the actual cost was 241.00 EEK/MWh . By summer 
the price had risen further to 751.00 EEK/MWh, but the inhabitants were still charged 
236.00 EEK/MWh, which in reality meant that the city subsidized and continues to 
subsidize the whole dwelling fund with the diﬀ erence in prices. 
On September 21, 2001, the city was faced with the following expenses to be paid 
from its annual budget of 13.2 million kroons: 
      •     6 million kroons—the bonds issue (redemption from the Compensation Fund 
on August 15, 2002);
      •     3 million kroons—bond interest;
      •     200,410.00 kroons—ﬁ ne for delay arising from outstanding interest;
      •     750,000.00 kroons—loan from the Environmental Fund for purchase of the 
boiler-house;
      •     480,000.00 kroons—interest on the loan made from the Environmental 
Fund;
      •     2.1 million kroons (approximately) for outstanding invoices including a debt 
of 2 million to a fuel supplier, plus interest in the same amount;
      •     2.3 million kroons—debt to neighbouring LGs for education.
 
Th us, the total debt of the city amounted to 14,830,410.00 kroons.
At the end of 2001 the court ordered Pussi city to pay 1.5 million kroons to the 
Compensation Fund. When the city government refused to pay, an executive procedure 
was carried out and the executor seized the accounts of the city. Th e city government 
then decided to stop the provision of heating and hot water. At the end of 2002, the 
Compensation Fund was liquidated and the claim of 6 million kroons was handed over 
to the Ministry of Finance. In 2003, the state government allocated 100 thousand kroons 
to Pussi city to pay back a debt to neighbouring LGs for education services provided 
to children from Pussi.
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4.6 Actions of the Ministry of Finance when Limits are Exceeded
Th e State Budget Law provides that if the LG has exceeded the limits on borrowing set 
by law, then the State Government has the right to decrease the transfers made to the 
LG from the support fund by the amount that exceeded the limits. Th is threat is only 
theoretical, however, and has never been applied.
In these cases, the Ministry of Finance would:
      •     Notify the parties about the decrease in transfers from the support fund to the 
LG, with an explanatory letter to be supplied;
      •     Transfer the retained amounts to the reserve for administrating foreign loans.
Paragraph 9 of Article 4 in the State Budget Law provides that if the LG has not 
fulﬁ lled its obligations set by contract towards the state, the State Government has the 
right not to transfer grants to that LG in the amount of the unfulﬁ lled obligations and 
by that to erase the unfulﬁ lled obligations. Th is procedure is regulated by a decree of 
the state government.
In its reporting on the state budget, the Ministry of Finance considers the obliga-
tions of LGs or other public organizations fulﬁ lled towards the state in the amount not 
paid to the LG.
4.7 Statistical Analysis of LGs’ Management of Borrowing
Systematic data concerning LGs’ borrowing have been available in Estonia since 1995. 
Th e tables and ﬁ gures below show Estonian LGs’ borrowing activities from 1996 to 
2002.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that in 1996 and 1999 a drastic rise in loan-taking oc-
curred. Th e reason for this is that elections of municipal councils were held in these 
years. Th e preliminary summary of year 2002 shows clearly that there is a direct link 
between the election year and the increase in the amount of loans (total loans were 
nearly one billion and repaid loans slightly over EEK 600 million). As the restrictions 
on borrowing are quite soft, the municipal leaders have broad opportunities to realize 
their political promises and so-called “buy votes.” 
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Figure 6.2
LGs’ Annual Loans and Repayment Including Interest (1996–2001)
Figure 6.3
Th e Structure of Local Government Debt (1996–2001)
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Table 6.7
Structure of Debt (1996–2001) [Th ousand EEK]
1996 1997 1998
Net revenue of LG budgets 4,015,926 4,999,455 5,569,195
Total debt (loan instruments) 1,234,337 1,382,972 1,469,381
Including principal sum 1,053,296 1,178,322 1,358,369
Including interest 181,041 204,650 111,012
Calculated average burden of loan debt of LGs 30.74% 27.66% 26.38%
1999 2000 2001
Net revenue of LG budgets 5,948,849 6,551,533 7,900,338
Total debt (loan instruments) 2,088,365 2,265,841 2,474,602
    • principal sum 1,961,439 1,882,570 2,068,445
    • interest 126,926 383,271 406,158
Calculated average burden of loan debt of LGs 35.11% 34.58% 31.32%
Table 6.7 shows that LGs tend to increase their debt burden in the years of municipal 
elections. If the revenue base rises more rapidly than the total debt in absolute sums, 
the situation is not considered so dramatic and a warning is not necessary.  
4.8 Reasons for Failure of Local Government Management 
      of Borrowing
Th ese legal restrictions are not able to regulate borrowing appropriately and do not 
assure that a municipality will not go bankrupt. Th ere are several weak points in the 
legislation. Firstly, the limits of LGs’ loans are not strictly deﬁ ned. Th e total amount 
of loans may actually be larger than 60% of revenues of the budget year because the 
requirement of the 60% (from revenues) does not include loans with state guarantees 
and short-term loans. Th e total amount of a municipality’s loans could therefore exceed 
the entire budget income of a current year. Table 6.8 shows an example of this. 
Th e law does not regulate what kind of measures can be taken with municipalities 
experiencing payment diﬃ  culties. A local government cannot go bankrupt according 
to the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Estonia. But according to the Law on Taking 
Foreign Loans for the Republic of Estonia and Ensuring State Guarantee to Foreign 
Contracts, the guarantor (the government) has the right to demand compensation for 
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loss of the guarantee, and if these are not compensated, the state may initiate bankruptcy 
procedures.  
Table 6.8
Total Loans of Municipalities Compared with Planned Revenues
Municipality County Planned Revenues 
for 1998 
[Thousands EEK]
Total Loans and Interest
[Thousands EEK]
Total Loans from 
Planned Revenues 
[%]
Kehra city Harju 10,706.50 19,975.202 186.57
Vőnnu Tartu 4,156.70 7,209.463 173.44
Vőhma city Viljandi 6,247.60 8,690.069 139.09
Orava Pőlva 3,201.90 3,717.111 116.09
Oru Lääne 3,093.90 3,213.463 103.86
Türi city Järva 21,116.50 20,472.987 96.95
Haapsalu city Lääne 52,334.60 48,943.191 93.52
Taebla Lääne 8,919.20 8,335.410 93.45
Räpina city Pőlva 11,484.60 10,585.345 92.17
Jőelähtme Harju 22,036.90 19,318.335 87.66
Püssi city Ida-Viru 12,831.30 10,790.000 84.09
Maardu city Harju 55,568.00 45,919.912 82.64
Kullamaa Lääne 5,052.50 4,040.669 79.97
Mooste Pőlva 5,387.70 4,289.188 79.61
Even though Estonian laws do not provide for LGs to give guarantees to enterprises 
with LG shares, the laws do not forbid subsidizing them.
Th e obligation to inform the Ministry of Finance about a loan or issuing of bonds 
has been interpreted by ﬁ nancial institutions (banks) as a reliable though silent guarantee 
to the loans of LGs. Th erefore, the banks have set a “special price” for municipal loans. 
Although it is not said in law that the state gives a guarantee to LG loans, ﬁ nancial 
institutions have taken for granted that when an LG arrives in ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties, the 
state will help it out.
Th e following table (Table 6.9) shows the LGs with the most serious problems, where 
the limits have been substantially exceeded. In addition to ignoring the restrictions, 
many LGs do not inform the Ministry of Finance upon taking ﬁ nancial obligations. 
Th e established rules thus appear to be ineﬀ ective. Many meetings have recently been 
held in the Ministry of Finance to discuss the problems and possible solutions.
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Table 6.9
Local Government Loans [Th ousand EEK] (2001–2003)
Municipality Revenues 
in 2000
Debt 
Including 
Interest
Debt 
as % of 
Revenues
Required Debt Service as % of Revenues
2001 2002 2003
Kehra city 15,633.2 13,319.8 85.20 18.82 18.82 19.02
Keila city 68,502.4 37,702.0 55.04 37.85 3.55 3.34
Keila parish 14,360.4 10,727.0 74.70 13.00 14.79 16.52
Paldiski city 20,082.0 13,632.1 67.88 17.41 15.86 14.48
Kärdla city 1, 098.9 12,904.6 75.47 18.82 11.63 11.63
Avinurme   9,171.8   5,926.8 64.62 9.50 8.60 8.11
Püssi city 13,438.6   8,243.0 61.34 13.29 46.34 1.70
Haapsalu city 71,742.8 58 ,408.0 81.41 6.42 9.36 8.67
Ridala 12,354.6   7,944.0 64.30 11.93 10.87 10.20
Pärnu city 232,084.8 194,174.8 83.67 38.07 14.06 13.72
Pőlva city 33,114.8 22,472.5 67.86 4.45 10.00 9.69
Räpina city 14,252.4   8,920.3 62.59 7.98 7.69 7.69
Kuressaare c. 74,607.0 44,436.3 59.56 5.26 12.85 11.83
Mőisaküla   6,318.4   6,353.0 100.55 13.77 13.91 15.17
Viljandi city 97,339.2 75,911.3 77.99 6.73 10.41 10.47
Vőhma city   7,939.5 12,642.0 159.23 17.22 18.65 18.49
Note:       Values higher than allowed by present legal regulations are marked with bold font.
No correlation has been established between a local govvernment’s size and its 
problems related to loan policy. Some have exceeded the legally set loan limits and 
many are approaching that line. Th ere are also LGs that have not yet begun to reduce 
the capital amount of the loans because of continuous reﬁ nancing, on each occasion 
to a lower interest rate. 
Currently, no possibilities exist to receive a more favorable loan and the LGs will 
have to start to pay back the basic amount. But this is diﬃ  cult when such discipline 
has not become a habit because of the continuous reﬁ nancing of the loan. A target has 
now been set, to achieve a balanced budget at all levels of government (both state and 
local government budgets) and to prevent the critical ﬁ nancial situations that can occur 
when LGs take on obligations beyond their capabilities.
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Th e standards established by law are not a good indicator of the actual situation 
where LG debt is concerned. Th e repayment of most foreign loans may start several 
years later. But at the same time, for most LGs, 75% of their own yearly revenues is too 
small an amount to make important investments. 
4.9 Devices for Control
Supervision and control over the economic and ﬁ nancial activities of LGs are basically 
regulated by ten acts. Th is legal control is exercised as follows:
      •     Th e County Governor monitors utilization of funds and investments delivered 
by the central government and the EU, grants and foreign aid;
      •     Th e legal chancellor veriﬁ es that local regulations conform to laws;
      •     Th e State Audit Oﬃ  ce supervises the funds and investments delivered by the 
central government, and also the loans guaranteed by central government;
      •     An Audit Commission named by the LG council monitors utilization of funds 
and investments drafted by central government and the EU, grants and other 
foreign aid, usage of municipal funds, correspondence of LG functions to LG 
decisions and regulations and settlement of ﬁ nancial and accounting principles 
of LG institutions;
      •     Internal control, found within only some LGs,  exercises controls similar to the 
Audit Commission’s.
4.9.1   Th e Audit Commission
In LGs the Council is the higher authority of control and evaluation of the work of 
LG organizations. Th e working regulations (operating procedures) of LG councils is 
determined by the LGOA. Th e LG council forms an audit commission to control LG 
actions until the next elections. Th e commission must consist at least of three members, 
and only the members of the LG council can be members of the audit commission. 
Th e composition of the commission is political. Th e governing coalition as well as 
the opposition must be represented among the members. Some of the LGs traditionally 
elect the head of the audit commission from the opposition. 
According to the LGOA the functions of the audit commission are to control:
      •     Th e compliance of LG actions to the legal acts and decrees;
      •     Th e collection and registration of revenues at a ﬁ xed date;
      •     Th e accordance of costs with what was in the approved LG budget;
      •     Th e correctness of accounting of LGs’ organizations, agencies and enterprises;
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      •     Th e purposeful utilization of LG assets by LG organizations;
      •     Th e implementation of contracts that are made by LGs.
Written reports about the mistakes or shortcomings that are identiﬁ ed have to 
be presented to the municipal government with proposals for their elimination. Th e 
municipal government has to provide a response to the report and present it with the 
decree to the LG council.
Estonian legislation includes a requirement of follow-up control for the local budget. 
According to the LGOA, the audit committee must present an overview about its work 
to the municipal council before budget authorization. Th e commission also has to 
present its comments and proposals. According to this regulation the audit commission 
carries out the follow-up control. But the external audit—the ﬁ nal step in the audit 
process—should be presented prior to the approval of the budget for the last year.
Th e obligation to conduct an a priori audit is not prescribed by Estonian legislation. 
At the same time it does not exclude that possibility either. According to the LGOA, 
the audit commission will report to the municipal government in written form about 
the discovered shortcomings and its proposals for eliminating these shortcomings. Th e 
municipal government will develop its response during the ten days after the audit 
report was received and will present it together with the ﬁ le to the municipal council. 
In this way the audit commission can audit some activity before its start, and both 
the municipal government and council must take the shortcomings pointed out into 
consideration.
4.9.2   Internal Control of the LG
Th e law does not impose any additional obligations for internal control on the LG. An 
internal control unit or staﬀ  position exists only in some LGs (the largest). In most, the 
internal control is carried out by an audit commission of the Council.
4.9.3   Legal Supervision by the County Governor
Governors are the representatives of central government on a regional level. Th ey have 
the duty and right to supervise whether an LG has followed legal norms in the imple-
mentation of budget. If a county governor discovers that a legal act adopted by an LG 
does not correspond to the superior legal act, he or she makes a proposal for dealing 
with the problem within 15 days. If the LG refuses, the county governor should apply 
to the administrative court.
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Usually the request of a county governor has enough moral force to change the deci-
sion even in cases where the law has not been formally violated. Th ere have been cases 
when after the protest of the county governor, unjustiﬁ ed expenses have been compen-
sated by the person concerned (for instance, for a training course in Morocco). 
If the county governor establishes that illegal or inappropriate management of 
state assets has occurred, all documents about the case must be presented to the State 
Audit.
4.9.4   Th e Role of the State Audit in Supervising the LG
Th e State Audit is an independent budget organization for the supervision of appropriate 
utilization and management of state assets. It can control the use of these assets and also 
of enterprises where the state holds more than half of the shares. Th is organization can 
also control the appropriate utilization of government grants and subsidies.
5.   STATE RESPONSE TO SOLVENCY PROBLEMS 
Regulating the borrowing activities of LGs is connected with regulating the ﬁ nancial 
crisis situations or “bankruptcy” of LGs.
As was mentioned earlier, the law does not regulate what kind of measures can be 
taken to deal with municipalities with payment diﬃ  culties. An LG cannot go bankrupt 
according to the Bankruptcy Law of the Republic of Estonia. But at the same time, in 
some cases, LGs have found themselves in critical ﬁ nancial situations. However, because 
of the absence of mechanisms for regulating the whole situation, the central govern-
ment has dealt with all these cases separately. Th e interference of central government 
has therefore oﬀ ered one-time solutions.
LGs facing solvency problems usually ﬁ le petitions together with explanatory 
memoranda to the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Internal Aﬀ airs as well as the 
Minister of Regional Aﬀ airs. Th e answer is unambiguous, as a rule—the state does not 
grant any loans to LGs to manage diﬃ  cult situations. Th is position is supported by the 
statement that lending by the state is regulated by the State Budget Act and the Law 
on Taking Foreign Loans for the Republic of Estonia and Ensuring State Guarantee to 
Foreign Contracts. 
Pursuant to section 38 of the State Budget Act, the state may take long-term loans 
for the purpose of balancing revenue and expenses in the state budget, and short-term 
loans for the purpose of ensuring the stability of cash-servicing. Th e State Budget Act 
does not provide for borrowing for any other purposes. Further, sub-section 29 (3) of 
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the State Budget Act stipulates that a Ministry and any state agency within that area of 
government may not give loans, provide guarantees or use the amounts received from 
the state budget for the purpose of lending. Th is position is also justiﬁ ed by the fact that 
the State Budget Act does not provide for lending on the part of the state at all.  
Th e state has very limited means to help LGs in case of ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties. Until 
2002, it could use resources from the Compensation Fund for Special Economic Situa-
tions under the Estonian Regional Development Agency. Th e resources of non-budgetary 
ownership reform reserve funds are in principle used for other purposes. As central 
government can only allocate non-returnable ﬁ nancial aid from its reserve funds (law 
does not permit the giving of loans from central government reserves), the minister of 
cabinet considers the decision of allocation thoroughly.  
By the second supplementary budget in 1997, resources from the Compensation 
Fund for Special Economic Situations in the amount of 45 million kroons (EUR 
2,876,024) were allocated to the Estonian Regional Development Agency. Th e primary 
aim of this fund is to promote activities designed to prevent economic crisis situations 
and to mitigate the consequences of special economic situations. 
A regulation on LG insolvency is now being drafted in the Ministry of Finance. In 
the draft, procedures for insolvency are under the management of the courts. Gener-
ally, the principles are quite similar to those in the private sector, but due to the status 
of LGs some speciﬁ c rules are introduced. First, LGs facing insolvency should not take 
on new obligations to increase revenues, and they are obligated to follow crisis budget 
principles and meet the claims of debtors. LGs operate under the direct and full super-
vision of the county governors.  
6.  POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTONIAN BORROWING PROCESS
Having considered the advantages and also the numerous deﬁ ciencies of the existing 
system of borrowing in Estonia, we would propose a new vision for how to improve the 
basic as well as the technical aspects of borrowing. Our views are somewhat diﬀ erent 
from the diagnosis and remedies proposed by the government. 
6.1 Organization and Functions of LGs
Th e basis of all the ﬁ nancial problems in Estonian LGs is the division of functions among 
the tiers. Th e idea of revising governance structures that were adopted in the 1993 LGOA 
concerned ﬁ rst of all the abolition of the second tier of LG. Hence, two substantially 
diﬀ erent sets of functions of governance—community and regional functions—were 
not clearly deﬁ ned and assigned to local and/or state regional institutions. Regional 
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functions of government, except for the abstract task of balancing, were not assigned to 
the county government. Regional functions cannot be carried out by the municipalities 
either. Th is paradox was solved theoretically through the idea of the development of 
inter-municipality cooperation. Th is cooperation has not transpired, however. 
Th e issue of allocation of functions is an important precondition for the healthy 
development of the local borrowing market, but since it goes beyond the scope of this 
report, it is not discussed in detail here. 
6.2 Borrowing and Regulating of Bancruptcy
To improve the existing situation three alternatives could be implemented.
In the ﬁ rst alternative, the LGs would take loans, ﬁ rst of all, from commercial 
banks. Th en:
      •     When calculating the suitable limits we must deﬁ nitely take into account the 
fact that teachers’ salaries that were given to LG budgets from 2001 will con-
siderably increase revenues; 
      •     An ex ante control mechanism must be established, i.e., that LGs will present 
their loan applications to the Ministry of Finance for approval before concluding 
the contracts. On the one hand, this will assure that the Ministry of Finance 
will know about all the ﬁ nancial obligations and can discover at an early stage if 
some LG has broken rules. Th en suitable measures can be taken to prevent the 
LG from concluding the contract. On the other hand, this restriction contradicts 
the policy that gives LGs as much freedom as possible, i.e., to decentralize the 
system. Besides, the Constitution states that LGs are independent units that 
have their own budgets.
In the second alternative, if ex ante control mechanisms are not applied we should 
establish consequences for those who intentionally break the limits and or present 
wrong data:
      •     Stemming from administrative reform, only general principles of borrowing will 
be prescribed by law and the government will be given a right to establish the 
limits, presenting and processing loan applications and the rules for registering 
bond issues;
      •     Integration of the databases of LG loans of commercial banks with databases of 
the Ministry of Finance should be considered to improve follow-up control;
      •     Th e Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act should prescribe that the state 
does not guarantee LG loans. Probably after that, ﬁ nancial institutions will assess 
more carefully LGs’ ability to pay back the loan and interests, and the amount 
of other loans it has.
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In the third alternative the LGs would not have access to the loan market of com-
mercial banks, or only restricted access, and all the borrowing would take place through 
the Treasury which would:
      •     Establish the total sum of loans of the public sector every year in a state budget;
      •     Create a loans committee in the Ministry of Finance that would evaluate the 
LGs’ loan applications;
      •     Establish in a law or in another juridical act the criteria for assessing the loan 
applications and also the rules for processing these applications.
Against the third alternative one could use a legal argument about the corre-
spondence of the suggested principles with Article 9, Clause 8 of the European Charter 
of Local Governments, which states: “Local authorities have an access to the national 
capital market within the law if they want to take a loan for capital investments.”
In the view of our research group, the ﬁ rst alternative is the easiest to implement 
because half of it is already written in the LGOA. Th e only item that should be added is 
the sanctions that will (not only theoretically) be imposed if the law is not followed.
6.3 Government Grants
From the point of view of the borrowing market, the most important recommendation 
is that the general amount of government grants must become much more stable and 
should be determined for several years forward. Government must take more risks in 
ensuring a level of ﬁ nancing that reﬂ ects its own forecasts. Simultaneously, intensive 
training in forecast capacity at the level of individual communes should be organized. 
6.4 Investments
Th e system of municipal investments ought to be adjusted for the requirements that 
enable LGs to receive resources from the structural funds of the EU. Diﬀ erent public 
channels, through which external investment resources could be obtained, should be 
integrated. It should be possible to consider the resources of LGs as well as support 
grants of the state as co-ﬁ nancing funds when making application to the structural funds 
of the EU. Th e Ministry of Internal Aﬀ airs has also suggested that resources should be 
allocated from the state budget in accordance with the project-principle for the whole 
period of an investment project.
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6.5 Reporting and Controlling
In most LGs, the audit commission of the Council is the only unit that carries out the 
function of internal control. Th e work of the audit commission should become more 
regular and clearly scheduled. Th is would enable it to control all budget units during a 
certain period. In smaller communities the internal control could be jointly contracted 
out to regional development centers.
Information that is legally obligatory should be separated from information essential 
for analysis, and attention needs to be given to collecting data for the latter purpose. 
Developing the analytic capacity of the Ministry of Finance does not require an increase 
in personnel. Th e analysis could be contracted out. LG unions could be the contractor 
in the event that their capacity is increased with the change of their status and roles. It 
is also important to discuss the results of analyses with the LG ﬁ nancial managers with 
the aim of unifying the practices of ﬁ nancial management in LGs. 
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APPENDIX
Cases of Local Government Insolvency
LG unit Year Amount EEK/ measure Source Remarks
Vormsi 
rural area
1997 550,000 (340,000)/ 
support
County government 
support fund (state 
budget)
Initially 550,000 kroons 
was transferred, but then 
it was discovered that the 
municipality did not use 
the resources as agreed. 
Kallaste city 2000 1,250,000/ loan until 
2005
Estonian Regional 
Development Agency 
assurance fund for 
special situations 
Kallaste owed 
Hansacapital company, 
and the court decided 
to seize the accounts of 
the municipality. The 
contract was extended 
with the company.  
Narva-
Jőesuu city
2000 1,500,000/ 
returnable support 
2002 (without 
interest)
Earmarked reserve 
fund of property 
reform 
Paldiski city 2000 1,500,000/ loan until 
2005   (3% annual 
interest)
3,371,600/ 
nonreturnable 
support
Estonian Regional 
Development Agency 
assurance fund for 
special situations 
Earmarked reserve 
fund of property 
reform 
The transfer decree stated 
that the money was for 
municipalization of the 
state assets.
Tootsi 
rural area
2000 927,697/ 
nonreturnable 
support
Estonian Regional 
Development Agency 
assurance fund for 
special situations 
Püssi city 2001 The city had very big debts (17 million kroons in a total budget of 
15 million kroons).
In 2001, the court required  Püssi city to pay 1.5 million kroons to 
Hüvitusfond (unpaid interest). Hüvitusfond started the executive procedure 
and the executor seized all the city accounts, thus ensuring the payment of 
1.5 million kroons to the Hüvitusfond.
In 2002, Püssi city bonds were redeemed. As the Hüvitusfond has finished 
the operation, the claim has been handed over to Ministry of Finance, 
which wants to go to court again.
In 2003, the state government allocated 100 thousand kroons to Pussi to 
pay back debt to neighbouring LGs. 
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Bond Issues and Bank Loans
—New Mechanisms to Support 
Local Development in Romania  
Anca Ghinea, Gabriela Căluşeru, Iordan Nicola and Stela Stretean
1.   INTRODUCTION
Th e restructuring process in public administration was initiated immediately after the 
removal of the Romanian communist regime in December 1989. Upon the adoption 
of a law on local public administration (Law no. 69/1991, replaced in 2001 by Law no. 
215), and a law on local elections and articles (nos.119 and 120 of the new Constitu-
tion) in 1991, the necessary legal framework for a real public administration reform 
process was established. 
Romania is divided into counties (judeţe), towns (oraşe) and communes (comune), 
whose boundaries are established by law. A county structure consists of a capital 
(municipiu reşedinţă de judeţ),1 several municipalities (municipii) and all the towns and 
communes within the county’s territorial boundaries. Certain towns are classiﬁ ed as 
municipalities. Although there are no legal regulations in terms of public administration 
institutions or policies to distinguish towns from municipalities, the main existing 
criteria are: territorial size, number of inhabitants, historical background  and socio-
cultural importance (the term municipality will be used in the report to name the 
speciﬁ c administrative territorial units). Bucharest Municipality is a unique case as it 
has subdivisions (sectors) that are each able to designate district councils and mayors. 
Romania is divided into 42 counties (including Bucharest Municipality), 262 towns 
and 2,686 communes. 
Th e public administration institutions through which local autonomy is implemented 
in the local communities are the local councils as deliberative authorities and the 
mayoralties as executive authorities. County councils with deliberative prerogatives, 
and the president of the county council as the executive authority, are the representatives 
of county government.  Th ere is one further administrative institution at the county 
level, the Prefecture, which mainly supervises the legality of local governments’ actions. 
Th e prefect is the representative of the government at the county level.
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According to Law no. 70/1992 regarding local elections, local and county councils 
are to be elected on the basis of the party list system through direct suﬀ rage, while mayors 
are to be elected on the basis of a uninominal system in two rounds. Th e local councils, 
the county councils, the mayors and the General Council of Bucharest Municipality are 
elected by universal, equal, direct and freely expressed suﬀ rage. Th e last local elections 
were held in June 2000.
Th ere is no subordination between the prefect and local authorities, nor is there 
subordination between the county public administration and the local one, accord-
ing to the Law on Public Administration (2001). In reality, in both cases there are 
diﬀ erent aspects that make the insubordination principle more a desideratum than an 
obligation for the functioning of the local administration. For instance,  prefects have 
the responsibility to supervise the legality of  normative acts issued by local authorities 
within the counties they are appointed in. At the same time, they can take legal action 
against local authorities if they consider that the normative acts are illegal. Domestic 
and international analysts have expressed concern about  political interference in the 
administrative decision-making process, which was reported in a signiﬁ cant number of 
localities all around Romania. 
A more clear “dependency” is the one regarding the relation between the president 
of the county council and the rest of the local authorities within the county. Th e 
“dependency” is mainly related to the constitution and distribution of local budgets. 
Th e president of the county council is responsible for the distribution of the equalization 
funds to the local communities within the county.2 
Once the major pieces of legislation regarding the functioning of the public ad-
ministration were adopted, the most problematic task was to assist local authorities 
to understand their new ﬁ nancial responsibilities and—even more important—the 
complete reversal in their relationship with the central authorities, compared to what 
they had been accustomed to as “tutors.”
With all the provisions of the law on local public ﬁ nances, for example, it becomes 
easy to understand why local authorities have complained more frequently about the 
equalization funds (percentage and criteria) than about legislation allowing them to try 
other ﬁ nancial tools (borrowings, credits, etc.). An unfriendly local economic environ-
ment is the main reason why they have tended to seek an increase in central government 
transfers. But the old culture of dependency still exists, and this may also play a role. 
People need more time to adapt to the new trends and realities.
Ultimately, local implementers are more likely to make use of the new legislation on 
ﬁ nancial self-autonomy and other means of supplementing local revenues if some of the 
following elements exist: the conﬁ dence to try other mechanisms than state transfers, 
experience, a strong relationship with the business community, good communication 
between the executive and legislative branches at the local level, and assistance from the 
central government in following the correct procedures.
283
B O N D  I S S U E S  A N D  B A N K  LO A N S — N E W  M E C H A N I S M S  T O  S U P P O R T  LO C A L  D E V E LO P M E N T  I N  R O M A N I A
It is quite clear that new practices such as local borrowing were initially regarded as 
“extravagant” by mayors and local authorities at their ﬁ rst mandate. More experienced 
local authorities, on the other hand, saw them as very positive. It is new practices that will 
lead to transformation, and Romanian local authorities can adapt. However, extensive 
exposure to those local authorities who have succeeded (both within the country and 
abroad) will undoubtedly assist the process.
2.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING MECHANISMS 
Th e local public administration in Romania includes two levels of government: a local 
level  (communes, towns and municipalities) and a county level. Each has distinctive 
own revenues and competencies (expenditures) according to the adopted legislation 
and reform strategies.
Local public administration in Romania manages approximately 4% of GDP 
(2002). During the ﬁ rst years after 1990, the annual Law on the State Budget was used 
as the basis for drafting and implementing local administration ﬁ nance policies. Th e 
provisions of the law seemed to reﬂ ect a high degree of centralization of the decision-
making process and insuﬃ  cient budgetary predictability for the local level, although 
the situation has considerably improved over time. Th e State Budget Law is adopted 
annually and includes information about the equalization funds allocated to the counties. 
A preliminary assessment of spending occurs midway through the year, and normally, 
additional funds are wired to the local communities at that time.
During the annual drafting of the State Budget Law, an intense discussion takes 
place concerning the so-called “special funds.” Th ese are earmarked funds meant to as-
sist local communities with investment projects they are unable to completely ﬁ nance 
themselves. Th ese funds are managed by the ministries, and are established through a 
Decree issued either by the Romanian Government or the Parliament. Th ey must be 
established and collected for a speciﬁ c project with a concrete goal, and implemented 
within a certain time frame. Special funds come from special taxes paid by the direct 
beneﬁ ciaries. In 2002 the main special funds were: the Fund for Health and Social 
Insurance, the Special Fund for Developing the Energy System and the Special Fund 
for Public Roads. Th e criteria for distribution of the funds are decided by the minis-
tries. Th e Special Fund for Public Roads, for example, is managed by the Ministry for 
Transportation, an institution often criticized for having an insuﬃ  ciently transparent 
implementation process.
Administrative reform has continued since 1991, passing a signiﬁ cant crossroad in 
1997–98; analysts agree that at a certain point the process even accelerated, in the sense 
that key ﬁ nancial policies changing the structure of public ﬁ nance and ﬁ scal relations 
between central and local authorities were implemented. 
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Fiscal decentralization was initiated along with the adoption of the Law on Local 
Taxes and Charges (1994). Th e law clearly stipulates that local taxes and charges form 
the local communities’ own revenues; their rates are decided, collected and controlled 
by local governments. Th us, the property tax became the main source of own revenues 
of local communities in Romania. During 2002 the law was amended to facilitate the 
increase of local government own revenues.
Th e Law on Local Public Finances was issued in 1998 and the role of local budgets 
became more important at this time. Th e law regulates the transfers between diﬀ er-
ent levels of the government, the equalization funds’ role, as well as local government 
borrowing. A mathematical formula for assessing the ﬁ nancial capacity of the local 
governments was established in order to help the central government correctly distrib-
ute the equalization funds. Th e equalization of the local budgets happens in two ways: 
from the national level to the county level, and from the county level to the municipali-
ties, towns and communes within one county. Although stipulated in the law on local 
public ﬁ nances, the indicators as well as the place of the ﬁ nancial capacity formula in 
the whole equalization process are annually revised in the context of drafting the State 
Budget Law.
Th e Law on Local Public Finances also includes an appendix on the budgetary 
classiﬁ cation that must be followed by the local administration while administrating 
the budgetary revenues and expenditures. Th e adoption of the law changed the whole 
approach to public ﬁ nancing, as local communities after 1998 were given a share of the 
income tax collected in their community. Earmarked transfers allocated to autonomous 
enterprises or to public services and investments were eliminated. An equalization system 
that aimed to correct expenditure and ﬁ scal capacity disparities among counties/local 
communities was also elaborated.
Th e key aim of the law was to strengthen local ﬁ scal autonomy while clarifying and 
expanding local control over revenues and the formation of local budgets. Although 
the establishment of an equalization system has been an important step towards local 
ﬁ nancial autonomy, there are still problems that are mainly related to transparency in the 
allocation process and to political interference in the ﬁ nancial decentralization process 
at diﬀ erent levels. For example, the allocation of equalization funds often becomes a 
political negotiation open to inﬂ uence rather than the result of an objective and trans-
parent eﬀ ort to fairly diﬀ erentiate between local needs. Th e criteria for the distribution 
of funds to the local level are modiﬁ ed annually while adopting the State Budget Law. 
But the key role in allocating the funds to mayoralties belongs to the president of the 
county council, and there have been frequent accusations of political membership be-
ing a factor in the county council president’s relation with the local authorities in the 
process of allocating the transfers (a very hot topic in Romania but obviously not the 
central theme of the current report). It should also be mentioned that consultations are 
part of the funds’ allocation process.
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In the same way that consultations (correctly speaking, negotiations) between the 
central authorities and the representatives of the counties should be genuine and fair, 
the president of the county council should also consult with the mayors in the county, 
listening to their needs before allocating the funds. How often this happens would be 
another very interesting area to research, keeping in mind the very personal nature of 
the relationships between public authorities in Romania.
Th e positive contribution of the 1994 Law on Local Taxes and Charges is unques-
tionable, but real progress also occurred when the Law on Local Public Finances was 
elaborated in 1998. It was in this year that the approach changed, and local budgets 
were addressed as part of a larger, comprehensive, unitary policy for local budgeting. 
Th rough the creation of a unique, articulated legal framework, the old individual resolu-
tions approach turned into an articulated vision on local public ﬁ nances in Romania. 
Improvements to complement this process became easier to introduce after 1998, 
although some have still been diﬃ  cult to implement.
2.1 The Structure of the Revenues 
      of Local Public Administration in Romania
Local public administration revenues include own revenues, transfers from the state 
budget and internal and external borrowings.
2.1.1   Own Revenues 
In Romania the percentage of own revenues within local budgets’ revenues increased 
during the last several years, mainly as a result of the changes in legislation allowing 
the decentralization of several sources of revenues. In 1995 own revenues formed 28% 
of the revenues of local budgets at the national level. Th e percentage decreased during 
1996 (22.61%) and 1997 (18.95%), and increased again in 1998 (24.73%) as a result 
of the new Law on Local Public Finances. In 1999 the consequences of the new law 
became quite visible as own revenues reached 44.58% (a quota of the income tax being 
decentralized). During 2000 there was a slight decrease to 36.28% (see Figure 7.1).
Th e distribution of local revenues according to diﬀ erent types of local government 
units shows that the municipalities collect the highest percentage of revenues of all the 
local government units (see Figure 7.2). Th e main reason is that the local economic 
environment plays a signiﬁ cant role in the formation of the local revenues, and the 
municipalities have the most developed business environment of all other types of local 
community in Romania.
Own revenues include current revenues (ﬁ scal and non-ﬁ scal), capital revenues and 
earmarked revenues.
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Figure 7.1
Local Government Units’ Own and Shared Revenues 
as a Percentage of the Total Revenues of the Local Budgets
Figure 7.2
Distribution of Local Revenues According to Type of Local Government Unit (2001)
2.1.1.1    Current Fiscal Revenues 
Th ese are the taxes and charges collected at the local level, such as the property tax. Non-
ﬁ scal revenues come from the proﬁ t of private and autonomous enterprises, as well as 
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from public institutions. It resembles the corporate income tax, except that in Romania 
it is not a tax and is considered a non-ﬁ scal revenue of the local budget.  
According to the legislation, own revenues are under the control and audit of the 
local authorities, who are responsible for establishing the taxes and charges of the local 
communities and also their levels. Th e Audit Court is the institution at the central level 
responsible for control of local communities’ expenditures. 
Local public authorities are directly involved in the establishment and collection 
of taxes and charges, and they can conduct their own ﬁ scal policy depending on the 
status of local economic development, local needs and their own institutional capac-
ity. Th e Law on Local Taxes and Charges of 1994 had no limitation on the number or 
level of taxes and charges that local authorities could establish. In 2002, however, after 
many local authorities succeeded in increasing their local taxes by over 50%, the central 
government issued an Emergency Ordinance that established some maximum limits for 
main local taxes and charges (the ones regarding buildings, lands, automobiles and the 
issuing of construction authorizations). Th ere are small variations between municipali-
ties’ local tax rates with respect to the main taxes (e.g., property tax) but the funds raised 
from the local taxes also depend on the capacity and inventiveness of local authorities 
in establishing new taxes. Th e following are just two examples of taxes established by 
local authorities:
        •     Th e tax on questions—Sibiu. According to a decision of the local council in 
Sibiu, a tourist who gets lost while hiking has to pay 10,000 lei for every ques-
tion he addresses to the members of the rescue team;
        •     Th e tax on interviews—Vrancea. Th e mayor of Ţâmboieşti commune (Vrancea 
County) decided that for each interview with local authorities, there should be 
a charge of 400,000 lei, generating funds that will help the local budget;
2.1.1.2    Capital Revenues 
Th ese are generated by the sale of assets belonging to the local government. Th ey are rather 
exceptional revenues representing only a small fraction of the total local revenues.
2.1.1.3    Earmarked Revenues
Th ese include special taxes3 that can be established in order to ﬁ nance the provision of 
public services. Th ey represent an optional choice for local communities, not all of which 
access this type of revenue (under current circumstances, they are not substantial).
Quotas from personal income tax are a shared tax representing one important 
ﬁ nancial resource for local budgets. It is distributed to local public administrations 
according to the Law on Local Public Finances, but the percentages may change every 
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year in accordance with the new provisions of the State Budget Law. For instance in 2002 
the personal income tax was shared between the levels of government as follows:
        •     37.5% remained at the local level after the tax was collected;
        •     10% was allocated to the county level;
        •     15% was transferred to county authorities that further distribute it to local 
communities within the county, according to the criteria provided by law for 
the respective year;
        •     37.5% belonged to the State budget.
2.1.2   Transfers from the State Budget
Th ese revenues include:
        •     Grants and quotas from shared taxes
        •     Earmarked transfers
2.1.2.1    Grants from Shared Taxes 
Th ese consist of transfers from the personal income tax (the quota that remains at the 
state level) and from the Value Added Tax (VAT). Th ese funds can be:
        •     non-earmarked and used by local authorities to fund any kind of expenditure;
        •     earmarked to cover such things as subsidies for the price of the heat distributed 
to population, for the salaries of teachers in primary and secondary schools, 
and for social welfare. In this case local authorities do not decide their level or 
their destination.
2.1.2.2    Earmarked Transfers
Th ese transfers are the government’s contribution to the projects of international or-
ganizations. Th e government is required to contribute to the ﬁ nancing of activities and 
services representing medium and long-term investments in local communities. 
2.1.3    Internal and External Borrowings
Local government borrowing is the most innovative of the tools for increasing investment 
revenues of local public administrations in Romania. Several regulations regarding bor-
rowing were introduced by the new Law on Local Public Finances in 1998, enabling two 
instruments of borrowing: loans from commercial banks and bond issues. Th e Romanian 
experience with internal local borrowing will be explored in the following section.
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Local government units also have access to external borrowing. When contract-
ing external loans, the local communities must have the approval of a Commission 
mandated to authorize and approve the loans (consisting of representatives of the local 
public administration, the Government and the National Bank of Romania) when a 
certain amount will be exceeded. Th is maximum amount is periodically updated. Th e 
members of the Commission meet monthly and they assess all requests coming from 
local government units. Th e Ministry of Finance can guarantee an external loan con-
tracted by a local government unit. In this case, the Ministry will supervise the contract 
procedure as well as the repayment of the loan. We do not include details about the 
external loans of local government units here, as the speciﬁ c procedures and institutions 
involved require separate research.
2.2 The Structure of Expenditures 
      of the Local Public Administration in Romania
In actual practice, central authorities in Romania have a tendency to maintain control 
over the level and structure of local administration expenditures. A study of the Partners 
for Local Development Foundation (2002, p.15) shows that there are at least two ex-
planations for this tendency: the concern for macroeconomic stability and the fact that 
central government still plays an important role in ﬁ nancing the decentralized respon-
sibilities. Local public administrative units continue to act as agents of the government 
when dealing with some public services. Central authorities may have transferred the 
management of public services to the local level and provided some of the ﬁ nancial 
resources, but local authorities are still not able to make important decisions regarding 
the quality of those services. For instance, the responsibility for teachers’ salaries was 
transferred to the local communities along with the ﬁ nancial resources, but the local 
authorities still cannot decide the number of teachers in a school or the number of 
schools their community needs. Th ese decisions are made at the county department of 
education, a decentralized government institution.
In 2001 local public expenditure as a proportion of total public expenditure reached 
36.4%, while in 2002 it represented 35%. 
2.3 Forms of Funding for Local Capital Investments
 
Until 1998 investments at the local level were ﬁ nanced through earmarked transfers (for 
utilities such as water and gas, waste removal, heating units, roads and bridges, housing, 
etc.). Th ese transfers were eliminated with the Law on Local Public Finances, when 
investments became ﬁ nanced either through own revenues or borrowings.
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Although the transfer of responsibilities regarding investment ﬁ nancing is a positive 
step towards real local autonomy, problems occurred after the adoption of the law. Many 
local communities had insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial resources to support investments, unlike 
the central government, which could continue at full capacity. Because of this, they 
generally did not get involved in investment projects until the new ﬁ nancial instruments 
were created. In 2000, capital expenditures constituted 19.7% and in 2001 13.2% of 
total local government expenditures.
During 2001 the percentage of all types of capital expenditure of local communi-
ties decreased due to a weak synchronization between the transfer of ﬁ scal resources 
and the delegation of responsibilities to the local level. At the same time, the newly 
delegated social assistance projects required such a large share of the local budget that 
local authorities could not aﬀ ord to invest in development programs. 
Capital expenditure for local development can be ﬁ nanced through:
        •     Own revenues (local communities elaborate their own ﬁ scal policies, according 
to the provisions in the law);
        •     Grants based on two criteria: the contribution of the local public administra-
tion to the creation of public resources and the level of expenditures for public 
services;
        •     Internal and foreign resources (credits, bond issues, grants and non-reimbursable 
borrowings).
      
Municipalities ﬁ nance the largest portion of capital expenditures (47.4%) and towns 
the lowest (8.9% in 2000). 
Reform of the local public ﬁ nance system is deﬁ nitely moving ahead and will reach 
a new stage as local public authority representatives (the Local Authorities Federa-
tion in Romania) more strongly promote their needs and are successful in achieving 
changes. Th e experience of the ﬁ rst few years of implementation of the Law on Public 
Finances has already led central government to consider modiﬁ cations to the law in 
2003, in response to both the reality of implementation and the advocacy of the Local 
Authorities Federation. What public authorities are mainly seeking is increased ﬁ nancial 
autonomy as well as a better match between ﬁ scal decentralization and the assignment 
of responsibilities. 
Recommendations:
        •     Th e ﬁ scal decentralization process should be accelerated in order to allow stabil-
ity and predictability in the local budgeting process; 
        •     Th e local communities’ budgets should be created on a multi-annual basis to 
better contract and manage long-term investments.
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3.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN ROMANIA
3.1 General Regulations and Practices of Local Borrowing
As local borrowing is still at an incipient stage in Romania, we have room for further 
detailing of the relation between current regulations and the institutions’ ability to re-
spond to market needs. Several relevant examples will help to illustrate the situation.
From all last years’ statements, it appears that the future high-priority policy issue 
in Romania will be the establishment of a local government credit market.With a delay 
of more than ten years, Romania is now ready to follow its neighboring countries such 
as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, whose strong economic and political will 
back in the 1990s favored signiﬁ cant local development over the years. Th e following 
factors are part of the background that must be considered for improving the legal 
framework for municipal credit market development in Romania:
        •     A greater eﬀ ort is needed to match available resources with assigned responsibili-
ties, e.g., for disabled and handicapped support, child protection and capital 
expenditures for schools. Over the past decade local communities have faced 
an increasing burden when undertaking the capital investments necessary to 
provide local services at appropriate standards.
        •     Th e central government has limited resources available for capital investments. 
Its need to ensure macroeconomic stability directly aﬀ ects the transfers and 
grants coming from the State budget. Central authorities’ strategy for encourag-
ing the development of local borrowing consists more in a re-evaluation of the 
legislation than in the allocation of grants for local capital investments.
        •     Accession to the European Union (EU) will require a massive investment in 
environmental cleaning, much of it in landﬁ lls, incinerators, water treatment 
plants and other facilities at the local level. As in other countries aspiring to 
join the EU, the Romanian public sector will have to contribute signiﬁ cantly 
to  this eﬀ ort, helping to meet the twenty-ﬁ ve percent (25%) country match 
required for obtaining EU preaccession grants. Developing the ability to lever-
age local investment resources through access to private debt ﬁ nancing will be 
a precondition for local government units to contribute their share to the local 
public services’ undertaking.
Th e fact that there have been so few practices in the area of local government bor-
rowing indicates that while the responsibility primarily belongs to the local authorities, 
their success has also depended on central government assistance. One of the main 
conclusions of the present chapter is that the current legal framework governing local 
government borrowing needs substantial improvement. Local authorities associations 
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have already drafted concrete proposals that would improve the legislation, equipping 
them with more appropriate tools to successfully contract borrowings. Central govern-
ment, in its turn, is analyzing the possibility of amending the legislation to deal with 
institutional implications both at the central level (the role of Treasury, the banks, etc.) 
and the local level.
In this legislative review process, we must keep in mind that certain enthusiastic 
local authorities did decide to contract borrowings, despite the risks and the ﬁ nancial 
and legislative instability. Th ese examples lead us to believe that commitment is a very 
important factor. It is still hard to speak about wide-spread local borrowing practices 
in Romania, but those few examples provide an idea of what would be the minimum 
conditions necessary when deciding to contract loans. Local practices in Romania 
indicate that legislation is only one very important factor that needs to be in place. A 
local authority’s commitment and  long-term strategy, predictability of revenues and 
future years’ spending,  and local authorities’ will to help the community grow (thus its 
willingness to borrow the necessary funds to invest in development projects) are only a 
few conditions that also need to be fulﬁ lled.
3.1.1   Th e Legal Framework Regarding Local Government Borrowing
With the adoption of the Law on Local Public Finances in 1998 establishing the basic 
principles regarding municipal borrowing in Romania, the local government units could 
contract loans and issue bonds. Th e ﬁ rst loans were contracted in 1999 after the adoption 
of methods for implementation. 2001 was the year when the local communities issued 
the ﬁ rst bonds. Other aspects regarding local government borrowing are stipulated in 
the Law on Public Debt (no. 81/1999) as well as in various other normative acts like 
Orders issued by the Ministry of Public Finances such as:
        •     Order no. 291 (2000) regarding the calculation of the debt service;
        •     Order no. 7 (2001) that decides who is excepted from municipal bonds taxation;
        •     Order no. 1631 (1999) regarding the obligation of the local public authorities 
to send information about local government borrowings. 
All this intense legislative activity demonstrates visible progress that required constant 
improvement to legislation. 
Th e provisions of the Law on Local Public Finances apply to loans and bond issue 
procedures. It is the responsibility of the local and/or county council to approve internal 
or external medium and long-term borrowings that concern their particular community. 
According to the legislation, the mayor or the president of a county council, as execu-
tive authorities of the local communities at each of the two levels, are responsible for 
the implementation of this decision. In practice, the mayor’s and/or the county council 
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president’s initiative of issuing bonds is often easily approved by the local/county coun-
cils, as the ﬁ nal responsibility belongs to the executive level. No doubt the personality 
of the mayor or county council president and his previous managerial experience are 
other important factors that have an impact on the deliberative process.
Th e law stipulates two main instruments that local government units can use in 
borrowing (bonds and loans from commercial banks). Th e borrowing destination is 
clearly regulated by law: the funds coming from a loan or a bond issue can only be used 
to ﬁ nance local public investments or the reﬁ nancing of the local public debt. Local 
public authorities in Romania regard such funds as one important source of ﬁ nancing of 
their development projects, keeping the rest (the state transfers, local taxes and charges) 
for daily operational costs.
Th e Law on Local Public Finances also allows a temporary ﬁ nancing of cash deﬁ -
cits through short-term borrowed cash from the available funds in the State Treasury 
(Art.53, [1]). Whenever these situations occur, the contractor (the local community) 
has to deposit the money at the Treasury. No deposits in commercial banks are allowed. 
Today this is one of the most important topics for negotiation between central and local 
government. In the context of a banking system that is still not suﬃ  ciently stable in 
Romania, central government sees too high a risk in local communities depositing their 
funds at the commercial banks. On the other side, local communities demand more 
autonomy and expect to be treated as mature enough to distinguish between risky and 
safe banks. Besides, the interest on deposits at a bank is considered to be an important, 
useful and additional source of income that the Treasury is not, by law, able to provide. 
When new negotiations between local and central government were conducted in Febru-
ary 2003, the local authorities reiterated their request, emphasizing again that they were 
aware of the risks but also that the gains were important for their development projects, 
and the central government was less able to ﬁ nance these. Th e central government has 
remained cautious, no change being accepted so far.
Th e internal borrowings can be contracted and managed by local authorities in-
dependently, as no support from the central government is required. For each internal 
borrowing the Ministry of Finances need only be notiﬁ ed by the local or county council 
that decided to contract the loan or bond issue. Th e topic of notiﬁ cation is discussed 
later in the report. 
Central government has a legitimate interest in seeing that local communities do 
reach a balance between excessive debt and their own ﬁ nancial resources.  Most coun-
tries accomplish this through a debt limitation. Th e Law on Local Public Finances in 
Romania stipulates that the “annual debts representing the due installments deriving 
from contracted loans … shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total current 
revenues of the local budgets ….” (Article 51 [1]). Th is debt limitation has been in-
terpreted to mean that the overall local debt in any single year shall not exceed twenty 
percent (20%) of the total current revenues of the local budget. Governmental Order 
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no. 219/2000 speciﬁ es that the calculation of the debt service with a variable interest 
rate shall be based on the initial interest rate. At the same time, Governmental Order 
no. 219/ 2000 also addresses the issue of calculation of the debt service within the debt 
limitation that is guaranteed by a municipality.  Th e Order says that the entire local 
government guaranteed debt service shall be subject to the debt limitation. 
Th is provision is unnecessarily conservative. For instance, in the case of the proposed 
ﬁ fteen-year loans oﬀ ered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) to local communities (without a sovereign guaranty), the local government has 
to provide guarantees that the debt will be reimbursed. In order to secure this guarantee, 
the municipality will be required to create a “reserve fund” that is equal to the amount 
of the annual debt service of the loan.  In such a case, when the debt has been fully 
reimbursed during the year, it seems unnecessary to include such a guarantee for the 
debt limitation.  Additionally, as a result of current restrictions on commercial bank 
deposits, such funds would remain uninvested for ﬁ fteen years, substantially increasing 
the cost of ﬁ nancing. Furthermore, there are no executory procedures in place that the 
creditor can use in order to access such funds from the Treasury.
Th e Law on Local Public Finances stipulates that long and medium-term loans may 
be authorized only if their purpose is to ﬁ nance public investments of local interest or 
to reﬁ nance the local public debt (Article 48 [1]). Th is provision limits the municipal 
debt destination to infrastructure projects that are included in the “public domain” and 
sets an appropriate “public purpose” standard for all local government credits.  
Also, the Law on Local Public Finances stipulates that short-term Treasury loans 
for cash ﬂ ow deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing shall not exceed ﬁ ve percent (5%) of a local government’s 
budgeted revenues (Article 53 [2], [1]).  Additionally, the law stipulates that such loans 
shall not exceed the amount that the local government is able to cover during the re-
spective ﬁ scal year. 
As we have emphasized in the report, revisions to the legal framework regarding local 
government borrowing are currently under debate, and many of the above-mentioned 
issues are now being extensively discussed among the main actors involved.
Recommendations:
        •     Th e Law on Local Public Finances allows no exceptions to the maximum amounts 
set forth, should any local community plan to access more. Consideration should 
be given to a more ﬂ exible framework. It could be  stipulated that if certain 
criteria are accomplished (i.e., the own local revenue base can support a greater 
amount of the debt, or creditworthiness indicators are better compared to the 
maximum level registered by local government units of the same category), the 
debt limitation might be exceeded. Such a procedure for exception would allow: 
i) additional ﬁ nancing for more creditworthy municipalities, ii) ﬁ nancing of 
investments that have a positive net impact on cash ﬂ ow, e.g., energy conserva-
tion projects;
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        •     Th e Law on Local Public Finances should include clearer regulations regarding 
the calculation of the debt limit;
        •     Local government units should be allowed to make deposits at commercial banks. 
A step forward would also be the decision of the central government to permit 
local communities to collect interest on the deposits in the State Treasury;
        •     Consideration should also be given to the possibility of eliminating the restric-
tion on short-term debt for the ﬁ nancing of “temporary cash deﬁ cits.” Local 
communities’ arguments in favor of ﬁ nancing public investment projects with 
short-term debt should be more carefully analyzed. For example, they might 
need this either in anticipation of a long-term debt to be issued later, or to 
ﬁ nance some preliminary costs of a public short-term investment project.
3.1.2   Monitoring and Database Regarding Local Government Debt
Th e Law on Local Public Finances stipulates that “a municipality may contract loans 
only after the Ministry of Finance is informed about the intention” (Article 48 [6]). 
Th e law does not state when the Ministry of Finances should be notiﬁ ed, nor what the 
standard form of notiﬁ cation should be.  
Local government units are required to book all their debts and store the informa-
tion in their annual accounting report (Article 52 [1]). Th e registry book must include 
“details of such debt” and any other information required by the Ministry of Finances 
(Article 52 [2]). On the same matter, the Ministry of Finances has issued Order no. 
1631/1999 providing details on precisely what information should be included in the 
public registry.  
Legal provisions regarding data collection on local government borrowing are 
thus in place. In practice, however, the Ministry of Finances has no national database. 
Th erefore, no nation-wide, clear view of the extent of the local public debt is available 
to the public. Also, no detailed data about the local government units that contracted 
loans is centralized. Th e role of the Ministry of Finances is crucial in providing current, 
updated nation-wide information about the local authorities’ experiences and capacity 
in our area of interest. A ﬂ uent exchange of information between the central authorities 
and local communities also needs to be in place, with both parties transparently shar-
ing information. Central authorities would beneﬁ t greatly from up-to-date knowledge 
of local ﬁ nancial capacity, and could better determine the most  appropriate ﬁ nancial 
development policies. Th ese, in turn, would bring more advantages to the local com-
munities and would increase cooperation between the two levels.
As the legal provisions require, it is the primary role of the local authorities to inform 
central government on their situation regarding the local debt. But in interviews with 
central government representatives while developing this report, it became clear that the 
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representatives of the Ministry of Finances do not see the task of updating a national 
database as part of their role.  One explanation could be that they are not suﬃ  ciently 
aware of their role in ascertaining a clear, overall picture of local borrowing in Romania, 
or of the value in having a local perspective on how the municipal borrowing system 
should be regulated. On the other hand, the local authorities perceive notifying and 
informing central government about their local debt and borrowing as an interference of 
central government in their local autonomy and in the local decision-making process.
Sensitive to EU recommendations, central government has often overreacted, acting 
with excessive caution in demanding information or notiﬁ cation from the local govern-
ment. Obviously, the concept of local self-governance is perceived very diﬀ erently by 
the many public authorities at diﬀ erent levels in Romania.
Th ere is no suﬃ  cient monitoring of the municipal debt process. According to the 
current legislation, neither the local government unit nor the lender should notify the 
Ministry of Finances in case of a default. Consideration should be given to requiring a 
default notiﬁ cation in a public register to be stored at the Ministry of Finances and, of 
course, open to the public. 
Closely linked to eﬀ ective economic development and eﬃ  cient use of public re-
sources is the improvement of municipal budgeting and ﬁ nancial reporting practices. 
Preparation of local budgets and ﬁ nancial reporting are two important and intricately 
connected parts of local ﬁ scal management. In Romania, both processes are subject 
to strict national regulations. Information from the local level plays a crucial role in 
the drafting of the State budget. A budget is line-itemed in order to clearly indicate 
the inputs (the ﬁ nancial resources) as well as the appropriate level of expenditures that 
need to be realistically planned. Local government ﬁ scal information is based on the 
chart of accounts for budgetary (public) organizations. It is up to each local authority 
to describe in detail the local ﬁ nancial report according to the information that it needs 
internally. All this detailed information should be integrated into the legal requirements 
and limitations.
Budgeting and ﬁ nancial reporting are more than just a set of procedural rules for 
spending public money; they could have a very important impact on local development. 
A well-structured budget may be used as a tool when implementing policies that are 
in accordance with local needs, and reporting might serve as an instrument to provide 
feedback on outcomes of the policies. A sectorial or program-type approach promotes 
allocative eﬃ  ciency, i.e., allocation of resources from lesser to higher priority sectors 
or programs. Th e application of performance indicators or output indicators is closely 
linked to operational eﬃ  ciency, providing information about the cost-eﬃ  ciency of the 
service provider units.
In short, local budgeting and reporting procedures in Romania currently entail the 
following problems: (i) lack of strategic vision in the context of the budgeting preparation 
process, (ii) lack of regional and sectorial perspective, (iii) current reporting standards 
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that do not allow credit analysis, and (iv) limited access to comparative information on 
municipal ﬁ nances and service delivery. Th e main problems mentioned above are inter-
connected. In the absence of a clear strategy regarding the delivery of services, output 
(performance) criteria will not have been   identiﬁ ed, and there can be no measurable 
service goals and standards if performance indicators are lacking. 
Most of these problems cannot be solved by simply introducing new regulations. 
Innovative approaches and methods should be disseminated to professionals and local 
practitioners. One possible option is to replace the current organization-oriented, input-
based budgeting methods with output-oriented programs and budgeting mechanisms. An 
important step in this direction might be to develop and introduce key service delivery 
indicators, ensuring that these are included in both the budget plans and the annual 
reports, and that information on outputs is fed back to the budget of the subsequent 
year.
Finally, another problematic area is the publicity for and public accessibility to the 
ﬁ scal data of local government units. Information on the local municipal budgets and the 
budgets of municipally owned service providers, including balance sheets and property 
registration data, is centralized by the local oﬃ  ces of the Ministry of Finances. Although 
the government annually collects several hundreds of expenditure and revenue variables 
for ﬁ scal monitoring purposes, this information is kept conﬁ dential at the national level. 
Only the Ministry of Finances has access to detailed ﬁ scal data from local government 
units. Th e existing data-synthesized charts, although very important, are insuﬃ  cient for 
any elaborated analyses on matters regarding communities’ ﬁ nancial capacities.
Th ere is no legal obligation for the Ministry of Finances to transparently communi-
cate the local governments’ debt. Th e only requirement refers to the local governments 
whose budget has to be published in a local newspaper so that all citizens can read it. 
It also should be noted that the requirement refers to the estimated budget and not to 
the executed budget. 
Emphasizing the importance of publicity and accessibility to information regarding 
local public debt, our recommendations are:
Recommendations:
        •     A special department should be established under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Finances, whose responsibility will be to build and constantly update the 
database regarding local government borrowing. We would recommend that the 
Ministry of Finances require a Notice that contains the same detailed information 
as is included in the local government units’ public registry. 
        •       Careful consideration should be given to the information to be reported, to 
ensure that all relevant information about the debt is included.  In addition 
to the information required through the Order, to be contained in the local 
government units’ public registry, a certiﬁ cation of compliance with the debt 
limitation should also be solicited. Additionally, notiﬁ cation by both a lender and 
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a borrower should, upon default of payment, be an obligation. Such information 
should be accessible to the public.
        •     Th is current inventory could also be annually updated, with special attention 
being regularly paid to improving local government units’ debt reporting 
practices. Moreover, it could also be maintained as a public registry open 
to prospective lenders in order to assist them when underwriting the local 
government credits.  
        •     Should any default on a local government credit occur, both the local community 
and the lender should be asked by law to notify the Ministry of Finances over 
a certain period of time (e.g., in ten days).  
3.1.3   Regulations Regarding Insolvency
As complex as it is, and even though it has been revised almost annually during the 
last few years, the legal framework in Romania has no provisions to regulate municipal 
insolvency situations. Th e Law on Local Public Finances does have some remedial pro-
cedures that relate solely to short-term loans owed in the Treasury.
Laws and procedures need to be drafted soon to allow better management of local 
government insolvency and to clarify its rights. Th e regulations should also stipulate 
which policies need to be in place in order to assist a local community in regaining a 
stable ﬁ nancial status. Th e central government, the local government units themselves, 
or the local government units’ creditors should be able to initiate such procedures. Th e 
deﬁ nition of local government insolvency, as well as the rules and conditions under 
which a procedure to address municipal insolvency may be engaged should be also 
very clearly stated. When interviewed about the policies regarding the medium/long 
term insolvency, most respondents have agreed that, if insolvency regulations were to 
be adopted, the remedial procedures should primarily fall under the responsibility of 
the local authorities. Central government should have a limited role, more in the sense 
of assisting the local community. 
In cases involving the incapacity of local communities to reimburse bond issues, 
the law stipulates that each creditor of the municipal bonds should individually try to 
recover the money. Probably not a unique case, the Romanian experience has shown 
that it is in a way unrealistic to imagine that each municipal creditor will manage to 
collect individually what is owed. Th e legal framework should be amended to provide 
the creditors with more appropriate tools to act in an eﬃ  cient and organized manner, 
nominating a person to legally represent their interests.
Closely linked with insolvency is the creditworthiness of the local government 
units. Neither laws nor regulations require creditworthiness analyses or evaluations. 
Since the banks were not very active in contracting borrowings to municipalities, such 
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analyses were conducted on a very casual basis. Only a few municipalities undertook 
such analysis, for their own ﬁ nancial management purposes exclusively.
As yet there are no local rating agencies oﬀ ering such analyses. Also, no international 
rating agency has provided a rating to a Romanian local government unit. Some years 
ago the city of Sinaia tried to contract such a rating. Th e Mayor of Sinaia planned to 
issue bonds on the European market, but at that time this was possible only after the 
approval of the Ministry of Public Finances. Despite the favorable perception of Ro-
mania in the Europe ﬁ nancial markets, the approval was not granted. As was already 
mentioned, it is very important to have a mutually beneﬁ cial relation between local and 
central government when it comes to contracting a borrowing.
Banks are involved in undertaking credit analysis as part of their internal rules since 
they have become more and more interested (but still cautious) in working with the 
local government units. In most cases such rules are of little use to a local government, 
but more to commercial companies, given the fact that they are the most important 
clients of the commercial banks. 
Recommendations:
        •     Th ere is no clear legal regulation on local government insolvency. Law and 
procedures should be developed for managing an insolvent municipality, 
its relationships and rights with regard to creditors. Th e deﬁ nition of local 
government insolvency, as well as the rules and conditions under which a 
procedure to address municipal insolvency may be engaged, should be very 
clearly elaborated; 
        •     As the local government borrowing market develops, the independent rating 
agencies should be more active since their involvement will contribute to further 
development of the local credit market in Romania;
        •     A set of policies to assist a municipality in regaining a stable ﬁ nancial position 
should be drafted. Depending on the rules that are adopted, such procedures 
could be initiated by the central government, the local government unit itself, 
or, eventually, the local communities’ creditors;
        •     Th e regulations regarding bond issues’ creditors should be more clearly deﬁ ned, 
so that they would act in a more eﬃ  cient manner while trying to recover their 
debt.
3.1.4   Guarantees for Local Government Borrowing
Th e largest source of local revenues is still represented by transferred central governmental 
funds. Th is can easily be seen when the existing overall ﬁ nancial resources and estimations 
regarding the local communities’ near future ﬁ nancial capacity are analyzed. A number 
of countries use legislatively authorized “intercepts” of such intergovernmental transfers 
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to enhance the ability of local governments to provide safety for their borrowings. Such 
intercepts can provide a strong incentive to the credit market without any implied central 
government guarantee or additional “costs” of the Treasury. Own revenues thus represent 
the most frequently used form of guarantee in local government borrowing. 
Th e Law on Local Public Finances stipulates that a local community has to guarantee 
any contracted loan with own revenues, except when the ultimate use of the loan could 
also be ﬁ nanced through earmarked transfers from the State budget (Article 48(3)). Th e 
Law on Local Public Finances authorizes municipalities to pledge other transfers from 
the central government, e.g., quota and other amounts derived from certain incomes 
of the State budget. 
Although the Law on Local Public Finances does not include any provision related 
to securing municipal debt through physical property, the general principles of Roma-
nian legislation would not prohibit securing municipal debt with a mortgage on local 
government property in the private domain. Although this may involve a decrease in 
collateral, it is a way of securing loans that bank lenders are familiar with, and it could 
have a role in the initial stages of bank lending to local communities.  However, the 
Law on the Public Domain, which will classify the “private domain” property that is 
eligible to be used as guarantee, has not yet been fully implemented by the government. 
Th is has adversely aﬀ ected the ability of local communities to use physical property as 
a guarantee. A shift away from physical guarantees to general obligation and revenue-
secured debt may be a signiﬁ cant precondition for the sustainable development of a 
local government credit market.
Th e current legal framework has a foreclosure procedure that further decreases 
the value of physical property as guarantee. An amendment that became eﬀ ective in 
January 2001 expedited the process of enforcement over movable assets (no. 99/1999). 
However, the foreclosure procedure for immovable or real property remains a time-
consuming process.
Another form of guarantee is the reserve fund. Th is is a ﬁ nancing device that sets 
aside an amount of funds, usually from the borrowing total. It is held separate from 
the other funds of the local government and is available only for debt payments when 
the local community is unable to make the payments.  In such a case, the municipality 
is required to replenish the reserve fund within a well-speciﬁ ed period of time.  Th is 
device enhances the security on a debt instrument by providing a source of funding for 
debt service payments in the case of cash ﬂ ow disruptions that would otherwise result 
in a payment default on the debt.  Th e Law on Local Public Finances has no provisions 
to allow or to prohibit such a security device. As we have already mentioned, certain 
local government guarantee programs require the municipal guarantor to create a reserve 
fund equal to the guaranteed annual debt service. But unless such funds were permit-
ted to be held in interest-bearing accounts, the guaranteeing municipality would pay a 
substantial negative arbitrage cost in addition to such reserve funds.
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Th e Law on Local Public Finances expressly states that the central government can 
guarantee the internal loans, if conditions such as ﬁ nancial capacity of local government 
units are fulﬁ lled.
Th e Law on Local Public Finances also stipulates that the “government may oﬀ er 
guarantees to external municipal ‘loans’ in accordance with the terms of the Law on 
Public Debt” (Article 55).  Th e Law on Public Debt authorizes the government to of-
fer guarantees on debt issued in the domestic currency (Article 27). Despite all eﬀ orts 
to amend the Law on Local Public Finances in such way that the central government 
would guarantee the domestic debt, it was not changed. Discussions created nothing 
but confusion.  Since the Law on Local Public Finances does not prohibit such a guar-
antee, and the Law on Public Debt clearly speaks about such a guarantee, it becomes 
the Ministry of Finances’ role to further debate the issue and identify the appropriate 
solution, harmonizing the provisions.
Private guarantees or insurance on municipal debt have been widely used to reduce 
creditors’ risk and enhance the municipality’s creditworthiness. Private insurance com-
panies insured almost half of all municipal bonds that have been issued so far for the 
one-time payment of debt service. Unlike free government guarantees, private insurance 
does not create “perverse” eﬃ  ciency incentives.  A premium is paid for guarantee cover-
age. A guarantor has well-trained staﬀ  to assess ﬁ nancial risk, or a project’s ﬁ nancing 
stability.  Th e greater the risk, the bigger the premium that will be charged to obtain 
the guarantee. However, this is not a substitute for local governments’ creditworthi-
ness, as the guarantors will only guarantee the debt of communities considered to be 
creditworthy.
Normally, lending banks in Romania get similar insurance from companies guar-
anteeing the loan reimbursements. Further documentation regarding the possibility of 
developing this option for local government debt transactions is necessary. 
Recommendations:
        •     Currently, most ﬁ nancial institutions require real estate guarantees and just a 
few allow local authorities to guarantee the loan with their annual own revenues. 
Many local authorities in Romania do not have a clear understanding of what 
is private or public property of the local government. Only a Governmental 
Decree for each and every locality can establish the nature of property in this 
regard. Under these circumstances, the procedures should be simpliﬁ ed and 
decentralized to the level of the local councils; 
        •     A shift away from physical guarantees to general obligation and revenue- secured 
debt is recommended as a signiﬁ cant precondition for sustained development 
of a local government credit market;
        •     Th rough speciﬁ c banking mechanisms, the commercial banks should be encour-
aged to accept collateral forms of guarantee from the local public authorities;
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        •     Local communities should be allowed to deposit the money coming from the 
local budget reserve fund at commercial banks, thus oﬀ ering a supplementary 
guarantee.
3.1.5   Th e Role of Central Government in the Local Borrowing Process
Even in a decentralized public ﬁ nance system, the central government retains a legitimate 
interest in the integrity of municipal budgeting and ﬁ nancial management. Th e ﬁ rst 
priority of a local government unit should be to provide the best local services to the 
community. A second fundamental priority is to prepare and execute balanced operat-
ing budgets. Th e central government has one critical objective in ensuring compliance 
with legally mandated procedures, and that is to limit the consolidated public sector’s 
outstanding debt to comply with the international agreements, to preserve the govern-
ment’s ability to borrow from abroad, and most importantly, to build a solid base for 
the national economy and future participation in the European Union. 
It is very important to protect the local government (and the central government 
indirectly) from imprudent loans that could threaten the safety of the overall public ﬁ -
nance system and put pressure on the national government to deliver costly bailouts.
Still, under existing circumstances, it is not advisable that the Ministry of Finances 
be authorized to exercise prior restraint on municipal debt issuance. Th e Law on Local 
Public Finances suggests a careful approach by not requiring the Ministry of Finances’ 
approval for any municipal debt unless it is an external debt. As already mentioned, the 
Ministry of Finances has repealed a prior order that required approval of local govern-
ment bond issues. A statutory debt limitation is used to decide a maximum “limit” on 
the debt that a local community can issue. 
Th e heart of the rationale for private capital market development is the conﬁ dence 
that the self-interest of banks and other ﬁ nancial institutions will motivate them to as-
sess the capacity of the borrowers in reimbursing their debts. To duplicate this function 
requires a sophisticated institutional capacity that the Ministry of Finances or another 
appropriate agency should develop. Even when this institutional capacity exists, there 
is little reason to believe that the monitoring agency will do a better job in assessing 
credit risks than the lenders or the rating agencies (or, for that matter, the communities 
themselves). Moreover, central government review and approval of local government 
credits can easily imply the idea of an implicit guarantee, with municipal bondholders 
or lenders likely to hold the oversight agency responsible for any payment default.
Th e role of the central government in the new ﬁ nancial environment (in which 
more and more local communities are seeking other means through which to supple-
ment their local revenues) is currently the subject of debate. Successful local authorities 
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(experienced and ﬁ nancially independent) would expect no assistance from the central 
government other than channeling the necessary information from top to bottom and 
vice versa. Th e ones whose experience is only now being consolidated claim more sub-
stantial support from the central authorities, whose involvement they feel will bring 
more conﬁ dence that they ultimately will not fail. 
3.2 The Scale of Local Indebtedness
As previously mentioned, the local public authorities will not have access to any type 
of borrowing if the total annual debt (consisting of interest on existing loans, and other 
interest and commissions including loans that are still to be contracted) exceeds 20% of 
current revenues. Th e percentage will not change, should the size of the local govern-
ment unit or ﬁ nancial capacity vary. Some local authorities in Romania are advocating 
for the Ministry of Finances to amend the legislation so that a city that is ﬁ nancially 
stable can borrow beyond the current limitation.
Th e debt service ratio is calculated as follows: 
Debt service ratio = 
Th e annual debt
 Total current revenues
Periodical estimations on debt service ratio are needed as it can vary from one year 
to another. With regular estimations not only will the central government be constantly 
aware of the size of the debt, but also the most ﬁ nancially successful, self-developed 
local communities will have more initiative and incentive to grow.
According to the Law on Local Public Finances, local communities can contract 
short, medium and long-term loans. But in reality they can now contract medium 
and long-term loans only. As noted earlier, if local government units plan to contract 
short-term loans, they can only access funds from the State Treasury with the purpose 
of reﬁ nancing the cash ﬂ ow.
Today, there is no centralized data available that would show the geographic distri-
bution of the local debt. Th e existing information, however,  suggests that in Romania 
it is the cities and big towns that have so far contracted the most numerous and also 
most consistent (in terms of the borrowed amount) borrowings. No county council 
has accessed the internal market of loans or issued bonds for supplementing its own 
budget so far.
Macroeconomic development has an important impact on the Romanian credit 
market and on the scale of local indebtedness. Until now, the eﬀ ect of ﬂ uctuations in 
macroeconomic indicators on local borrowings could not be comprehensively estimated. 
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Th e practice of local government borrowing is still in its early stages and there is not 
suﬃ  cient data to allow correlations. At the same time, it is obvious that the development 
of local borrowing, in its turn, also directly inﬂ uences macroeconomic growth and/or 
stability. It is in fact a dual process and the policy-makers need to be aware of how the 
correlations are inter-related.
In theory it is suggested that an increase in the inﬂ ation rate will cause a decrease in 
the lending rate. Information from the Romanian case shows an upward trend in the in-
ﬂ ation rate as well as a parallel downward trend in the interest rate. Th is might encourage 
the local authorities to access local borrowing because crediting will be stimulated.
Other factors that are involved in the decision-making process regarding the size of 
a loan or a bond issue to be contracted are:
        •     the estimate of revenues and expenditures of a local government unit;
        •     the estimate of the resources that will be available after covering the operational 
expenditures;
        •     the net debt per capita;
        •     the experience of the local community in managing public debt;
        •     the available resources to allow the development and the maintenance of the 
project for which a loan is to be contracted;
        •     the consideration of analyses regarding major economic and political aspects 
(especially in Romania where the legal framework is unstable and frequently 
amended);
        •     the willingness to accept risk.
 As for the supervision of the local borrowing process, the central government has 
two reasons for concern other than compliance of local communities with the law:
        •     Th e need to carefully monitor and limit the public debt in order to comply with 
international standards, while allowing the government to contract loans from 
international organizations. Th ese practices will create the ground for a more 
rapid but also professional EU integration process. Th e consolidated national 
public deﬁ cit includes the deﬁ cits of all local budgets. In this sense, the public 
debt in Romania (which includes the national and subnational debt) has ﬂ uctu-
ated as follows: 
            –    1997—27.7% of GDP
            –    1998—28.0%
            –    1999—26.67%
            –    2000—29.3% 
            Th ese ﬁ gures are far under the limit of 60% recommended by the EU.
        •     Risky borrowings of local communities may aﬀ ect the integrity of the pub-
lic ﬁ nance system, forcing the central government to undertake “expensive” 
actions.
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A consolidated ﬁ nancial environment, in which central government assists local 
public authorities ﬁ nancially unable to deal with reimbursement of loans, will strengthen 
arguments concerning the need to carry out legislation revision. It is true that in the early 
stages of development, central authorities in Romania had to become closely involved 
with the diﬀ erent local communities, assessing their needs and assisting with the neces-
sary processes in constructing a loan. Such experiences, no matter how diﬃ  cult, have a 
value and importance that must be considered when framing arguments for changing 
the law. Future weaknesses could be avoided if recommendations were made based on 
prior experiences. Of particular value would be recommendations regarding a better 
consultation process between diﬀ erent levels of government, and ones concerning non-
partisan assistance from central government to the local communities.
Also, since these practices (loans, bond issues) are so new in Romania, borrowers 
with insuﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial capacity among the local communities will naturally have a 
direct eﬀ ect on the conﬁ dence of potential new clients. It is imperative that all interested 
parties have free access to information, learning from others’ experiences while carefully 
assessing their ﬁ nancial capacity, and also being assisted by more experienced central 
government experts whenever necessary.
Recommendations:
        •     Th e annual State Budget Law should include information about the local internal 
public debt. Currently it only includes information about the total internal and 
external public debt;
        •     Policies regarding local government borrowing should be periodically correlated 
with the existing macroeconomic situation;
        •     Th e consultation process between diﬀ erent levels of government should become 
permanent in order to improve practices and avoid future failures in the local 
government borrowing process.
3.3 The Debate on Establishing an Investment Bank 
      for Local Communities in Romania
Romania has no specialized institution in charge of managing or facilitating the local 
government borrowing process. At times there have been discussions about creating an 
Investment Bank for Local Communities (IBLC), following the examples of diﬀ erent 
Western European municipal banks. In evaluating the possibility of establishing a bank 
whose clients would only be the local authorities, the central government has analyzed the 
factors that will directly have an impact. Financial ﬂ uctuations are obviously a main fac-
tor, as Romanian internal resources are insuﬃ  cient for ﬁ nancing such a project. Th e cost 
of capitalization (a serious potential burden for the local authorities still not ﬁ nancially 
stabilized) was the second major concern that has been deeply analyzed. Th e experience 
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of other countries when capitalizing their Local Authorities Bank was studied, and the 
Romanian Government and local authorities are currently accumulating and analyzing 
all the information gathered. Finally, the criteria for contracting loans were discussed, 
since preferential loans could easily undermine the credibility of the whole initiative.
Th e idea of establishing an Investment Bank for Local Communities was generated 
by the many problems that local authorities faced in the local government borrowing 
process. No doubt the idea arose as a compromise between local and central authorities. 
Th e local communities’ suggestion was that ﬁ nancial operations would no longer be 
managed exclusively by the Treasury, since the responsiveness of banks was perceived 
as being more rapid and therefore more helpful. To fully explore the possibility of 
establishing an IBLC, central government has had consultations with a number of foreign 
experts. Th e Dutch and Danish experiences in this area are only two of a number that 
were closely researched. Of these two, the Dutch one is seen as inappropriate for Romania 
at the present time, mainly because the chief responsibility in the capitalization process 
there belongs to the Ministry of Finances. Th e Danish example is still being carefully 
assessed, with some analysts expressing concern that in this model the local authorities 
may expose themselves to too high risks in the process of becoming shareholders. Th e 
analysis is continuing with other questions still not fully answered, including  the steps 
in the process towards a proper capitalization, as well as the role of the bank in relation 
to the rest of the state institutions.
Th e arguments in favor of establishing the bank focus on the following: the 
deposit risk attenuation, a lower interest rate, and the possibility of contributing to the 
capitalization of the bank. Another aspect that will stimulate local communities’ interest 
in contracting local government borrowings is related to the guarantees. In these new 
circumstances, the local communities could provide a guarantee only with their current 
revenues. At the same time, the bank could better represent the speciﬁ c interests of the 
local communities and could provide consultancy services that the commercial banks 
are not delivering today. 
An important matter that should be regulated is the relation between the 
capitalization process and the possibility of contracting a loan. Th e latter should not 
be directly dependent on the local administration’s capacity to capitalize. Political 
interference, which was perceived by many international analysts as being a dangerous 
characteristic of the developing Romanian democracy, should be avoided. If not, small 
local communities and public authorities that have limited access to banking information 
will be disadvantaged. 
Th ere are clearly both advantages and risks involved. Still, it is the general opinion that 
the IBLC should not remain the unique source of available funds that local communities 
can access when borrowing. Th e current commercial banking community should also 
be strengthened, as their services should continue to serve the local communities’ needs. 
Local public authorities have been positive about the project of creating the bank. In 
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fact, 92.6% of local authorities questioned in a survey conducted by the Institute for 
Public Policy in Romania in July 20024 were in favor of the project of establishing the 
bank. Th ere was an 80% response rate to the questionnaire.
For successful development of the local authorities, it is imperative that the future 
IBCL act with transparency and professionalism at all times, respecting the principles 
of trust and mutual cooperation between all parties. Th e temptation to subjectively 
allocate preferential loans is a very sensitive, problematic area in the Romanian banking 
community. However, the bank will grow as a solid and credible institution only if 
no preferential loans are approved on the basis of political interference, or because 
of clientelistic relations between the mayor and the bank delegate. Th e procedures, 
methodology, obligations and rights related to loans should be well explained and widely 
communicated through all media channels in Romania.
Recommendations:
        •     Th e study of the feasibility of establishing the IBLC should continue to analyze 
all options; 
        •     Th e decision about establishing the IBLC should not be taken without consulta-
tion with all actors involved;
        •     If the IBLC is established, local communities’ access to other commercial banks 
should not be limited.
3.4 Bond Issues: Specifi c Considerations
Th e speciﬁ c nature of the bond issue process requires a closer look at several other 
important aspects, such as the proﬁ le of the underwriters and the role of the ﬁ nancial 
consultant.
Two Romanian banks have been the underwriters for most of the bonds issued 
in Romania in 2001 and 2002: the Romanian Commercial Bank and the Romanian 
Development Bank—Societe Generale Group. Th e major investors are the banks, the 
investment funds and the companies (shipyards, oil companies) and, to a lesser extent, 
the insurance companies. No pension fund has invested in municipal bonds so far. Also, 
just a few of the underwriters originate from the town or city the bonds were issued in. 
From this perspective it is clear that the citizens are not necessarily directly connected 
to the bond issue.
At ﬁ rst, the joint bond issue projects of local communities and banks were mostly 
initiated by the local communities. But in time the banks also became initiators, ap-
proaching other local authorities more frequently as they began to “enjoy” operating 
locally. Interviews with bank representatives, whose opinions have relevance to the 
report, showed that the two banks were very interested in this new type of partnership. 
Although concerned with the local authorities’ ﬁ nancial solvency and their capacity to 
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meet the reimbursement deadlines, the banks admitted that these partnerships were and 
would continue to be an important part of the future development of Romania.
With some other new banks struggling to enter the market, the two banks identiﬁ ed 
became ﬂ exible and more receptive to local solicitations. Th eir role changed over  time 
from that of a typically rigid loan provider to more of a partner providing consultancy 
services and dealing with each situation in a ﬂ exible manner. According to the local 
authorities that were also interviewed, this improved the whole loans and bond issuing 
process.
Th e new role of the banks in the entire local ﬁ nancial development and decentraliza-
tion process in Romania raises new questions about relations among the three partners: 
the bank, the local community and central government, and the Ministry of Public 
Finances. Th e role of this last institution, in particular, is constantly questioned.
Th e competition between the two banks that is very visible these days will undoubt-
edly increase the quality of their services, which will reach a larger number of local 
communities and increase the attractiveness of the two ﬁ nancial mechanisms (bond 
issuing and bank loans) to local communities.
Th e consultant’s role becomes very important in the issuing of bonds. In addition to 
developing speciﬁ c knowledge and staﬀ  within the local government units, most local 
authorities that issued bonds worked with an independent consultancy company. Th e 
consultants assist local authorities through the entire process of municipal borrowing by: 
        •     analyzing the indebtedness capacity of local government units and recommend-
ing  the amount of money to be borrowed;
        •       analyzing other alternatives on the market: Treasury bonds, borrowing credits, 
external borrowing, etc;
        •       suggesting the optimum moment for a bond issue, the nominal value of the 
bonds and the maturity rate; 
        •       negotiating the interest rate;
        •     estimating the macroeconomic trends and interest rates on the banking and 
capital market;
        •     analyzing the budgetary ﬂ ow of local government units and making predictions 
for the following years, etc.
Th e bond market is less politicized and more transparent than the bank market in 
Romania. Also, the procedure for issuing bonds is less complicated than for contracting 
banking loans, the bureaucracy being considerably reduced in the case of  bond issues. 
Another element that makes bond issues more attractive than other ﬁ nancial instruments 
is the fact that the interest rate is lower because of competition among the economic 
agents (most of the bond issues in Romania were oversubscribed). 
Th e bond issue is becoming a popular instrument used by local communities in 
Romania in their eﬀ orts to better support local investments. Still, the procedure is not 
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suﬃ  ciently regulated and further legislative steps need to be taken in order to facilitate 
an easier access to the bond market. In addition, the incomplete consolidation of this 
practice undermines its perception as a trust-worthy mechanism for improving the 
local revenues.
Recommendations:
        •     Th e Law on Local Public Finances should include a distinct section regulating 
bond issue procedures;
        •     Legal provisions regarding bond issues should be correlated with the legislation 
regarding public debt and guarantees;
        •     Speciﬁ c expertise should be further developed within the local public adminis-
tration institutions; one suggestion might be the establishment of a department 
specializing in loans and bond issues within the economic department of the 
local public authority.
 
3.5 Local Policies on Borrowing and Debt Management
3.5.1   Th e Attitude of Local Government Units towards Borrowing
Local government units accessed internal borrowing for the ﬁ rst time in 1999. Th at year 
and the next, most loans were small and their role was to co-ﬁ nance local investment 
projects. Focşani (an important city in eastern Romania) was the ﬁ rst local community 
to contract a loan from a commercial bank. Th is was a loan of 25 billion lei (approx. 
USD 192,000 at the currency rate of that time), contracted for ﬁ nancing the expansion 
of Moldova Market Place. At that time funds were borrowed for the purpose of sup-
plementing existing but insuﬃ  cient local revenues. Local authorities in Romania, still 
dependent on centrally allocated resources, are interested in exploiting other means of 
increasing their local resources. However, they are not necessarily equipped to better 
ﬁ nance their development initiatives. 
During 1999–2000, just a few local government units borrowed funds to supplement 
their own revenues. State budget transfers and local taxes and charges are optimum for 
covering the operational costs, while investment projects require additional ﬁ nancial 
support. Th e local authorities were cautious about taking risks, as ﬁ scal decentraliza-
tion was in its early stages and the local revenues still lacked predictability and stability. 
On the other hand, local government borrowing was also a novelty for the rest of the 
partners involved, such as the banks. Th e banks were greatly concerned that they would 
not receive a guarantee; insolvency was not clearly deﬁ ned in the legislation and the 
local communities were forbidden to make deposits at commercial banks. Still, even in 
that quite risky environment, two solid banks decided to get involved (the Romanian 
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Commercial Bank and the Romanian Bank for Development), becoming an active part 
of the local government borrowing process during its ﬁ rst stage in Romania.
In 2001, the ﬁ rst two local government units to issue bonds were Predeal and 
Mangalia, two small tourist towns (mountain and summer resorts). Eight other local 
communities followed them in 2002 and the popularity of the bond issues has grown 
every year. Th e success stories immediately became an inspiration for the rest. Indi-
vidual, direct consultations among the mayors have clariﬁ ed questions about whether to 
take “such risks” or not, a question that became prevalent among the local authorities. 
Although not fully understood in its complexity, the mechanism of the bond issue is 
certainly a question to reﬂ ect upon for many of the local managers who are committed 
to developing the local community through attracting additional ﬁ nancial resources.
In July 2002,5 a survey of the Institute for Public Policy showed that 60.7% of 
the local authorities questioned answered “yes” to the question: “Are you planning to 
initiate a bond issue during the following months?” In practice the number might turn 
out to be lower, but it at least it indicates that local authorities in Romania were aware 
of how important it is to explore other means of supplementing local revenues and 
that issuing bonds could be one possible solution. A local community needs to know 
that risk is involved (many types of risks, sometimes almost uncontrollable), but it also 
requires a realistic evaluation of the local ﬁ nancial capacity at that moment and in the 
near future. At the same time, it requires vision as much as it involves pragmatism and 
strong support from the ﬁ nal beneﬁ ciary of the project: the local community.
As the existing centralized data show, 12 local communities (including big cities) 
contracted loans during the period of October–December, 2001. Th e total value of the 
contracted loans was 934,000 million lei (approximately USD 350,000). Two of them 
chose a bond issue (Predeal and Mangalia), and the remaining ten contracted loans 
from commercial banks. Th e clearest proof that the mechanisms are slowly becoming 
understood and assimilated by the local beneﬁ ciaries consists in the higher number of 
loans contracted from commercial banks or bond issues in 2002.  Eight of these were 
bond issues to be reimbursed in 2007,6 and 30 were bank loans.
As the data in Table 7.1 below shows, the funds raised through the bond issues 
progressively increased while the interest rate decreased (see Figure 7.8). Th is situation 
may reﬂ ect the banks’ increasing conﬁ dence in the system, as more local government 
units engaged in bond issue activity. Table 7.1 also shows that most of the municipalities 
that issued bonds were in Transylvania. Th e only exceptions are Bacău (Moldova) and 
Mangalia (Dobrogea).
Th e data presented in Table 7.1 as well as other macroeconomic trends (e.g., the 
estimated inﬂ ation decrease) show that the bond market will not only be more attractive 
to the local communities but also more accessible.
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Table 7.1
Bond Issues in Romania (2001 and 2002)
Municipality Number of 
Inhabitants
Year of 
the Bond 
Issue
Number 
of 
Issued 
Bonds 
Total Funds Gained Interest 
Rate 
[%]
Alba Iulia
(Alba county)
71,848 2002 160,000 16 billion lei 
(484,848.48 USD)
32
Bacău
(Bacău county)
208,643 2002 350,000 35 billion lei
(1,060,606.06 USD)
26
Breaza
(Prahova county)
18,768 2002 15,000 3 billion lei
(90,909.09 USD)
28.3
Cluj-Napoca
(Cluj county)
332,941 2002 250,000 25 billion lei
(714,285.71 USD)
34.28
Mangalia
(Constanţa county)
43,974
(summer resort)
2001 100,000 10 billion lei
(312,500.00 USD)
36
1st bond issue by 
Predeal municipality
(Braşov county)
6,646
(winter resort)
2001 50,000 5 billion lei
(156,250.00 USD)
37
2nd bond issue by 
Predeal municipality
(Braşov county)
6,646
(winter resort)
2002 75,000 7,5 billion lei
(214,285.71 USD)
25
Sebeş
(Alba county)
29,483 2002 10,000 10 billion lei
(285,714.28 USD)
23
Tîrgu Mureş
(Mureş county)
164,132 2002 20,000 20 billion lei
(571,428.57 USD)
23
Zalău
(Sălaj county)
70,497 2002 100,000 10 billion lei
(285,714.28 USD)
35
Source:     Th e data was collected directly from the local authorities, no centralized data-base being 
available. 
3.5.2   Local Government Units’ Attitude 
           towards Bank Credits vs. Bond Issues
Th e analysis of neighboring developed markets, in which it was expected that bank 
loans would predominate over bond issues, shows that each country’s experience 
diﬀ ers according to many factors. Th ese include the local ﬁ nancial capacity and the 
solidity of the banks, the conﬁ dence of the local managers and their partnership with 
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the local business community. In any case, in Romania, the two municipal bond issues 
successfully carried out in the fall of 2001 indicate that the capital markets were waiting 
for real ﬁ nancial investment instruments resulting in lower borrowing costs for the local 
community than could have been achieved through bank lending.  
Since the adoption of the Law on Local Public Finances, more local government 
units have contracted loans from commercial banks than have issued bonds. One 
possible explanation could be related to the broader dissemination and completeness 
of information regarding the loans procedures, while the mechanisms for bond issues 
remain vaguely understood. Also, steps towards contracting loans were more easily 
understood by the local communities while the comprehensive mechanism for issuing 
bonds continued to cause reluctance among some local actors. Th e promotion of best 
practices, helpful in this respect, became a preoccupation only recently.
Nevertheless, many of the local authorities have been commenting in the last few 
years on the possibility of supplementing their local revenues through bond issues. Th e 
main reasons they have cited are as follows:
        •     the interest rate was lower in the capital market than in the banking sector;
        •     the procedure for issuing bonds is less complicated than the one for contract-
ing bank loans, as the bureaucracy is considerably reduced in the case of  bond 
issues;
        •     best practices in the area of bond issues were constantly promoted through 
central and local media.
Regarding capital spending, it should be noted that most is ﬁ nanced through in-
ternal or external borrowings. Th e Law on Local Public Finances, as has been repeated 
frequently in the report, does not allow local communities to use the loan funds for 
their operational expenditures. Th e experience of Romania so far has shown that the 
areas more ﬁ nanceable through borrowing are the public utilities (water, street main-
tenance and waste disposal), and the construction or improvement of tourist facilities 
or market places. Various other projects could be ﬁ nanced through this mechanism as 
local communities continue to grow.
In the cases of both contracted loans and bond issues, a key element contributing 
to the success of the borrowing process is the political commitment of the local public 
authorities. Th e community will beneﬁ t if the mayor and the local councilors have the 
same understanding of the local public interest and the correlated investment priorities. 
In the communities in which the mayor and the local councilors have diﬀ erent perspec-
tives on local development and where political disputes frequently occur, investment 
initiatives and the borrowing process might be aﬀ ected.
If we are to consider a typology of the local communities that have accessed local 
government borrowings, most of them are medium-size municipalities whose economy 
is well developed. Also, many of them are tourist areas in which local authorities col-
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laborate closely with the local business community. At the same time, small towns 
obviously lack these advantages and the number of their contracted loans remains small. 
Big cities, in turn, have become more attracted to external borrowings because these 
bring more substantial revenues. 
We cannot discuss practices in managing insolvency of local government units yet, 
as there has been no case of bankruptcy or liquidation of local governments. Th is is 
partially explained by the fact that legal provisions regarding the debt level (20% of 
total currant revenues) oﬀ er protection by not allowing the local communities to bor-
row beyond their ﬁ nancial capacity. On the other hand, although the practice of local 
borrowing is still in its early stages, it is expected that this type of problem will occur 
along with the development of local borrowing. 
In the end, the acceptance of new mechanisms for supplementing local revenues 
depends directly on how informed the local authorities are about the whole process and 
its obligations. It is encouraging that the attitude of local authorities towards borrow-
ing has slowly evolved, from mistrust and fear of risk during the ﬁ rst two years after 
the adoption of the Law on Local Public Finances, to a more positive perception of 
local government borrowing by the beginning of 2002. Although there are currently 
more contracted loans than bond issues, information from the ﬁ eld indicates that the 
popularity of the latter is constantly growing among the local communities.
Recommendations:
        •     Best practices in the domain of bond issues and loans contracted from commer-
cial banks should be further promoted, so that local communities in Romania 
will place more trust in these ﬁ nancial instruments that are crucial for local 
development;
        •     Local communities should diversify their investment objectives, public utilities 
being the main target so far;
        •     Local public authorities should increase their eﬀ ort to improve relations with 
the local business community, the main creditors of the bond issues;
        •     In order to reduce risk in local investments, thus encouraging more involvement, 
local authorities should diversify their ﬁ nancial instruments. Our recommen-
dation is to use the bond issue or commercial bank loans for co-ﬁ nancing 
investment projects.
4.   CONCLUSIONS
Contracting loans from banks or partnering with citizens and companies in the borrowing 
process were not common practices in Romania. It took a while for these practices to 
be understood, but eventually they became part of daily life in many local communi-
ties. Eager to help in developing their communities, local authorities have faced more 
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and more severe budget constraints. In the ﬁ rst years after 1989, drafting policies to 
address community development was rather exceptional, with many local authorities 
struggling to adapt to the new circumstances. But step by step, local communities began 
to implement development projects, ﬁ rst with assistance and then independently and 
proactively. During this process they became very receptive to other means through 
which to supplement their local revenues. Th e more demanding they became, the more 
development-oriented they were, the bigger the pressure on the central government to 
create the necessary tools for local communities to increase their revenues. 
In a big country like Romania, it is hard to generalize about attitudes and experiences. 
Th e largest communities, run by former well-trained managers, have quickly become 
ﬁ nancially stable. Th ey have also become more demanding, seeking access to funds that 
will help them grow further. A signiﬁ cant number of local authorities, however, have 
continued to rely on assistance from the central government and to request State budget 
transfers in order to meet their needs. It is important for such communities to be widely 
exposed to the experiences of neighboring localities, to be helped (of course) but also 
trained in how to replace the centrally transferred funds with money they have raised 
themselves. Risk management and planning based on a good sense of future needs are 
part of the challenge, but also good management skills. And, as we know from life, not 
everybody succeeds.
Local government borrowing is one of the most recent (and therefore still insuf-
ﬁ ciently explored) means through which local communities in Romania are aiming 
to raise additional funds for their development projects. Soon after the 1990s, learn-
ing that resources from the central budget would become limited, local communities 
started to explore other less traditional means. Th e ﬁ rst “temptation” was to increase 
and diversify the local taxes. As a new method, increasing taxes or inventing new ones 
was closest to the traditional means of ﬁ nancing local needs. It was when approaching 
the less traditional ﬁ nancial tools that some local authorities became quite reluctant. It 
was almost ridiculous how far some local authorities were willing to go to increase their 
local funds to ﬁ nance their development projects. Examples of local authorities imposing 
taxes on questions or interviews were earlier mentioned in this report. Despite the very 
questionable legality of such approaches, they serve well to demonstrate the more and 
more serious need for extra State budget funds to cover the development projects. Th e 
State transfers will remain crucial for the operational costs of the local communities.
While other post-communist countries have made borrowing a normal means of 
channeling additional funds into their local communities, Romania has looked at this 
option rather cautiously. We have to admit that it is a tendency of the system to adopt 
a protective stance towards change, leading to resistance on the part of public institu-
tions and authorities towards risk that comes with the new. Th rough the eyes of many, 
a secure and predictable ﬁ nancial system was revolutionized by these two not-so-secure 
mechanisms through which to raise more funds.
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Why are the local authorities still cautious when approaching the banks or, even 
more, when issuing bonds? How diﬃ  cult is it for some of the local communities 
to assimilate free market practices, e.g., approaching a commercial bank for a loan? 
Besides the legal framework, there are other obstacles that have had a direct impact on 
the relatively few local authorities that tried to contract a loan or issue bonds. Some 
of these barriers are related to the insuﬃ  cient experience and initiative of many local 
authorities in Romania. Public servants are generally not suﬃ  ciently trained in preparing 
and conducting the necessary documentation (e.g., in drafting a business plan). Also, 
local authorities are still inexperienced in building medium and long-term strategies 
that could provide them with a trajectory of ﬁ nances and investments for three to ﬁ ve 
years. It is only recently that the central government established the Institute for Public 
Administration, whose main role is to train locally and centrally elected oﬃ  cials as well 
as public servants. Training topics vary from human resources management to public 
relations to EU accession requirements. 
Many of the local authorities that were approached during our investigations 
explained the diﬃ  culty, if not the near-impossibility, of multi-year budget predictability. 
Still dependent on yearly budgeting, local communities that felt ready to contract 
ambitious development projects would need to advocate strenuously to convince 
the central government to adopt such a profoundly new budgeting philosophy. 
Very concerned with the ﬁ nancial discrepancies between local communities, central 
government ﬁ nds it safer to supervise the ﬁ nancial process at the local level on an annual 
basis. A continuous concern in analyzing the central government’s role in relation to 
the local communities has been the diﬀ erent (sometimes extremely diﬀ erent) level of 
development of communities from distinct areas of the country. In an environment 
of increasing competition for additional funds to ﬁ nance development projects, it is 
very hard these days to underestimate the importance and the implications of concepts 
such as subsidiarity, solidarity, etc. Th ere are many values that Romania has only 
recently learned about, and many questions still to be answered, as it decides its future 
development priorities. 
As a direct consequence of local ﬁ nancial growth and of the frequent exposure 
of many local authorities to their counterparts’ experience, the contracting of loans 
and bond issues have slowly but surely become integrated into the Romanian market. 
Th ere are no statistics available to indicate how developed the ﬁ rst local communities 
participating in these practices were. Economic development (both in terms of local 
revenues and a well-developed business community) was obviously a key criterion. In 
reality, these well-developed local communities not only proved that borrowing can 
work, but they were the ones whose advocacy led to improving the legal framework, 
thus enhancing the ease of future experiences.
Certainly these several years of experience were not enough to create perfect legisla-
tion, and local authorities reunited in a Local Authorities Federation of Romania are still 
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lobbying for future amendments. A multi-level working group including representatives 
of the Ministry of Finances, Ministry of Public Administration and local authorities 
has analyzed the possibility of amending the legislation. Amendments that would make 
possible local access to other sources of funds are only one part of a more comprehensive 
reform of local public administration that is currently being implemented.
Th e main legislation regulating our topic of interest should be also correlated with all 
complementary legal provisions. Local budgets need to become predictable to facilitate 
planning for the reimbursement to a bank or to be able to compensate the community 
for borrowed contributions. In this sense, it is imperative that the ﬁ scal decentralization 
process continues. More ﬁ nancial resources should be transferred to the local com-
munities so they can exercise real local autonomy in designing and implementing the 
necessary policies. A more realistic correlation between ﬁ scal decentralization and the 
assignment of responsibilities is also very important. Local authorities should not only 
be allocated resources and mandated responsibilities, but they should also be entitled 
to make decisions about how the local public services are administered and therefore 
how the money is locally spent.
To ensure the future growth of Romanian local communities, the local ﬁ nances must 
be strengthened and local authorities equipped with the necessary legislative tools. Local 
authorities must also have at least a minimum exposure to the examples of others who 
have previously borrowed from the population or contracted a loan. When familiariz-
ing the local authorities with new means through which to supplement their revenues, 
it is important to emphasize the necessity of having conﬁ dence in the project, and of 
accepting responsibility for it. Parallel with this entire comprehensive process, all other 
processes that the central government uses to ﬁ nancially help the local communities 
must be completely transparent. Th e criteria, methods and processes for distributing 
the Ministers’ “special funds” must be applied in a fair and transparent way. All this is 
essential for good relations between central and local authorities. In the same context, 
it is also very important to raise awareness about the long-term threat to the consolida-
tion of institutions posed by political interference in administrative decision-making 
at any level.
Th e two ﬁ nancial instruments largely debated in this report—loans from commer-
cial banks and bond issues—seem to be less exposed to political interference, although 
certain individual cases suggest it is not impossible to inﬂ uence banks’ transactions in 
Romania, to give but one example.
It is obvious that the local community cannot and should not be separated from the 
central government, since there are continuous and mutual interconnections. In terms 
of development, a stable, predictable macroeconomic development and the growing 
number of both foreign and domestic investors will directly inﬂ uence the conﬁ dence of 
local authorities in the idea of issuing bonds (as an example) to ﬁ nance a development 
project. 
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Th e ultimate goal of public administration reform should be the building of strong, 
powerful, independent local communities with solid budgets and capable of providing 
high quality services to the citizens. Th ese can be achieved only if the necessary res-
ponsibilities and instruments are available (local government borrowing being one of 
them). When the necessary tools are in place, it is expected that local communities in 
Romania will take charge of all local matters, designing and implementing policies that 
will further stimulate local development.
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NOTES
1     Th e capital is the biggest municipality within the county and the headquarters of 
all county public institutions.
2     Equalization funds are non-earmarked funds allocated from the state budget to local 
communities in order to conduct a horizontal and vertical equalization of budgetary 
revenues.
318 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
3     Special taxes are collected with a speciﬁ c purpose and the revenues are spent according 
to their initial destination.
4     Institute for Public Policy (2002), Practical Guide to Local Budgets. How Local 
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Local Government Borrowing in Russia: 
Difficult Paths of Economic Transformation
Sergey Mikhaylovich Nikiforov, Andrey Vasil’evich Cherniavsky, 
Vladislav Eduardovich Grigorov, Igor Vyacheslavovich Belyakov, 
Konstantin Gur’evich Tioussov 
1.    INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Last Decade of Decentralization 
Like Russia’s economic reform, the reform of municipal ﬁ nances in Russia has a history 
of more than ten years. For municipal governments, these reforms meant great changes 
in the local budget revenue and spending conditions, the development of new budgeting 
procedures and the development of local governments’ ability to meet the challenges 
of federal and regional policy. 
Th e formation of the Russian democratic state took place from 1990 to 1993. Th e 
process was completed with the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion, which declares that Russia is a federal state and establishes the jurisdiction and 
powers of the federal bodies of state administration and the various bodies within the 
Russian Federation. Th ese bodies are referred to in the Constitution as “subjects of the 
federation,” and include all the ethno-national territories and administrative bodies. 
Th e Constitution provides an exhaustive list of matters under the jurisdiction of the 
Russian Federation and of those falling under the joint jurisdiction of the Federation 
and its subnational bodies or “subjects.” With respect to other matters, the subjects hold 
state power to the full extent. 
Th e Constitution guarantees local self-government and contains a separate article 
on it. Concerning ﬁ scal authority, Article 132 says that the “local self-government bod-
ies shall independently manage municipal property, form, adopt and implement the 
local budgets [and] introduce local taxes and dues....” Th e same Article says that “local 
self-government bodies” may be vested with certain state powers and for this purpose 
an appropriate law must be passed. Th e transfer of powers must be accompanied by the 
transfer of necessary material and ﬁ nancial resources for their implementation.
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Th e adoption of the Russian Constitution had a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on the develop-
ment of local self-government. A new level of governance not included in the system of 
state administration was established by the fundamental law of the Russian Federation. 
But there were many cases where state powers were transferred to the municipal level 
without the necessary resources. 
Th e ﬁ rst step in reforming inter-budgetary relations and in developing the ﬁ scal 
independence of regions was made in 1994. Until then, the amount of ﬁ nancial aid from 
the federal budget was determined separately for each region or subject of the Russian 
Federation and the amounts and forms of ﬁ nancial aid were used as an instrument of 
political pressure. But uniform federal tax retention quotas were established for all Rus-
sian regions in 1994, increasing their political independence from the federal center. 
Th e Regional Financial Support Fund has been part of the federal budget since 1995. 
Th e resources accumulated in that fund are now distributed among regions in accord-
ance with a uniform procedure, which is becoming more formalized and objective from 
year to year. Th e relationships between Russian regional and municipal governments 
are developing in the same direction. Until recently, however, the shares of federal taxes 
transferred to budgets of other levels were established each year by the law on the federal 
budget and laws on regional budgets. 
Th e next important milestone on the way to decentralization was the adoption of 
the Federal Law “On the General Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian 
Federation” in 1995. Two years later the Federal Law “On the Financial Bases of Local 
Self-Government” was passed, establishing the minimum shares of federal taxes that 
must be transferred to budgets of municipalities. Th is made municipal government 
revenues more stable and predictable.
Th e Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation became eﬀ ective at the beginning of 
2000. Th is document has much signiﬁ cance for Russian public ﬁ nance law. It lays legal 
bases for the budgetary system, establishes general principles of budgetary legislation, 
determines the legal status of subjects of budgetary relations and divides their powers. 
Unfortunately, despite an obvious evolution of Russia’s budgetary legislation towards 
greater ﬁ scal independence of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities, 
signiﬁ cant vertical imbalances between revenue collection and spending powers of state 
administration bodies of various levels still remain in place. A signiﬁ cant part of the 
budgetary need of Russia’s subnational governments is covered through ﬁ nancial aid 
from the budgets of higher levels. 
Simultaneously with the introduction of these changes in legislation, which were 
aimed at the division of powers in the budgetary sphere and increasing the ﬁ scal au-
tonomy of subnational bodies, a number of legislative acts aimed at the protection of 
various groups within the  population have been adopted during the last ten years. Such 
laws allow groups of citizens to buy certain services at reduced rates. Most frequently, the 
services are those provided by municipal governments, but the procedure for compensat-
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ing the expenses involved is not described clearly or is not speciﬁ ed at all. In practice, 
this only shifts such costs to the municipal governments. With respect to municipal 
ﬁ nances, the most “burdensome” law for Russia’s municipal governments was the Law 
on Veterans passed in 1995. Th e federal center has applied Article 132 of the Constitu-
tion to the part concerning vesting certain state powers in local self-government bodies. 
However, the obligation to provide municipal governments with the necessary material 
and ﬁ nancial resources for their implementation is not entirely fulﬁ lled. As a result, 
regional and municipal governments can not use their revenues at their own discretion 
because they have to spend their funds on ﬁ nancing federal obligations. 
Russia’s tax system has been developing during these years, with the main goal of 
reforms being reduction of the tax burden on the Russian economy. Th e tax reform 
has led to signiﬁ cant changes in the structure of regional and municipal government 
revenues. 
Th e processes described above collide with each other, however, and have con-
tradictory and divergent impacts on the ﬁ nancial position of regional and municipal 
governments.
1.2 Administrative and Territorial Structure 
      of the Russian Federation
Russia’s 1993 Constitution established three levels of power in the Russian Federa-
tion. Th ey are the federal level, the level of subjects of the Russian Federation and the 
municipal level. Th e Russian Federation consists of 11 republics, 6 krajs (territories), 
59 oblasts (regions), 2 cities of federal signiﬁ cance—Moscow and St. Petersburg—10 
autonomous okrugs (districts) and one autonomous oblast (the Jewish Autonomous 
Oblasts)—89 subjects of the Russian Federation in all.
In Soviet Russia, the autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs were part of the 
krajs (territories) and fell within their administrative jurisdiction. At present, in ac-
cordance with Russia’s current Constitution, all subjects of the Russian Federation have 
equal rights. Republics within the Russian Federation have their own Constitutions and 
legislation. Krajs, oblasts, cities of federal signiﬁ cance and the autonomous oblast and 
the autonomous okrugs have their own charters and legislation. 
Russia’s Budgetary Code also provides for a three-level budget system, but in reality 
the situation is more complex. Th ere are remaining elements of subordination between 
territories and their autonomous districts. Sometimes problems arise during the dis-
tribution of revenues between territorial budgets and budgets of autonomous districts 
within respective territories. In some cases, such conﬂ icts become open and develop 
into a confrontation between particular areas, as in the case of the Krasnoyarsk Territory 
and the Taimyr Autonomous District. 
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Figure 8.1
Subjects of the Russian Federation
Source:     Map by Billie Bielckus, SIPRI. http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/pressre/ptiia.html.
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According to the 1993 Russian Constitution, the Russian Federation consists of 89 “subjects of the federation,” 32 ethno-national territories and 57 admin-
istrative entities.
Ethno-national territories
Republics
1.       Karelia
2.       Komi
3.       Mordovia
4.       Chuvashia
5.       Mariy El
6.       Tatarstan
7.       Udmurtia
8.       Bashkortostan
9.       Adygueya
10.     Karachaevo-Cherkessia
11.     Kabardino-Balkaria
12.     Northern Ossetia
13.     Ingushetia
14.     Chechnya
15.     Dagestan
16.     Kahmykia
17.     Gomiy Altay
18.     Khakassia
19.     Tuva
20.     Buryatia
21.     Yakut-Sakha
Autonomous Region*
22.     Yevreysk (Blagoveshchensk)
Autonomous Districts
23.     Nenets
24.     Komi-Pemyak
25.     Ust-Ordyn Buryat
26.     Aguin Buryat
27.     Yamalo-Nenets
28.     Khanty-Mansi
29.     Taymyr
30.     Evenki
31.     Chukotka
32.     Koryaki
Administrative Entities
Federal Cities
33.     Moscow
34.     St. Petersburg
Territories (kraj)
(numbers undelined on map)
35.     Krasnodar
36.     Stavropol
37.     Altay (Bamaul)
38.     Krasnoyarsk
39.     Khabarovsk
40.     Primorskiy (Vladivostok)
Regions (oblast)*
41.     Kaliningrad
42.     Murmansk
43.     Archangelsk
44.     Leningrad (St. Petercburg)
45.     Pskov
46.     Novgorod
47.     Vologda
48.     Smolensk
49.     Kalinin
50.     Yaroslavl
51.     Bryansk
52.     Kaluga
53.     Moscow
54.     Vladimir
55      Ivanovo
56.     Kostroma
57.     Kursk
58.     Orel
59.     Tura
60.     Ryazan
61.     Nizhniy Novgorod
62.     Kirov
63.     Belgorod
64.     Voronezh
65.     Lipetsk
66.     Tambov
67.     Penza
68.     Rostov
69.     Volgograd
70.     Saratov
71.     Ulyanovsk
72.     Samara
73.     Astrakhan
74.     Orenburg
75.     Pern
76.     Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg)
77.     Chelyabinsk
78.     Kurgan
79.     Tyumen
80.     Omsk
81.     Tomsk
82.     Novosibirsk
83.     Kemerovo
84.     Irkutsk
85.     Chita
86.     Amur (Blagoveshchensk)
87.     Magadan
88.     Kamchatka 
          (Petropavlovsk)
89.     Sakhalin (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk)
*  where the name of the region is not that of the capital city, the city is given in parentheses.
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Another ﬂ aw exists in the current legislation regulating local self-government in 
Russia. Th e Federal Law “On the General Principles of Organization of Local Self-
Government in the Russian Federation” establishes equality in the legal status of all 
municipalities. But in practice, local self-government in the Russian Federation has 
two levels. In some municipalities such as a district and a city, there may be smaller 
self-governing units having the same status of “municipal formation.” In practice, the 
division of responsibilities for the provision of services to the population deviates from 
the provisions of the law in such municipalities, frequently resulting in friction over 
tax revenue distribution. 
According to the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat), 
there are 12,261 municipalities in Russia. Most are rural (9,325 or 76%) and these may 
consist of several settlements each. Th e second largest group is administrative districts 
(1,440 or 12% of the total number of municipalities). Th ere are also 591 cities, 524 
urban-type settlements and 214 rural settlements that are independent municipalities. 
Th e least-populated district is the Aleutsky District of the Kamchatka region, with 
only 500 people. Th e ten most populated districts, those with a population of 170,000 to 
260,000, are located in European Russia in the Moscow and Leningrad Regions. Th ere 
are 11 cities with a population larger than a million people, 21 with between 500,000 
and 1,000,000 and 131 with a population of 100,000 to 500,000 people in Russia.
1.3 Local Government Financial Mechanisms 
Currently, the Budgetary Code determines that expenditures to be ﬁ nanced jointly 
from the federal budget, budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation and budgets 
of municipalities include: 
      •     State-supported construction and construction materials industries, gas and 
water-supply, agriculture, road and water transport, the Metro, telecommunica-
tions, road construction and maintenance ( the nuclear power industry is not 
included); 
      •     law-enforcement activities; 
      •     ﬁ re-protection activities; 
      •     research and development work ensuring scientiﬁ c and technical progress; 
      •     social security measures; 
      •     environmental protection, protection and sustainability of natural resources, 
hydrometeorological service operation; 
      •     prevention and alleviation of emergency situations and natural disaster conse-
quences on a regional scale; 
      •     market infrastructure development; 
      •     development of federal and nationality relations; 
329
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G  I N  R U S S I A :  D I F F I C U LT  PAT H S  O F  E C O N O M I C  T R A N S F O R M AT I O N
      •     operation of the election commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation;
      •     activities in the media sector; 
      •     other expenditures. 
 Local budgets are used exclusively to ﬁ nance the following activities: 
      •     municipal property formation and management; 
      •     organization, support and development of educational, health, cultural, physical 
culture and sports organizations, institutions and enterprises, the mass media 
and other institutions and organizations in municipal ownership or under the 
jurisdiction of local self-government bodies; 
      •     support of municipal law-enforcement bodies; 
      •     management, support and development of municipal utilities service complexes; 
      •     municipal road building and maintenance of roads of municipal signiﬁ cance; 
      •     improvement and planting of greenery in the municipalities; 
      •     household and domestic waste removal and treatment (with the exception of 
radioactive waste); 
      •     maintenance of cemeteries under the jurisdiction of municipal bodies; 
      •     provision of transportation services to the population and to institutions in 
municipal ownership or under the jurisdiction of local self-government bodies; 
      •     ﬁ re safety measures; 
      •     environmental protection in the territory of municipalities; 
      •     implementation of municipal governments’ purpose-oriented programs; 
      •     servicing and repayment of the municipal debt; 
      •     purpose-oriented subsidies to the population; 
      •     maintenance of the municipal archives; 
      •     municipal elections and local referendums; 
      •     other expenditures. 
Th e above list is rather impressive. In addition, primary and secondary education, 
health, housing and utility services, and most of the social security programs must be 
ﬁ nanced from local budgets. Th e municipal government bears full responsibility for the 
development of the housing and utilities services and the public and communal service 
sectors within their boundaries. 
In present-day Russia the share of municipal government spending in Russia’s con-
solidated budget is rather high; this data can be seen in Table 8.1.
However, receiving such a signiﬁ cant share from the Russian Federation consolidated 
budget does not mean that municipal governments have much budget autonomy. For 
the municipal governments, the problem lies not so much in the amount of revenue 
available, but rather in the practical impossibility of making independent spending 
decisions.
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Table 8.1 
Th e Role of Local Budgets in Russian Public Finance
Year Local Budget Spending 
as % of Consolidated Budget Spending
Local Budget Revenues 
as % of GDP
1995 37.6 7.3
1997 31.7 10.9
1998 29.8 8.7
1999 27.5 6.8
2001 26.7 6.2
Source:     Ministry of Finance (Minﬁ n) of the Russian Federation and the Russian Federation State Statistics 
Committee (Goskomstat). 
 Th e reduction of the municipalities’ share in Russia’s consolidated budget that took 
place during the last few years reﬂ ects a centralization trend in which the federal budget’s 
share in the Russian Federation consolidated budget increased, and Russia’s regional 
administrations began to assume certain municipal spending functions. In terms of the 
data in Table 8.1, it should be pointed out that according to the Russian Federation 
State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), Russia’s  GDP in 2001 was 72% of what it was 
in 1992, while municipal government revenues declined 37% during the same period. 
Compared to 1990 this was a 50% reduction, according to our estimates. 
Annual municipal budget revenue growth (reduction) rates for the period from 
1996 through 2001 are shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2
Municipal Budget Revenue Growth (Reduction) Rates
[in Constant Prices] (1996–2001) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Municipal budget revenue 
growth rates (chain rates) 
112.2 74.2 84.4 100.1 104.8 
Municipal budget revenue 
growth rates (compared 
to the 1996 base year) 
112.2 83.1 70.1 70.2 73.5 
Source:     Ministry of Finance (Minﬁ n) of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation State Statistics 
Committee (Goskomstat). For local budget revenue comparison purposes, GDP deﬂ ators for 
respective years were applied. Th e 2001 ﬁ gures are estimated. 
Russian municipal government revenues have declined 26% over the last ﬁ ve years. 
Th e reduction that took place in 1998 was associated with Russia’s systemic ﬁ nancial 
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crisis, which resulted in a decline in tax revenues. Th e 1999 reduction was caused mostly 
by the shift of regional revenue centers in the direction of regional budgets. Th e 2002 
growth of local budget revenues was approximately equal to Russia’s GDP growth, 
which amounted to 5%. 
Signiﬁ cant changes occurred after 1998 in how Russia’s budget was apportioned. Th e 
role of the federal budget increased. While in the 1990s it amounted to 12% to 14% 
of Russia’s GDP (with the exception of 1992), in 2000 and 2001, when the situation 
changed, the federal budget grew from 16% to 17.5% of GDP. We can point to three 
factors behind such growth. First, tax revenues were redistributed in favor of the federal 
center. Second, the favorable situation on the primary fuel market resulted in an increase 
in tax revenues of the federal budget after 1998. Th ird, there was an increase in federal 
tax collectability after Russia’s ﬁ nancial crisis, while the practice of tax claim oﬀ -sets with 
the federal budget and tax payments in a non-monetary form was discarded. 
At the same time, the spending powers of diﬀ erent levels of government have been 
changed over the last few years (e.g., since 2000 some social beneﬁ ts have been ﬁ nanced 
from the federal budget). Th is clariﬁ es some of the decline in local spending to GDP 
ratio.
Th e structure of municipal budget revenues for the last six years is shown in Table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3
Municipal Budget Revenue Structure [%] (1996–2001)
Revenues / Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tax revenues, including: 59.8 60.5 63.8 69.7 68.2 61.5
         VAT revenues 7.1 7.5 7.9 6.8 5.3 0
         Profit tax revenues 11.5 9.3 9.1 14.6 13.5 16.7
         Income tax revenues 17.0 18.2 18.4 16.6 16.8 21.1
         Property tax revenues 9.2 8.9 10.0 7.8 6.2 6.7
         Sales tax revenues — — 0.0 2.8 2.9 2.8
Local tax revenues (except tax 
on individual persons’ property, 
but including land tax) 
Not 
available
Not 
available
11.2 13.4 14.9 5.1
Non-tax local own revenues 2.4 2.2 3.7 3.6 3.5 4.3
Non-repayable transfers 37.8 37.3 32.5 26.7 28.3 34.2
Share of municipal governments’ 
own revenues in their total revenues 
Not
available
Not 
available 24.9 27.6 27.5 18.9
Source:     Ministry of Finance (Minﬁ n) of the Russian Federation. 
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It should be noted that Russia’s tax and budgetary legislation reform is not yet 
complete, with tax legislation being reformed especially actively. Th is explains the un-
stable condition of the municipal budget revenue structure during the last six years. 
Th e ratio between tax revenues and ﬁ nancial aid from budgets of higher levels is one 
of the key ﬁ gures characterizing the structure of local budgets. We have already noted 
the growth of tax revenues and the reduction in the share of non-repayable transfers in 
the structure of municipal government budgets from 1996 to 1999. But in 1999, as a 
result of the tax system reform, the evident trend towards an increase in local budget 
revenues reversed. 
As Table 8.3 shows, the major municipal revenue-earner during the entire period 
under review was the personal income tax. According to Russia’s tax code this is a federal 
tax, and for this reason the obligatory income tax revenue distribution proportions are 
established annually by a law on the budget. In 2001, for instance, of the federal 13% 
income tax revenues, 1% went to the federal budget and 12% to regional budgets. But 
in 2002, 100% was transferred to regional budgets. 
Corporate taxes (on the proﬁ ts of organizations) are the second-largest revenue-
earner for municipal governments. As with income taxes, the distribution proportions 
for proﬁ t tax revenue  are determined by agreement with the regions. Municipalities 
“negotiate” their share of taxes with the regions. From 1997 to 2001, the minimum 
share that was transferred to local budgets was 5% of the proﬁ t tax rate. After the intro-
duction of Chapter 25 of Russia’s Tax Code on January 1, 2002, the minimum share of 
the proﬁ t tax transferred to local budgets decreased to 2%. As these examples illustrate, 
local budget revenues from the main tax revenue sources change signiﬁ cantly from year 
to year and cannot be forecasted with suﬃ  cient reliability. 
For our present purposes, we may assume that municipal governments’ own revenues 
include total revenues from the property, sales and local tax revenues, including land 
tax  revenues, and non-tax revenues. It should be pointed out that sales and enterprise 
property tax revenues of local budgets may exceed the shares established by law. From 
1998 to 2000, governments’ own revenues accounted for 25% to 27.5% of their total 
revenues but decreased sharply in 2001 as a result of the abolition of some turnover taxes, 
the highest of which was the tax on the housing and utilities service sector. Th at tax had 
to be abolished in order to improve the structure of Russia’s tax system as a whole, but 
there was no compensation to municipal budgets for the loss of that revenue. 
As part of the continuing reform to the tax system, Part I of the Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation, which deﬁ nes the general principles of taxation and tax collection, 
came into eﬀ ect on January 1, 1999. Th e separate chapters of Part II, which regulate 
particular taxes, have been introduced one by one. Russia’s tax code distributes tax 
revenues between three levels of power and forbids introducing taxes other than those 
envisaged in the code.
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During the introduction of local taxes, the local self-government bodies can estab-
lish tax rates only within the limits established by the tax code. One of the local taxes 
is the personal property tax, whose rate depends on the type of property. If it is valued 
at more than 500,000 rubles, the tax limit according to federal law is 0.3%–2%. Th e 
land tax depends on the type of land used, its quality and placement. Federal legislation 
lays out the average land tax rates (annual payments per unit of land) for each region 
and the municipal self-governments can establish the speciﬁ c tax rates for each territory 
based on the given average rate.
Th e Tax Code of the Russian Federation also establishes the tax bases, tax periods, 
maximum rates and calculation procedures pertaining to regional and local taxes.
2.   LEGISLATION REGULATING MUNICIPAL BORROWING 
2.1 The Concept of Debt and Forms of Debt Instruments 
Th e evolution of legislation regulating government and municipal borrowing will be 
described in the section on the development of the municipal securities market. Th is 
section gives an account of the legislative regulations and requirements that are cur-
rently in eﬀ ect. 
At present, the Budgetary Code is Russia’s main law regulating legal relationships in 
the area of government and municipal ﬁ nances, including government and municipal 
borrowing. 
Th is law deﬁ nes municipal debt as the aggregate of obligations of a municipal forma-
tion and establishes that municipal debt must be fully and unconditionally secured by 
all the municipal property comprising the municipal treasury. Th e Budgetary Code says 
that the maturity of a municipal formation’s debt instruments must not exceed ten years. 
Municipal debt is managed by an authorized body of local self-government. Obligations 
of a municipal formation that arise as a result of municipal securities issuance must be 
denominated and repaid in the currency of the Russian Federation. Russian legislation 
forbids municipalities to issue securities that create foreign debt. 
Debt instruments of a municipality may include: 
      •     loan agreements and contracts; 
      •     borrowing by way of issuance of municipal securities; 
      •     agreements and contracts for municipalities to receive budgetary loans and 
credits from other-level budgets within the Russian Federation; 
      •     agreements on the provision of municipal guarantees. 
Th e law forbids municipalities to use any other form of debt instrument. 
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Municipal debt includes the following: 
      •     the nominal amount of principal debt on municipal securities; 
      •     the nominal amount of principal debt under loans received by a municipal 
formation; 
      •     the principal amount of debt under budgetary loans and credits received by 
municipalities from budgets of other levels; 
      •     total liabilities under guarantees provided by a municipal formation. 
In Russia, because municipal ﬁ nances are accounted for on a cash basis, local gov-
ernments’ obligations are reported only when they are fulﬁ lled. Th is leads to a situation 
in which local governments may have unfulﬁ lled liabilities for services already received, 
which are not shown on their balance sheets. Such liabilities are called accounts payable. 
Th e Budgetary Code does not include payables in the government and municipal debt. 
In Russia the total amount of payables of local administrations is very large, but this fact 
is not reported in their budget execution reports. In 2000, local state administrations 
and local self-governments  began to show the amount and structure of their payables 
in their budget execution reports, but payables are still excluded from debt calculations 
and debt servicing expenditures. 
2.2 Current Capital Expenditures and Purposes of Borrowing
Depending on their economic purpose, budgetary expenditures are subdivided into 
current and capital expenditures. Russian legislation allows a development budget to be 
established within a local budget, including in it all or part of the capital expenditures, 
but this is not obligatory. Usually, the local government submits budgets for considera-
tion to the respective representative authorities not only as functional and departmental 
documents, but also as economic ones. For this reason, the amounts of capital ex-
penditures are known to all the participants in the budgetary process and interested 
parties. Nevertheless, budget execution reports are prepared as functional documents 
and therefore they present all capital investment expenditures by functional categories 
(e.g., capital expenditures on new school construction are shown in the “Education” 
section, and library construction in the “Culture” section). 
Th e Budgetary Code says that current spending of subnational budgets must not 
exceed their revenues. Consequently, a budget deﬁ cit may arise only as a result of capi-
tal investment. Another provision of the code stipulates that domestic borrowing may 
be used for spending on capital investments or on debt reﬁ nancing of budget deﬁ cits, 
within the established limits on the redemption of government and municipal debt. A 
separate Budgetary Code article is dedicated to debt restructuring. Th e restructuring is 
construed as replacement, based on agreement, of certain government or municipal debt 
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instruments by other instruments with diﬀ erent debt servicing and repayment terms. 
Debt restructuring may be carried out together with a partial write-oﬀ  (reduction) of 
the principal amount of debt. 
2.3 Budget Defi cits and Sources of Funding to Finance Them 
Th e budget deﬁ cit of a subject of the Russian Federation must not exceed 15% of its 
revenues, excluding ﬁ nancial aid from the federal budget. But a local budget deﬁ cit is 
subject to tighter regulation, and must not exceed 10% of its ﬁ nancial aid from the federal 
budget and from the budget of the respective subject of the Russian Federation. 
If the annual budget includes revenues from the sale of property, the maximum 
budget deﬁ cit may exceed the above limit, though only by the amount of property 
sales revenues. 
Representative authorities must approve the sources of funds for ﬁ nancing the budget 
deﬁ cit for each ﬁ nancial year, according to the category of borrowed funds. Th ese may 
include the following internal sources: 
      •     municipal borrowing carried out through municipal securities issues made on 
behalf of municipalities; 
      •     loans from lending institutions; 
      •     budgetary loans and credits received from budgets of other levels of the budget 
system of the Russian Federation; 
      •     revenues from the sale of municipal property; 
      •     change in the local governments’ budgetary account balances. 
2.4 Government and Municipal Debt Limitations
Th e Budgetary Code establishes that government and municipal borrowing, as well as 
the provision of government and municipal guarantees to other borrowers, must be 
approved by the relevant representative authority. 
Th e maximum amount of debt servicing expenditures of a subject of the Russian 
Federation or a municipal body must not exceed 15% of the total expenditures of the 
respective budget.
Th e total amount of public debt of a subject of the Russian Federation or a municipal 
body must not exceed budget revenues, with the exception of ﬁ nancial aid provided 
from the budgets of other levels of the Russian Federation budget system. 
To control these ratios, the budget execution report must be sent to the Ministry of 
Finance, and may be checked by the latter if a reason arises. If the ratios are exceeded 
new securities issues will not be approved by the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, the 
Ministry may temporarily take over the execution of a territorial budget. 
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2.5 Shortcomings of the Existing System of Restrictions 
Th e system of quantitative and qualitative restrictions on municipal borrowing estab-
lished by the Budgetary Code has certain drawbacks and contradictions:
Restrictions on the total amount of debt. Obviously, the amount of debt by itself can 
hardly have any impact on the borrower’s creditworthiness, which depends on the debt 
structure (its maturity, currency, interest rates, possibility or impossibility of advanced 
repayment claims, etc.). All other conditions being equal, the risk of default on short-
term debt denominated in hard-currency and with 50% interest per annum, which 
amounts to only 30% of budget revenues, is much higher than the risk of default on a 
ruble-denominated loan comparable to total budget revenues, but raised for a term of ten 
years at 10% per annum. Th e restriction on the total amount of debt is worded rather 
unclearly. It is not clear, for example, which year or years can be included in reporting 
municipal revenues. Finally, this restriction impedes municipal administrations wishing 
to assume reasonable risks associated with the implementation of large investment 
projects. 
Restrictions on the budget deﬁ cit. Investment projects in the public infrastructure sector, 
which are ﬁ nanced by regional and municipal administrations with borrowed funds, 
are often very large. Moreover, one important condition of eﬀ ective implementation 
of such projects is the fast introduction of infrastructure facilities. Consequently, such 
tight restrictions on the total amount of borrowing at a given time within a ﬁ scal year 
may have a negative impact on the eﬃ  ciency of the investment policy implemented by 
municipal administrations. 
But this restriction does not apply to guarantees provided by subjects of the Russian 
Federation and municipal administrations with respect to third party obligations. 
According to the Budgetary Code, municipal guarantees are a type of debt instrument 
and, as such, are included in the total government (municipal) debt. But for all that, 
guarantees are not a source of funds for ﬁ nancing budget deﬁ cits because it is assumed 
that debt instruments are issued to ﬁ nance the expenditures of the end borrower rather 
than administrative expenses. However, in some cases administrations may use guarantees 
as the administration’s deferred payment or bank loan repayment.1 In this case, the 
absence of quantitative restrictions on guarantees provided by a subject of the Russian 
Federation (municipal administration) during the year may be a loophole enabling 
increased borrowing. 
Restrictions on the use of borrowed funds. Despite the requirement that current spend-
ing must be ﬁ nanced only with budget revenues (there is an indirect ban on the use 
of borrowed funds for that purpose), local administrations frequently use borrowed 
funds for making wage payments and ﬁ nancing routine repairs and other non-capital 
expenditures. Frequently, they are compelled to do this because of insuﬃ  ciently con-
sidered actions of the federal authorities. For instance, in order to implement a federal 
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resolution of November 6, 2001 on raising wages of employees on the government 
payroll, municipal administrations sharply reduced allocations for capital construction 
and used the released funds to pay the wages. Current municipal borrowing practices 
provide many other examples of violations of both quantitative and qualitative restric-
tions contained in the Budgetary Code. 
In addition, there are many common municipal borrowing practices that are prob-
lematic even if they do not violate the Budgetary Code. Such practices include: 
      •     Th e absence of a uniform debt management strategy. Most Russian cities do not 
develop long-term ﬁ nancial plans (and thus violate the unclear requirement of 
the Budgetary Code) and have no long-term borrowing strategy. It is diﬃ  cult 
to blame them for that under current conditions because their revenues (as 
deﬁ ned by the Budgetary Code) are small, while inter-budgetary relations in 
Russia are unstable. 
      •     Inadequate debt structure. One result of the absence of a municipal borrowing 
strategy is an inadequate municipal debt structure. At present, short-term bor-
rowing accounts for too large a part of municipal debt. Moreover, borrowing is 
inconsistent with the capital construction programs implemented, which only 
increases the risks involved. 
      •     Th e absence of borrowing eﬃ  ciency assessment criteria. Another peculiarity of the 
budget process in Russia is the absence of criteria for assessing the eﬃ  ciency 
of the use of budgetary resources. Th e same applies to the use of borrowed 
funds.
2.6 Recognition of Budgetary Borrowings and Expenditures 
      for Government and Municipal Debt Servicing and Repayment  
Borrowed funds and other liabilities are recognized in the budget as sources for ﬁ nancing 
the deﬁ cit, and all debt-servicing expenditures are recognized as spending on govern-
ment and municipal debt servicing. Revenues from government or municipal securities 
placement which exceed the nominal amount of the issue, the coupon income accrued 
and revenues received in the event of the repurchase of securities at prices lower than 
the placement price are all credited to the government and municipal debt-servicing 
expenditures account for the current year. Repayment of the principal amount of 
government or municipal debt is recognized as a source of deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing, causing a 
reduction in budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing sources. 
Obligations on securities, guaranteed with government or municipal property in 
accordance with the terms of the issue, can be fulﬁ lled by way of transfer of such prop-
erty to the securities’ owners. In this event, the debt will be reduced by the principal 
amount repaid in such manner. 
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2.7 Debt Books 
Russia’s Budgetary code obligates all government and local self-government bodies that 
make borrowings to keep debt books, and this information must be provided to the 
body responsible for keeping the state debt book of the particular subject of the Rus-
sian Federation.
Russia’s Budgetary Code establishes that the minimum amount of information to 
be included in the debt book with respect to each type of borrowing is: 
      •     the total debt of a subject of the Russian Federation (guarantees included); 
      •     the date of borrowing; 
      •     the means of securing the performance of obligations; 
      •     information about the fulﬁ llment of speciﬁ ed obligations in full or in part. 
Th e law allows representative authorities to make decisions on the inclusion of ad-
ditional information in the debt books. Th e content of the information entered, its entry 
methods, the arrangement and other registration-procedure elements diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly 
from region to region and from city to city. 
Th e most typical structure of the standard document includes three or four obliga-
tory sections. Th e ﬁ rst section is general, describing the nature and structure of debt 
of a region or city and specifying the body responsible for keeping the debt book. Th e 
second section is dedicated to the procedures for the book-keeping and entry-making. 
In this section, the content of information entered and the entry-making procedures are 
described, and additional analytical information is provided. Th e third part describes 
the procedures for the provision of information contained in the debt book to other 
interested parties, and the procedure for reporting out. Th e fourth and ﬁ nal part contains 
provisions concerning responsibility, control and supervision, etc. 
Th e debt book information may be accumulated and stored in electronic form, on 
hard copy or using both methods. In the Republic of Mari El and the Vologda Region, 
only the electronic form of debt book-keeping is used. In the Bryansk Region and St. 
Petersburg, only hard copies are used. Th e debt book of the Irkutsk Region is a strict 
accounting form (hard copy). 
Levels of transparency and availability of the information contained in the debt 
books also vary. Access to the information is provided to: 
      •     regional executive bodies of the state administration and local self-governments, 
and territorial bodies of federal bodies of state administration in accordance 
with their debt management authority; 
      •     creditors of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities; 
      •     law-enforcement agencies and other organizations in cases provided for by the 
current legislation. 
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Th e procedure for receiving information from the debt book is also regulated. As a 
rule, information is provided upon receipt of a written request specifying the reasons. 
Few regions and municipalities have a standard-form debt book conforming to the 
Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation. Some municipal administrations classify 
debt instruments in the most general way, subdividing the entries between two groups 
of debt, such as “direct borrowing” and “government guarantees.” Some debt books 
contain such entries as “other debt instruments,” but do not explain their exact type. 
Moreover, some subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal administrations 
do not strictly observe the mandatory requirements of the Budgetary Code concerning 
information on debt. Information about the purposes of borrowing is especially diﬃ  cult 
to ﬁ nd. Th ough the code forbids municipalities to engage in foreign borrowing, debt 
books of some municipal administrations contain sections reserved for information 
about the currencies of obligations that result from international contracts and agree-
ments. Th e analytical sections of the debt books are hardly a strong point. Some contain 
information about the maximum amount of debt established by a law on the budget of 
a subject of the Russian Federation or by a legal act of a municipal government for the 
respective ﬁ scal year. Other restrictions may also be established. Th ey may include the 
maximum amount of borrowed funds that can be used for budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing in 
the current ﬁ scal year, the maximum spending on the state debt services in the current 
ﬁ scal year or the maximum total amount of government guarantees. 
Russia has not yet developed recognized rules for keeping debt books. Th ey will be 
worked out sooner or later on the basis of acquired experience and in accordance with 
the principles of best practice.
2.8 Government and Municipal Guarantee Provisions 
Since guarantees provided by subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal admin-
istrations reduce investors’ risks, they are an eﬀ ective instrument for attracting capital. 
Under usual conditions they do not increase spending. However, they require that the 
law on the budget provide for special allocations to the extent of possible fulﬁ llment of 
obligations under the guarantees provided. Th e eﬀ ectiveness of this instrument, as well 
as the possibility of using the allotted funds for other purposes, makes it very popular 
among ﬁ nancially stable regions and cities. For this reason, guarantees now account for 
more than  half of the total debt of some regions. 
In the early 1990s, the procedure for the provision of guarantees was in complete dis-
order, resulting in serious ﬁ nancial problems for many regions and cities. Consequently, 
the Budgetary Code established a detailed procedure for the provision of government 
and municipal guarantees. Th e guarantee is construed as a method of securing civil-law 
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obligations by virtue of which the guarantor undertakes to answer for the performance 
of the person to whom the state or municipal guarantee was provided, in fulﬁ lling the 
obligations to third persons in full or in part. 
Government and municipal guarantees must be provided in writing, and failure to 
comply with this requirement renders it invalid (void). 
Th e guarantee must contain information about the guarantor and the name of the 
body issuing the guarantee on behalf of the speciﬁ ed guarantor. It must also specify the 
extent of obligations under the guarantee. Th e term of the guarantee is determined by 
the maturity of obligations covered by the guarantee. 
As a rule, guarantees are provided on a competitive basis. Th e guarantor under 
government or municipal guarantee bears secondary liability, additional to the debtor’s 
obligation whose fulﬁ llment is guaranteed by the guarantor. Th e guarantor’s obligation 
to a third person under the government or municipal guarantee is limited to the pay-
ment of the amount of obligation for which the guarantee was issued. A guarantor who 
has fulﬁ lled the obligations of the principal has the right to demand the reimbursement 
of payment made to a third person under the government or municipal guarantee, in 
full and in accordance with the procedure described by the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation. 
Payments under government or municipal guarantees must be recognized as loans 
provided and must be included in the budgetary expenditures. If payments made by the 
guarantor in that capacity do not cause the emergence of the guarantor’s claims to the 
debtor who failed to fulﬁ ll his obligation, the payments made under government and 
municipal guarantees must be recognized as deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing sources in the budget. 
Decisions to levy execution on the third person’s securities on behalf of municipalities 
are made by the local authorities responsible for the management of municipal debt. 
Securities issued by third persons and guaranteed by the Russian Federation, a 
subject of the Russian Federation or a municipal formation (government or municipal 
guarantee) are not regarded as government or municipal securities. 
Government guarantees of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal guar-
antees are provided to subjects of the Russian Federation, municipalities and other legal 
persons to ensure the fulﬁ llment of their obligations to third persons. Th e agreement 
on the provision of the government or municipal guarantee must specify the obligation 
whose performance is secured by the guarantee. 
Th e list of guarantees provided to particular subjects of the Russian Federation, 
municipalities or other legal persons for any amount exceeding 0.01% of the spending 
of the respective budget must be approved by a law (decision) on the budget for the 
next ﬁ scal year. Th e total amount of guarantees provided is included in the total debt 
of the respective subject of the Russian Federation or municipal formation as particular 
kinds of debt instruments. If the principal under the guarantee fulﬁ lls his obligations 
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to a third person, the debt of a subject of the Russian Federation or the municipal debt 
is reduced by the respective amount, while entries to that eﬀ ect are made in the budget 
execution report. 
An appropriate ﬁ nance-management body keeps records of all the guarantees issued, 
the fulﬁ llment of obligations by the principals and payments made in accordance with the 
guarantees. Based on that information, a detailed report on the guarantees is issued.
Government guarantees are provided by an appropriate executive body of the 
state administration. Municipal guarantees are provided by an authorized local self-
government body. In the event of government or municipal guarantee provision, an 
appropriate ﬁ nancial body must perform due diligence procedures with respect to the 
principal under the guarantee. Th e representative authority may also order the account-
ing body of the subject of the Russian Federation or municipality to carry out an audit 
on the principal under the government or municipal guarantee. 
Russian legislation restricts the guarantee-provision rights of those regions and 
municipalities that receive equalization grants. Th e amount of guarantees provided by 
such regions and municipalities must not exceed 5% of their spending. 
2.9 Measures to Prevent Municipalities’ Failure 
      to Fulfi ll their Obligations 
Th e law requires that the state ﬁ scal authorities supervise the execution of subnational 
budgets and implement measures aimed at preventing their default. If a municipality 
that is capable of servicing and repaying its debt has violated at least one of the budget-
deﬁ cit or debt-amount restrictions established by law, it will be forbidden to assume 
new obligations until it brings its budget into conformity with statutory requirements. 
Th e only exception is borrowing (assumption of new obligations) carried out for the 
purposes of municipal debt restructuring and repayment.
If a municipality is unable to service and repay its debt, the ﬁ scal agency of the 
Russian Federation may implement the following measures:
      •     order the performance of an audit of the local budget; 
      •     place the local budget under the control of the body responsible for the execu-
tion of the budget of the respective subject of the Russian Federation; 
      •     implement other measures as outlined in the budgetary legislation of the Rus-
sian Federation. 
Some observers, however, believe that removing local control over the execution of 
the budget contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
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3.  MUNICIPAL BORROWING POLICY
3.1 Local Budget Defi cit Financing 
Sources of funds for ﬁ nancing deﬁ cits of local budgets, which are permitted by Russian 
legislation, are described in Section 2 of this chapter. Here we shall analyze the con-
tribution of each of these sources to ﬁ nancing the aggregate budget deﬁ cit of Russia’s 
municipalities. 
Th e aggregate local budget deﬁ cit in the period from 1996 to 2001 and the structure 
of its ﬁ nancing are shown in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4
Aggregate Local Budget Deﬁ cit 
[in trillion rubles until 1997, in billion rubles thereafter]
Budget Item / Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total revenues 218.1 269.3 239.9 324.2 480.6 588.5
Total spending 223.5 283.0 243.1 323.8 483.0 576.5
Budget deficit/surplus –5.4 –13.7 –3.2 0.4 –2.4 –15.2
Financing sources 
Change in budget balance 2.2 2.8 0.4 –5.2 –10.9 2.7
Securities 0.4 0.0 –0.3 –0.3 0.007 –0.06
Budgetary loans 0.0 0.0 –0.5 2.9 9.7 7.9
Bank loans Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
–0.00 1.7
Sale of property Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
1.4 2.0
Other sources Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
Not 
available 
2.3 0.7
Source:    Ministry of Finance (Minﬁ n) of the Russian Federation. 
Data obtained from the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance for 1996 to 1999 
do not give a clear understanding of sources of funds for local budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing 
during that period. However, the table shows that securities issues have never played a 
signiﬁ cant role in budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing. 
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Th e main contributors to budget ﬁ nancing are budgetary loans provided to munici-
palities from budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation. In 2000, budgetary loans to 
municipal governments were so large that, despite an aggregate municipal budget deﬁ cit 
of 2.4 billion rubles, municipal governments’ budgetary account balances increased by 
the end of the year to 10.9 billion rubles. 
Table 8.4 and Figure 8.2 also show that in 2000 municipal bond issuance exceeded 
municipal bond redemption by 7.8 billion rubles, while in 2001 redemption exceeded 
issuance by 59 million rubles. Also, the total amount of loan contracts concluded in 
2001 was 1.7 billion rubles, while in the previous year this source of funds played no 
role at all (305,000 rubles for all the municipal governments in Russia). 
Figure 8.2 shows that after the 1998 crisis, municipal governments spent more funds 
on securities redemption than they raised through securities issuance. Th e amount of 
budgetary loans that municipal governments received from budgets of a higher level 
has been growing since 1999. 
Figure 8.2
Deﬁ cit Financing Sources
As of the end of 2002, the aggregate municipal debt in Russia amounted to 12.9 
billion rubles (Moscow and St. Petersburg excluded), according to preliminary data 
from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. In 2000, 9.7 billion rubles 
was provided in loans to municipal governments from budgets of a higher level. Th is 
means that budgetary loan-taking was the main factor behind an increase in municipal 
debt during that year. 
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In 2001, the aggregate municipal debt grew by 8.8 billion rubles, to 21.7 from 
12.9 billion rubles. During that year, municipal budgets received 7.9 billion rubles in 
budgetary loans from regional budgets. Th us, it was budgetary loans that accounted for 
the entire growth of municipal debt in 2001. 
On the other hand, we should remember that budgetary loans amounted to an in-
signiﬁ cant part of municipal spending. As a rule, budgetary loans amount to not more 
than 2% of  budgetary spending.
Figure 8.3 oﬀ ers an overview of the role of budgetary loans in the budgets of mu-
nicipal governments. Th at ﬁ gure and some of the later ones are “boxplot diagrams” and 
are constructed in the following way. For any random variable such as the amount of 
budgetary loans of a city, we can construct percentage points at 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
100%. For example, 25% of all cases (cities) with the lowest values lay between 0% 
and 25% percentage points. 
Th e box on a boxplot diagram marks the segment between 25 and 75 percentage 
points of a variable distribution. Th us it covers 50% of all cases “in the middle.” Th e 
horizontal line within the box shows the median value. 
Th e lines above and below (whiskers) restrict the area of all used values of a particular 
indicator between 0 and 100 percentage points, with the exception of “extreme” points 
which, in our case, include those cities that spent signiﬁ cantly larger portions of their 
budgets on taking or returning budgetary loans, such as Syktyvkar, Ulan-Ude, Kemerovo, 
Blagoveshensk, or Komsomolsk, Habarovsk and Magnotogorsk. 
Figure 8.3 and similar ﬁ gures that follow are based on a sample of 79 Russian cities 
whose population varies from 140,000 to 1,398,000. Th e majority of cities of that size 
are included and these represent various geographical regions, which assures that the 
ﬁ gure is more or less representative for mid- and large-size Russian cities.  Moscow and 
St. Petersburg are not presented here. Th ey are huge and have regional status, so including 
their data would somewhat distort our illustration of municipal policies in Russia.
Figure 8.3 shows that a signiﬁ cant portion of municipal governments successfully 
repaid the loans raised in the time period under review (half of them in 1999). 
Budgetary loans and credits are the cheapest source of funds for budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nanc-
ing and closing the revenue-spending gap for regional and municipal budgets. Th ey may 
be either interest-bearing or interest-free, and are provided for terms no longer than six 
months on the condition of their repayment in the same ﬁ nancial year. Budgetary loans 
are provided to close temporary budget gaps or as an advance provision of ﬁ nancial aid 
to a budget of a lower level. Quite frequently, budgetary loans are extended to the next 
ﬁ nancial year. In this case, they are accounted for as sources of funds for budget deﬁ cit 
ﬁ nancing. Budgetary credits may be provided not only to local governments, but also 
to other legal entities, including, in particular, state-owned and municipal enterprises. 
Russia’s Budgetary Code imposes no limits on the term of budgetary credits. Budget-
ary credit is always interest-bearing, but the interest rate is always lower than the bank 
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interest rate. Th e bodies providing budgetary loans and credits often require the use of 
property or other assets as loan security. 
Figure  8.3
Budgetary Loans as Percent of Budgetary Expenditures (1999–2001)
Th e use of budgetary loans and credits also leads to tighter control over budget 
execution by the borrower from the body providing funds. We can regard the grow-
ing role of budgetary loans in local budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing as a sign of curtailment of 
municipal governments’ budgetary autonomy. 
Bank loans still remain a cheaper source of funds than securities issue for regional 
and municipal administrations. Bank loans are not only cheaper, but can be received 
more quickly and involve lower organizational costs. For this reason, in 2001 municipal 
and regional administrations were able to reduce their outstanding bonded debt by 
reﬁ nancing it partially through bank loans. 
Th e exemption of municipal administrations and subjects of the Russian Federation 
from the securities registration tax, which now amounts to 0.8% of the nominal value of 
the registered issue, can make this method of ﬁ nancing a budget deﬁ cit more attractive 
for subfederal authorities. However, even with the reduction of organizational costs, 
securities issuance may remain less  attractive than taking bank loans. 
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It should also be pointed out that the share of funds raised for budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nanc-
ing through the sale of municipal property remains signiﬁ cant: 10% in 2000 and 13% 
in 2001. Usually, this is less than 1% of budgetary expenditures. However, we were 
unable to analyze whether the sale of municipal property is merely part of the planned 
restructuring of municipal assets or is caused by the unavailability of other sources of 
funds for budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing. 
3.2 Capital Investment Financed by Local Governments 
Th e share of expenditures on capital construction in subnational budgets varied from 
11% in 1998 to 18.9% in 2001. Regional consolidated budget data is shown in Figure 
8.4. For our purposes, the consolidated budget is understood as a budget of the subject 
of the Russian Federation consolidated with budgets of all municipalities located in its 
territory. After a deep decline in investment in 1998, capital expenditures from regional 
consolidated budgets increased slowly from 11% to 19%. It is interesting that in the 
period between 1996 and 2001, regional consolidated budget expenditures increased 
by 8% in comparable prices.
During the last six years, the share of spending on the construction of new facilities 
(about 60% of all capital spending), capital repairs (over 20%) and equipment purchases 
(below 20%), has hardly changed at all, despite serious ﬁ nancial problems in 1998-1999 
caused by Russia’s ﬁ nancial crisis. 
In 2000, capital expenditures of Russia’s municipalities accounted, on average, for 
13.6% of their total spending. Th e ﬁ gure grew to 14.9% in 2001. For purposes of 
comparison, the Russian regions’ capital expenditures amounted to 15.1% and 22.0% 
in 2000 and 2001, respectively.
Figure 8.4
Proportion of Capital Expenditures in Total Consolidated Regional Budget
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It is interesting to analyze municipalities’ budget execution reports to see the dis-
tribution of capital investment by spending items, such as equipment and durables 
purchases, capital construction and capital repairs. Th e data for all municipalities in 
Russia for 2000 and 2001 are given in Figure 8.5.
Figure 8.5
Capital Investments in 2000 (left) and 2001 (right) (Local Budgets)
About half of the capital spending of municipalities is used for construction of new 
facilities, while the respective share for Russian regions is just over two-thirds. It is interest-
ing that, despite the rather diﬃ  cult ﬁ nancial position faced by the majority of cities, their 
spending on new construction is nearly twice as large as their capital repairs spending. 
Results of our analysis of spending in these two categories are shown in Figure 8.6.  
Figure 8.6
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In 2000, funding from the municipal budgets was primarily used for construction 
of non-industrial facilities such as schools, health and social institutions, etc. Municipal 
housing construction accounted for about 25% of capital construction, while produc-
tion facility construction for less than 10%.
Half of the municipal budgets’ allotments for capital construction are used to 
ﬁ nance capital repairs in the non-production sector. One-third of funds are used to 
ﬁ nance repairs of municipal housing, while 20% is used to ﬁ nance repairs of municipal 
production facilities.
Interviews with heads of municipalities make it clear that cities attach much im-
portance to modernization of the material and technical basis of educational and health 
institutions and resource-related programs. Th ese expenditures are used to ﬁ nance com-
puter purchases for schools, measuring instruments for the heating and water-supply 
systems and other resource-saving equipment. 
It would be appropriate to analyze which facilities are ﬁ nanced from the “con-
struction of production facilities” item and which are ﬁ nanced from the “other capital 
repairs” item. Such analysis will show whether and how much municipalities invest in 
commercial projects. However, it seems that the greatest part of funds is used to ﬁ nance 
construction of engineering infrastructure facilities. A general analysis of the budget-
ary data shows that, for Russia as a whole, the proportions of various types of capital 
investment spending are quite reasonable. An analysis of a representative sample of cities 
would be required to reach more deﬁ nite conclusions.
It should be added that sometimes municipal property construction is supported 
by federal block grants. In such cases the work is funded either jointly or by the federal 
budget. Th e scale of this phenomenon is hardly calculable.
3.3 Relationship between Capital Investments 
      and Affl uence of Budgets
Based on the budget execution data from 79 Russian cities, we shall analyze capital 
investment as a share of municipalities’ total spending in 1999 through 2002. 
Th ere is a strong statistical dependence between the budget adequacy and munici-
palities’ spending on capital investment purposes. In fact, these indicators are nearly 
proportional: the coeﬃ  cients of correlation between per capita income and per capita 
investment are not smaller than 0.85 in each of the periods under review (they are 
signiﬁ cant at the 0.95 level; all correlations to be mentioned are also signiﬁ cant at the 
same level).
One pronounced trend in 2000 and 2001 was that more wealthy municipalities 
spent a large percentage of their funds on capital investment. Th is can be seen clearly 
in Figure 8.7 below, which shows that the correlation between the shares of investment 
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spending and budget aﬄ  uence amounted to 0.44 in 2000 and 0.33 in 2001 (0.24 in 
1999). 
Figure 8.7
Scatterplot: Share of Capital Spending vs. Per-capita Municipal Revenues (2001)
Our analysis allows us to conclude that the larger the municipal budget per capita, 
the greater the share of budgetary funds spent on capital investment purposes. Th is 
trend, which was barely visible in 1999, became evident in 2000 and 2001.
3.4 Amount and Structure of Local Budgets’ Debt
To analyze the debt burden on the municipal level, we used the following three indica-
tors: the amount of the municipal debt, the amount of the municipal debt including 
guarantees provided, and the amount of the municipal debt including overdue payables. 
Th e last indicator cannot be counted as municipal debt according to the Budgetary Code 
of the Russian Federation. At the same time, based on economic sense, the overdue 
liabilities can be regarded as municipal debt because they are in fact a form of crediting 
the municipal budget at the expense of enterprises’ funds (wage debts in the housing 
and utilities service sector) or employees on the municipal government payroll (delayed 
salaries).
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Th e structure of debt at the municipal level is shown in Figure 8.8. Overdue payables 
are taken into account.
Figure 8.8
Structure of Municipal Debt
In 2000, overdue municipal payables accounted for about 68% of the total municipal 
debt. Th e loans and bonds accounted for 23%, while guarantees provided accounted 
for 9%. In 2001, the share of overdue payables decreased sharply, to 52%. At the same 
time, the share of loans amounted to 36%, while the share of guarantees accounted 
for 12%.
A calculation of debt-revenues balance was made for each subject of the Russian 
Federation. Th e calculation was made using data for the municipal level of subjects of 
the Russian Federation. To characterize the debt burden on the budget, we calculated the 
debt-revenues ratio using the three above-mentioned debt indicators. Municipal debts 
were registered in 28 subjects of the Russian Federation in 2000, and 27 in 2001.Th e 
largest debt was registered in the Republic of Buryatia, where it accounted for 69% 
of budget revenues in 2000 and 46% in 2001. With guarantees and overdue payables 
taken into account, municipal debt in Buryatia accounted for 88% and 123% of budget 
revenues, respectively. In 2001, the ﬁ gures for Buryatia amounted to 46% for general 
debt, 50% with guarantees taken into account, and 88% if overdue payables are taken 
into account. 
Russia’s Primorsky Kraj was the second Russian region ranked according to the 
amount of municipal debt in 2000 and 2001. Th ere, the debt to revenues ratio amounted 
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to 56% in 2000, while the debt plus guarantees to revenues and the debt plus overdue 
payables to revenues ratio amounted to 56% and 72%, respectively. Th e ﬁ gures for 
2001 were 21%, 21% and 25%, respectively. 
For Russia as a whole, the ratio between the municipal debt and municipal govern-
ment revenues amounted 3% in 2000 and 4% in 2001. With guarantees taken into 
account, these ratios were 4% in 2000 and 5% in 2001. Taking into account overdue 
payables, diﬀ erent ﬁ gures are produced: 12% for 2000 and 10% for 2001. 
Th us, the recent years revealed a trend towards municipal debt growth with a si-
multaneous reduction of overdue payables, which shows that a process of conversion of 
overdue payables into municipalities’ debt is now underway. Th e total amount of debt 
with respect to guarantees and overdue payables has decreased. 
An analysis of the relationship between a municipal formation’s debt and municipal 
budget revenues has shown that there is practically no statistical relationship between 
budget revenues and various types of municipal debt. 
3.5 The Impact of the Macroeconomic Situation 
      on Municipal Borrowing 
 
We carried out a time analysis of the relationship between net budgetary loans and net 
outstanding municipal bonds (funds raised less repayment), based on the consumer price 
index. For the purposes of our analysis, we took the 1996-2001 series of net amounts of 
outstanding securities (securities placement less redemption) and net budgetary loans 
from budgets of higher levels (funds raising less repayment), as well as the inﬂ ation 
data. Th e results of our analysis of the relationship between inﬂ ation and net securities 
issuing are shown in Figure 8.9.
Figure 8.9
Relationship between Net Securities Issuing and Inﬂ ation (1996–2001)
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As the ﬁ gure shows, there is a weak negative relationship between the net amount 
of securities issuing and the rate of inﬂ ation. Th e ﬁ gure also gives the coeﬃ  cients for 
a linear regression model that shows the relationship between the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and the net amount of outstanding municipal bonds. All the coeﬃ  cients 
of the model proved to be signiﬁ cant. Moreover, the model determination coeﬃ  cient 
equals 0.25, which means that inﬂ ation has a very slight impact on the net amount of 
outstanding securities.
Th e relationship between net budgetary loans and inﬂ ation is shown in Figure 
8.10.
Figure 8.10
Net Budgetary Loans—Inﬂ ation Relationship
A similar regression model developed for this particular case shows that the deter-
mination coeﬃ  cient is close to 0.57, which means that the inﬂ ation factor has a rather 
strong impact on the amount of budgetary loans. 
In both analyzed cases, the linear model slope ratio amounts to approximately 0.003. 
Th is means that inﬂ ation’s impact on the amounts of municipal borrowing is rather 
weak when both net municipal securities issuance and net budgetary loan raising from 
budgets of higher levels are concerned. 
Owing to a suﬃ  ciently long sequence of data characterizing municipal borrowing, 
a cross section analysis of macroeconomic parameters’ impact was carried out for the 
period of 2000 through 2001. Similar results are achieved during a cross-section analysis 
of the 2000 and 2001 data. We analyzed the relationship between the total municipal 
debt in the subject of the Russian Federation and the rate of inﬂ ation in that region. 
Th e coeﬃ  cient of correlation between the two indicators amounted to about –0.05 in 
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2001 and –0.03 in 2000. Moreover, Russia’s 2001 inﬂ ation amounted to 118% of the 
previous year’s inﬂ ation. Th e inﬂ ation rates varied from 115% in the Vologda region to 
128% in the Ulyanovsk Region. 
Th us, we can conclude that inﬂ ation has a slight negative impact on the amounts 
of current borrowing by a municipal formation. At the same time, there is practically 
no relationship between the total amount of debt and inﬂ ation. 
Such behavior can be explained by the fact that an increase in inﬂ ation leads to 
an increase in economic activities and consequently in budget revenue growth, which 
slightly reduces the need for borrowed funds. Since most budgetary loans are short-term 
loans, inﬂ ation’s maximum impact is on the amount of short-term borrowing. 
3.6 Trends in Use of Borrowed Funds
On the basis of a statistical analysis of data from 79 Russian municipal governments 
from 1999 to 2001 and  research into the spending directions of their borrowed funds, 
we can make a number of observations. In 1999 and 2000 municipal government bor-
rowing amounted to about 5% of spending. In 2001, municipal governments borrowed 
much less, about 1% to 2% of their spending. One can also consider the ratio against 
capital spending, illustrated in Figure 8.11.
Figure 8.11
Loan-raising as a Percentage of Capital Expenditures (1999–2001)
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Th is ﬁ gure shows that municipal borrowing is usually no more than the capital 
expenditures (except for some outliers). Median value is about 50%. And again, bor-
rowings as a ratio to capital spending in 2001 were considerably lower than in the years 
1999–2000.
Th e main observation with respect to municipal government borrowing during that 
period is that in 1999 and 2000 a signiﬁ cant amount of borrowed funds was used to 
repay municipal debts, i.e., for the purposes of municipal debt reﬁ nancing. Accordingly, 
the correlation coeﬃ  cients were 0.94 and 0.93, respectively. Th e correlation between 
loan raising and debt repayment was signiﬁ cant in 2000 and 2001, although there was 
much less municipal borrowing in 2001, as we have already mentioned.
Figure 8.12
Scatterplot: Share of Loan-raising vs. Share of Debt Repayment (2000)
Overall, no statistical relationship between investment spending and municipal 
borrowing is to be observed. For instance, many municipal governments ended 1999 
with a budget surplus and therefore ﬁ nanced their capital investments as current ex-
penditures. Moreover, in some cases capital investment spending ﬁ nanced from current 
income was accompanied by an increase in municipal governments’ bank accounts, i.e., 
in their savings.
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In 2000, a trend emerged towards use of loans to ﬁ nance capital investments (cor-
relation: 0.46). When adjusted (taken as% of budgetary spending), there is no statistical 
relationship between these two values. Th is means that the correlation occurred because 
of a small number of municipal governments whose large capital investment was ac-
companied by raising large loans.
Figure 8.13
Scatterplot: Share of Loan-raising vs. Share of Debt Repayment (2001)
Two conclusions can be drawn on the basis of Figure 8.12: 
      1)   No statistical relationship between capital investment and borrowing by Russian 
municipal governments has been revealed.
      2)   During the post-crisis period, the greatest part of municipal borrowing was used 
for debt reﬁ nancing, but this trend was not as pronounced in 2001 as in 1999 
and 2000. In addition, the total volume of borrowing was signiﬁ cantly smaller 
in 2001.
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Figure 8.14
Scatterplot: Borrowing Less Debt Repayment vs. Capital Expenditures (2000)
3.7 Conclusions
Municipal borrowing primarily comprises loans and credits from the budgets of other 
levels and to a lesser extent bank credits. Zero-interest loans are obtained for funding 
budget gaps and temporary ﬁ nancial shortfalls occurring as emergencies. However, if 
loans are not repaid over the year they are reﬂ ected in the budget report and contribute 
to increasing the municipal debt.
Th e municipal debt total by the end of 2001 was 21.7 billion rubles. Th is makes 
up 3.5% of local budget expenditures, with budget loans and credits accounting for 
80% of this amount.
Th e proportion of long-term and short-term budget credits has not yet been assessed, 
and the rest of the municipal debt consists mostly of bank credits.
Municipalities do not usually draw bank credits for ﬁ nancing budget gaps. Th ese 
funds are used for reﬁ nancing old outstanding debts and, to some extent, for capital 
construction.
Th e analysis of data from 79 cities shows that these cities allocate an average of 12% 
of their expenditures to capital investment. In addition, a lot of municipal facilities are 
built with direct funding from regional budgets.
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Local budget deﬁ cits amounted to 0.5% and 2.4% of local government expenditures 
in 2000 and 2001 respectively.
Municipalities’ debt total in 2001 (21.7 billion rubles), debt augmentation in 2001 
(8.8 billion rubles), local budget deﬁ cits (15 billion rubles) and capital investments (92.8 
billion rubles) in the same year shows that in extremis borrowing may ﬁ nance no more 
than 12% of expenditures for capital investment. Th e remaining 88% of expenditures 
is funded by municipalities on a pay-as-you-go basis.
4.   MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
Municipalities attract very few loans from the securities market, as was shown in the 
previous section. In 2001 the volume of repayment exceeded that of borrowing. At 
present, securities amount to less than 1% of the municipal borrowing total. One can 
assume, however, that in the near future municipalities will more actively use them as 
a source of funds. Bank loans are indeed more competitive than bonds, but banks are 
interested in short-term lending, while most infrastructure investment implies long-
term borrowing.
4.1 Development of Legislation Regulating Municipal Borrowing 
During the ten years of Russia’s economic reform, the municipal bond market grew 
rather rapidly if somewhat unevenly. In the early 1990s, municipal borrowing was carried 
out according to old Soviet practices based on Soviet principles of budgetary ﬁ nance. 
In case of a shortage of funds, municipal governments borrowed from the budget of a 
higher level. Th ese borrowings had to be repaid by the end of the same ﬁ nancial year. 
Two laws passed in the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s established a rather liberal regime of 
borrowing by subjects of the Russian Federation. One was the now-abrogated Law on 
the Bases of Budgetary Rights and Rights for the Formation and Use of Extra-Budgetary 
Funds (1993), while the other was the Law on the Bases of Organization of Local Self-
Government in the Russian Federation (1995). Article 42 of the latter law says that 
in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation, local self-government bodies 
have the right to ﬂ oat municipal loans and hold lotteries, provide and receive loans and 
establish municipal banks and other ﬁ nancial and lending institutions. However, the 
law determines neither the upper borrowing limit nor the purposes of borrowing.
In the mid-90s many regions and municipalities actively borrowed by means of 
municipal and regional bonds and bank credits. Th e absence of borrowing limits 
and borrowing aim restrictions for regional and municipal governments had negative 
consequences: municipal governments actively borrowed funds to ﬁ nance their current 
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needs on extremely unfavorable terms and without having a loan repayment plan. For 
this reason, the federal center introduced some restrictions soon after.
According to the applicable law in eﬀ ect at that time, transactions with state bonds 
were not taxed. “Provisions on Issue and Circulation of Municipal Securities in Stock 
Markets in the RSFSR” deﬁ ned state debt obligations as “any securities certifying a 
borrowing relationship involving the state authority as a debtor.” Th erefore, it was 
beneﬁ cial to attribute the status of state securities to the issue of regional and municipal 
securities, and the applicable law at that time allowed doing so. Th e act of the Federal 
Securities Commission of May 5, 1995  preserved  state status only for securities of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation. Th at very decision sharply decreased municipalities’ 
incentive to issue new securities.
In 1995, extremely proﬁ table and seemingly risk-free federal state securities also 
came into existence. Th is ﬁ nancial tool had been accumulating most of the surplus 
ﬁ nancial resources in the country for three and a half years.
Bills of exchange issued by regional and municipal governments became widespread 
in 1995 and 1996. Th ese proved to be a very convenient instrument for implementing 
various mutual oﬀ -set plans. Bill issues do not need not to be registered. Bills of exchange 
exist only in documentary form, and they can be used for settlements with suppliers 
and creditors, bypassing the banks. Th is made it possible for their users to fulﬁ ll obliga-
tions and simultaneously accumulate debts within the budgets of various levels. Many 
privatization plans were implemented using regional and municipal governments’ bills 
of exchange. After all, under conditions of an acute cash shortage (the Central Bank 
of the Russian Federation ceased to provide loans to Russia’s Ministry of Finance in 
1995) and ﬂ ourishing non-monetary settlements, bills of exchange were a convenient 
money substitute. However, the issue of regional and municipal bills of exchange and 
their circulation and repayment procedures were insuﬃ  ciently regulated. Th e existing 
practice of advanced payment of regional and municipal bills of exchange provided 
signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial beneﬁ ts to bill holders. 
In 1997, the Federal Law “On the Note and Bill of Exchange” prohibited regional 
and municipal administrations from assuming “note and bill of exchange liabilities.”
4.2 Government and Municipal Securities Issue Procedures 
Procedures for the issuance of government and municipal securities, the circulation of 
securities, the assumption and performance of obligations arising from the securities 
issue and the disclosure of information by securities issuers are regulated by the Federal 
Law of the Russian Federation “On the Speciﬁ cs of the Issuance and Circulation of the 
Government and Municipal Securities.” Th e issuance procedure consists of several phases. 
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      1)   To issue securities, a local government must approve a municipal regulatory 
document entitled General Terms and Conditions of the Issuance and Circula-
tion of Municipal Securities. Th e General Terms and Conditions must specify 
the following: 
            •     the types of securities; 
            •     the form of securities issuance; 
            •     the maturity of the type of securities concerned (short, long or medium-
term securities); 
            •     security denomination currency; 
            •     speciﬁ cs of the fulﬁ llment of obligations, which provide for the right to use 
property instead of cash for redemption purposes; 
            •     restrictions, if any, on the circulation of securities and the categories of 
securities holders who may own or hold these securities. 
            •     in accordance with the General Terms and Conditions, the issuer (the 
municipal government in the case of a municipal formation) must adopt 
a regulatory document specifying the conditions of the government and 
municipal securities issue and circulation, including the following: 
                  – the types of securities; 
                  – the shortest and longest maturities of that type of government or munici-
pal securities; diﬀ erent securities issues may have diﬀ erent maturities; 
                  – the nominal value of each government or municipal security in the 
issue; 
                  – the procedure for the government or municipal securities placement; 
                  – the procedure for the execution of rights attached to securities; 
                  – the yield or the procedure for its calculation; 
                  – other signiﬁ cant conditions of the issue, which are important from the 
viewpoint of the emergence, fulﬁ llment or termination of obligations 
on government or municipal securities. 
            Th e terms and conditions of the securities issuance by subjects of the Russian 
Federation and municipal administrations must also contain the following 
information: 
            •     the borrower’s budget for the year of the government or municipal securi-
ties issue with a breakdown into the current and development (capital) 
budgets; 
            •     the borrower’s total outstanding debt as of the time of the government or 
municipal securities issue; 
            •     information about the execution of the borrower’s budget for the last three 
ﬁ scal years. 
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      2)   Th e Terms and Conditions of the Government and Municipal Securities Issue 
are subject to state registration. Russia has a uniform government and municipal 
loan registration system. Subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities 
register the loans they ﬂ oat in the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion, and each issue of government or municipal securities is assigned a state 
registration number. 
            Th e Ministry of Finance may refuse to register the Terms and Conditions of 
the Issue if the issuer violates the borrowing limits established by representative 
and executive authorities of subjects of the Russian Federation and local self-
government bodies. 
            In the event of denial of state registration of the Terms and Conditions of the 
Securities Issue, the issuer has the right to appeal against it in court. 
      3)   Upon the registration of the Terms and Conditions of the Issue by the Minis-
try of Finance, the issuer must make the issuance decision. Th e decision must 
conform to the General Terms and Conditions of the Issue.  
      4)   Th e terms and conditions speciﬁ ed in the securities issuance decision must be 
published in the media or disclosed in some other way by the issuer not later 
than two working days prior to the beginning of placement.
            Government or municipal securities issuers must register information relating 
to obligations under each securities issue. Th is information includes the total 
amount of obligations on issued securities and their maturities. 
            Government and municipal securities issuers must prepare annual reports on 
the results of securities issues, approve it by a legal document and submit to the 
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation not later than May 1 of the year 
following the reporting year in accordance with the established procedure. 
            Th e report on the results of securities issue must contain the following informa-
tion: 
            a)   the total obligations of a subject of the Russian Federation or municipal 
formation, which emerged as a result of the securities issue, denominated 
in a foreign currency or rubles as of the end of the reporting year; 
            b)  overdue debt, including principal and interest, which must be shown sepa-
rately; 
            c)   liabilities due in the future (with speciﬁ cation of principal repayments and 
interest payments); 
            d)  the source of funds for budget deﬁ cit ﬁ nancing, which must be approved 
by a law (decision) on the budget (nominal ﬁ gures); 
            e)   the total amounts of securities issuance and redemption at par, with a 
breakdown by each type of security; 
            f )   the amount of funds raised through the securities issuance in the reporting 
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year (compared to the similar amount for the previous ﬁ scal year); 
            g)   the debt servicing expenditures of a subject of the Russian Federation or a 
municipal formation (separately for each type of debt instrument, compared 
to the similar ﬁ gure for the previous ﬁ scal year); 
            h)  the amount of borrowing made through the securities issue as a source of 
ﬁ nancing a budget deﬁ cit of a respective level in the reporting year and the 
total budget deﬁ cit; 
            i)    measures aimed at debt restructuring, debt servicing expenditure optimiza-
tion, borrowing procedure improvement and securities market infrastructure 
development, which were implemented by the securities issuer in the report-
ing year. 
4.3 Information Disclosure on Securities Issue 
According to the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On the Speciﬁ cs of Govern-
ment and Municipal Securities Issue and Circulation,” information about government 
and municipal securities must be available to all interested parties. 
In addition, executive bodies of the subjects of the Russian Federation and local 
self-government bodies must publish quarterly reports on the execution of their budgets 
and submit reports on the fulﬁ llment of obligations that have emerged as a result of the 
securities issue to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 
In early 2001, Russia’s Ministry of Finance introduced additional disclosure standards 
applying to government and municipal securities. Th e document requires that securities 
issuers put the above information on their Internet servers, and submit it to the General 
Securities Underwriter and/or dealers on the government (municipal) securities market 
for further information provision to the interested parties. 
4.4 Regional and Municipal Bond Market: Phases of Development
4.4.1   Market Origination
In its development, the subfederal and municipal bond market passed through four 
qualitatively diﬀ erent phases, including the following: the formation phase (1992–1996), 
the growth phase (1997 to August 17, 1998), the crisis phase (August 17, 1998 to 
December 31, 1998) and the post-crisis phase (1999 to the present). 
 For the ﬁ rst time, governments of subjects of the Russian Federation and the 
municipal governments tried to raise funds through bond issuance in the early 1990s. 
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Th e ﬁ rst regional bonds were issued in the Habarovsk Kraj in March 1992. In 1992 
and 1993, the issue of bonds and other debt was of an experimental nature. Th e bonds 
were placed and circulated in isolated regional markets with inadequate infrastructure. 
During that period, the total issue of subfederal and municipal securities (bills of ex-
change excluded) amounted to only 1.2% of the respective regional budget deﬁ cits. 
Th e main factors impeding the development of the municipal bond market was Russia’s 
hyperinﬂ ation and the absence of an adequate regulatory base. 
In 1992, Russia’s Ministry of Finance registered ﬁ ve subfederal and municipal bond 
issues worth 5.6 million rubles (with adjustment for the ruble denomination), while in 
1993 there were eight issues worth 9.3 million rubles. 
Table 8.5
Subfederal and Municipal Bond Issues in 1992–1996
Year Bond Issues Nominal Issue Amount 
Number Growth on the 
Previous Year [%] 
Weight Million Rubles Growth on the 
Previous Year [%] 
Weight 
1992 5 3.27 5.6 0.03
1993 8 160 5.23 9.3 166.1 0.05
1994 28 350 18.3 2,701.0 29,043.0 13.49
1995 73 260.7 47.71 6,516.0 241.2 32.54
1996 39 53.4 25.49 10,789.0 165.6 53.89
Total 153 100.00 100.00
Source:     Finansy i Kredit Magazine, No. 7, 2002. 
In 1994, the executive bodies of state administration began to use debt issuance 
more widely, as an  alternative to bank lending as a source of borrowed funds. During 
that year, Russia’s Ministry of Finance registered 28 subfederal and municipal bond 
issues worth 2,701 million rubles. In 1995 it registered 73 issues worth 6,516 million 
rubles, and in 1996, 39 issues worth 10,789 million rubles. In some regions the share 
of the budget deﬁ cit of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities, which 
was ﬁ nanced through the issue of bonds, grew to 50% in 1995 and 1996. 
From 1992 to 1996, bond issues were characterized by the following distinctive 
features: 
      1)   Securities issuers provided no high-quality issue prospectuses. Government 
authorities had no reliable information about the ﬁ nancial and economic posi-
tion of their territories and the actual need for ﬁ nancial resources. As a result, 
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the greatest part of the bonded debt issued during that period was aimed at 
bridging temporary budget gaps and increasing local budget revenues. A small 
part of the funds raised was used to ﬁ nance housing construction and public 
welfare programs. 
      2)   When selecting agents for servicing subfederal and municipal loans, executive 
bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal bodies practiced a 
sort of protectionism for regional and local ﬁ nancial institutions. Custody and 
settlement risks were so high that the most important investor in the region 
or municipality had no possibility of showing any signiﬁ cant presence in the 
market. 
      3)   Th ere were no generally-accepted, common guarantee mechanisms for bond 
repayment. Quite frequently, the debt-servicing amounts were not even shown 
as a separate spending item in the regional or local budget. 
      4)   A signiﬁ cant portion of subfederal and municipal bonds was used as an instru-
ment of tax payments to the regional budget, which only increased the outﬂ ow 
of real ﬁ nancial resources from the region.
4.4.2   Th e Development Phase 
Russia’s macroeconomic situation changed signiﬁ cantly in 1997. During that period, 
Russia’s GDP grew, inﬂ ation and real interest rates decreased, and the reliability of the 
trading system as a whole and the professional adequacy of exchanges increased. In ad-
dition, the attitude of Russian and foreign investors to Russian government securities 
improved and credit ratings were assigned to them. Th e growing investment needs of 
Russian ﬁ nancial and industrial groups revealed the inadequate capacity of the Russian 
securities market. Unsatisﬁ ed demand for securities amounted to dozens of billions of 
rubles. 
Th e total number of registered subfederal and municipal bond issues grew more 
than eightfold in 1997 compared to 1996 (from 39 to 313), while the total amount 
issued grew more than 2.7 times, from 10,789 to 29,488 million rubles. Nevertheless, 
only six billion rubles were taken from the bond market for the purpose of covering 
the substantial budget deﬁ cit.
In all, as of January 1, 1998, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation 
registered 466 prospectuses of bond issues by the executive bodies of subjects of the 
Russian Federation and municipalities for a total amount of 49,508.8 million rubles 
at par. Th is means that 67.2% of the total number of subfederal and municipal bond 
issues made between 1992 and 1997 was registered in 1997. Th e bond issuance activi-
ties of executive bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities reached 
their peak in that year.
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 Th e intensive growth of the subfederal and municipal bond market in 1997 can 
be explained by a number of factors, including the following: 
      •     a signiﬁ cant reduction of federal government securities yields; 
      •     a ban on the issue of bills of exchange by the bodies of state administration of 
subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal governments imposed by the 
Federal Law “On the Note and the Bill of Exchange” passed in March 1997; 
      •     changes in the legislation of the Russian Federation, requiring registration of 
securities issues and assignment of state registration numbers to them; 
      •     the aggressive behavior of certain issuers on the securities market. For instance, 
the Moscow city government represented by its Committee for Municipal Loans 
was a large borrower on the securities market in 1997. 
      •     the large number of agribond issues—201 issues in all. 
One feature of Russia’s subfederal and municipal bond market in 1997 was a signiﬁ -
cant share of no-purpose borrowing in the total amount of borrowing. Most of the bonds 
issued during that period were short-term or medium-term discount bonds (57%). 
Th e situation on the securities market worsened in late 1997. Interest rates grew and 
became unstable, while the maturities of the bond issues increased. As a result, pressure 
on budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities increased, while 
issue planning and loan management became more diﬃ  cult. 
However, Russia’s subfederal and municipal governments continued to issue debt 
securities rather actively until May 1998. In January through May, Russia’s Ministry 
of Finance registered 59 subfederal and municipal bond issues worth 14,122.5 million 
rubles. But compared to 1997 the average monthly securities issue volume decreased, to 
1,606.45 million rubles (2,025.4 million rubles in 1998). Th at period was also charac-
terized by a more rapid concentration of trading in municipal bonds on trading ﬂ oors 
located in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Cities placed their bonds only on the regional 
ﬁ nancial markets. 
In May of 1998, industrial production began to decline and borrowing conditions 
worsened as a result. From June to August, 1998, 24 regional and municipal bond issues 
worth 7,918.56 million rubles were registered in Russia. Th e capacity of the ﬁ nancial 
market decreased signiﬁ cantly as a result of a sharp increase in foreign capital outﬂ ow 
from Russia and the continuous withdrawal of funds from the securities market by non-
resident investors with their subsequent conversion into hard currency. Th e ﬁ rst cases of 
subfederal and municipal government defaults on debt obligations were also registered 
on the market during that time. Th e issuers’ failure to fulﬁ ll their agribond and energy 
bond obligations was explained not only by the worsening of Russia’s macroeconomic 
conditions, but also by the “administrative factor,” which is the issuers’ reluctance to 
repay their liabilities. 
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From January to August, 1998, seven municipalities registered their internal bonded 
debt ﬂ oats worth 378.95 million rubles, or 2.95% of the total amount of the outstanding 
municipal debt, while Moscow and the Moscow Region registered four external bond 
issues. Th e total amount of Eurobond issues as of the date of their state registration, 
calculated according to the exchange rate quoted by the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation for that date, accounted for 41.6% of the total debt issued, while their weight 
in the total number of bond issues amounted to 4.8%. 
Regional and local governments grew more active on the securities market from 1992 
to 1998, with the total of  internal subfederal and municipal bond issues amounting to 
71,549.96 million rubles at par. 
But despite a rapid development of the subfederal and municipal bond market 
during that period, it still accounted for a rather moderate share of Russia’s securities 
market. In 1997, for instance, subfederal and municipal bonds accounted for an in-
signiﬁ cant 6.6% of all outstanding bonds issued in Russia. To a great extent, that was 
explained by a faster growth of the GKO/OFZ market and the  introduction of new 
types of government securities, including those targeted at small investors in general 
and ordinary Russians in particular. Th e institute of underwriting was not yet formed 
during that period. 
4.4.3   Th e Crisis Phase
Russia’s August 17, 1998 crisis caused a mass sell-oﬀ  of securities by bond holders at 
dumping prices. Th e volume of securities issuance decreased sharply, too. In September 
through December, 1998, only one municipal bond issue was registered in Russia. It 
was registered by the Yaroslavl Mayor’s Oﬃ  ce. 
During the crisis, only Moscow and St. Petersburg continued to service their debt, 
but even Moscow sometimes delayed payments and repaid part of its liabilities in a 
non-monetary form (provision of tax exemptions and debt conversion in newly-issued 
securities) on agreement with investors. Moreover, only St. Petersburg managed to 
maintain its secondary securities market during the crisis. St. Petersburg also managed 
to place new bond issues, although investors bought only 10% to 15% of each issue, 
while the issuer rejected the most aggressive bids. Cases of mass defaults on the subfederal 
and municipal bond market revealed a number of major problems faced by the market 
at that time and even at present.
In addition to political and national risks, the main impediment to raising funds was 
the absence of institutional mechanisms for protecting the rights of creditors ﬁ nancing 
executive bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal governments. In 
the event of refusal to fulﬁ ll bond redemption obligations by regional and local govern-
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ments, it was impossible to enforce court decisions made in favor of creditors. Th e only 
known precedent was in 2002, when an administration building, which was the property 
of the Nakhodka Mayor’s Oﬃ  ce, was seized in accordance with a court decision. 
Furthermore, there is no procedure for enforcing the precedence of payment of credi-
tors’ interest in the event of default, and there are no mechanisms of control over the 
use of funds in accordance with the stated borrowing purposes or over the management 
of reserve funds. Nor is there a system for monitoring investment project implemen-
tation and the assessment of risks involved. As a result, the formation of a secondary 
subfederal and municipal bond market needed for attracting commercial banks’ funds 
and portfolio investment is impossible. 
In spite of all this, Russia’s subfederal and municipal bond market was one of the 
few ﬁ nancial market segments that remained active under the conditions of Russia’s 
ﬁ nancial crisis in the second half of 1998, although to a lesser extent. 
4.4.4   Th e Post-Crisis Phase (1999 to the Present) 
Th e paying capacity of regional governments has increased signiﬁ cantly during the last 
two or three years. Assets of regional and municipal governments are growing rapidly. 
According to the Bank of Russia, regional and local government bank deposits amounted 
to 52.2 billion rubles as of November 1, 2000, while their liabilities to the banking 
system amounted to 21.4 billion rubles. Th e regional governments’ outstanding debt 
has also decreased signiﬁ cantly.  
In addition, the numbers of subfederal and municipal bond issues returned to 
their 1994 level. Regional budget surpluses led to the reduction of the subfederal and 
municipal bond market by more than 5 billion rubles. A change in the debt structure 
in favor of bank loans also contributed to this reduction. 
 Despite the fact that the subfederal and municipal bond market is shrinking, new 
issuers have emerged while the best-known borrowers of the past are leaving it. In 2001, 
an excessive supply of ﬁ xed-income securities was characteristic of the bond market. Th e 
increase in investment seen in 2001 was due to an improvement in Russia’s macroeco-
nomic conditions. High international oil prices, political stability in Russia, moderate 
government borrowing on the domestic market and the subsequent excessive liquidity 
of Russian banks prompted investment in securities. 
In the years since the crisis, yields on the Russian securities market have returned to 
their pre-crisis levels. Recently, the yields in various segments of the Russian securities 
market have decreased signiﬁ cantly, including GKO/OFZ yields, regional bond yields 
(especially yields on bonds issued by Moscow and St. Petersburg), municipal bond yields 
and yields on corporate bonds, a market segment that is growing again. 
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 Figures 8.15 and 8.16 illustrate the change in the structure of domestic borrowing 
from 2001 to 2002, as follows: the share of municipal bonds and corporate securities 
increased, while the share of government securities shrank.
Figure 8.15
Distribution of the Bond Market (May 2001)
Source:     Bankovskoye Delo. #8, 2002.
Figure 8.16
Distribution of the Bond Market (December 2002)
Source:     Cbonds.Ru. #1, 2003.
State bonds
191.1 Billion Rubles
Municipal bonds
12.6 Billion Rubles
Corporate bonds
14.7 Billion Rubles
State bonds
217.008 Billion Rubles
Municipal bonds
34.92 Billion Rubles
Corporate bonds
108.933 Billion Rubles
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 Moscow and St. Petersburg accounted for the two largest shares of the municipal 
bond market, which amounted to about 9 billion rubles each. Moreover, Moscow’s and 
St. Petersburg’s shares signiﬁ cantly increased from 2001 to early 2002.
Figure 8.17
Distribution of the Bond Market by Issuers
Source:     Bankovskoye Delo. #8, 2002
 
St. Petersburg’s share of the market grew from 3 billion rubles at the start of 2001 
to almost 10 billion rubles at the year’s end. As of the start of 2001, Moscow’s outstand-
ing bonds included only its eighth issue of bonds worth 560 million rubles. However, 
having had its borrowing program approved, Moscow successfully placed eleven more 
issues worth 10 billion rubles, two of which are already redeemed. Moscow’s municipal 
bond turnover on the secondary market has also increased signiﬁ cantly.
4.5 Bonded Debt Types
Th e bonded debt issued by regional and municipal governments can be subdivided by 
type into the following: bonds similar to federal government short-term bonds (GKOs 
and OFZs) issued to ﬁ nance a budget deﬁ cit, agribonds, “energy” bonds, savings bonds 
and Eurobonds. 
Leningrad Oblast—0.5 Billion Rubles
Bashkortostan—1 Billion Rubles
Moscow
9.06 Billion Rubles
St. Petersburg
9.614 Billion Rubles
Karelia—0.15 Billion Rubles
Komi Republic—0.4 Billion Rubles
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4.5.1   Bonds Similar to Federal Government Short-term Bonds
           (GKOs and OFZs) 
Mechanisms for the issuance and placement of most of these bonds, as well as the 
secondary market organization, are similar to GKO and OFZ issue and circulation 
mechanisms. Bonds of this type are registered securities issued in a non-documentary 
form. Th ey are placed in series (tranches) by auction or on exchanges. Such bonds have 
been issued by Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian regions in both documentary 
and non-documentary forms. 
Table 8.6
Moscow’s and St. Petersburg’s Municipal Bond Issues (1992–1996) 
Securities Issuer Issued Amount
[Billion Rubles]
Daily Turnover
[Billion Rubles]
Daily Turnover as a 
Percentage of Total Issue 
Ministry of Finance (Minfin) of the 
Russian Federation (GKOs and OFZs) 
360,000 4,000 1.11
St. Petersburg city administration 3,000 33 1.1
Moscow city government 2,000 0.755 0.04
Source:     Rynok–Tsennye Bumagi Magazine, No. 4, 1998. 
4.5.2   Bond Issues for Financing Purpose-Oriented Investment Programs 
Subjects of the Russian Federation and local self-government bodies also ﬂ oat purpose-
oriented loans in order to ﬁ nance investment projects in the manufacturing and other 
sectors. 
Th e most common are housing loans. Housing bonds are issued in small tranches. 
Th ey conﬁ rm that their holders have invested a certain amount of funds to ﬁ nance 
construction of a particular housing project. In most cases, such securities are inter-
est-bearing. Th ey are redeemed within several years with housing or with cash. Th eir 
redemption is guaranteed by the total amount of new housing built under contract 
with the administration of subjects of the Russian Federation and by other property 
and budgetary funds. Th e interest accrued is paid on the redemption date. 
Housing bonds were issued by administrations of the Nizhni Novgorod Region, 
the Krasnoyarsk Territory and other Russian regions and territories. Most frequently, 
they were issued by municipalities within subjects of the Russian Federation such as 
Samara, Omsk, Yaroslavl, Dubna and others.
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After Russia’s August 1998 crisis, Moscow was the only city that registered a secu-
rities issue to ﬁ nance projects implemented in accordance with Moscow’s investment 
program. 
4.5.3   Agribonds and “Energy” Bonds 
Agribonds were issued in 1996 by subjects of the Russian Federation against commod-
ity credit provided by the federal government in the amount of 1996-denominated 
rubles. Th ey were also an attempt to change the existing agri-industrial complex support 
practices through the conversion of its debt to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian 
Federation into securities to be sold on the stock market, with the raised funds being 
transferred to the Fund for Soft Lending to Agribusinesses. 
“Energy” bonds of two other subjects of the Russian Federation, the Primorsky and 
Habarovsk Territories, are similar by origin. Th ese securities are instruments for the 
restructuring of Russia’s debt to the federal government in the fuel and energy complex, 
into loans provided against the guarantees of territorial governments. “Energy” bonds 
were ﬁ xed-income securities issued in a non-documentary form. 
4.5.4   Savings Bonds 
Savings bonds are targeted at a particular category of investors—the population of the 
region that issues them. Th ese securities are coupon bonds issued in a documentary 
form. Coupon income is paid annually or quarterly. Th ough savings bonds were success-
fully issued by Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Astrakhan Region and some other Russian 
regions, they are hardly a widespread instrument. 
4.5.5   Foreign Borrowing 
International ﬁ nancial markets attracted Russian securities issuers, including subjects of 
the Russian Federation, because of a signiﬁ cant demand for debt instruments, longer 
maturities and the relative cheapness of funds (before the August 1998 crisis) compared 
to the Russian market. Another factor behind entering international markets was the 
desire to create a favorable investment image for Russia. 
However, few Russian regions will be able to work on the Eurobond market even 
if it remains attractive to them. Since Russia’s capacity to absorb investment is limited, 
the federal government, when entering the international ﬁ nancial market, would be af-
fected by competition from regional governments. In addition, their borrowing increases 
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Russia’s aggregate foreign debt. Th e timeliness of repayment of foreign debt liabilities by 
subjects of the Russian Federation also aﬀ ects Russia’s credit rating and, consequently, 
the cost of servicing its foreign debt. 
Until 2000, Russian legislation imposed no restrictions on local self-government 
bodies’ right to borrow in foreign countries, although no municipal formation managed 
to use that right. When the Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation came into eﬀ ect, 
however, municipalities lost the opportunity altogether. 
Table 8.7
Weightings of Various Types of Bonds Issued (1996 and 1997) 
Issue Nominal Issue Amount 
Number of issues % of the Total 
Number 
Billion Rubles % of the Total 
Issue Amount 
1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997
GKO-type bonds 34 97 87.2 31.3 10,582.3 16,780.9 98.1 69.04
Agribonds — 201 — 64.8 — 7,233 — 29.76
Housing bonds 5 8 12.8 2.6 207 151.1 1.9 0.62
Other bonds — 4 — 1.3 — 140 — 0.58
Total 39 310 100.0 100.0 10,789.3 24,305 100 100.00
Source:     Rynok–Tsennye Bumagi Magazine, No. 4, 1998. 
4.6 Underwriting
When the ﬁ rst subnational and municipal securities were issued, their placement was 
made either by appropriate departments of local administrations or governments, or 
municipal organizations established specially for the purpose. Th at was possible because 
municipal securities issued in early 1990s were intended only for a limited number of 
investors and were never distributed outside the issuer’s region. As the municipal bond 
market grew, securities placement began to require professionalism and the function 
was thus transferred to professional underwriters. Under current conditions, securities 
underwriters and secondary-market agents must have a thorough knowledge of the 
ﬁ nancial market. To work out and successfully implement a detailed plan of the issue, 
it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the market infrastructure and legal 
aspects of the issue registration. In addition, it is necessary to assess demand for securi-
ties, attract attention of potential investors, minimize debt-servicing costs and, ﬁ nally, 
ensure liquidity of the secondary market. Dealing with so wide a range of tasks requires 
372 D F I D – L G I  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  P O L I C Y  P A R T N E R S H I P  P R O G R A M
LO C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  B O R R O W I N G :  R I S K S  A N D  R E WA R D S  • •  PA R T  I I
professionalism. For this reason, large investment companies based in Moscow and other 
large cities play an important role in municipal bond distributions. Th ey consult local 
administrations on all matters relating to the securities issue.
During the last few years, local administrations have been appointing their agents 
for securities placement, servicing and redemption on a competitive basis. Such agents 
are charged with the entire scope of work, including the following:
      •     development of the securities placement and circulation plan; 
      •     preparation of all documents needed for the registration of an issue, as well as 
its registration; 
      •     organization of municipal bond placements, including preparation, agreement 
and conclusion of agreements with all major participants in municipal bond 
placements; 
      •     organization of municipal bond circulation on the secondary market; 
      •     securities servicing and redemption; 
      •     informational support of municipal bond issues. 
Table 8.8
Municipal Bonds Underwriters’ Rating 
 Underwriter Volume 
of Issues 
[Million Rubles]
Number 
of 
Issuers
Number 
of 
Issues
Location of Issue (#)
1 AVK Investment Company 4,520 1 13 Saint-Petersburg (13)
2 RosBank 1,625 3 7 Ufa, Bashkortostan, 
Moscow (5)
3–4 Zenit Bank 1,475 2 6 Ufa, Moscow (5)
3–4 Trust and Investment Bank 1,475 2 6 Ufa, Moscow (5)
5 Bank of Moscow 1,425 1 5 Moscow (5)
6 Web-invest Bank 1,000 3 3 Komi Republic, 
Tver Oblast, Moscow
7 Citibank 800 1 3 Moscow (3)
8 Uralsib Bank 550 2 3 Ufa, Bashkortostan (2)
9–12 MDM-Bank 300 1 1 Moscow
9–12 NOMOS-Bank 300 1 1 Moscow
9–12 ING Bank 300 1 1 Moscow
9–12 AMRO Bank 300 1 1 Moscow
Note:       Th e table does not list nine underwriters whose volume of issue was below 250 million rubles.
Source:     Cbonds.ru
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Participants in such tenders may include only the holders of appropriate licenses 
for professional activities on the securities markets. Additional requirements for the 
ﬁ nancial position, qualiﬁ cation and business reputation of participants in such tenders 
may be set, too. Th is particular service sector is now growing rapidly.
4.7 Credit Ratings, Rating Agencies 
      and the National Credit-rating Scale 
Th e main component of the debt securities analysis is an evaluation of the issuer’s 
creditworthiness and capability of repaying obligations. Th e evaluation provides what 
is known as a credit rating, which performs a speciﬁ c and limited function: it describes 
credit risk.
Th e practice of credit rating is not yet suﬃ  ciently developed in Russia. In the pre-
crisis period, Russia’s regions and some cities, anxious to enter international capital 
markets, were very much interested in receiving credit ratings. But at present, when 
the consequences of the 1998 crisis are already alleviated, Russian regions continue to 
implement a very conservative borrowing policy. As a result, they show little interest in 
credit ratings, including both international and domestic ones. 
Th e main factor behind Russian regions’ indiﬀ erence to credit ratings is the absence 
of real beneﬁ ts from their assignment. Th e assignment of a credit rating implies that the 
borrower’s ﬁ nancial position is better monitored and the borrower’s debt instruments 
have been thoroughly described. In addition, investment possibilities in the region 
concerned are made known. But the main factor behind the wide use of credit ratings 
in international practices is the desire to attract the funds of insurance companies and 
pension funds. Th e fact is that Western pension funds and insurance companies are 
allowed to buy only investment-grade securities. In many countries, there exist regula-
tions requiring that obligatory provisions should be increased for investing in securities 
issued by borrowers with low credit ratings. Russia’s low national risk rating makes it 
impossible for even the most reliable Russian securities issuers to count on getting an 
investment-grade rating. 
Another reason for getting an international credit rating is to make a Eurobond issue, 
because Eurobond issues are impossible without a credit rating. However, this reason is 
irrelevant for a signiﬁ cant part of Russia’s regional and municipal administrations. Th e 
Budgetary Code of the Russian Federation forbids new foreign borrowing by regional 
administrations, be they through Eurobond issues or loans from foreign banks. 
 For these reasons Russian regions can now regard the acquisition of international 
credit ratings only as an advertising measure, useful either for attracting funds for their 
foreign debt reﬁ nancing or for improving the region’s investment proﬁ le. Th us, Russian 
regions now have hardly any reason to have international credit ratings, unless they 
received them in the past. 
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Similar factors are behind Russian regions’ indiﬀ erence to the acquisition of Russian 
credit ratings. But in this case there are additional negative factors, including the absence 
of Russian rating agencies with signiﬁ cant reputations and the absence of investors, other 
than banks, who are interested in an independent evaluation of risks of securities issu-
ers. At the same time, bank lending to Russia’s regions is in no way dependent on any 
domestic or international ratings. Such creditors rely more on their informal relationships 
with regional administrations than on evaluations of their creditworthiness, though of 
course such practices are unscrupulous. Th us, investors’ indiﬀ erence to the independent 
risk assessment is the main impediment to further development of rating agencies and 
a factor limiting reputation-building possibilities for them. Th e low standing of any 
credit ratings that have been assigned by Russian agencies reduces demand for them 
from the borrowers. Moreover, loan provision to a region usually involves evaluation of 
the borrower’s paying capacity by the creditor’s internal analytical division. 
Finally, violations of spending and reporting procedures by regional administra-
tions may also be a factor behind their reluctance to receive credit ratings. Since rating 
assignment procedures require that such information be revealed, it may mean trouble 
for certain regional administration oﬃ  cials. One consequence of the eﬀ ective absence 
of demand for domestic credit ratings in Russia is that the agencies will voluntarily as-
sign credit ratings at their own expense as an agency advertising measure, or sometimes 
the rating is requested and ﬁ nanced by international ﬁ nancial institutions whose goals 
include development of the Russian ﬁ nancial market infrastructure. 
S&P international and Russian credit ratings for Russia, the Russian regions and 
local administrations are presented in Table 8.9.
Th e issuance of regional and municipal securities is expected to increase in Rus-
sia as Russia’s economic situation improves. Th e regions and cities are very much in 
need of funds for investing in their economies. Moreover, the regional administrations’ 
need for investment resources will increase as the Russian economy stabilizes. It will 
be impossible to meet these needs using only bank loans. On the other hand, as the 
Russian economy stabilizes, new securities market participants will be emerging in 
Russia. Th ey will create demand on ﬁ xed-income instruments issued by regional and 
municipal administrations.
Additional grounds for this conclusion are provided by another indicator, the 
relationship between loans of all types raised by regional administrations and their 
consolidated revenues. According to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 
as of January 1, 2001, the total (foreign and domestic) consolidated debt of subjects 
of the Russian Federation amounted to 97,911 billion rubles, while their domestic 
debt amounted to 68.1 billion rubles, of which non-market forms of borrowing 
(guarantees and sureties) accounted for 31.4 billion rubles. At the same time, the 
consolidated regional budget revenues amounted to 1.032 trillion rubles. It is obvious 
that at present the ruble part of the market-sector debt of subjects of the Russian 
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Table 8.9
International (S&P) and Russian Credit Ratings
International Credit Rating
Securities Issuer Date of Assignment 
(Last Upgrading/
Downgrading) 
Foreign Currency/Outlook Local Currency/
Outlook 
Russia’s Sovereign Credit Rating
Russian Federation February 22, 2002 B+/Positive B+/Positive 
International Credit Ratings of Russia’s Regional and Local Governments 
Republic of Bashkortostan November 13, 2002 B/Positive —/—
Irkutsk Region October 3, 2001 CCC+/Positive —/—
Moscow February 22, 2002 B+/Positive —/—
Nizhni Novgorod Region September 6, 1999 Credit rating withdrawn  
Rostov Region July 31, 2000 Credit rating withdrawn  
Samara Region November 13, 2001 B/Positive —/—
St. Petersburg February 22, 2002 B+/Positive B/Positive 
Sverdlovsk Region August 23, 2001 CCC+/Positive CCC+/Positive 
Republic of Tatarstan October 9, 2001 CCC+/Positive —/—
Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous District 
March 7, 2002 B+/Stable —/—
Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous District 
May 8, 2001 CCC+/Positive —/—
Russian Credit Ratings 
Securities issuer Date of assignment (last 
upgrading / downgrading) 
Issuer’s Rating  
Russia’s Sovereign Credit Rating 
Russian Federation February 22, 2002 ru AA+  
Russia’s Regional and Local Governments’ Credit Ratings 
Khanty-Mansi 
Autonomous Region 
March 7, 2002 ru AA  
Cherepovets January 28, 2002 ru BB  
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Federation (36.7 billion rubles) is quite insigniﬁ cant, compared to their budget revenues. 
Even such coarse estimates testify to a signiﬁ cant potential capacity of the regional debt 
market. 
Th is will eventually make it necessary for regional and local administrations to 
receive credit ratings. As a result, Russia’s regional and local administrations will become 
the largest group of Russian credit agencies’ clients. 
International rating agencies actively began to expand their activities in Russia in 
the mid-1990s, when they began to assign credit ratings to Russian banks, industrial 
enterprises and subjects of the Russian Federation. Subjects of the Russian Federation 
have credit ratings from Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA. A number of 
Russian rating agencies were also established at that time (e.g., EA Ratings, the AK&M 
rating center, the Interfax Rating Agency, EXPERT RA and the MFK-Renaissance 
Rating Agency). 
On December 9, 2002, the AK&M information and analysis agency and the Ex-
pert RA rating agency announced the establishment of the Expert RA-AK&M rating 
consortium. Th e consortium’s purpose is the assignment of credit ratings to subjects of 
the Russian Federation and municipalities, and it plans to use a proprietary technique 
developed by AK&M and Expert RA specialists in early October, 2002. 
Th e relatively short time that has passed since the beginning of the development 
of market-economy institutions in Russia is hardly suﬃ  cient for Russian rating agen-
cies to establish a reputation. No matter how high its specialists’ analytical skills are, 
any Russian agency is going to lose when compared to a large international agency. To 
change this situation, strategic partnership (aﬃ  liation) mechanisms can be employed. 
Such partnerships can make it possible for a Russian rating agency to hold the reputation 
of its international strategic partner by guaranteeing uniformity of practice in certain 
essential areas such as credit-risk assessment techniques and procedures, and business 
ethics standards. 
One example of such a relationship is the aﬃ  liation agreement between the Euro-
Asian Rating Service (EA Ratings) and Standard & Poor’s, concluded in August 1998. 
Th e agreement provides for a joint marketing policy of the two agencies, uniform business 
ethics standards, uniform techniques and procedures, division of functions (Standard & 
Poor’s is responsible for the international, and EA Ratings for the domestic ratings), the 
procedure for the use of Standard & Poor’s “brand” by EA Ratings and the approaches 
of EA Ratings’ integration into Standard & Poor’s international structure. 
One important attribute of a rating agency is its own rating scale, which is the main 
element distinguishing it from any information agency. It is the rating scale and the 
corresponding deﬁ nitions for each category that allow an agency to assign ratings, as 
distinguished from ranks, which are frequently mistaken for ratings. 
Th e national scale allows greater diﬀ erentiation and more precise comparison of 
risks associated with diﬀ erent securities issuers and their debt in the country concerned. 
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Th e national scale is especially important when, as a result of a high national risk and 
other factors, borrowers’ international credit ratings are low and the application of 
the international scale cannot provide suﬃ  cient diﬀ erentiation of risk levels. It is also 
important in situations when domestic borrowers and investors dominate the country’s 
ﬁ nancial markets. In addition, the national rating scale provides a greater range of do-
mestic credit ratings. For example, Standard & Poor’s international ratings have stayed 
within the D -CCC+ range during the last two years, but the national rating scale can 
provide a greater range of creditworthiness levels
On December 6, 2002, Russia received the highest rating in her history from Stand-
ard & Poor’s international rating agency: BB for foreign currency obligations and BB+ 
for obligations in the national currency. Th e letter rating is the highest in the high-risk 
category. It is only one grade below the investment grade rating BBB-, which already 
allows conservative foreign investors, such as pension funds, to invest on the Russian 
securities market. Moody’s international rating agency has also announced that it can 
upgrade Russia’s credit rating by two grades, i.e., to its highest rating in the risk group. 
At present, Russia has Moody’s Ba3 rating, which is three grades below the investment-
grade rating group. Upgrading Russia’s rating by two grades to Ba1 will raise Russia’s 
rating to a level higher than it was from 1996 to 1998.
For Russian securities issuers, the costs of receiving a domestic credit rating are 
signiﬁ cantly lower than the costs of receiving an international rating.
Standard & Poor’s Russian credit-rating scale, which was developed to meet the 
needs of borrowers, guarantors, sureties, business partners, ﬁ nancial intermediaries and 
investors operating on the Russian ﬁ nancial market, is a tool for evaluating creditworthi-
ness of Russian borrowers under conditions of Russia’s ﬁ nancial market. Based on the 
national credit-rating scale, credit ratings may be assigned to both borrowers and their 
debt. Standard & Poor’s credit-rating scale for Russia uses Standard & Poor’s traditional 
symbols with the preﬁ x “ru” to denote Russia and to specify that these ratings are intended 
solely for Russia. Th e national and international rating criteria are similar.
However, certain national risk factors are less signiﬁ cant when Standard & Poor’s 
national scale for Russia is applied. When such risks will aﬀ ect all Russian borrowers 
equally, they are practically disregarded by Standard & Poor’s national scale for Russia. 
Russia’s national risk is taken into account only in the context of the Russian market 
and to the extent of its impact on a particular borrower, which diﬀ ers from the impact 
on other Russian borrowers. As a result, Standard & Poor’s Russian national ratings can 
not be directly compared to their international ratings or to ratings assigned in accord-
ance with some other national scale.
Standard & Poor’s national ratings for Russia are a current evaluation of the general 
creditworthiness of a securities issuer, guarantor, surety or business partner, as well as 
the assessment of their ability and willingness to fulﬁ ll their obligations in full and in 
due time as they mature, as compared to other Russian borrowers. 
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4.8 Regional and Municipal Borrowing Prospects 
Many of the subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities are continuously 
in need of funds for ﬁ nancing their economic and social programs. With a growing 
concentration of revenues at the federal level, the amount of funds left at the disposal 
of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities is decreasing. Th e funds they 
retain are suﬃ  cient only for wage payments to employees on the government payroll 
and for the minimum needed to maintain the social and cultural facilities and the utili-
ties and housing sectors in their areas. Since the accident rate in the utilities, housing 
and social and cultural sectors has increased signiﬁ cantly, the problem of renovation 
of the obsolete infrastructure in these sectors (whose depreciation amounts to 80%) 
has become especially acute during the last few years. For this reason, the regional and 
municipal governments will have to look for additional sources of ﬁ nance in the years 
to come, and their return to the bond market is only a matter of time. Other factors 
promoting such a return include the following:
      •     investors’ interest in new securities market instruments, which has arisen because 
of an acute shortage of ﬁ nancial market instruments under conditions of  high 
liquidity in the banking system; 
      •     a sharp reduction in interest rates, which on the one hand makes borrowing more 
attractive for regional and local governments, and on the other compels investors 
to look for new, more lucrative investment opportunities and instruments; 
      •     current conditions making it possible to borrow funds for longer terms: while 
before the crisis, investors were reluctant to invest for time periods longer than 
twelve months, now they show interest in longer-term investments of from three 
to ﬁ ve years (recent issues have typically been for multi-years periods, while the 
maturity of issues in 1997 or 1998 was normally for only a few months—see 
Table 8.10);  
      •     the rather inactive behavior of the federal government on the securities market, 
which creates favorable conditions for subfederal and municipal securities place-
ment; 
      •     large new borrowings, possible due to the relatively small liabilities of most of 
the subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities; 
      •     the establishment of a uniform subfederal and municipal bond trading system 
in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which helps attract more investors through 
increasing market liquidity and reducing interest on such bonds; 
      •     signiﬁ cant bank account balances, which form an investment potential.
Based on the above, we can conclude that the revival of the subfederal and municipal 
bond market is likely to begin in the near future. It will be accompanied by a signiﬁ cant 
growth in the number of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities using 
market mechanisms for the purpose of raising funds.
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Table 8.10
Municipal Bond Maturities (1997–2002)
Year of Issue 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Median 1 year 1 year 1 year 2 years 2.5 years 2 years
Maximum 25 years 10 years 5 years 5 years 5 years 9 years
Minimum 3 months 6 months 2 months 3 months 1 year 2 months
Source:     Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 
In October 2002, St. Petersburg issued bonds with a nine year maturity and an annual 
yield of 19.34%. Th e placement of that issue was more successful than the seven year 
maturity issued in September. Th e Cbonds consulting company based in St. Petersburg 
assumes that successful distribution of that issue was possible because banks possessed 
idle resources. Nevertheless, analysts tend to consider this maturity term too long for 
the present bond market in Russia. Only St. Petersburg can succeed in the distribution 
of such issues because of its exclusive credit history and ﬁ nancial standing. Overall, a 
maturity of ﬁ ve years seems to be a real investment horizon.
In 2002 there was a signiﬁ cant increase in the volume of regional and municipal 
bonds at the end of the year. Both economic and technical reasons can explain this. 
Regional and municipal authorities, on having registered their bond issue in the current 
year, would try to execute the placement of at least the ﬁ rst tranche before the end of 
the respective year.
Th ere are 23 bond issues planned for 2003 by municipal and regional governments. 
Th is number includes three issues by Moscow city, one by St Petersburg and two by 
other, non-metropolitan cities (Volgograd and Ufa). Th e remaining 17 issues are planned 
at the regional level. 
Although the potential debt of regional administrations and local self-government 
bodies may be rather large (up to US$30 billion), the actual capacity of the subfederal 
bond market that can be achieved in the future is much smaller. According to expert 
estimates, the maximum capacity of that market can be estimated at 100 to 200 billion 
rubles (Eurobonds included).
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
Nearly all subjects of the Russian Federation and a signiﬁ cant part of Russia’s munici-
palities have substantial borrowing experience. During the last ten years, the regional 
and municipal administrations have used various debt instruments for their borrowing 
purposes, including ruble-denominated bonds, bills of exchange, ruble- and foreign-
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currency denominated bank loans, guarantees and sureties, and budgetary loans from 
budgets of higher levels. Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhni Novgorod have issued 
Eurobonds. 
During the years of Russia’s radical economic reforms, the subfederal and municipal 
debt market passed through various phases of development. Th e most rapid growth in 
the debt market was from 1992 to 1998. At this time, Russia’s regional and municipal 
governments were actively operating on the capital market where they raised both 
ruble and hard-currency amounts. Russia’s systemic ﬁ nancial and banking crises and 
a 70% devaluation of the national currency caused numerous defaults on the regional 
and municipal levels. Some regions have not yet repaid their debts accumulated in the 
pre-crisis period. 
In the post-crisis period, regional and local administrations’ activity on Russia’s ﬁ nan-
cial markets has been sluggish, in large part due to the tightening of Russia’s budgetary 
legislation through the restrictive provisions of the Budgetary Code, and the negative 
borrowing experience and lost conﬁ dence in Russia’s debt markets. At present, only a 
few subjects of the Russian Federation are actively operating on the debt market. Th ey 
include Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Republic of Bashkortostan. Lately the number 
of non-metropolitan cities borrowing money on the bond market has shrunk to only 
two, Ufa and Volgograd. Th e gross increase in the bond market has been achieved by 
market expansion in Moscow and especially St. Petersburg. Provincial cities are reluctant 
to choose bonds as a ﬁ nancial tool. Furthermore, there are few examples of recurring 
bond issues among provincial cities, one exception being Volgograd.
Russian regions’ and municipalities’ experience in borrowing may serve as a lesson. 
Th e following widespread mistakes in borrowing practices should be noted:
      •     Th e Budgetary Code’s regulations on the debt management policy of Russia’s 
regions and municipalities were frequently violated. Many municipalities failed 
to keep properly organized debt books, and the information contained in them 
is unavailable to the public. Th e restriction on the total amount of debt is 
frequently violated. Moreover, the federal and regional governments apply no 
sanctions to violators. Without sanctions, municipal administrations are hardly 
working hard to eliminate such violations. 
      •     Most Russian cities do not have any borrowing strategy, which results in the 
absence of medium-term (three- to ﬁ ve-year) borrowing plans. Th e same can 
be said about Russia’s regional governments.
      •     One result of the absence of a municipal borrowing strategy is an inadequate 
municipal debt structure. Debt instruments are inconsistent with the respective 
investment programs. In most cases, short-term debt to a small group of creditors 
accounts for the greatest part of municipal debt. Such debt needs continuous 
reﬁ nancing. Th is situation has occurred due to diﬃ  culties in obtaining long 
money rather than bad management.
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      •     Regional and municipal administrations often use borrowed funds to ﬁ nance 
commercial projects which business people regard as too risky. Such use of bor-
rowed and, more generally, budgetary funds can seldom be justiﬁ ed. Apart from 
debt reﬁ nancing, the greatest part of budgetary funds is used for wage payments, 
current repairs and other non-capital spending purposes. Th is contradicts an 
indirect requirement contained in the Budgetary Code. 
      •     Most regional and local administrations have no criteria (indicators) with which 
to assess the eﬃ  ciency of borrowed funds. For this reason, irrespective of the 
results achieved, there is really no objective information available to local or 
municipal oﬃ  cials, or to deputies of the local legislative assemblies and taxpayers, 
that would make it possible to assess borrowing purposes, strategy and quality 
of management of borrowed funds. 
But there are a number of positive factors that make it possible to hope for  favorable 
developments in municipal borrowing in Russia. Th ese factors include the following:
      •     Even under the conditions of Russia’s ﬁ nancial crisis, a number of regional and 
municipal administrations managed to maintain their favorable credit history, 
continuing to service and issue debt. Such borrowers include Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Th ese borrowers managed to create a rather liquid market for their 
bonds, which made debt management signiﬁ cantly easier for them. 
      •     Regional and municipal administrations are in need of funds to ﬁ nance their 
investment projects, and for their part, investors are interested in further growth 
in the securities market. At present, Russian commercial banks have to keep huge 
amounts of funds in their correspondent accounts in the Central Bank because 
of the inadequate condition and liquidity of Russia’s securities markets. Since 
the federal government securities market is small and slow-growing, the present 
situation is favorable for the development of the subfederal and municipal bond 
market. 
      •     Eﬀ orts of Russia’s monetary authorities and especially its Central Bank reduce 
inﬂ ation and interest rates. Th is makes bank loans more attractive to regional 
and municipal administrations than securities.
      •     Macroeconomic stabilization makes it possible for securities issuers to switch 
from short-term borrowing to medium- and long-term borrowing that is already 
comparable to investment cycles and, in some cases, with the life cycles of the 
new facilities introduced into operation. Bank loan terms will also increase, 
as macroeconomic stabilization allows for longer terms. One-year bank loans 
have become usual, three-year terms are less frequent though widespread in 
the corporate sector, and St. Petersburg has placed securities with seven- and 
nine-year maturities! 
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6.   RECOMMENDATIONS
In this current phase, it is possible to formulate a number of recommendations addressed 
to municipal administrations. Th e implementation of the following recommendations 
could help promote further development of the system of municipal borrowing.
Municipal administrations must plan their debt management policy in a way that 
ties it to their ﬁ scal and investment policy:
      •     Short-term borrowing should be used for ﬁ nancing temporary budget gaps, and 
long-term borrowing for ﬁ nancing investments (ﬁ rst of all, in infrastructure 
development and housing construction projects). 
      •     Local administrations should not use borrowed funds for ﬁ nancing projects 
that fall outside their jurisdiction and commercial projects. 
      •     Optimal debt structure and management of risks associated with debt are es-
sential. 
      •     Special attention should be given to the commitments of local administrations. 
Th ey should be more careful in furnishing guarantees. 
Th e same recommendation is elaborated in more detail below. 
In planning for debt management, municipal administrations must clearly formulate 
their debt policy objectives and prepare long-term plans (minimum ﬁ ve years) for the 
repayment of their obligation and for raising new funds. Since the borrowing plan must 
very much conform to the ﬁ nancial investment plan, while the servicing and repayment 
is ﬁ nanced from the current budget revenues (and, possibly, through debt reﬁ nancing), 
the debt management plan must agree with the investment and ﬁ scal plans. Adminis-
trations must realize that borrowing funds can open the possibility of increasing other 
spending such as, for instance, wage payments. 
Th e debt management plan must include not only unconditional obligations (bank 
loans, bonded loans and bills of exchange), but also conditional obligations (guarantees 
and commitments of government and municipal enterprises). 
Th e debt management strategy must be based on an analysis of the prospective debt 
structure with a breakdown by type of debt, debt-holders’ structure and the repayment 
schedule for the near future (at least for the term of the debt with the most distant 
maturity). 
Th e debt strategy must be based on an analysis of the main debt plan targets’ sen-
sitivity to changes in interest rates on borrowed funds, amount of budget revenues and 
budget deﬁ cit. Municipalities that to a great extent depend on one or several taxpayer 
enterprises must analyze their debt plan’s sensitivity to prices for the products of those 
enterprises (oil, gas, mineral raw materials and metals). If such enterprises are exporters, 
the sensitivity analysis may be based on the international prices for the respective goods 
and the ruble/dollar rate. Quite often, large taxpayer enterprises in the extracting industry 
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are parts of vertically integrated companies. In this case, an analysis of the sensitivity of 
budget revenues to changes in the parent company’s proﬁ t consolidation policy may be 
performed (application of the “transfer prices” which are lower than fair-value prices in 
the oil sector has a signiﬁ cant impact on municipal administrations’ revenues). 
Financial resources borrowed for terms shorter than twelve months must be used 
exclusively for ﬁ nancing the revenue-expenditure gap. Such borrowing must be reduced 
to a minimum through eﬀ ective budget revenue and expenditure management. It is not 
recommended to ﬁ nance long-term investment projects (with terms longer than twelve 
months) through short-term debt issuance. Such practices involve signiﬁ cant risks of 
debt reﬁ nancing at an unaﬀ ordable cost. 
Long-term borrowing may be used for investment in social infrastructure, housing 
construction and, in some cases, for reﬁ nancing debt in order to optimize its structure. 
Long-term borrowing must be the basis of municipal administrations’ debt manage-
ment strategy. 
Th e practice of ﬁ nancing current spending, commercial projects and ﬁ nancial 
investments with long-term debt involves unacceptably high risks. With respect to ﬁ -
nancial investments, however, it is reasonable to invest temporarily free funds in reliable 
ﬁ nancial market instruments such as government securities. In some cases, municipal 
administrations’ participation in commercial projects may be justiﬁ ed. Th e same may 
apply to cooperation with large companies and banks who may be interested in lo-
cal administrations’ participation in certain projects because their participation may 
reduce political risks and, probably, provide opportunities for the use of the so-called 
“administrative resource.” 
Debt structure is especially important because it determines the main risks associated 
with borrowing. Th e general requirements for a sound debt structure are as follows: 
      •     Long-term debt must form the basis of municipal administrations’ debt; 
      •     Th e structure of debt must ensure the most even distribution of annual interest 
payments and principal repayment; 
      •     If debt-servicing payments will peak at a certain time, administrations must 
provide for the accumulation of ﬁ nancial reserves. Th e funds accumulated in 
the reserve funds should be temporarily invested in the most reliable ﬁ nancial 
instruments, such as government securities;
      •     Th e structure of the municipal administrations’ debt must be diversiﬁ ed as much 
as possible by type of debt instrument and creditor; 
      •     Priority treatment of some debt instruments compared to others is permitted 
only if it is provided for in the terms and conditions of borrowing.
Conditional obligations of local administrations must be distinguished by: 
      •     Guarantees and sureties issued by the administration; 
      •     Debt instruments issued by enterprises and organizations fully or partly owned 
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by local administrations and for whose obligations the owner will carry secondary 
liability in the event of their bankruptcy though the owner’s fault in accordance 
with legislation of the Russian Federation. 
It follows from this that municipal administrations must monitor the ﬁ nancial 
positions of its subsidiary enterprises in order to know the amount of debt arising in 
connection with such enterprises. 
Guarantees and sureties must not be used as a deferred payment instrument in cases 
when administrations know in advance that there are going to be events causing this 
debt instrument to become an unconditional obligation. 
Preferably, local administrations should provide guarantees and sureties to borrowers 
who raise funds to ﬁ nance construction of infrastructure facilities in order to help them 
enter capital markets and reduce borrowing costs. Provision of guarantees to commercial 
enterprises operating in a competitive environment (manufacturing, trade, agricultural 
and ﬁ nancial services) is undesirable. 
Provision of guarantees of performance of third parties’ obligations can be recom-
mended only in cases when municipal administration has the resources to take a greater 
debt burden and in the following cases: 
      •     When a guarantee is a precondition for the provision of funds by an investor; 
      •     When the administration’s guarantee reduces borrowing costs signiﬁ cantly.
 
Local administrations must provide guarantees and sureties on a compensatory 
basis. In such cases, administrations receive compensation for risks borne in connection 
with the guarantee issued, while the borrower has to make a reasonable decision about 
whether to apply or not apply for a guarantee. 
Local administrations must have clear guarantee and sureties provision criteria 
approved by appropriate documents. Such criteria should include spheres of activity, 
purposes of borrowing and levels of paying capacity of enterprises that are appropriate 
to the purpose. 
Reserves for the guarantees issued must be created to the extent of the risk of the 
principal’s probable default (in accordance with the principle applied by ﬁ nancial institu-
tions) rather than for the full amount of obligations whose performance is guaranteed 
in the following year.
NOTE
1     In this case, the administration knows in advance that the end borrower will never 
fulﬁ ll its obligations. 
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Comparing International Experience:
Emerging Markets for Local Borrowing? 
Paweł Swianiewicz
Local government borrowing is still a relatively new phenomenon in Central and Eastern 
Europe. With few exceptions, cities and communities were not allowed to borrow before 
1990, nor did they have any communal property separate from state-owned property 
that could be used as collateral. In some countries this situation continued beyond 1990. 
Hungary, where local borrowing has been a real (or at least legally possible) option since 
the economic reforms of the 1980s, is perhaps the only signiﬁ cant exception to this. 
Th e new possibility of using credit instruments came during a very diﬃ  cult period. 
First, the beginning of 1990s was very diﬃ  cult from the macroeconomic point of view. 
A rapidly decreasing GDP made public revenues unpredictable, and a high inﬂ ation 
rate pushed up the interest rate. Second, the banking sector was very weak, and banks 
themselves were trying to learn how to behave in a market environment. Understanding 
the nature of local governments and their ﬁ nancial needs was also quite low on the list 
of priorities of banking specialists. Th ird, the institutional setting for local government 
ﬁ nance was far from stable. One needed to wait for basic stabilization of institutional 
rules before even thinking about borrowing, especially for multi-year periods. Fourth, 
new local administrators and politicians had to learn how to operate in market condi-
tions. Th ey usually had very little experience in management in general, and in ﬁ nancial 
planning in particular. In countries where the turn-over of local elites was lower the 
situation was not much better—on the contrary, old habits from the planned, command 
economy  provided an important barrier to learning how to use credit instruments. All 
of these problems have been mentioned in the individual country reports and will also 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
But there was one more—to a large extent psychological—factor which should be 
drawn to attention. In some of the countries, new local governments found that they 
had inherited a high budget deﬁ cit from the previous communist administration. Th e 
deﬁ cit was not related to bank credits but to unpaid invoices or other ﬁ nancial obliga-
tions that could not be covered by current revenues. Without having any statistical data 
describing the extent of this phenomenon, we do know it has been quite widespread. 
In 1994 there was a competition announced for memoirs of mayors and councilors 
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in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia (Surażska 1995). One of winners, mayor 
Zbigniew Grzesiak from Mińsk Mazowiecki in Poland, wrote the following:
In his report presented during the ﬁ rst meeting of the city council, the 
departing mayor presented a very optimist picture of local ﬁ nances. 
However, after summing up revenues and liabilities I realized that our 
arrears were over 1 billion of [old] Polish zloty [about  USD 100,000—
P.S.], the execution of revenues was close to 35% of the plan...the bank 
account was empty and new revenues were just being spent on wages 
and salaries (actually, they were not even suﬃ  cient  for this purpose). 
I made a decision to stop all investments and to cover only a minimal 
level of operating expenditures. 
Th is phenomenon was by no means limited only to Poland. One of the Slovak 
mayors wrote:
When I learned about our ﬁ nancial situation I immediately understood 
why I had no counter-candidates in the mayoralty election. I realized 
it when I received the ﬁ rst bank account statement. I was scared to 
learn that our account was empty. But that was just the beginning. 
I then realized that we were indebted for over 300,000 Slovak koruna 
[about US 10,000—P.S.]. It was the beginning of the year and it was 
quite probable that our revenues would be immediately taken by the 
bank. We would not even have been able to pay salaries (Malikova, 
Bucek 1996).
 Coping with such a deﬁ cit was often a ﬁ rst test for new local authorities. Th is 
task was especially complicated because of the macroeconomic situation and lack of 
experience of the new elites, mentioned earlier. Th e fact that most local governments 
successfully solved their problems is really impressive. But one can risk a claim that this 
experience inﬂ uenced new mayors’ and administrators’ approach to ﬁ nancial planning. 
It contributed to the development of defensive budget planning and resistance to any 
form of borrowing, and this reluctance became an important aspect of the administra-
tive culture. In Poland it took several years to change this attitude. 
So what is the current picture of local government borrowing in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe? 
Before turning to the more detailed picture we should make one explanatory com-
ment. A common characteristic of decentralization reform in CEE countries has been 
a strengthening of the lowest (municipal)1 tier and a weakening (if not the abolition) of 
the upper tiers (county, regional). Consequently, local borrowing is mostly an activity 
of the municipal tier. In Poland the borrowing of county and regional governments is 
minimal, although still growing. Th ese are very new tiers of self-government, created 
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in 1999. But even more importantly they account for only a small fraction of total mu-
nicipal spending, their investment spending is even lower, and their revenues are highly 
dependent on transfers from the central government. Th e same observation is even truer 
for Slovakia and the Czech Republic, where regional governments are even younger. 
In Estonia the municipality is the only tier of self-government. In Hungary the role of 
counties is extremely limited, and so is their signiﬁ cance on the capital market. Th e role 
of counties in the provision of services is much more important in Romania; however, 
Romanian counties have also remained inactive on the borrowing market. Th e picture 
is much more complicated in Russia, where the scale of the country is diﬀ erent and 
territorial organization is diﬃ  cult to compare with the rest of the countries analyzed.  
1.  BORROWING REGULATIONS
Th e present picture of borrowing regulations in the seven countries examined in the 
book is summarized in Table 9.1.
Th e overview presented in Table 9.1 oﬀ ers only a snap-shot of a fast-changing 
situation. In many countries regulations on local borrowing have been changed several 
times during the last decade and are still far from being stable. Central governments 
responsible for these regulations have been in a learning phase. Central oﬃ  cials may 
not have understood the conditions for development of a debt market, but as they have 
learned, through both the good and bad examples of local government borrowing, the 
regulations have also been ﬁ ne-tuned. 
One can distinguish among several dimensions of regulations, which are presented 
in the table and analyzed brieﬂ y below:
      •     For what purposes can local governments borrow?
      •     What is the limit on the level of debt?
      •     What other conditions do local governments need to follow? What is the su-
pervision over local borrowing?
      •     How are potential insolvency situations regulated?
1.1 Borrowing for What?
In most of the countries analyzed it is legally required that the sole purpose for long-term 
borrowing (i.e., with a maturity period longer than one year) must be capital spend-
ing. Th is is in line with the classical “golden rule” of the balanced budget, discussed in 
Chapter 1, and applies to Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and Russia. Short-term borrowing 
is permitted for the easing of temporary cash-ﬂ ow problems, but usually such loans 
must be paid during the same budgetary year. In some countries (e.g., Romania) such 
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Table 9.1
Summary of Borrowing Regulations
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
For capital 
or operating 
purposes?
Both Long-term for 
investments 
only, but no 
separation of 
capital budget.
Both Both Long-term for 
investments 
only, but no 
separation of 
capital budget.
Long-term for 
investments 
only, but no 
separation of 
capital budget
For investments 
only. 
Limit of overall 
debt
No limit 60% of net 
revenues 
(without state 
earmarked 
grants)
No limit 60% of total 
revenues, 
20% of current 
revenues; short-
term: 5%
Annual budget 
revenues
No limits, but 
from 2005—
60% of current 
revenues; state-
supported loans 
not included
Limit of debt 
service
No limit 20% of net 
revenues
Adjusted 
current own 
revenues net 
of short-term 
commitments 
and liabilities 
15% of total 
revenues
No limit 15% of total 
expenditures
No limits, 
but from 
2005—25% of 
revenues; state-
support loans 
not included
Sanctions for 
not respecting
Not applicable 
(no limits 
defined)
Since 2003—
possibility of 
holding  state 
fund transfers
Effectively no Effectively no, 
but ex-ante 
control of 
Regional Audit 
Offices
No sanctions 
defined
No sanctions 
defined
Not applicable 
(no limits 
defined)
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Any other 
conditions
Forecast 
balance sheet 
for 2–5 years; 
internal audit; 
guarantees 
by local govt. 
prohibited, 
with some 
exceptions
Presentation of 
development 
plan; guarantees 
by local govt. 
prohibited
“Core 
properties” 
cannot be used 
as collateral
Limits applying 
when public 
debt exceeds 
50% GDP
Maturity not 
exceeding 
ten years. 
Limitation 
of the budget 
deficit
Ministry of 
Finance ex-ante 
approval of 
credits over 
US 2 million is 
required
Comments Limits were 
introduced for 
short periods 
only—in part 
of 2002 debt 
servicing no 
larger than 
15% of budget 
revenues
Debt of 
municipal 
companies not 
included in the 
limits
Debt of 
municipal 
companies not 
included in the 
limits (unless 
formal L.G. 
guarantees 
exist)
Debt of 
municipal 
companies is 
not included 
in the limits 
(unless formal 
L.G. guarantees 
exist)
All types of 
borrowing—
only since 1999 
Guarantees 
by local 
governments 
prohibited
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short-term returnable support is provided by the State Treasury, while in others local 
governments need to rely on commercial banks.
However, it should be noted that in most CEE countries, current and capital budgets 
are not strictly separated from each other (Slovakia provides a positive exception to this 
rule).  As ﬁ scal federalism theory argues (Musgrave, 1959; Mikesel, 1982), this makes 
eﬀ ective implementation of the “golden rule”  doubtful (see Chapter 1). Even if current 
practice does not provide many examples of local governments wanting to use loans 
to cover operating costs, it may become an issue in the future. But the “golden rule” is 
broken from time to time, and current examples of this are given in Chapter 8 (Rus-
sia) which notes frequent cases of “using borrowed funds for making wage payments 
and ﬁ nancing routine repairs and other non-capital expenditures.” To large extent this 
is due to insuﬃ  cient supervision of local ﬁ nance, but the lack of clear separation of 
capital and current budgets deﬁ nitely contributes to diﬃ  culties in establishing such a 
supervision system. 
But there is another group of countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Po-
land—in which the law does not limit the purpose for borrowing. Local governments 
can legally borrow not only to ﬁ nance their investments, but also to cover needs re-
lated to their operational spending. Th e clear intention in these countries is certainly 
that investments remain the main purpose of taking bank credits or issuing municipal 
bonds, and in practice most borrowing is for local capital investments. (Exceptions to 
this are discussed in the country reports.) In this chapter, therefore, we will focus on 
local government borrowing as a potential source of capital investments.
We should remember, however, that in addition to the diﬀ erent forms of loans and 
credits as well as bond issues in Central and Eastern European countries, there is also one 
more form of local government indebtedness—namely, arrears in payments (of salaries, 
of social beneﬁ t payments, of user charges for utility services). Although it is not the 
main focus of this book, we brieﬂ y discuss the issue in section 2.2 of this chapter.2 
1.2 Limitations on the Local Debt Level
In most of the countries limits are set on the overall level of debt and/or debt service, 
with two signiﬁ cant exceptions: the Czech Republic and Slovakia (but in the latter case 
they will be introduced in 2005). 
In the remaining cases, the most typical limitation is a set proportion of annual debt 
service3 in total (or current) revenues of the local budget. In some cases, loans which are 
guaranteed by the state are treated diﬀ erently and do not count in the total debt limit. 
In Poland and Estonia the level of local government debt is additionally limited by 
the overall proportion of accumulated debt to total budget revenues (in Poland) or to 
budget revenues excluding state grants (Estonia). 
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One more macroeconomic limitation exists in Poland, where the overall level of 
public debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP. Th is regulation has been written into the 
Constitution and is  repeated in the Law on Public Finance. If public debt is larger than 
50% of GDP, certain additional barriers to taking new loans apply. Th e constitutional 
limit does not distinguish between central and local debt, and in practice it may happen 
that ﬁ scal policy of the central government would impose limitations on local borrow-
ing even if local government behaviour is very prudent and their level of debt is low. It 
should be added that the Polish method of debt calculation is stricter than that applied 
in EU countries. Th e main diﬀ erence is related to the treatment of guarantees granted 
by local governments to other creditors. 
Th ere is one more important issue related to the debt level. In several countries, 
public utility companies (even if owned by local governments) are separate legal entities, 
and their credits do not count toward the limits set for local governments. In practice, 
however, the local government guarantees these loans and its intervention is required in 
case of diﬃ  culties in repayment. If the guarantee is a formal one, then the credit is taken 
into account in determining the position of the local government against the legal limit 
of local debt.4 But more typically, such a credit is not formally connected with the local 
budget, although the guarantee exists indirectly both in the consciousness of the bank 
oﬀ ering resources and through ownership rights of the communal property. Th is issue 
was extensively discussed in the chapters on Hungary and Poland. Similar problems also 
occur in some other countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Serbia (Meekel, 
2003), but also in West-European countries such as Germany.5 
In spite of this last issue, limitations on the level of local debt in the countries ana-
lyzed could be arranged on a scale where the rules imposed in Poland are the strictest, 
while those in the Czech Republic are the most liberal. 
1.3 Supervision over Local Borrowing
Strict formal rules on the debt level do not necessarily ensure the expected result. Th e 
most typical limit operates as a proportion of total current budget revenues, excluding 
grants. But this requires sound projections of future revenues, and if there is no exter-
nal control on such prognosis, there is sometimes a temptation to engage in “creative 
accounting” (or rather “creative ﬁ nancial planning”) that will allow for higher credits. 
In some cases, limits do exist and yet nothing happens because they are not observed 
in practice. 
Implementation of the adopted rules seems to be a weak point in most of the 
analyzed countries. A recent regulation in Estonia allows for the withholding of state 
grants as a punishment for local policy leading to excessive indebtedness. But it remains 
a theoretical option that has not protected against several cases of debt levels higher 
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than formally allowed by law. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that some 
specialists argue for the introduction of ex-ante control to monitor whether legal limits 
are followed. 
In some countries the absence of a reporting system and of good information impedes 
the eﬀ ective execution of adopted rules and limits. In Romania the approval of a special 
Committee is required for external borrowing (from foreign banks), but other borrowing 
is just reported to the Ministry of Finance and this function is poorly performed. Th e 
central information on local borrowing is incomplete and not very reliable. 
In Poland projections of future revenues and debt service are checked by Regional 
Audit Oﬃ  ces (RIO). Th eir qualiﬁ cations to analyze creditworthiness are often ques-
tioned, but at least “creative accounting” involving unrealistically inﬂ ated estimates is 
not possible. In practice, however, even this regulation does not prevent individual cases 
of local debt that is higher than allowed by law (though one has to admit these cases are 
not numerous). If such a situation continues for a long time, and attempts to improve 
the ﬁ scal position are unconvincing, a procedure for imposing a state commissioner to 
administer the municipality for a limited time may be initiated. 
As noted above, in Russia there have been cases of using borrowed funds in ways 
that are counter to law. Th e poor supervision and execution of existing legal regulations 
may be related to this situation to a large extent. 
1.4 Regulation of Insolvency Situations
In some of the analyzed countries there are special regulations on debt-problem situations. 
Th e most comprehensive and most interesting is probably the system in Hungary, where 
a special Debt Adjustment Act regulates situations in which the debt is more than 60 
days overdue. Th e ﬁ rst stage of the procedure is an attempt at agreement with a creditor. 
If this proves to be unsuccessful, the court may decide on the auctioning of marketable 
assets, but so called “core properties” of the local government are exempted. Th e state 
budget may provide temporary support in order to pay interest on local loans, but this 
support is given as a loan, not a grant. In the last seven years the Debt Adjustment Act 
procedures have been initiated in about 16 cases. 
In Slovakia as well, liability not paid within 60 days is a threshold initiating a 
special action. An additional requirement here is that overdue liabilities exceed 15% 
of current local revenues. Slovak law requires the preparation of a “recovery regime.” 
If such a regime is not introduced by local government itself, or if its implementation 
does not lead to improvement in the situation within 120 days, the central government 
may appoint an administrator. In practice, problems with payments arose in both small 
municipalities and big cities, but the latter cases were more frequently discussed. Th e 
second largest Slovak city, Košice, was supported by a loan of almost US$20 million 
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from the central government, and many observers were afraid that this might set a 
precedent for demands from other local governments. Another major city that has faced 
severe diﬃ  culty is Banská Bystrica, but in this case recovery was possible through the 
implementation of an agreement with banks involving dramatic cut-backs and without 
extraordinary support from the state. 
In the Czech Republic local governments cannot go bankrupt, but during the last 
few years there have been cases of the auctioning of local government property. Th ere 
have also been cases where local governments have had serious diﬃ  culties with repay-
ment of their liabilities. Two were related to problems with serving bond issues (one of 
them, Rokytnice nad Jizerou, failed to repay its bonds). Both occurred during the period 
when approval from the Ministry of Finance was formally required, which suggests that 
direct, administrative control of central regulation over local borrowing is not always 
an eﬃ  cient means of regulation. 
Regulations on debt service diﬃ  culties in Estonia are not very clear, either. In prac-
tice, municipalities often apply for state support, but lending from the state budget is not 
legal (it was permitted only in 1994–1996). However, central government may support 
local governments indirectly through the Regional Development Agency or through 
the ownership reserve fund, and there are cases of such support noted in Chapter 6. A 
newly drafted law provides a role for the court in management of the ﬁ nances of a local 
government having problems with serving its debt.  
In Russia, federal authorities have several measures for intervening if a municipal-
ity is unable to serve its debt. Th e ﬁ scal agency of the Russian Federation can order an 
audit or even take over control of the execution of the local budget. Th e latter remains 
doubtful, however, since some observers claim it is in contradiction with the Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation.
Poland does not have special legal procedures for insolvency situations, but in prac-
tice there have not been many occasions to call for such regulations, since debt service 
has usually been timely.
1.5 Borrowing Regulations—Typology
Figure 9.1 provides a very simple typology of borrowing regulations in CEE countries. 
With some simpliﬁ cations the analyzed countries can be grouped in the following 
categories:
      •     borrowing allowed for any purpose with no limits on the level of local debt—
Czech Republic;
      •     borrowing for capital projects only and (currently) no limits on the level of local 
debt—Slovakia;
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      •     borrowing allowed for any purpose and deﬁ ned limits on the level of debt—Hun-
gary, Poland;
      •     borrowing allowed for capital projects only and deﬁ ned limits on the level of 
debt—Estonia, Romania, Russia.
Th e ﬁ gure also illustrates the strictness of borrowing limits (the least liberal being 
Poland). It should be stressed that the ﬁ gure illustrates formal regulations only, and says 
nothing about the execution of rules (as described in sections 1.3 and 1.4), or about the 
real role of borrowing in the practice of local governments, which is discussed below. 
Figure 9.1
Classiﬁ cation of Local Borrowing Regulations
2.   THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL BORROWING
Generally speaking, the level of local debt in relation to GDP is very low in the analyzed 
countries (for details see Table 9.2). It is below 2% of GDP in Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia and just above this threshold in the Czech Republic and Estonia. Romania 
provides the only exception to this rule, but Romanian local debt consists primarily of 
arrears in payments, not of bank credits or bond issues. Th e ratio of local indebtedness 
to GDP is still considerably lower in most CEE countries than is typical in Western 
Europe (See Figure 9.2).
In most cases local debt is also negligible in comparison with the debt of the central 
government—in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia the local debt constitutes no more than 
2% to 4% of the total public debt (i.e., much less than the average in EU countries—see 
Strict
Liberal
Any purpose
Purpose of borrowing
Capital projects only
RUS
EST
RO HUN
CZ
PL
SKLi
m
it
at
io
n 
of
 d
eb
t
399
C O M PA R I N G  I N T E R N AT I O N A L  E X P E R I E N C E S :  E M E R G I N G  M A R K E T S  O F  LO C A L  B O R R O W I N G ?
Chapter 1). Th e share of local debt in total public debt is signiﬁ cantly higher in the 
Czech Republic, at 18% (and this ﬁ gure puts it close to the top in the ranking of EU 
countries)—and much higher in Estonia and Romania (around 45%). 
Th ese ﬁ gures indicate that the potential macroeconomic consequences of local debt 
are minimal and we may disregard them in our analysis. For that reason we focus in the 
next sections on microeconomic consequences for individual communities. 
Table 9.2
Size of Local Government Spending and Local Government Debt (2001)
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Poland Romania Russia Slovakia 
Local expenditures 
as % of GDP
8.3 10.0 11.2 10.6 4.1 6.4 3.2
Local investments 
as % of GDP
0.9 1.9 2.6 1.5 0.8 0.71 0.9
Local investments 
as % of public 
investments
49.5 40.1 58.3 (*) 20.3 21.9 (*)
Public debt 
as % of GDP
14.6 4.5 41.2 41.9 31.2 43.3
Local debt 
as % of public debt
17.5 (**) 43.8 1.7 3.6 1.4 0.25 3.05 
Local debt 
as % of GDP
2.2 2.1 0.7 1.6 0.4 1.32 
Local debt 
as % of local revenues
29 18.3 6.3 15.4 1.98 4.0 
(10 
including
arrears)
38.9
Local debt service 
as % of 
local revenues
6.6 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.28 8.9
*      2000
**    1999
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2.1 The Development of the Borrowing Market
It is diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd an example of a well-established and mature communal credit mar-
ket in Central and Eastern Europe. In all the analyzed countries, both legal regulations 
and the actual behaviour of the most important actors (local governments and banks) 
are far from becoming stabilized. Markets are still developing, so it is diﬃ  cult to talk 
about a mature market in any country, but we can perhaps distinguish between markets 
in their infancy (Romania and Russia) and markets in the “teen-age” stage (Hungary 
and Poland). For diﬀ erent reasons the remaining three countries could be placed some-
where in the middle. In the cases of Slovakia and Estonia the main reason for such a 
classiﬁ cation is the frequency and depth of changes in the legal environment. With the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia the reason is the relatively minor role of local government 
investments (below 1% of GDP, while in Poland and Estonia it is above 1.5% and in 
Hungary over 2%). In Estonia another reason is the low level of borrowed resources in 
ﬁ nancing local government investments (this issue is discussed further in section 2.3). 
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Figure 9.2
Local Government Indebtedness as % of GDP 
(EU Countries—2000, CEE countries—2001)
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Finally, in the Czech Republic there is only a very small proportion of revenues that 
local governments can directly inﬂ uence, such as local taxes. 
As was noted in the introductory section, the use of credit instruments in the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe was very rare at the beginning of the1990s. But in 
some countries it has gradually became more and more frequent over last decade. Th is 
has clearly been the case in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Th e most 
recent data on the level of local debt and debt service are included in Table 9.2. We 
have mentioned previously some psychological reasons for the reluctance to borrow at 
the beginning of the 1990s, but several other factors also contributed to the change in 
local governments’ attitude and practice, including the following:
      •     macroeconomic stabilization (decrease in the inﬂ ation rate and growth of GDP 
which lowered interest costs and gave local governments a greater amount of 
certainty in their future revenue projections);
      •     strengthening of the national banking systems;
      •     increasing ﬁ nancial management skills among local government staﬀ ; 
      •     advice (or sometimes even  pressure) from international ﬁ nancial institutions 
and donor organizations (the role of the World Bank and USAID was prob-
ably the most important in most of the countries, but in Romania it was  the 
EBRD);
      •     relative exhaustion of possibilities to ﬁ nance investments through revenues from 
sales of assets and property, the most valuable pieces of which have already been 
sold oﬀ  (this investment strategy was obviously unsustainable over time).
Th ese factors inﬂ uenced both the supply and demand sides of the borrowing market. 
In Slovakia the level of debt expressed as a proportion of total local government 
revenues has been on a clear increasing slope, rising from 2.5% in 1991 and just over 
5% in 1993 to over 30% in the most recent two years. Th e level of debt service has also 
been increasing, with the exception of 2001 when it decreased compared to 2000 (but 
this change was mostly related to the service of one big loan by the city of Bratislava). 
Th e level of new credits taken was below 5% of total revenues in 1993–94, and then 
it increased to over 10% in the period from 1995 to 2000 (with a decrease to 8.3% in 
2001—the lowest level since 1994).
A gradually increasing number of indebted local governments is also noticeable in 
the Czech Republic. Between 1993 and 1998 local government credits increased by 
almost ﬁ ve times (in constant prices), and since then have stabilized. Th e present debt 
level has reached almost 30% of total local revenues, while in 1993 it was below 5%.
In Poland, it was very unusual for local governments to take loans in the ﬁ rst half 
of the 1990s. In 1992 only 2% of rural and about 5% of urban local governments 
decided to take a loan—and this low number includes not only commercial but also 
preferential loans taken from environmental protection funds. In 1994 the proportion 
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of municipalities taking commercial loans increased to over 10%. In 2000 it was almost 
40% of rural and 60% of urban local governments, and almost 90% in the case of big 
cities. On average, the level of debt in 1995 was around 5.6% of local revenues, but in 
1998 it was already 9.5% and in 2001 slightly exceeded 14%. But the situation among 
individual local governments was very much diversiﬁ ed and in the case of several mu-
nicipalities (especially in certain big cities) debt levels were over 30% or even 40% of 
total revenues in 2001.
In Estonia local borrowing started in 1993. Th e market gradually expanded, and 
currently there is no local government that has not taken a loan. Th e development of 
the borrowing market was especially radical in the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s and stabilized 
in the second half of the decade. (Th e accumulated debt expressed as percentage of local 
revenues was even slightly higher in 1996—26%, than in 2001—18.3%, but the ratio 
of debt service to revenues increased from 4.8% in 1996 to 6.6% in 2001). 
Hungary, where local borrowing developed relatively early, is an exceptional case 
as it has decreased during last few years. Both in absolute terms and as a proportion of 
local revenues, new local loans reached their highest level in 1994. In 1999 the total 
local government debt was just 40% of the 1995 level, while the debt service ratio 
decreased from over 7% of revenues in 1997 to 3% in 2001. Th e debt level in 2001 
was at a moderate level of over 6% of local government revenues, but it varies greatly 
among local governments.
In Romania local borrowing began only in 1999, and we can observe a slow but 
constant increase in the scale of borrowing since then. It 1999 there was just one local 
government that used credit ﬁ nancing. A clear increase was evident in 2000–2001, 
with two bond issues in 2001 and eight in 2002, and a slowly growing number of 
bank credits. 
In Russia, ﬂ uctuations in the emerging local borrowing market show a signiﬁ cant 
correlation with macroeconomic changes, and especially with phases of the 1998 
ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Another interesting observation related to trends in local borrowing concerns the 
inﬂ uence of elections. In the Czech, Estonian and Hungarian chapters, it was reported 
that borrowing has usually expanded immediately before local elections (e.g., in Hungary 
in 1994 and 1998 and in Estonia in 1996 and 1999, with preliminary data showing 
the same for 2002). Th is suggests that young local democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe are vulnerable to the well known “electoral cycle,” which has been described in 
Western Europe and America at the central government level (Tufte 1978), but also on 
a local level (see for example Mouritzen 1989). Shortly before elections local politicians 
try to increase budget spending, and the increase of capital expenditures is especially 
welcomed by their potential electorates. At the same time it is too risky to increase local 
fees or taxes (even assuming that local councilors do have the discretion to make such a 
decision). Consequently, taking loans for which repayment will not be a problem until 
after the election seems an ideal solution.
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Interestingly enough, the chapter on Poland suggests the opposite phenomenon. 
Th ere, local politicians are extremely careful in their borrowing policies in the period 
shortly before the next elections, because accusations of excessive indebtedness are 
considered extremely serious and can ruin the reputation of a candidate.6  
2.2 Borrowing—How and From Whom?
Earlier in this section we identiﬁ ed three major sources of local debt—borrowing for 
investments, borrowing for operating expenses and unpaid invoices. Here, taking into ac-
count the source of borrowed money, we can describe the most typical forms of debt: 
      •     intergovernmental loans (provided by central or other higher tiers of the public 
budget, usually, although not always, interest free, and sometimes with a real 
chance of being transformed into non-returnable aid);
      •     loans from special governmental programs administered by sector ministries 
or by state oﬀ -budget funds; environmental protection funds are among the 
most typical in several countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Th ey oﬀ er both grants (which are not the focus of analysis in this volume) and 
loans—usually with preferential interest rates (lower than commercial);
      •     commercial bank credits—taken both in local and foreign banks;
      •     issues of municipal bonds;
      •     arrears in payments (such as unpaid invoices or salaries). 
Each of the sources listed plays a diﬀ erent role in the countries analyzed. We discuss all 
ﬁ ve forms of indebtedness below, but it is important to note that not all of them can 
be identiﬁ ed with the development of the borrowing market in the sense intended by 
ﬁ scal federalism theory and the “golden rule of balanced budgeting.” It is obvious that 
arrears in payments are nothing more than an indicator of unhealthy ﬁ scal relations. But 
because omitting them in the presentation of data on local indebtedness might lead to 
false conclusions (on the creditworthiness of local governments, for example), arrears 
will be included as well. Also, intergovernmental loans are not usually considered helpful 
in the development of a proper borrowing market. In many countries they are a hidden 
form of subsidization of local governments by central or regional state administration. 
But again, their inﬂ uence on local indebtedness in some countries is too big to simply 
skip them in a discussion of borrowing practices. 
2.2.1   Intergovernmental Loans
Th is has been perhaps the most signiﬁ cant funding source in Russia, especially during 
2000 and 2001 when loans from other tiers of government constituted well over two-
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thirds of borrowed resources (arrears in payments excluded). Th is source is similarly 
important in some other countries of the region, such as Ukraine, where loans from 
rayons (counties) to siolo (village) are very common but rarely repaid.
In the countries analyzed in this volume (other than Russia), intergovernmental loans 
either do not exist, as in Poland, or play only a marginal role, as in Slovakia, Estonia or 
Hungary. As was mentioned in section 1.4, recent state support for the severely indebted 
city of Košice in Slovakia (the second largest city in the country) was the ﬁ rst ever case 
of such an intervention, and caused serious questions to be raised by many observers. 
In Estonia, lending central government funds to localities is not allowed, but sometimes 
it is done indirectly through state-controlled agencies. 
2.2.2   Loans from State Funds and other Governmental Programs
Housing and environmental protection, especially water management, are the most 
common sectors covered by subsidized loans programs. Th e role of preferential loans 
in shaping the size and structure of local government investments seems to be most sig-
niﬁ cant in three countries: Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  In these countries 
support has been oﬀ ered either as grants or preferential loans from state funds aimed at 
environmental protection and housing development. Th is has been especially important 
in Poland,  where investment sectors supported by national and regional environmental 
protection funds have played a dominant role in the structure of all municipal investment 
projects for a long time. Th e role of the housing fund in Poland was much more limited. 
Th e chapter on Poland  also noted an important educational role of state funds; being 
the ﬁ rst to accept applications for returnable resources, they helped local governments 
to learn application procedures, basic creditworthiness analysis etc. Th is prepared the 
ground for a boom in commercial borrowing at the end of 1990s. Th e environmental 
funds were of greater importance in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, too, although 
in Slovakia in recent years, the state policy on support for housing development has 
temporarily reversed this emphasis.
In Hungary both the housing and water sectors have been included in programs 
oﬀ ered by the Hungarian government. 
In Estonia preferential environmental loans have been oﬀ ered through central gov-
ernment channels for energy-saving programs. A unique aspect of the Estonian case has 
been a program of loans from the reserve fund for property reform. Th is program was 
intended to support the reprivatization process, which included moving out of several 
properties being used by local governments. 
Sectoral programs of subsidized loans are absent in Romania and Russia.
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2.2.3   Municipal Bonds
Th e fashion for ﬁ nancing investments through the issuing of municipal bonds arrived 
in Central and Eastern Europe together with American advisers working for USAID 
or the World Bank. Th e role of bond issues varies from one country to another, but 
in general they seem to be less important than ﬁ nancing through classic bank credits 
(data on the relative importance of diﬀ erent sources of borrowing are presented in the 
table below). 
Two more general issues inﬂ uencing development of local bond markets in Central 
and Eastern Europe should be mentioned:
      •     opposite to the situation in the United States, in the CEE countries there are 
typically no tax exemptions related to purchase of bonds issued by local govern-
ments. Th is seriously restricts the interest of individual citizens in this type of 
investment;
      •     the future development of the bond market may be stimulated by the pension 
reform (currently introduced in several countries of the region) which leads to 
the creation of well-capitalized pension funds. Such funds may soon become 
signiﬁ cant investors in municipal bonds.
In the Czech Republic the ﬁ rst issue took place in Ostrava in 1992, and there were 
altogether 23 issues by the end of 2001. Th e boom for bond issues was in 1994–1996 
with 16 issues during these three years, followed by a decreasing trend later on. In 1995 
debt in the form of bonds was 1.5 times higher than commercial credits, while in 1999 
the proportion was almost exactly the opposite. Since 1998 Prague and Brno (the two 
largest Czech cities) have been the only local governments to take new issues. In general, 
bonds were used mostly in big cities (ten issues in ﬁ ve cities of over 100,000 citizens), 
but there were also a few issues in relatively small towns (four in towns with a popula-
tion of 3,000–5,000).  According to the Czech authors, two factors contributed to the 
decrease in the popularity of bonds in the second half of the 1990s: ﬁ rst, the general 
economic problems of 1997–1998 had an inﬂ uence, and second, small and mid-size 
towns realized that small issues are too expensive since they cannot take advantage of 
economy of scale. 
Th e picture in Slovakia is quite similar. Th ere have been 37 issues in 28 cities since 
1993. Th e most intense activity was from1995 to1997, with 27 issues during these 
three years. In 1996 over half of local debt was in the form of bonds, while in 2001 
this proportion decreased to about one-eighth. As might be expected, big cities have 
been the most active, and rural villages are not present on the market at all. But there 
was also a considerable number of issues in small towns—ﬁ ve in those with populations 
below 10,000, and seven in the 10,000–20,000 cohort. Several bonds are traded on the 
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public market in Slovakia, and there were two issues on international markets—both 
by Bratislava, the capital city. 
Table 9.3
Th e Structure of Local Government Debt (2001) [%]
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia 
Unpaid invoices 
and other arrears
25.7 NA NA 5.9 26.4
Intergovernmental 
budgetary loans
0.1 0.0 0.0 exceptional
Loans from 
special funds
46.8 12.9 3.1 79.8 1.2
Commercial credits 65.3 78.7 60.0
Bonds 27.5 21.7 18.2 13.7 12.0
In Hungary most issues were on the international market, but the role of the domes-
tic market seems to be increasing. In 1998, debt to domestic investors was just 5% of 
total bonds, while in 2002 it was 25%. Th e role of bonds has been limited, accounting 
for only one-sixth of local debt in 2001, down from 25% in 1998. Unlike the Slovak 
model, Hungarian local bonds are exclusively private issues, with no secondary market 
for municipal bonds.  
In Poland the role of bonds is still very limited, but it has been the most dynamically 
growing part of the borrowing sector during the last few years. As in Hungary (and the 
opposite of Slovakia), most of the issues were private, bought by banks which in 2001 
held 72% of municipal bonds. For the banks this was a more comfortable way of lend-
ing money, and consequently cheaper for local authorities. Th e only public issue was 
organized by Ostrów Wielkopolski, and another was announced in 2003 by Rybnik. 
Bond issues really started in 1996, with 11 issues, and by the end of 2001 there were 
almost 200. Th e real boom came in 2000 when the number of issues grew to 46 from 
20 in 1999. In 2001 alone there were over 70. Most of the issues were in big cities, but 
there were also relatively numerous small issues. Almost 100 of these had a value of less 
than PLN 5 million (approximately USD 1.3 million) and many were in small towns 
or even rural local governments. But the value of small issues was less than 10% of the 
total volume of Polish municipal bonds. Th e smallest issue of all was undertaken by the 
town of Proszowice and had a value of less than USD 200,000. On the other hand, the 
largest issues were organized by Kraków city, whose two issues were larger than USD 
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30 million each. In 2001 bond issues were organized in over 20% of big cities (cities of 
county status), 8% of other cities and less than 1% of rural local governments. But in 
absolute numbers, the number of local governments issuing bonds in 2001 was almost 
identical among big cities and among rural gminy (between 10 and 15 in both cases). 
Since competition between banks lowered the issuance fees to almost zero, costs were 
not prohibitively high even for very small amounts. A very high proportion of bonds 
has been channelled into transport investments (roads and the purchase of busses and 
trams)—the only major sector of local capital spending that had no chance for prefer-
ential loans or for substantial grants from the central government (Deroń 2001). 
In Estonia, too, bond issues have been organized mostly by large and medium-size 
towns. Th is is explained by the fact that neither investors nor banks are usually interested 
in issues below 10 million kroons (about USD 750,000). Th e capital city of Tallinn was 
the ﬁ rst to turn to the international market in 1996. Unfortunately, available data do 
not allow us to give the precise number of issues or of local governments that decided 
on this course of action. A speciﬁ c feature in Estonia is that bonds were the major form 
of borrowing in the second half of 1990s (more than two-thirds of the total debt in 
1996-1998). But the role of bonds has signiﬁ cantly decreased in recent years, and bank 
credits now amount to almost three times more than bond-debt. 
In Romania there were no issues until the end of 2000,  but we know that there 
were two issues in 2001 and eight in 2002. Th e size of the local governments involved 
varied from 6,000 (Predeal) to over 300,000 citizens (Cluj). Th e issues were relatively 
small—between 150 and 1,000 thousand USD. Here also, banks were the underwriters 
and main investors for most local government bonds. Th e increasing interest in bonds 
is evidenced by the fact that in a recent survey (2002), over 60% of local governments 
admitted they were considering plans to issue bonds in the near future. But bank credits 
remain more popular, since banking procedures are better known to local governments 
and also because a special EBRD credit line for Romanian municipalities has stimulated 
interest in such borrowing. Th e municipalities involved claim that bonds allow for lower 
interest rates and—surprisingly—that the procedures are easier than for bank credits. 
If this information is conﬁ rmed and disseminated, we may expect a boom in bonds on 
the quickly changing local borrowing market in Romania.
In Russia the ﬁ rst issues were organized in 1992. Th ey were very numerous in 1995 
and 1996, and booming in 1997 and the beginning of 1998. Th e ﬁ nancial crisis of 1998 
was a reason for cases of default in municipal bonds and the decline of the market for 
a short time. But since 1999 it has been possible to detect a dynamic growth again. In 
2001 municipal bonds constituted around 6% of all bonds in Russia, but at the end 
of 2002 the proportion raised to 10%. Th e two biggest cities—Moscow and St. Peters-
burg—have a dominant position; both issued bonds of about 10 billion rubles (over 
USD 300 million). But during the last four years 11 other cities have also organized 
issues (e.g., Volgograd, Nizhnyj Novgorod, Ufa and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk). 
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It is diﬃ  cult to summarize the development of the municipal bonds market because 
of signiﬁ cant variation among the countries analyzed, but the following issues should 
perhaps be stressed:
      •     Th ere are two models of development. In Hungary, Poland, Romania and Rus-
sia the market has been gradually growing (with a break in 1997–98 in Russia 
due to the ﬁ nancial crisis), while in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia 
disillusionment with bonds brought a decrease in their importance after the 
boom in the mid-nineties;
      •     Except for the brief boom in certain countries mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, bonds remain much less important than traditional bank credits;  
      •     Big cities are the most active in the bond market, although in several countries 
small local governments try issues as well;
      •     Big cities are also often active on the international market and they apply for 
ratings from well-known international agencies (some examples of received 
ratings are cited in Chapter 1);
      •     Local rating agencies have been created in some countries, in addition to the 
activity of international ones. Th is has been the case in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland (the Polish one—CERA— has been recently bought by 
Fitch); 
      •     In most of the countries (except Slovakia) private issues that are usually bought 
by an underwriting bank are dominant. In many cases a bond is simply a speciﬁ c 
form of bank credit, denoted that way for bureaucratic reasons. 
2.2.4   Commercial Bank Credits
As mentioned above, commercial bank credits remain the main source of borrowing in 
most of the countries analyzed.
In several countries (Poland, Romania and Slovakia) discussions took place on the 
creation of a special bank that would specialize in lending resources to local govern-
ments. Typically this would be a communal bank, i.e., partially or totally owned by 
local governments. But for various reasons little came from this idea. In Poland, the 
government’s clear declaration that it would not support such a bank was probably of 
decisive importance. In Romania, also, in spite of the wide “moral support” of over 90% 
of local governments and in spite of careful preparation and research based on studies 
of the Dutch and Danish experiences, the idea has not yet materialized. 
Th e communal bank, Prvá komunálna banka, was eventually established in Slovakia 
only in 1993. It was established by several municipalities, but presently local govern-
ments have only 20% of its shares.
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Th e lack of a state or municipal bank formally specializing in serving local gov-
ernments does not mean that in practice there are no “general purpose” banks that 
focus particularly on the local market. Th e Slovak Prvá komunálna banka clearly has a 
dominant position on the market—in 2000 it held 75% and in 2001 83% of credits 
for municipalities. 
But the dominance of one or two major banks is not necessarily less prevalent in 
countries in which there are no municipal banks. In Hungary, the OTP bank has an 
81% share in local governments’ account keeping (2003 data), but one should note 
this is a decrease from 95% in 1995. Th e OTP also has a dominant position in lending 
resources (currently over 60% of all credits), again a decrease from over 80% in the 
ﬁ rst half of the 1990s.  Raiﬀ eisenbank is a strong newcomer and the main reason for 
the gradually decreasing dominance of OTP. 
Th ere is no clear domination by one bank in the Czech Republic, but there are three 
that deﬁ nitely have the strongest position on the market: Česká spořitelna, Komerční 
banka and Raiﬀ eisenbank (the same bank that has recently been so active in Hungary). 
Compared to the situation a few years ago, Czech banks now appear to have a better 
understanding of municipalities, but they also check their creditworthiness more care-
fully. Privatization of the banking sector after 2000 has deﬁ nitely contributed to this 
change
Th ere is no similar domination of one or even two or three banks in Poland. Th e 
Bank of Environmental Protection (BOŚ) is the most active in channelling loans from 
environmental protection funds, but most of the major commercial banks are very 
active on the local market. According to a survey of over 300 urban governments in 
1998,7 the distribution of main bank accounts of local governments was far from being 
monopolized. Th e largest share was held by Bank Zachodni WBK—15%, followed by 
Pekao—13%, PKO BP—11% and BPH-PBK—9%.8 Th e market appears even more 
diversiﬁ ed if we take into account rural communities, which often keep their accounts 
in small, local Co-operative Banks.9  Th is variation also reﬂ ects the competition in 
the market of banks lending money to local governments. According to Kopańska 
(1999), at the end of 1998 none of banks had more than a 20% share in credits for 
local governments. Th e situation is similar for the market in municipal bonds—there 
is no strong domination of one underwriting bank, although a few banks are the most 
active. According to analysis conducted by FITCH, PKO BP has organized slightly 
over half of all municipal issues, but most of them were relatively small. If we take into 
consideration the value of issues, the leader is Pekao, which has been involved in issues 
worth over one-third of all municipal bonds in Poland (data including issues till the 
end of 2001). But by the end of 2000, altogether 20 banks were involved in communal 
issues (Deroń 2001).
In general, in spite of isolated insolvency cases, local governments are considered 
by most banks to be among the most attractive and desired clients. Sometimes their ap-
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proach is even too liberal—they assume there will be state support in case of diﬃ  culties 
in debt service, so they apply less demanding criteria than they do with private investors. 
Th is may contribute to the crowding out of private investments.
 
2.2.5   Arrears in Payments
Th is area is often in the shadows, since hardly any precise data is available even on the 
local level. It is not diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd municipalities in Ukraine or other former Soviet 
Republics in which data on arrears are not closely monitored by the local executive 
board, which does not have exact and up-to-date information from municipal utility 
enterprises or individual departments in the city administration. Nevertheless, we know 
that in some countries this is a very signiﬁ cant (sometimes most signiﬁ cant) type of local 
debt. Among the countries analyzed in this volume, arrears in Russia constitute over 
half of the local accumulated debt, and in Romania the ﬁ gure is also high (although 
we do not have precise data on arrears in “local Romania”). Th is is also a considerable 
problem in some other countries of the region. For example in Bulgaria, Soﬁ a remains 
the only local government without payment arrears (Swianiewicz 2002). In Ukraine 
local government arrears peaked at 6.4% of GDP at the end of 1998, and were reduced 
to “only” 0.8% of GDP at the end of 2001. In other countries such as Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Estonia, the phenomenon is much less important, although 
sometimes not totally unimportant. Our research team has calculated that in Slovakia 
local government arrears are equal to almost one-quarter of the total debt. Th ere are 
also signiﬁ cant arrears in some Estonian cities. In 1999 in the city of Tőrva, of the 4 
million Estonian crown debt (over USD 300,000), around 1.4 million was in unpaid 
invoices. As reported in the chapter on Poland, the total of delayed or unpaid invoices 
has recently grown as well, although as a national average it is still around 5% of the 
total debt of local governments, very diﬀ erent from countries in which this category is 
the main component of the debt portfolio. 
2.3 The Role of Borrowing in Financing Local Investments
How important is borrowing as a source of local government investments? Although it 
is next to impossible to give a very precise answer, we have tried to oﬀ er an estimate. Th e 
results are presented in Table 9.4, but we need to stress that some calculations are based 
on simpliﬁ ed assumptions. For example, in Poland we assume that all credits taken in 
2001 for more than one year have been utilized for capital projects.
In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland the role of borrowing has 
risen signiﬁ cantly, to over 40% of the value of total capital spending. Th e proportion 
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in these four countries is now quite similar to numbers identiﬁ ed for several countries 
of Western Europe (compare with Table 1.1). Poland has seen a clear, gradual increase 
throughout the last years, while in the remaining three countries over the same period 
local borrowing has been relatively stable. In Hungary, the role of borrowing is especially 
high in public utility companies (almost 70% of their investment spending, against just 
over 20% in investments ﬁ nanced from local government budgets directly). 
Table 9.4
Th e Structure of Local Investment Financing (2001) [%]
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary* 
(2003)
Poland Slovakia 
Current own revenues 63.4 17 40.8
Sale of property 3 0.6
Central government grants 17.6 12 7.4
Grants from off-budget funds 5.3 2.1
EU and other grants 2.5** 25 5.8
Subsidized loans 1.7 11.2 42 36.4 19
Commercial bank credits 34.6 30
Municipal bonds 10.6 6.9
*      Local governments plus municipal utility companies.
**    Most foreign grants are not visible in Estonian local government budgets and are not included in this 
table.
Th e level of borrowing in Estonia is much lower, at just over 11% of investment 
spending. It is even less signiﬁ cant in Romania and Russia unless we include arrears in 
payments in the calculations, but precise data for that are not available.
For what purposes is borrowed money normally used? We have already said that the 
vast majority is directed at capital investments, but how are these investments structured? 
Is the structure the same as the general structure of all capital projects ﬁ nanced by local 
governments, or are there speciﬁ c diﬀ erences in the use of borrowed resources? 
As the authors have indicated throughout this book, there are usually several national 
programs oﬀ ering grants or subsidized loans for diﬀ erent sectors. It is not surprising, 
however, that commercial credits or bond issues are often directed disproportionately at 
those sectors that are considered important locally, but which  cannot count on extensive 
support from other sources.  In Poland, for example, the sector structure of projects 
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ﬁ nanced through commercial borrowing diﬀ ers substantially from the structure of all 
local capital investments. In particular, road construction and bus/tram purchase projects 
are over-represented as purposes for borrowing, while sectors for which alternative cheap 
means of ﬁ nancing are available (mainly environmental protection—i.e., projects like 
solid waste and waste water treatment, as well as municipal housing) are under-repre-
sented. Similarly, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the availability of cheap loans or 
grants for housing and environmental protection often causes commercial borrowing 
to be targeted at other sectors. In the Czech Republic, of 23 bond issues only six were 
totally or partially targeted for environmental protection or housing projects. 
Characteristically, credits are sometimes taken for projects serving general com-
munity development rather than the narrowly deﬁ ned compulsory functions of local 
government.  Th e development of a cable network in Slovakia, Czech shopping center 
projects and Romanian hotels, tourist development and general upgrading of cities are 
good examples of this phenomenon.
2.4 Local Borrowing Practices
      —Variation among Local Governments 
Th ere is also no uniformity in the pattern of local borrowing within the individual 
countries analyzed. Local governments are highly diversiﬁ ed in their size, aﬄ  uence, 
political colour, etc., and so is their approach to using credit instruments. 
Th e ﬁ rst striking similarity is that in several countries borrowing is mostly the busi-
ness of large local authorities. It is not particularly surprising that extremely small Czech, 
Slovak or Hungarian villages are not very active in this ﬁ eld, but the domination of the 
biggest cities on the capital market is sometimes surprising.
In the Czech Republic half of the total local debt is in the four largest cities (Praha, 
Brno, Ostrava and Pilsen). It is still the highest if we calculate the debt per capita (in 
general the index is signiﬁ cantly, positively correlated with the size of municipality). At 
the same time, these four cities contain less than 20% of the Czech population. 
Th e concentration is perhaps even larger in Slovakia, where two-thirds of the debt is 
in the three largest cities (Bratislava, Košice and Banská Bistrica). In local governments 
with populations below 3,000 the average debt per capita is SKK 668 (about USD15); 
in local governments over 3,000 it is more than ﬁ ve times larger (SKK 3,681 or almost 
USD 80). At the same time (2000) in Bratislava it was SKK 11,400 (USD 240) per 
capita, and in Košice or Banská Bistrica, over SKK 8,000 (USD 180) per capita. 
A similar but not as strong a relation between size and borrowing is observed in 
Hungary. Small villages usually do not enter the borrowing market—they are too small 
to have suﬃ  cient creditworthiness, they lack the capacity to manage credits, and their 
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demand is too small to be proﬁ table for ﬁ nancial institutions. Larger cities, county 
seats and especially Budapest, are the most active on the credit instruments market. In 
2002 the approximate outstanding debt per capita was around USD 20 in Hungarian 
villages, USD 25 in small towns, USD 50 in county seats and around USD 120 in 
Budapest. But because rural budgets are also very low, the ratio of accumulated debt to 
annual budget revenues is higher than in small towns (4.5% and 3.9% respectively in 
2002). In 2002 the average debt in county seats was 6.9% of annual budget revenues, 
while in Budapest it was over 10%.  
Poland is not diﬀ erent in this respect. In 2001 borrowing covered about 59% 
of investment expenditures in cities with county status, but less than 35% in other 
municipal governments. Th e diﬀ erence was even larger in bond issues, which covered 
almost 13% of the investment spending of big cities, but just over 3% in the remaining 
municipalities. In 2001 two-thirds of rural governments took credits (either commer-
cial or preferential), compared to 95% of cities with county status. In December 2001 
accumulated debt was lower than 0.5% of budget revenues in 12% of rural govern-
ments, 4% of small towns, but in none of the mid-size or big cities. Th e average per 
capita debt in local governments with populations below 10,000 was around USD 45 
by the end of 2001, while in cities of 50,000–100,000 it was around USD 70 and in 
cities over 100,000 around USD 95.  
Similar observations can be made about Romania. According to the country report 
(Chapter 7) none of the rural communes, around 3% of small towns and almost 40% 
of larger cities (called “municipalities”) have ever issued bonds or borrowed money 
from a bank.
In Russia, as mentioned above, the borrowing market is dominated by the two 
largest cities— Moscow and St Petersburg.
Estonia is a slightly diﬀ erent case. Th e basic diﬀ erence between small and big local 
governments is the high proportion of central government grants in the former group 
and the much smaller share of such grants in bigger cities. In 2002 state grants provided 
altogether 49% of investment spending in rural governments with fewer than 1,500 
citizens. At the same time in towns over 10,000 the proportion was below 25%. On 
the other side of the same coin, bigger local governments rely on their own operational 
surplus to much larger extent. But diﬀ erences between small and big municipalities in 
the use of credit instruments are almost non-existent. More than 90% of governments 
borrowed money in 2001, regardless of which source cohort we consider, and the pro-
portion of borrowed funds in ﬁ nancing investment spending has been similar as well. 
Table 9.5 summarizes the relationship between the size of local government and 
per capita indebtedness. 
But the observation that big cities use credits more often in the analyzed countries 
does not mean that larger governments are more vulnerable to problems related to 
excessive indebtedness. It is true that debt-service problems were noticed in Košice and 
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Banská Bistrica—two of the largest Slovak cities. But usually big cities have higher ﬁ s-
cal capacity and the problems are more typical of small governments. According to the 
Czech report, in 2000 as many as 27% of municipalities were not indebted at all (small 
villages dominated in this group). At the same time around 3% were indebted at the 
risk level.  Among the smallest villages (fewer than 1,500 inhabitants) the proportion of 
risky indebtedness was similar to the national average. On the other hand only one of 
64 cities was in this sort of troublesome situation. Th e proportion of risk-indebtedness 
was the highest among municipalities with populations of 50,000-20,000 (almost 10% 
of governments are within this size cohort). Th ese mid-size local governments are big 
enough to use debt instruments, but not big enough to have a strong economic base, 
nor suﬃ  cient skills to manage the debt. 
Table 9.5
Debt Per Capita and Size of Municipal Government (2001) [in approx. USD] 
Population Czech Republic Hungary* Poland Slovakia
Up to 5,000 70 18 45 15
5,000–10,000 95 25 45 80
10,000–50,000 70 55
50,000–100,000 60 45 70
Over 100,000 305 110 95 220
*      For Hungary data are based on the following categories: rural governments, small towns, county 
capitals and Budapest. For comparison reasons, these four categories have been approximated to 
population-size groups.
In Poland, as well, cases of excessive indebtedness (larger than the legal limit of 
60% of local revenues) have occurred only among small towns and rural governments, 
although the average level of indebtedness is higher among big local governments. 
Popular opinion holds that it is often poverty that pushes local governments to 
borrow money. Th ey do not have suﬃ  cient resources, so they take credits to cover 
their costs. But this simple explanation does not ﬁ nd conﬁ rmation in empirical data. 
In Poland the debt of local governments with revenues per capita higher than 125% of 
the national average is more than twice as big as those with revenues lower than 80% 
of the national average. Th e high indebtedness of big cities in the Czech Republic or 
Slovakia is also a conﬁ rmation of the above-average credit activity of the most aﬄ  uent 
local governments. Th e Romanian report also calls attention to the fact that relatively 
well-oﬀ  local governments are more active on the borrowing market.
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Th ere are at least two explanations for this. First, more aﬄ  uent municipalities have 
a better chance to successfully apply for credit at a bank. Second— and perhaps more 
important—taking loans is more often related to the existence of a long-term invest-
ment strategy than to the necessity to close the “budget gap.”
3.   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL LESSONS 
In the ﬁ rst chapter of the book, several theoretical arguments were presented for the 
advantage of using credit instruments to ﬁ nance local investment spending. But which 
of these arguments is considered the most important in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe? Th e answer to this question is not obvious. When asked why they 
borrow money, most local oﬃ  cials or administrators give a very simple but not very 
helpful answer: “Because our own resources are too scarce to ﬁ nance all the necessary 
investment projects.” Th e next question, logically, is: “Why do you think it is better to 
borrow funds now and then suﬀ er for several years trying to ﬁ nd the resources necessary 
for debt principal and interest service, rather than wait until you are able to collect suf-
ﬁ cient own resources to implement the project on pay-as-you-go basis?”  Th is question 
remains not only unanswered, but usually even unasked. 
Does this mean that all the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter 1 are ir-
relevant in this part of Europe? Quite the opposite—I am convinced that most of them 
are especially valid in this region. But at the same time most of them are neither known 
nor discussed by local politicians. 
Th e inter-generational and geographical equity arguments seem to be especially 
important in young democracies, where citizens are still learning about the relationship 
between contributing to and beneﬁ ting from public budgets. 
Beneﬁ ting from accelerated local development and reducing excessive operational 
costs are both especially relevant in the context of ﬁ lling the gap in long-term delays of 
development programs and dealing with the considerable depreciation of assets inherited 
from the previous system. 
Making the investment cycle shorter appears very relevant when we are reminded of 
the long-lasting, over-scaled and badly-managed investments of the socialist period.
Last but not least, borrowing may well become the linchpin in making use of pre-
accession and structural funds made available by European Union regional policies. 
Th is is especially true of programs such as SAPARD, where it is usually necessary to 
spend the whole required amount ﬁ rst, and then wait for eventual reimbursement of 
the agreed proportion of costs. In some of the analysed countries the same will soon 
apply to access to EU Structural Funds.
We should also remember that in many cases, local governments are responsible 
for the bulk of public investments in their respective countries. All these points support 
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the claim that daring but prudent borrowing policies are not only recommended to local 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe—they are essential.  Th ey also suggest that the 
rationale for using debt instruments has not yet been the subject of suﬃ  cient reﬂ ection 
among local politicians and administrators in the region. 
Table 9.6
Local Government Borrowing—Summary of Regulations and Practice
Regulations Practice
Purpose of 
Borrowing
Limitations 
on Debt 
Dominant Form 
of Borrowing
Local Debt 
as % of 
Local 
Revenues
The Role 
of Debt in 
Financing 
of Local 
Investments
Russia capital spending moderate-strict arrears, 
intergovernmental 
loans
around 4 <10%
Romania capital spending moderate-strict arrears around 2 <10% 
Estonia capital spending moderate-strict bank credits, bonds almost 20 around 12%
Slovakia capital spending liberal bank credits almost 40 > 40%
Czech Rep. any liberal bank credits around 30 > 40%
Hungary any moderate-strict bank credits around 6 > 40%
Poland any strict bank credits around 15 > 40%
A summary of regulations and practice in local borrowing is brieﬂ y summarized 
in Table 9.6. We can see that the position of individual countries is highly diversiﬁ ed, 
but bank credits and bond issues have gradually became a signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial resource 
for development projects in several countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia). In some other countries (Russia, Romania, and to a much lesser extent 
Estonia), borrowing has remained a marginal source of resources, used by innovators 
rather than by typical local governments. In spite of the initial boom for bonds (in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Estonia) and in spite of external conditions for bond is-
sues being sometimes more favourable (Poland), bank credits have remained the main 
source of capital. Th is puts Central and East European countries closer to the European 
than the American model of ﬁ nancing for local investments. Also, in spite of several 
discussions on the issue, most lending is oﬀ ered by “general purpose” banks rather than 
by special institutions established to ﬁ nance local government projects. Th e degree of 
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competition among banks varies from one country to another, but usually one or two 
banks have a dominant position on the market.
What practical recommendations ﬂ ow from the analysis presented in this volume? 
Th ey may be summarized as follows:
      •     First of all it must be repeated that there are several sound arguments for the wider 
use of borrowing to ﬁ nance local government investments. And in countries where 
this method has not yet become popular, the case for investigating this option more 
thoroughly is especially strong. Arguments supporting this claim are introduced 
at the beginning of the current section. In addition, however, there are practical 
manuals available in most countries (often prepared in conjunction with foreign 
donor programs, especially those sponsored by USAID or the World Bank) that 
provide guidance on how to calculate a safe level of debt, and how to initiate 
investment programs utilizing credit instruments in a way that avoids the trap 
of excessive indebtedness. 
      •     One may discuss to what extent local government borrowing should be super-
vised, but there is no doubt it should be monitored. It requires complete, precise 
and up-to-date information both on the aggregate size and structure of local 
indebtedness and on the position of individual municipalities. In practice, 
however, we have experienced enormous problems in obtaining comparable 
data. Th e diﬃ  culty concerns not only comparisons between countries, but even 
the availability of reliable information within individual countries. In Romania, 
Russia or even in Estonia certain important information is missing in oﬃ  cial 
statistics. In Russia, data on arrears in payments is not counted as part of the 
debt, which makes information on local debt incomplete and often misleading. 
Similarly, the authors of the Slovak report discovered that oﬃ  cial reports do not 
include all sources of debt and they needed to make a special eﬀ ort to estimate 
(for example) the amount in unpaid invoices and other parts of debt that are 
normally “invisible.” In Poland and Hungary, oﬃ  cial data on local debt do not 
include the borrowing of local utility companies, for which local governments 
act as an explicit or implicit guarantor. In Hungary in 1997, utility companies 
spent 1.5% of GDP on investments (about three-quarters of what local govern-
ments budget themselves). In recent years the balance has been even more in 
favor of utility investments. In Poland such precise estimations are not possible 
at all. In both cases utility companies’ debt does not count against the limit 
of local government debt or debt service. Improving the information base is 
necessary to properly assess and monitor both the macro- and microeconomic 
consequences of taking loans by local governments.
      •     Another issue closely related to the availability of information is transparency 
and public access to data on local borrowing. Public ﬁ nance is public, so it cannot 
be conﬁ dential. Th is means that information on city borrowing policies and 
practices should be available to the general public. It is not always the case. In 
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some countries the access to information on local borrowing is strictly limited 
(see, for example, the Russian report).
      •     In discussing the development of local borrowing one cannot ignore the wider 
context—the stability of public ﬁ nance, the predictability of local revenues, the 
condition of the banking system, etc. In particular, the health of the local ﬁ nancial 
system is a precondition of  special importance. Opposite to what might be 
expected, the development of a local capital market does not depend mainly on 
how severe the legal regulations on borrowing are. Poland is one of the countries 
with the strictest regulations, but also with the most developed and relatively 
healthy local government operation on a credit market. It is also very telling that 
Polish municipalities are both more courageous and more prudent in their loan 
policies than county or regional governments. Th is may be directly related to the 
system of local revenues, which is relatively autonomous, with room for local 
discretion in the case of municipalities, and with less stable revenues strongly 
dominated by state grants in the case of counties or regions;
      •     Even in unitary states (all of the countries analyzed in this volume except for 
the Russian Federation) local governments should have a considerable amount of 
ﬁ scal autonomy and their borrowing policies should not be subordinated to the debt 
incurred by the central government. Such a danger is now very real in Poland, 
where the total public debt is noticeably close to the constitutional limit of 
60% of GDP, but with a very modest contribution of local governments to 
this problem. But because the limit is not divided in any way among tiers of 
government, local government borrowing power may soon be seriously limited 
because of the central budget debt made to cover social expenses. It is true that 
such a separation of debt limits is not common in European countries either 
at the moment—it has been discussed in Germany, but not introduced in the 
end. Nevertheless, it is still worth discussing in Poland, which has a constitu-
tional limit on the public debt, as well as in other countries in which borrowing 
regulations are included in “regular” laws. 
      •     Th ere is one more important precondition for the local borrowing market that is 
related to ﬁ scal autonomy—namely, control of local government over its revenues. 
If local budgets are dominated by conditional grants (as, for example, regions 
or counties in Poland) or by other revenues that the local council has no discre-
tion to inﬂ uence (as for example in the Czech Republic) then development of 
rational borrowing policies is much more diﬃ  cult.
      •     Th e development of a healthy local borrowing market also requires the liquida-
tion of substantial arrears in payments, such as those now existing in Romania, 
Russia or several other countries not analyzed in this volume (e.g., Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, etc.). Although our discussion on arrears focused on local borrowing 
because in some cases arrears seriously inﬂ uence the real indebtedness level, 
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this is not an acceptable way of ﬁ nancing local investments. Th e precondition 
for eﬀ ectively coping with this problem is usually a general improvement in 
macroeconomic indicators, but also a reform of the way local governments are 
ﬁ nanced. Such reforms should make the allocation of revenues to local govern-
ments more transparent and more predictable, but should also impose “hard 
budget constraints” and support budget discipline. Th is item is another case 
where borrowing cannot be discussed outside of the wider context—which is 
formally beyond the scope of analysis in this volume. 
      •     Another form of local indebtedness that plays an important role in several countries, 
but which we must not recommend, is a system of intergovernmental loans. In several 
countries this turns out to be a way of invisibly subsidizing some local govern-
ments. And even though it is a loan, this form does not promote the eﬀ ective 
use of borrowed resources. Th ere are no elements of market competition for 
resources, and usually no tools that typically support control over the feasibility 
of the ﬁ nanced projects. In turn, intergovernmental loans tend to soften hard 
budget constraint and hamper budget discipline.  
      •     Turning to regulations on local borrowing—these must be predictable, which ﬁ rst of 
all requires stability. Th is is not always the case in the countries analyzed in this 
volume. Th e lengthy sections describing legal changes during the last decade in 
Estonia or the Czech Republic provide good examples of this phenomenon. 
      •     It seems that the “golden rule of the balanced budget” should be applied in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well. Th at means that borrowing for capital spending 
should be allowed or even encouraged, but the use of credit resources to ﬁ nance 
operating expenditures should be strictly prohibited. Perhaps an exception could 
be made for some amount of short-term loans (repaid within the same budget 
year) to ease cash-ﬂ ow problems. Th e “golden rule” is formally followed in some 
but not all of the analyzed countries (e.g., not in Poland or the Czech Republic). 
In practice, borrowing for operating needs is not frequent but it does happen, 
and—as the Polish example of ﬁ nancing the teachers’ salary increase in 2000 
suggests—it may quickly proliferate under unfavourable conditions.
      •     Moreover, as ﬁ scal federalism theory suggests, eﬀ ective implementation of the 
“golden rule” requires a clear separation of capital and operating budgets, which is 
very rare in Central and East European ﬁ nancial regulations. Th e separation of 
capital budgets would not only support monitoring and control of local borrow-
ing, but it would also make investment programs more transparent and easier 
to prepare. Th e last issue, however, goes beyond the scope of analysis presented 
in this volume. 
      •     But when rules regulating local government borrowing are discussed, the ﬁ rst 
precondition is that the rules agreed upon are also really observed in practice. In 
the country reports we ﬁ nd numerous examples of rules which are perhaps ﬁ ne 
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in print, but they are not followed and in practice there are no sanctions for 
ignoring them. Examples are the use of borrowed money for current spending 
in countries where it is forbidden, the surpassing of legal limits of indebtedness 
etc. Th is means an eﬀ ective system of supervision is necessary, and this require-
ment is not at all in contradiction with the recommendation to increase local 
ﬁ scal autonomy. 
      •     Turning to the practice of borrowing on a local level, there is still a demand for 
developing the expertise of the local staﬀ . Eﬀ ective usage of borrowing tools requires 
sophisticated skills that are not everywhere available, especially (but not only) 
in smaller local governments. Obviously training needs diﬀ er from one country 
to another, as well as among individual cities, but access to relevant courses is 
required in each of countries of the region.
      •     In practice most of the local governments are prudent in their borrowing policies, 
but there are some exceptions to this rule (discussed in the country reports) and they 
call for the existence of clear external regulations.  As stated before, such regulations 
should be transparent, stable and non-discriminating. In the country reports 
we ﬁ nd at least three arguments calling for external regulations on borrowing:
            –    In several chapters the authors noted that banks usually see local govern-
ments as “easier” or more reliable customers than private businesses. Th is 
also strengthens the case for external regulation of the market. 
            –    Another argument supporting external regulations arises from observations 
about the electoral cycle in local borrowing. Local governments are especially 
inclined to borrow in the period directly before elections. Th e intention is 
to strengthen the position of the ruling group in the coming election, but 
an additional danger is that service of the new debt too often becomes the 
problem of the new authorities. Elected for a new term,  they had little to do 
with taking the credit. Th e inﬂ uence of the electoral cycle on spending and 
credit-taking has been noticed in Estonia, Hungary and Czech Republic. 
            –    Th ere are examples of local governments whose indebtedness is irrationally 
high and where borrowed funds were misused or mismanaged, although it 
should be stressed these examples are not numerous. It is to be expected that 
the Czech report, written by authors working for SMOR (which represents 
local governments at the national level), calls for administrative control over 
the issuing of bonds. Currently the legal environment for local borrowing 
in the Czech Republic is probably the most deregulated among the analysed 
countries. One may wish to discuss the logic of the Czech authors’ sugges-
tion to increase control over bonds while leaving the bank credits market 
deregulated, but more important is the observation that representatives of 
an association of local governments see important arguments for imposing 
some form of control over local borrowing. 
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NOTES
1     For simplicity I use the term “municipality” to describe all local governments of the 
lowest level, even though in some countries such as Romania this term is reserved 
for a more limited group within the basic tier of local governments. 
2     Reasons for including this issue are explained in the ﬁ nal section of Chapter 1.
3     By annual debt service we mean annual interest plus principal repayment on 
outstanding debt.
4     Strictly speaking, guarantees are taken into account only in some of the analyzed 
countries. But in others (e.g., Poland), formal guarantees granted by local 
governments are treated in the same way as loans taken by the local budget. 
5     See Farber 2002. For more details see Chapter 1. 
6     Th is observation on Poland had been made on the basis of the 1998 local elections. 
However, recent data show that before the 2002 elections, the behaviour of Polish 
local politicians was closer to the classical model—i.e., the borrowing has rapidly 
increased.
7     Data based on a survey conducted for BPH bank by the Gdańsk Institute for Market 
Economics (see Swianiewicz, Dziemianowicz 1999).
8     Actually, Bank Zachodni and WBK as well as BPH and PBK were separate banks 
when the survey was conducted. Th ey merged in 2000, as part of the consolidation 
of the banking system. I present accumulated data for these pairs of banks to show 
that consolidation has not resulted in a dramatic decrease of competition in the 
local government market. 
9     According to Libura (1998), in 1997 in the representative sample of all local 
governments, 46% were keeping main accounts in Cooperative Banks, 9% in 
Bank Zachodni-WBK, 8% in BPH-PBK and 7% in PKO.
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